Urban Growth and Decline: San Jose and St. Louis in the 1960's

Common demographic processes have dissimilar effects on populations of growing and declining cities.

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In this article I present an analysis of the sharply contrasting demographic trends in two U.S. metropolitan areas and discuss the implications of these trends for public policy. San Jose, California, exemplifies rapid population growth in the low-density mode typical of the 1950's and 1960's. The city of St. Louis exemplifies central-city population decline within the core jurisdiction of metropolitan St. Louis.

If we studied San Jose and St. Louis as isolated cases and sought to explain their population changes, historically unique processes that have shaped each city probably would occupy our attention and prevent us from seeing them as variations of common demographic processes. It is therefore advantageous to take a broad view of the two as opposite extremes of a growth-decline continuum. If we can perceive common demographic processes at work in such contrasting settings, our generalizations about these processes should be all the firmer.

San Jose: Growth and Migration Flows

Early in this century, population in urban centers grew mainly through rural-to-urban and international migration. These large migrations from outside the metropolitan system, along with a substantial amount of natural increase, afforded all urban centers some measure of growth. In recent years, however, the intensification or reversal of some long-standing trends has altered the growth and redistribution of the U.S. population.

For one thing, net growth from international migration has diminished both absolutely and as a percentage of the U.S. population. During the era of major immigration—1908 to 1915—the population increased 0.6 percent annually through net international migration; more recently, this increase has been only about 0.2 percent.

The rate of rural-to-urban migration has also diminished. The rural population has declined over recent decades, leaving a limited reservoir of potential migrants in the countryside. Equally significant is the fact that rural areas now retain a much higher proportion of their population growth than formerly.

Finally, the national fertility rate has declined. The "average" woman in 1960 would eventually bear 3.7 children over a lifetime; in 1973, her completed fertility would be only 2.0 children.

As these traditional growth forces weakened, migration flows among metropolitan areas emerged as the principal determinants of urban growth. But intermetropolitan migration favors a certain few metropolitan centers with most of the available migratory growth (*1*).

No metropolis demonstrates this effect more clearly than San Jose, whose rapidly expanding aerospace and service industries have attracted an extraordinary influx of new residents over the last two decades. During the 1960's, metropolitan San Jose's population increased 66 percent, a rate surpassed by only four other standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA's) in the United States. One-third of this growth was due to natural increase, two-thirds to net in-migration. In 1965, fewer than seven of every thousand metropolitan Americans were residents of San Jose, but San Jose received 55 of every thousand net migrants arriving in metropolitan areas between 1960 and 1970.

Having more than tripled in population between 1950 and 1970, San Jose today bears the cumulative hallmarks of selective in-migration: its population is young and highly migratory, and its age distribution, enriched through additions of young adults of childbearing age, gives rise to many more births than deaths.

But this remarkable growth cannot be comprehended strictly in local terms. San Jose's experience is part of the expansion of California's entire metropolitan structure through migration to and within it (*2*).

California draws migrants from great distances. The vast majority of them enter the state through Los Angeles, San Francisco, or San Diego. Table 1 shows that these centers act as national magnets, drawing migrants mostly from out of state (*3*). (Los Angeles and San Francisco also draw significant numbers of foreign immigrants.) The ten other California metropolises in Table 1 draw migrants primarily from within the state.

But large numbers of people use these cities only as gateways. Consider the flows in and out of San Francisco. Between 1965 and 1970, San Francisco received 269,000 out-of-state migrants and sent only 204,000 migrants to other states—a net population gain of 65,000 for San Francisco (and California). But San Francisco kept little of this gain: 249,000 of its residents moved to other places in California, but only 191,000 Californians moved to San Francisco; so the city lost 59,000 migrants to the rest of the state, of whom 23,000 ended up in San Jose. In fact, San Jose lures nearly as many migrants away from San Francisco and Los Angeles combined as it does from the remainder of the entire nation (Table 2). This abundant supply of new growth funneled into California through San Francisco and Los Angeles has undoubtedly been an important factor in San Jose's 44 percent increase through migration during the 1960's.

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Repercussions of Rapid Migratory Growth

Rapid growth causes a number of repercussions, one of which is the youth-weighted age distribution that heavy in-migration typically confers. (Nationally, nearly a third of all migrants are in their 20's, the peak childbearing age, and 16 percent more are children aged 1 to 6 years.) One can see the difference between a place that grows through migration and another that declines by comparing the San Jose SMSA with the city of St. Louis. While San Jose's population more than tripled between 1950 and 1970, mostly because of migration, St. Louis's declined 27 percent as heavy out-migration more than canceled out its natural increase. Thus, compared with that of St. Louis, San Jose's age distribution shows a comparative surplus in the under-44 age brackets and a comparative deficit in the over-45 range (Fig. 1). With relatively more potential parents, San Jose's population grew faster than that of St. Louis. San Jose's rate of natural increase during 1960 to 1970 was 21.6 per hundred residents in 1960; St. Louis's increase was only 7.3.

San Jose's rapid migratory growth also makes its population hypermobile. Since people who migrate tend to do so repeatedly, a population built up by waves of past in-migration is heavily weighted with chronically mobile people and, therefore, is subject to high rates of subsequent out-migration (*4*). Consequently, there is a continual flow of migrants through San Jose. Annual net migration into metropolitan San Jose averaged nearly 4 percent during the 1960's. This net flow was composed of about 21 arrivals and 17 departures each year per hundred residents (or nearly 10 actual moves for each "net migrant" added) (*5*). About 7 of these 17 out-migrants, though, had moved into San Jose only 1 year before. Indeed, fully one-third of the migrants attracted to San Jose had moved away a year later.

Thus, San Jose's rapid population growth rests on a rather precarious arithmetic balance between in-migration and out-migration. Although many of its in-migrants subsequently leave, San Jose manages to grow by attracting more than enough new arrivals each year to offset this considerable loss. Any moderate decline in the rate of gross in-migration could easily bring net migration down to a small fraction of its present level. For example, if San Jose attracted only 16 (instead of 21) in-migrants per hundred residents, its net migratory gain would stand at less than 1 percent (instead of 4 percent) annually (*6*).

On the other hand, because it is highly mobile, San Jose's population can probably accommodate change quite quickly. Adjustment to changes in the overall demand for labor, or to shifts in the mix of required skills, can occur promptly because of the brisk inflow and outflow of workers. For this reason, San Jose's labor market is likely to show an uncommon resiliency to change.



Fig. 1. Contrasting age distributions: San Jose SMSA and St. Louis, 1970.

St. Louis: Population Decline and Its Consequences

The St. Louis SMSA encompasses the city of St. Louis and six counties lying on both sides of the Mississippi River: the counties of St. Louis, St. Charles, Franklin, and Jefferson in Missouri and the counties of St. Clair and Madison in Illinois. The city of St. Louis is entirely separate in area and jurisdiction from St. Louis County. (Hereafter, St. Louis will refer to the city, while St. Louis County will be so designated.) The closest metropolitan area of comparable size is the Kansas City SMSA, about 275 miles (440 kilometers) to the west.

In 1970, the population of metropolitan St. Louis stood at about 2.4 million. It had increased by 12 percent since 1960, a rate lower than the average national metropolitan increase of 17 percent. After 1970, population in metropolitan St. Louis, like that in 21 other formerly growing SMSA's, began to decline.

St. Louis attained a peak population of 880,000 in the early 1950's. But by 1972 it had dwindled to a city of less than 590,000. During the 1960's, St. Louis's population declined 17 percent while its metropolitan ring population increased 29 percent. The central-city decline was acute, compared with that of most cities. Examination of the demographic change components reveals why (*7*) (see Table 3).

The white population declined mostly because of massive outward migration, chiefly to the suburbs. Between 1960 and 1970, a net 34 percent of the white city dwellers moved away. But whites also declined because their death rate steadily approached their birth rate, and since 1965 has exceeded it. Those who remained in the city added only 2 percent to their numbers (nationally, the increase in the white metropolitan population for that decade was 11 percent).

It was a different picture for blacks. There was no gain or loss through net migration during the 1960's, but the black population rose 19.5 percent through natural increase, very close to its national rate of 21.6 percent. Annual population estimates, however, show St. Louis's nonwhite population to have peaked in 1968 at around 269,000 (*8*). By 1972, it is estimated to have dropped below 250,000. In view of the black population's positive natural increase, the only explanation

is that blacks have been migrating out of the city since at least 1968 (and almost certainly before).

The number and composition of households in the city also changed during the decade. The number of households declined somewhat more slowly than the population (13 versus 17 percent), and the average size of a household went down slightly. Households with only one person increased from 21 percent in 1960 to 28 percent in 1970, a reflection primarily of the growing frequency of widowed elderly persons.

Demographic trends were somewhat more uniform outside the city (Table 3). Natural increase and net migration contributed equally to the white population's 26.6 percent increase during the 1960's. The black population's 53.8 percent suburban growth was attributable more to net migration than to natural increase (*9*). St. Louis's suburbs attracted migrants largely from the city but also from outside the metropolitan area. Increasingly, migrants of both races entering the St. Louis SMSA bypassed the city and settled in the suburbs (mainly in St. Louis County). It can be seen in Fig. 2 that the total stream of new arrivals to St. Louis between 1965 and 1970 was smaller (both absolutely and relatively) than it had been a decade earlier. For blacks, the inbound stream was numerically about the same; but in relative terms, newly arriving blacks increasingly favored the suburbs.

Persistent and severe migration away from St. Louis has altered the structure of its population. These changes bear heavily on the city's capacity to meet the needs of the increasingly disadvantaged population that remains and on this population's very capacity to regenerate itself.

Diminished replacement capacity. The white population's capacity to replace itself diminished during the 1960's. Heavy and prolonged out-migration among whites drew away potential parents and left behind an elderly population that no longer replaces itself.

We can gauge the severity of out-migration by young white adults by following individual age cohorts from 1960 to 1970 (Fig. 3). For example, in the absence of migratory change, people 5 to 14 years old in 1960 would reappear as the same number of people 15 to 24 years old in 1970, less a small allowance for mortality. Since this al-

Table 1. Domestic migration streams into and out of California's metropolitan areas, 1965 to 1970. These data exclude foreign migration. The Salinas-Monterey and Vallejo-Napa SMSA's are not shown, since they cannot be approximated with the data for the state economic areas used here (*3*).

Metropolitan area*	Migrants to metropolitan area from		Migrants from metropolitan area to		Net migration to metropolitan area	
	California	Out of state	California	Out of state	California	Out of state
San Francisco	190,931	268,824	249,495	204,149	− 58,564	+ 64,675
Los Angeles	265,500	649,166	414,096	516,019	− 148,596	+ 133,147
San Diego	124,578	223,001	88,544	139,130	+ 36,034	+ 83,871
San Jose	132,223	102,416	92,875	67,043	+ 39,348	+ 35,373
Sacramento	67,055	52,245	77,359	50,631	− 10,304	+ 1,614
Stockton	29,601	13,808	29,658	11,609	− 57	+ 2,199
Fresno	39,296	15,731	47,972	18,704	− 8,676	− 2,973
San Bernardino–Riverside	150,470	112,553	107,600	91,728	+ 42,870	+ 20,825
Bakersfield	35,097	23,451	42,314	24,328	− 7,217	− 877
Santa Barbara	41,296	31,879	32,576	29,529	+ 8,720	+ 2,350
Santa Rosa	51,516	15,201	29,834	14,178	+ 21,682	+ 1,023
Modesto	35,493	21,793	31,797	20,801	+ 3,696	+ 992
Oxnard-Ventura	68,157	37,366	39,973	29,183	+ 28,184	+ 8,183

* These are SMSA's, with the following exceptions: San Francisco here includes Solano County, Los Angeles combines the Los Angeles SMSA and the Anaheim–Santa Ana–Garden Grove SMSA, Sacramento excludes Placer and Yolo counties, Santa Rosa includes Napa County, and Modesto includes Merced County.

Table 2. Domestic migration streams into and out of the San Jose SMSA, 1965 to 1970. Foreign migration is excluded, and the Salinas-Monterey and Vallejo-Napa SMSA's are not shown (see Table 1). [Data from (*3*)]

Metropolitan area*	Migrants from metropolitan area to San Jose	Migrants to metropolitan area from San Jose	Net migration to San Jose
San Francisco	55,674	32,241	+ 23,433
Los Angeles	23,741	15,363	+ 8,378
San Diego	5,553	4,008	+ 1,545
Sacramento	6,646	2,443	+ 4,203
Stockton	2,160	1,616	+ 544
Fresno	3,954	1,897	+ 2,057
San Bernardino–Riverside	3,219	2,504	+ 715
Bakersfield	1,970	968	+ 1,002
Santa Barbara	2,881	2,169	+ 712
Santa Rosa	2,340	2,875	− 535
Modesto	2,788	2,428	+ 360
Oxnard-Ventura	1,265	1,452	− 187
Rest of California	20,032	22,911	− 2,879
Rest of United States	102,416	67,043	+ 35,373

* See footnote to Table 1.

Table 3. Components of population change in St. Louis, 1960 to 1970 (*7*). Data are expressed as rates of change per 100 residents in 1960.

Area	Total change	Natural increase*	Net migration
	Both races		
St. Louis SMSA	12.3	11.5	0.8
St. Louis city	− 17.0	7.3	− 24.4
Remainder of SMSA†	28.5	13.8	14.7
	Whites		
St. Louis SMSA	9.4	10.1	− 0.7
St. Louis city	− 31.6	2.4	− 34.0
Remainder of SMSA†	26.6	13.3	13.3
	Nonwhites‡		
St. Louis SMSA	28.2	20.2	9.7
St. Louis city	18.6	19.5	− 0.4
Remainder of SMSA†	53.8	22.0	37.2

* Rate of increase attributed to excess births over deaths. † Metropolitan ring. ‡ In this section of the table, "total change" applies only to the black population. "Natural increase" and "net migration" apply to the nonwhite population as a whole, but virtually all nonwhites in the St. Louis SMSA are blacks.

lowance is negligible below age 45 (at most 5 percent), any sizable discrepancy between 1960 and 1970 indicates the extent of migration that has taken place in that cohort. Figure 3 gives stark evidence of extensive out-migration from St. Louis in the early adult years. For example, in 1960 there were 37,900 white females aged 15 to 24, but by 1970 only 17,900 aged 25 to 34 remained—a 53 percent reduction. There were 31,100 white males 25 to 34 in 1960, but only 15,900 aged 35 to 44 in 1970—a 49 percent reduction. Overall, 46 percent of whites 15 to 34 in 1960 were gone by 1970, leaving St. Louis with a sharply diminished pool of prospective parents.

The resultant modifications in replacement capacity are illustrated more directly in Table 4, from which we can see that:

1) Women in the middle and later childbearing years had grown more scarce. In 1960, white women aged 25 to 44 made up 22.1 percent of all white women in the city; by 1970 the figure had dropped to 17.6 percent. (Part of this drop stemmed from the changing national age distribution; for white women nationally, this age group declined from 26.4 to 23.5 percent of the total population between 1960 and 1970.)

2) The proportion of elderly whites had risen. Whites 65 and over made up 14.5 percent of the population in 1960, but 19.2 percent in 1970. (The corresponding figure nationally was 10 percent in both years.)

3) Partially as a result of these changes in age structure, the crude birth rate per thousand whites declined from 22.1 in 1960 to 12.0 in 1972; and the crude death rate per thousand whites rose from 14.8 to 18.0. (Part of the decline in the birth rate, of course, was a consequence of the national trend in the birth rate, which dropped nearly 25 percent during the 1960's.)

Since 1965, the white population has ceased to replace itself, its death rate having exceeded its birth rate. By 1972, the services of the undertaker exceeded those of the obstetrician by a margin of 3 to 2. Since it is now undergoing natural decrease, St. Louis's white population will continue to shrink whether or not net out-migration continues. Only a dramatic rise in fertility or a massive influx of childbearing families can alter this situation (*10*).

The city's black population has not undergone severe migratory change and retains its strong replacement capacity: in 1972 its crude birth rate was 24.9 per thousand, but its crude death rate was only 11.2. In 1969, however, the black population began to decline, indicating a net migratory loss severe enough to offset its natural increase. This recent shift could signify an increase in departing migrants, a reduction in entering migrants, or a combination of both. Indications favor the first of these explanations (*11*).

Accumulation of disadvantaged citizens. As migration has changed the metropolitan-wide distribution of population, St. Louis has come to be composed disproportionately of those citizens who are disadvantaged or have special needs, as the following comparisons show:

1) Between 1960 and 1970, the black percentage of the city's population rose from 29 to 41 percent; it increased only from 6 to 7 percent in the rest of the metropolitan area.

2) The city's residents aged 65 years and older increased from 12 percent to constitute 15 percent of the population;



Fig. 2. Destinations of migrants entering the St. Louis SMSA, 1955 to 1960 and 1965 to 1970 (persons 5 years old and over, residing outside the SMSA or abroad 5 years previously). (A) Total. (B) Blacks (data shown for 1955 to 1960 refer to nonwhites).



Fig. 3. Age distribution of the white population in St. Louis, 1960 and 1970.

they stayed at 8 percent in the rest of the metropolitan area.

3) For families and unrelated individuals, median income in the city was 79 percent of that for the St. Louis SMSA in 1959; by 1969 city income was only 68 percent of the SMSA income.

4) The proportion of relatively high income families declined sharply. In 1959, 11 percent of families in the city had incomes at least double the city's median family income; 10 years later, only 4 percent had incomes double the 1969 median.

5) The proportion of relatively low income families rose slightly. In 1959, 16 percent of families in the city had incomes less than half the city's median family income; 10 years later, 21 percent had incomes less than half the 1969 median.

Through selective out-migration, then, problems of dependency and poverty—not exclusively problems *of* St. Louis—have come increasingly to be located *in* St. Louis.

The Dilemma of Policy: Coping with Decline

The degree of population decline in St. Louis may be exceptional, but St. Louis is no exception to the rule. The phenomenon of local population decline is widespread now—a characteristic of entire metropolitan areas, not just their central cities. The policy dilemma in coping with decline and its local consequences is likely to intensify during the 1970's.

The dilemma is this. The local official responsible for what happens in a place like St. Louis is understandably alarmed by severe population loss and the bleak future in store for the city if it continues. The city's boundaries, which have not changed since 1876, separate the problems within St. Louis from resources in its suburbs. But from the standpoint of individual welfare, it can be argued that the people who left St. Louis now enjoy living conditions they prefer, and those who remain have benefited from a thinning out of people from formerly overcrowded areas (*12*). Even the widespread abandoned housing in St. Louis can be viewed as a positive sign that many people have upgraded their living conditions, leaving behind a residue of housing no longer competitive within the market. Both views have validity, the choice depending on whether one's perspective is that of a local policy-maker or of a freely mobile citizen.

Table 4. Indices of change in replacement capacity for St. Louis's black and white population, 1960 to 1972.

Indicator	1960	1970	1972
Percentage of women in later childbearing years (age 25 to 44)			
White	22.1	17.6	*
Black	27.1	22.7	*
Percentage of population age 65 and over			
White	14.5	19.2	*
Black	6.8	8.3	*
Crude birth rate per thousand			
White	22.1	14.5	12.0
Black	34.4	25.1	24.9
Crude death rate per thousand			
White	14.8	17.7	18.0
Black	11.4	11.3	11.2

* Data not available.

But that line of argument may amount to no more than a confusing piece of sophistry for the policy-maker, or even the objective student of urban affairs, who looks at careful statistics from respectable sources telling him unequivocally that St. Louis is much worse off than it used to be. Part of the confusion is due to the paradox that statistics can be deceptive even when they are accurate. They can mislead us here, for example, if they beguile us into confining our attention to the plight of *places,* whereas our central concern is with the well-being of *people.* It is hard to escape that situation, however. A major difficulty in our way is that standard social and economic statistics are compiled and organized mostly by areas rather than by groups of people. Consequently, we can observe the experience of places, but not of people. These experiences can differ sharply. For instance, black in-migrants from impoverished rural areas in states like Mississippi may be less affluent or employable, on the average, than the mostly white population they join in St. Louis. If this is true in St. Louis as it is in other cities (*13*), then area indicators (for example, unemployment or poverty in St. Louis) may register a worsening of local conditions. But measures of individuals' experiences (for example, their unemployment or poverty now, compared with what it was before they came to St. Louis) may show marked improvement. In short, the place we call St. Louis may be worse off because of in-migration while the in-migrant people are better off than they were.

Summary and Conclusions

The population changes in San Jose and St. Louis between 1960 and 1970 exemplify the two broad trends—urban formation followed by metropolitan dispersal—that have shaped 20th-century urbanization in this country. The fact that these developmental trends were expressed through demographic processes found to be common to both cities, despite their contrasting recent experiences, suggests that generalizations can be made about the complex forces underlying urbanization.

The formation of metropolitan San Jose's population parallels the traditional process whereby a region's growth comes to be focused, through migration, on a few urban centers. The modern variant is not characterized by a rural-to-urban shift, however, but by migration flows among urban areas, and particularly to a few most-favored areas, such as San Jose.

Migratory growth has left a powerful demographic legacy in San Jose. This legacy is also instructive for studying the migratory formation of any new city's population. Its demographic character determines its demographic destiny, whose likely variations we can now perceive with some clarity. San Jose's population is both youthful and chronically migratory. The presence of many prospective parents and relatively few elderly persons lays a broad foundation for the population's continued growth through natural increase, despite the national downturn in fertility (*14*). Even without further net in-migration, the population of new cities like San Jose would continue to grow at an above-average rate.

The hypermobility of San Jose's population (that is, its propensity for further migration) also has an important bearing on the future. With about 21 migrants entering and 17 departing each year per hundred residents, San Jose's rapid migratory growth rests (as it would in other new cities) on a precarious arithmetic balance. A significant dip in local employment growth could easily reduce net migration to a small fraction of its present high level. Even a slight decline would result in the inflow's no longer exceeding the high volume of outflow. Demographic analysis alone cannot foresee such an employment downturn, but if it happened, the migratory downturn probably would be swift. Hypermobility also works the other way; and given San

Jose's focal position in California's expanding metropolitan structure (with its virtually endless supply of migratory growth), net migration could resume with equal swiftness.

The outward dispersal of population from central cities that has occurred in St. Louis has been accelerating in other cities as well, and will remain a prominent feature of U.S. urban growth. It may seem paradoxical that in a period noted for something called "urban growth" there are so many declining central cities, but that is merely one indication that the "central city" no longer is the real city, except in name. Real city or not, the central city can expect to come into political conflict with other jurisdictions created in the process of dispersion. In cities like St. Louis, where population is dispersing but old political boundaries are fixed, the problems of the central city are separated from the resources in the suburbs. Transitional problems associated with persistent and severe outmigration also arise: accumulation of disadvantaged citizens, declining demand for city housing, and a diminished replacement capacity in the population.

Carried far enough, the last of these problems results in natural decrease, and thereafter the population's decline acquires its own dynamic. As noted earlier, the white population in St. Louis has reached this point: The number of persons dying now exceeds the number being born.

For two reasons, this natural decrease can do little other than intensify. First, a substantial proportion of whites are either entering or already within the high-mortality age brackets. The white population's crude death rate therefore will continue to rise. Second, prospective parents are becoming scarce among St. Louis's whites, and the national evidence that parents in general will choose to have smaller families continues to mount. The white population's crude birth rate is therefore likely to fall, barring a dramatic increase in fertility or a strong and sustained inflow of childbearing families. Nor is St. Louis's black population likely to grow substantially. It is expanding steadily through natural increase, but black migration out of the city is more than enough to cancel that increase.

References and Notes

1. W. Alonso and E. Medrich, in *Growth Centers in Regional Economic Development*, N. M. Hansen, Ed. (Free Press, New York, 1972), p. 229.
2. D. L. Foley, R. L. Drake, D. W. Lyon, B. A. Ynzenga, *Characteristics of Metropolitan Growth in California*, vol. 1, *Report* (Center for Planning and Development Research, Institute for Urban and Regional Development, Berkeley, Calif., 1965).
3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population, 1970: Subject Reports*, Final Report PC (2)-2E, *Migration between State Economic Areas* (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972).
4. Evidence on this point is given in P. A. Morrison, *Demography* **8**, 171 (1971).
5. Based on data from the Social Security Continuous Work History Sample. These data, which are furnished by the Social Security Administration, Washington, D.C., and cover nine out of ten wage and salary workers nationally, are not directly comparable to the census figures in (*3*). The Social Security data shown here refer only to employed civilians in Social Security–covered jobs—a subset of the entire population 5 years and older to which the census data refer. Thus, the Continuous Work History Sample excludes completely self-employed and unemployed workers, persons not in the labor force, and certain classes of workers (principally civilian employees of the federal government, some state and local government employees, and railroad workers). We have also excluded migrants entering or leaving military service.
6. This estimate is a rough approximation only. It assumes that the lower rate of in-migration would, by reducing the stock of chronic movers, lower the rate of subsequent outmigration from 17 to 15 per hundred residents. All estimates here refer to the period to which these Continuous Work History Sample data apply (1957 through 1966) and to San Jose residents working in Social Security–covered jobs.
7. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population and Housing: 1970; General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan Areas, 1960 to 1970*, Final report PHC(2)-1, tables 10–12; PHC-(2)-27, table 3; PHC(2)-15, table 3 (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1970).
8. In St. Louis, blacks make up 99 percent of the nonwhite population. Hence the terms "nonwhite" and "black" are used synonymously in the following discussion.
9. Suburban blacks registered a high overall rate of growth between 1960 and 1970 because their 1960 base was minuscule.
10. Because changes in fertility are difficult to forecast, a dramatic rise cannot be entirely ruled out, although it seems highly unlikely at this time. Foreseeable changes in mortality have no appreciable bearing on the population's replacement capacity.
11. Data in Fig. 2 indicate that the gross number of black migrants entering St. Louis between 1965 and 1970 was about the same as between 1955 and 1960—around 10,000. Thus only an increase in gross out-migration could account for the change in net migration.
12. If the number of persons per room is taken as the conventional index of overcrowding, census data show that only 12.7 percent of all occupied housing units in St. Louis contained more than one person per room in 1970, compared with 16.4 percent in 1960.
13. Evidence on this point is reviewed by P. A. Morrison, "The impact and significance of rural-urban migration in the United States," in *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, on Land Ownership, Use and Distribution*, held in San Francisco, 11 January 1972 (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972), part 3A, p. 1039.
14. The exact rate of San Jose's natural increase, although dependent on the future course of U.S. fertility, will remain above the national metropolitan average.
15. This article is drawn from P. A. Morrison, *San Jose and St. Louis in the 1960s: A Case Study of Changing Urban Populations, R-1313-NSF* (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., 1973), a report prepared under Rand's Urban Policy Analysis Program with support from the National Science Foundation. I thank Professor William Alonso of the University of California, Berkeley, and Professor Sidney Goldstein, director of the Population Studies and Training Center, Brown University, for their helpful criticism.