

technological change is bound to favor the large farmers who are better equipped to understand and take advantage of it. If the flow of research innovations is continuous, the large farmer's advantage may be rendered

permanent. The technical problems raised by the Green Revolution (discussed in an article to appear next week) may in fact demand that farmers master a steady flow of technical solutions. Yet even if socially disrupt-

ive, the Green Revolution does enable more food to be produced, and the problems of abundance are preferable to the problems of scarcity. Progress with disruption is better than no progress at all.—NICHOLAS WADE

Council for a Livable World: Dispute over Campaign Finance Disclosure

The Council for a Livable World (CLW), a group founded by the late Leo Szilard which lobbies for arms control and raises money for sympathetic Senate candidates, is one of the principal parties in a surprising controversy over campaign finance disclosure. At the moment, the controversy consists of a war of words on two fronts. One front is in Washington. There, the CLW, which raised \$336,500 for 17 Senate candidates during 1973 and 1974, is engaged in a dispute with the office of Secretary of the Senate Francis R. Valeo, who is responsible for supervising Senate campaigns for compliance with the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The CLW is taking issue with a determination by Valeo's office in October that called for some preelection disclosures not previously required.

The other front is in North Dakota, where, at this writing, the race between Senator Milton Young, the Republican incumbent, and William Guy, a former Democratic governor, is still undecided pending a recount (Young had a 177-vote edge on the initial count). In the last month of the campaign, Guy found himself under heavy attack for having accepted a total of over \$27,000 in checks from some 2000 CLW supporters without disclosing from the outset the council's role in soliciting the checks and "bundling" them for delivery. Ironically, one of those raising the issue of disclosure was an independent candidate, James R. Jungroth, a former state chairman of the North Dakota Democratic party who had himself once sought CLW support but failed to get it.

Despite the fact that disclosure of the CLW's intermediary role in fund-raising had not been legally required,

several North Dakota newspapers hit Guy hard on this issue. For instance, the *Fargo Forum*, noting that Guy had pledged not to accept money from "special interest groups," gave him a "high hypocrisy rating."

For his part, Guy, although he had authorized the CLW to solicit funds on his behalf, expressed surprise at the amount of money he received from council supporters. On 22 October, Guy made the following comments to a television interviewer in Bismark, N.D.

When we started our campaign in January we decided we would accept contributions only from individuals. . . . And we also said we would welcome endorsements by responsible groups, but no money. . . . That is, no block grant from any special interest group . . . because then the membership of that special interest organization would be denied the individual choice that I think they should have.

We've followed that policy very closely. . . . In each instance we've said that this endorsement will be accepted *only* if it carries no commitment whatsoever, and no organizational financial support. But if your members want to support us, fine. . . . And this is the way it has worked. I didn't realize that more than 1600 Americans from all over the country would send me money as members of the Council for a Livable World. . . .

The lines were drawn in the Washington controversy when the CLW chose not to follow the determination by Valeo's office on 18 October that it should make public disclosure prior to the November election of the sums raised for Senate candidates. Indeed, council leaders and their attorney, Terry F. Lenzner, formerly assistant chief counsel for the Senate Watergate Investigations Committee, have not even conceded that there has been such a ruling.

They contend that the only thing

the council had received was a "preliminary" interpretation by Valeo's staff of disclosure requirements, and that no binding ruling on disclosure had been issued by the secretary's office—a difficult position to maintain inasmuch as the staff determination was approved by Valeo himself. According to Orlando B. Potter, consultant to the secretary on election campaign matters, "He [Valeo] reacted very emphatically, and said that the council was accountable under the [1971] act and had to make the disclosures we were requiring."

The council has never tried to conceal from the general public the identities of the candidates chosen to benefit from its fund-raising efforts. With mailings to "supporters"—or previous contributors—going out to some 32,500 persons, secretiveness would be impossible even if it were desired. But, as to preelection disclosure of the results of CLW solicitations, the council has left this to the discretion of the candidates themselves.

The president of the CLW, William Von E. Doering, a Harvard chemistry professor, has offered two principal arguments in support of the council's position.

One is that, as a group devoted not merely to fund-raising but also to advising senators on arms control issues through lobbying and seminars, the CLW could be hurt should its support for candidates become an issue in elections. This argument seems curious in light of the fuss that arose in North Dakota not from early disclosure but partly from the absence of it.

The other argument is that disclosure may make trouble for some CLW supporters whose donations are large enough (over \$100) to be reported by name and who live or work in a place where arms control issues happen to be intensely controversial. In states where right-wing political factions tend to be strong, the CLW is often falsely accused of championing "unilateral disarmament." Thus, in Doering's view, mandatory disclosure could constitute an infringement on an in-

dividual's first amendment right to freedom of association.

What Secretary Valeo's office had concluded was that the CLW's method of soliciting and delivering campaign funds fell within the category of "earmarking," as defined in regulations the secretary had issued. The staff had decided that disclosure was required even though the earmarking involved was the reverse of the notorious kind contemplated when the regulations were drafted.

In the classical sense, earmarking refers to a donor's trying to conceal his contribution to a particular candidate by making his check payable to, say, a state or national party organization, yet giving some word or sign that candidate so-and-so is to be the ultimate beneficiary. Although clearly an evasion, such earmarking had not been made subject to disclosure until 1973, after Common Cause had brought a lawsuit against the secretary.

What the CLW was doing for the 1974 campaign year was what it always had done, and quite legally, from the time of its creation by Szilard and other scientists in 1962. The CLW had sent out to its supporters brochures urging that checks be made payable to the campaign committees of certain described candidates believed to share the CLW's belief in an urgent need for arms control agreements. While the checks would not pass through the CLW's bank account, they would all go to the CLW's Washington headquarters to be bundled and sent to the various candidates. To avoid the problem of a Senator Fulbright or some other especially well-known candidate getting a disproportionate share of the donations, the CLW has used a simple formula which its supporters are said to have accepted to a remarkable degree. Supporters whose names begin with the letters A through F might be asked to make out their checks to one candidate, while those whose names fall within subsequent alphabetical sequences are asked to donate to other candidates.

The CLW has coupled this method of fund-raising with an astute policy of supporting promising candidates chiefly in small-population states where campaign budgets are modest and a \$30,000 contribution goes a long way. As a result, the council's presence on the political scene, and perhaps its influence in the Senate, is greater than its relatively small resources would suggest.

Thus, without a requirement for full preelection disclosure of the CLW's

role, thousands of CLW-solicited dollars can come pouring from out of state into campaign treasuries without voters knowing the extent of CLW involvement—although this is not to say that candidates generally have tried to keep the council's part in their fund-raising a secret. Donations of \$100 or more are reported by name,* but such limited disclosure may give no hint of the donors' motivation. Donations of less than \$100 need not be disclosed at all, yet such contributions account for the greater part of the money the CLW raises. In postelection reports sent to its supporters and made readily available to the press, the CLW states precisely how much money was raised and delivered to specific candidates. But postelection disclosure certainly is not the same as preelection disclosure.

Common Cause favors Disclosure

Indeed, given the letter and spirit of the election campaign laws, the disclosure question raised in the CLW case is likely to appear open and shut to most people concerned with campaign finance reform. The attitude of Common Cause, the reform group that first raised the earmarking issue, is clearly relevant here. Although unwilling to comment specifically on the CLW dispute, Fred M. Wertheimer, legislative director at Common Cause, told *Science*: "We believe that the disclosure laws mean that where a group plays a role in raising money and delivering it to the candidate, that involvement should be disclosed."

After receiving the 18 October notice from Valeo's office that disclosure was required, the CLW responded with a letter—delivered late the eve of the November election—asking the secretary for a hearing. It is possible that this hearing will be held before the secretary's duties with respect to campaign finance are assumed sometime early next year by a new Federal Elections Commission to be established under recently enacted amendments to the 1971 act. These same amendments explicitly require an intermediary group to report the source and intended recipient of any contribution "directed through" it. So, now, the CLW is likely to find its position even harder to sustain.

The CLW's most realistic alternatives

* Unsure whether the law requires disclosure of donations of \$100 as well as those of \$101 and up, the CLW has been reporting the former as well as the latter. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 says that donations "in excess of \$100" are subject to disclosure.

would seem to be (i) to accommodate to the new disclosure requirements and continue, as best it can, its present method of fund-raising or (ii) to abandon the present method and go to a system of having the CLW donate money to candidates in the name of the council itself, which even in the past it has done to a limited extent. Given this latter method, donations of more than \$100 made to the council by its supporters would still be subject to public disclosure, but, for whatever advantage it might be to them, the individual donors would at least know that they would not be identified directly with specific candidates. Donations made directly by the council to a candidate running in either a primary or general election would be subject to the \$5000 limitation established by the recent campaign act amendments. Most issue-oriented political groups apparently will continue supporting candidates in this manner.

The CLW can elect to pursue a third—but uncertain—alternative if the determination by Valeo's office on disclosure cannot be changed administratively. It can go to court and challenge the ruling's constitutionality under the first amendment. Serious constitutional questions about the 1971 act's disclosure provisions have in fact already been raised by the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of the Socialist Workers Party. The Socialist Workers may indeed be able to show that disclosure would expose its members or supporters to various forms of political, economic, and social harassment. Yet, even so, in the only court ruling thus far in this case, a federal district judge has held that no substantial constitutional question has been raised.

At the moment, the CLW leadership—which in a practical sense sometimes seems to consist chiefly of Doering—appears to believe that the council has somehow become a target of malice and discrimination by Secretary Valeo's staff. In a letter to *Science*, Doering has alleged, incorrectly, that this article has been "initiated" by the staff. He also has suggested that the CLW "may be the only organization directed to assume this newly created burden [of disclosure]. . . ."

In fact, all of the information given by the staff to this reporter is said to apply equally to all other groups that solicit donations and bundle them for delivery to candidates. Such groups appear relatively few, but the conser-

vatively oriented Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA) is among them. The ACA responded to the determination by Valeo's office on "bundling" by sending to the secretary's office prior to the election photocopies

of every check, in whatever amount, that it had delivered.

In sum, the CLW, a group which many thoughtful people have admired and supported, now seems about to become further entangled in a poten-

tially damaging controversy over the question of disclosure. To many council supporters, this question may seem to be neither a matter that is vital to council goals nor one that is appropriate to contest.—LUTHER J. CARTER

Academy for Contemporary Problems: Mixed Parentage, Ambitious Aims

Columbus, Ohio. The Academy for Contemporary Problems might be described as an institution established to attack the problems whose time had come in the 1960's with strategies devised to work in the 1970's. The academy is a joint venture of Ohio State University (OSU) and Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI) created on the premise that the new organization could do things that could not be done by either of the parent institutions—each the largest of its breed—or by other existing organizations.

The academy was conceived in the social climate of the late 1960's, when the "relevance" of the university was being sharply questioned and when research organizations like Battelle were under fire for putting science and technology to inhumane or at last amoral uses. At the same time, there was an awareness among leaders of OSU and Battelle that knowledge that could be useful in dealing with the problems of society was not being applied at the community level.

In the broadest sense, the academy was intended to act as a technology transfer organization to benefit society. The purposes of the academy stated in the formal agreement signed in May 1971 by Sherwood L. Fawcett, president of Battelle, and Novice G. Fawcett, then president of OSU, were very general* as is often the case in such documents. But the clear implication of the Battelle-OSU initiative is that other organizations dealing with problems of society have been failures, to one degree or another, in getting new ideas implemented. The corollary is that the academy is asking to be judged by the extent to which it succeeds. This,

some may feel, means that the academy has a congenital case of institutional hubris.

Taxonomically, the academy is not just a smaller version of think tanks such as the Rand Corporation or the Stanford Research Institute. Nor is it very similar to the centers for advanced study that have grown up inside and outside universities or to the urban studies centers which burgeoned on poverty-program money and now, in many cases, have withered. It has elements of all these but does not really fit into any of the available institutional pigeonholes.

In the most practical sense, what sets the academy apart is that it does not depend on contract research to pay its way. The agreement between Battelle and OSU says that the parent institutions shall go halves in providing a minimum \$1 million a year operating budget for 10 years. Because inflation has escalated costs, Battelle has upped its contribution to \$1 million, so that the academy budget for 1974 is \$1.5 million.

In addition to its commitment to a decade of support, Battelle also gave, as part of the dowry, the academy's brand new \$2 million facilities. These consist of a main building housing offices for researchers and administrative staff

and space for meetings. There is also a separate lodge with two apartments for longer-term visitors and 15 rooms.

The academy buildings have style. The main building's ground floor has a flexible layout which accommodates small groups very comfortably. And the architects have managed an exterior which doesn't obtrude excessively on a neighborhood of middle-aged brick and frame houses.

But there are some drawbacks. The offices for academy fellows and their associates are, by design, clustered on the second and third floors in a way that puts teams together. But the result is that groups are cloistered as well as clustered.

The place has more than a touch of class. The lodge, for example, is furnished in a fashion several notches above motel modern, with designer chairs and details to match. It is all very comfortable and durable and in the affluent 1960's would probably not have caused comment. Now the elegant angular architecture of the buildings and the tasteful interiors seem to strike some staff members as an inappropriate setting for an effort to deal with certain of the grittier issues facing society.

The academy's ambiance and its freedom from dependence on contract research are enviable assets—and they are envied. Unquestionably, the academy is resented by some people in both parent organizations, and this resentment has been sharpened by current economic pressures. The university has avoided using state funds for its contribution to the academy and has consequently drawn on development funds provided mainly from private gifts and endowment income. The demands on development funds are heavy these days, and the commitment of funds to the academy is noted. Battelle has always used a portion of fees and investment income to sponsor research programs of its own, but there is a tradition at BMI of "covering your charge number," that is, of generating revenue to defray the cost of one's work. Particularly at a time of financial stringency, this causes some hostility toward

* The section on purposes is as follows: "The purposes of The Academy shall be: (a) to encourage a combination of advanced study, education, and the development of strategies for problem solving on topics relevant to contemporary challenges of man; (b) to promote provocative and mutually beneficial communication of information between members of The Academy and the leadership of the community regarding important public problems; (c) to serve mankind through the application of knowledge and provide advanced training and public service."