

same collectivity of others, but as long as the variance among individual conceptions of the generalized other does not interfere with the ability of the several individuals to accomplish their purposes with and through one another, they have the sense of sharing a common set of understandings, a common set of standards and mutual expectations—that something anthropologists call a culture.

A theory of culture must concern itself with the conditions and processes that affect the degree of variance among these individual conceptions. These conditions and processes include, for example, the contexts and rates of social interaction; the selective process in cognitive learning of hypothesis formation, testing, and reformation; the selective process in conditioning and associational learning through which people attach value to things and are positively and negatively reinforced; and those things, whatever they are, that affect people's commitment to caring about the expectations of their fellows at all.

Having attributed standards to a generalized other and having used them as guides for his own behavior in dealing with others—as presumably representing their expectations of him—a person inevitably perceives these standards to be a property of the group of others and to be shared by its members collectively. For him those standards are the group's culture, although he in fact created them in the course of his own learning. Crucial, of course, are the selective processes mentioned above. If they did not continually operate to keep within workable bounds the variance in these individual conceptions of the generalized other, no practically useful conceptions of a generalized other—of a group's culture—could be developed. The narrower the range of variance in the individual conceptions adults have of their group's culture, the easier it is for newcomers to the group, be they children or visiting anthropologists, to create workable conceptions of their own of that group's culture. It goes without saying that social interaction, which Geertz so emphasizes, is essential for the operation of these selective processes.

Missing from Geertz's theoretical discussion is attention to how the idea of the generalized other can help resolve the paradox his own formulation presents. That ideal forms can be and are successfully treated as if they had some

kind of extrasomatic or public existence is, of course, enormously consequential for human existence. It is with the consequences of this fact that cultural and social anthropologists, in their respective ways, have been largely concerned. Geertz's "thick description" provides an outstanding example of insightful and rich handling of these consequences. His work contributes greatly to our thinking *about* culture, but it falls short of providing a theory *of* culture.

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A Survey of Guiding Principles

The Nature of Human Values. MILTON ROKEACH. Free Press (Collier Macmillan), New York, 1973. x, 438 pp. \$13.95.

All of us have values. They guide our choices, help us to select our mates, candidates, careers, and research commitments. Our values cause us to act as we do. Not so! says a prevalent view among social scientists. Values are an epiphenomenon, a by-product of action. People infer their values and attitudes from their behavior and modify them to fit that behavior. They verbalize values to justify action; but values have no causal impact.

In their zeal to be scientific, behavioral scientists shied away from values for many decades. Values were too subjective, unnecessary hypothetical variables. Uses of values to characterize cultures or subgroups could be dismissed as "mere description." With the increasing popularity of cognitive theories in psychology, however, values are becoming respectable again. This eminently readable volume should speed the process. It argues strongly for the importance of values as indicators of social position and experience and as determinants of attitudes and behavior.

Values have been viewed by theorists either as criteria of judgment or as properties of objects. Rokeach adopts the former view, characteristic of those who consider the intervention of valuing processes between stimulus and response to be an important aspect of human distinctiveness. He defines a value conceptually as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct [instrumental value] or end-state of existence [terminal value] is personally or socially preferable" to its opposite or converse. A value system is an enduring

organization of values along a continuum of relative importance.

These definitions are operationalized by having respondents rank an alphabetically ordered list of 18 terminal values (for example, a world at peace, pleasure) and then 18 instrumental values (for example, ambitious, logical) "in order of importance . . . as guiding principles in *your* life." The briefly described procedures for selecting these values may be insufficiently rigorous to justify Rokeach's assumption that the lists are fairly exhaustive of the discrete values people in all cultures possess. This is regrettable, because the meaning of comparisons between groups depends on this assumption. Only if the lists are exhaustive can one assert confidently that a particular value is more or less important for one group than for another. Otherwise the ranks signify the relative importance of values within each group. They do not convey or permit comparisons of the absolute importance of a value.

With this reservation stated, consider a small sampling from the mine of value profiles and comparisons awaiting readers of this book. Data are from a national sample of American adults in 1968 and from numerous special samples. Respondents completed the Value Survey quickly (in 10 to 20 minutes), and considered it thought-provoking and no invasion of privacy.

Males and females agreed in ranking *a world at peace*, *family security*, and *freedom* as most important, but males tended to rank *a comfortable life* substantially higher and *salvation* lower than females. The poor and uneducated ranked *clean* and *a comfortable life* higher and *logical* and *a sense of accomplishment* lower than the affluent and highly educated. Whites differed from blacks most clearly in caring less for *equality*. Value differences appeared throughout the life cycle, from 11 years to over 70. *Wisdom*, for example, was ranked highest in the college years, being lower in relative importance for both older and younger groups.

A sample of U.S. students was more oriented toward materialistic achievement but less hedonistic and less concerned with equality than samples of Australian, Canadian, and Israeli students. A sample of policemen ranked *freedom* and *equality* lower and *pleasure*, *obedience*, and *self-control* higher than did matched adults. Regardless of field, academicians valued social and

intellectual stimulation and achievement more highly than other educated Americans, but ranked religious and self-restrictive values lower. Among scientists, biologists cared relatively more for *national security* and less for being *broad-minded*, physical scientists less for being *self-controlled*.

The many observed differences provide provocative cues for future theorizing. Rokeach offers plausible interpretations for some, and also suggests that value profiles indicate the quality of life a group enjoys—people concerned with self-actualizing as against adjustive values (for example, *a sense of accomplishment* versus *a comfortable life*) being better off. Although the functions and meanings of values are discussed, it is not completely clear what the ranking process means to the individual. I infer that high ranks reflect the current active strivings of a person after a value, while low ranks may reflect unimportance, undesirability, or something else.

Rokeach holds that both attitudes and behavior express subsets of values, though our understanding is still inadequate to specify in advance the values underlying most responses. He presents value profiles associated with racist and civil rights attitudes, protest behavior, political preferences and activism, hippie and homosexual lifestyles, religious involvement, and so on. Most thoroughly and convincingly developed is a model of the left-right continuum of political ideology as depending on the relative importance of two values, *equality* and *freedom*.

Persuasion research in social psychology has tended at best to achieve short-term changes in attitudes and in unimportant behaviors. Rokeach's experimental demonstration of long-term changes in significant cognitions and behaviors is therefore most unusual and striking. His key theoretical premise is that self-dissatisfaction is aroused when a person becomes aware of contradictions between his self-conceptions on the one hand and his values, attitudes, or behaviors on the other. This leads to change in the latter. In the basic experimental paradigm, a subject ranks his own values, receives information about and an interpretation of particular value rankings by a significant group of others, and compares his own rankings with theirs. Following the typical half-hour experiment there occurs, sequentially, a reorganiza-

tion of values toward consistency with preferred self-conceptions, a shift in related attitudes, and, last, a change in behavior. Modifications of attitudes or behavior that are not grounded in value reorganization are bound to erode.

In several studies university-student subjects ranked their own values. Experimental subjects, but not controls, were informed that students who tend to be against civil rights rank *freedom* far higher than *equality*, while those who favor civil rights rank both these values very high. (A better design would have exposed controls to irrelevant information about others' values.) Differences observed 3, 15, and even 21 months later suggest real changes, not mere responsiveness to experimenter demands. Compared to controls, experimental subjects increased their rankings of *freedom* and *equality* more, responded more favorably to NAACP solicitations, registered more in ethnic core courses, switched more from natural-science to social-science or education majors, and engaged in more direct eye-contact during interaction with blacks. Behavior has been modified by information about other values as well. Smoking was reduced by exposure to an interpretation of the information that smokers rank *broad-minded* substantially higher than *self-controlled* while nonsmokers reverse this order.

An effective method of behavior change with obvious application for educational, therapeutic, commercial, and political purposes can be dangerous. Rokeach himself has consulted ethics committees and has been guided by a commitment to using truthful feedback about values exclusively. On the basis of his theory, he speculates that change may occur only in directions that produce a more moral or competent self-conception. Dare we perform the experiments to test this speculation?

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