pretation of material from a surface survey, has done a good job of making explicit his procedures and assumptions with respect to both the mapping and the interpretation of what was mapped. Beyond this, he has furnished a useful summary of what the survey work seems to indicate about Teotihuacán as a functioning urban settlement. More on this, though, will come in future volumes. Through it all, Millon shows a refreshing openness of mind and respect for evidence, as opposed to facile commitment to a particular theoretical viewpoint.

In short, the Teotihuacán Map sets a high standard for archeological survey work and for archeological reporting. This is not New Archeology or Old Archeology, just Good Archeology. The map and text are indispensable for anyone seriously interested in ancient urban societies. Both the author and the publisher are to be congratulated for a job well done.

WILLIAM A. HAVILAND
Department of Anthropology, University of Vermont, Burlington

On Cultural Theory

The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays. CLIFFORD GEERTZ. Basic Books, New York, 1973. x, 470 pp. $15.

This volume of essays represents Geertz's more important shorter writings in social and cultural anthropology. They are arranged in five parts.

Part 1, previously unpublished and entitled "Thick description: toward an interpretative theory of culture," serves as an introduction, setting forth Geertz's conception of what cultural description in ethnography is properly all about: looking at "the symbolic dimension of social action—art, religion, ideology, science, law, morality, common sense" (p. 30). The object is "not to turn from the existential dilemmas of life [but] to plunge into the midst of them . . . not to answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers that others . . . have given, and thus to include them in the consultative record of what man has said" (p. 30). Geertz has a well-earned reputation for his rich and perceptive descriptions and interpretations of institutions in the societies he has studied. The opening essay expresses what he perceives to be involved in giving such descriptions.

The remaining essays have all been published before. Part 2 contains two general pieces, "The impact of the concept of culture on the concept of man" and "The growth of culture and the evolution of mind." Four essays on religion, including his influential "Religion as a cultural system," make up part 3. Part 4 consists of five essays dealing with the sociological study of ideology, especially in relation to the newly emerged states; and part 5 consists of three essays, a penetrating critique of the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss and two masterpieces, "Person, time, and conduct in Bali" and "Deep play: notes on the Balinese cockfight," that exemplify what Geertz's opening essay says ethnographic description should aim to do.

Since Geertz makes his contribution to cultural theory the *raison d'être* of the book, his view of culture invites our attention in this review.

The basic content of culture, he repeatedly says, is made up of symbols and their meanings. "Significant symbols" (a concept Geertz takes from G. H. Mead) and their meanings, being created and maintained in the course of social interaction, are public. Geertz criticizes this reviewer specifically for locating culture in people's "heads," where significant symbols would be private, presumably inaccessible to others, and hence nonsignificant. Yet the symbols and meanings comprising culture are learned through human cognitive processes, and Geertz's view of culture entails a paradox: symbols and their meanings are social and public and at the same time learned by processes that, however much stimulated socially, are intrasomatic and incapable of being observed directly. The resolution of this paradox is the crux of the problem of cultural theory. In stressing social exchanges, Geertz rivets attention on one of the relevant arenas—the one in which people manifest themselves to one another through symbolically governed behavior and make it possible for each to go to work cognitively on what the others have thus manifested. But that is where he leaves it. He seems not to see the paradox.

Culture thus remains in Geertz's analysis uncomfortably close to Durkheim's "collective representations." There is, Geertz says, a "control mechanism," which is a kind of "template" or "program," and it is public and a property of society, not of any individual (pp. 44–45). Individuals learn it, never quite perfectly, and contribute by undescribed processes to its gradual modification, but the individuals come and go while the template, however modified, goes on. Culture thus becomes a system of Platonic ideals that exists in society as a kind of collective mind rather than in people. It is imperfectly represented in the knowledge of each individual and even more imperfectly in his behavior, as he manipulates the symbols and what he understands to be the expectations of others regarding them in the pursuit of his own particular interests. "Thick description" allows us to appreciate the art and rhetoric, the varying skill and tactical creativity, of the individual actors in their various manipulations. Through the metaphor of thick description, Geertz seeks to give conceptual form to his major interest as an ethnographer: to describe not just the "grammar" or "structure" but the "rhetoric" of life, not just the rules of the game but the many, often conflicting purposes people hope to realize by playing the game and the strategies and tactics (including cheating) by which they try to realize them.

For Geertz's purposes it has not seriously mattered that culture be left where he leaves it. For many purposes it is sufficient to treat culture as a set of ideal forms—a "template"—that informs and guides the transactions in a social network and makes those transactions meaningful not only to the participants but also to outsiders who, like anthropologists, "learn" those same ideal forms. But for a theory of culture we must return to the other part of the paradox and ask how ideal forms can come to be the property of a collectivity when, as products of human cognition, they are created by every individual out of his own sensations and hence presumably are never exactly the same from individual to individual.

Most germane to this problem is another of G. H. Mead's powerful concepts, one that Geertz does not cite, although he criticizes his fellow anthropologists for failing to take account of Mead's work. It is the concept of the "generalized other."

Social learning includes each individual's arriving at a set of cognitive discriminations and expectations (meanings) associated with them—a set of standards for discriminating and interpreting—that he attributes generally to others in order to predict and interpret their behavior. These attributions do not perfectly coincide with the attributions each of the others makes to the

same collectivity of others, but as long as the variance among individual conceptions of the generalized other does not interfere with the ability of the several individuals to accomplish their purposes with and through one another, they have the sense of sharing a common set of understandings, a common set of standards and mutual expectations—that something anthropologists call a culture.

A theory of culture must concern itself with the conditions and processes that affect the degree of variance among these individual conceptions. These conditions and processes include, for example, the contexts and rates of social interaction; the selective process in cognitive learning of hypothesis formation, testing, and reformation; the selective process in conditioning and associational learning through which people attach value to things and are positively and negatively reinforced; and those things, whatever they are, that affect people's commitment to caring about the expectations of their fellows at all.

Having attributed standards to a generalized other and having used them as guides for his own behavior in dealing with others—as presumably representing their expectations of him—a person inevitably perceives these standards to be a property of the group of others and to be shared by its members collectively. For him those standards are the group's culture, although he in fact created them in the course of his own learning. Crucial, of course, are the selective processes mentioned above. If they did not continually operate to keep within workable bounds the variance in these individual conceptions of the generalized other, no practically useful conceptions of a generalized other —of a group's culture—could be developed. The narrower the range of variance in the individual conceptions adults have of their group's culture, the easier it is for newcomers to the group, be they children or visiting anthropologists, to create workable conceptions of their own of that group's culture. It goes without saying that social interaction, which Geertz so emphasizes, is essential for the operation of these selective processes.

Missing from Geertz's theoretical discussion is attention to how the idea of the generalized other can help resolve the paradox his own formulation presents. That ideal forms can be and are successfully treated as if they had some kind of extrasomatic or public existence is, of course, enormously consequential for human existence. It is with the consequences of this fact that cultural and social anthropologists, in their respective ways, have been largely concerned. Geertz's "thick description" provides an outstanding example of insightful and rich handling of these consequences. His work contributes greatly to our thinking *about* culture, but it falls short of providing a theory *of* culture.

WARD H. GOODENOUGH
Department of Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

A Survey of Guiding Principles

The Nature of Human Values. MILTON ROKEACH. Free Press (Collier Macmillan), New York, 1973. x, 438 pp. $13.95.

All of us have values. They guide our choices, help us to select our mates, candidates, careers, and research commitments. Our values cause us to act as we do. Not so! says a prevalent view among social scientists. Values are an epiphenomenon, a by-product of action. People infer their values and attitudes from their behavior and modify them to fit that behavior. They verbalize values to justify action; but values have no causal impact.

In their zeal to be scientific, behavioral scientists shied away from values for many decades. Values were too subjective, unnecessary hypothetical variables. Uses of values to characterize cultures or subgroups could be dismissed as "mere description." With the increasing popularity of cognitive theories in psychology, however, values are becoming respectable again. This eminently readable volume should speed the process. It argues strongly for the importance of values as indicators of social position and experience and as determinants of attitudes and behavior.

Values have been viewed by theorists either as criteria of judgment or as properties of objects. Rokeach adopts the former view, characteristic of those who consider the intervention of valuing processes between stimulus and response to be an important aspect of human distinctiveness. He defines a value conceptually as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct [instrumental value] or end-state of existence [terminal value] is personally or socially preferable" to its opposite or converse. A value system is an enduring organization of values along a continuum of relative importance.

These definitions are operationalized by having respondents rank an alphabetically ordered list of 18 terminal values (for example, a world at peace, pleasure) and then 18 instrumental values (for example, ambitious, logical) "in order of importance . . . as guiding principles in *your* life." The briefly described procedures for selecting these values may be insufficiently rigorous to justify Rokeach's assumption that the lists are fairly exhaustive of the discrete values people in all cultures possess. This is regrettable, because the meaning of comparisons between groups depends on this assumption. Only if the lists are exhaustive can one assert confidently that a particular value is more or less important for one group than for another. Otherwise the ranks signify the relative importance of values within each group. They do not convey or permit comparisons of the absolute importance of a value.

With this reservation stated, consider a small sampling from the mine of value profiles and comparisons awaiting readers of this book. Data are from a national sample of American adults in 1968 and from numerous special samples. Respondents completed the Value Survey quickly (in 10 to 20 minutes), and considered it thought-provoking and no invasion of privacy.

Males and females agreed in ranking *a world at peace, family security*, and *freedom* as most important, but males tended to rank *a comfortable life* substantially higher and *salvation* lower than females. The poor and uneducated ranked *clean* and *a comfortable life* higher and *logical* and *a sense of accomplishment* lower than the affluent and highly educated. Whites differed from blacks most clearly in caring less for *equality*. Value differences appeared throughout the life cycle, from 11 years to over 70. *Wisdom*, for example, was ranked highest in the college years, being lower in relative importance for both older and younger groups.

A sample of U.S. students was more oriented toward materialistic achievement but less hedonistic and less concerned with equality than samples of Australian, Canadian, and Israeli students. A sample of policemen ranked *freedom* and *equality* lower and *pleasure, obedience*, and *self-control* higher than did matched adults. Regardless of field, academicians valued social and