areas. All of this is intended to facilitate seismic monitoring of nuclear testing to verify adherence to the threshold limit of 150 kilotons. Information of this kind has never previously been exchanged.

At the same time, however, the Soviet Union has refused to apply the threshold limit to so-called "peaceful" nuclear explosives; these are to be governed by a separate agreement that is still to be worked out. Reportedly, an understanding was reached under which onsite inspections would be permitted in order to verify the peaceful nature of such explosions. This represents a return by the Soviet Union to a position it last expressed in 1963.

## Briefing

# Moscow Scientists Protest with Hunger Strike, Seminar

Whatever it may have accomplished for international relations (see page 237), the Nixon visit to Moscow this month both helped and hindered the cause of civil liberties within the Soviet Union.

While the President and Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev toasted one another in the Kremlin, the most prominent dissident in Russia, physicist Andrei D. Sakharov went on a hunger strike. Sakharov wanted to dramatize the cases of 83 "political prisoners" who have been deprived of their rights —a list of whom he submitted in a public appeal to Nixon and Brezhnev on the eve of the summit. Some of the Western television crews who tried to cover the Sakharov protest were able to film him, but others found that their electronic equipment simply went dead. After Nixon left Moscow, Sakharov gave up the hunger strike on the orders of doctors, he said, who were alarmed by his loss of 18 pounds.

Russia's most prominent would-be Jewish emigré is Veniamin G. Levich, a corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. When Levich made known his wish to emigrate to Israel in 1972, the authorities deprived him of his scientific jobs, harassed his family, and made him a nonperson in the scientific literature.

However, the end of this persecution was signaled when, the day after the President's arrival in Moscow, Levich was told that he would be permitted to go to Israel after all by the end of next year. His sons will be able to leave by the end of 1974. Knowledgeable sources in Washington speculated that private diplomacy in advance of the President's trip by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger could have been a factor in the Soviet government's turnaround on the Levich case.

High on the list of Western objec-

tions to Soviet internal policy has been the alleged practice of committing dissenters to mental hospitals. The most celebrated case of this type is that of former Red Army hero Major General Pytor Grigorenko, who fell from official grace when he criticized Nikita Khrushchev in 1961; Grigorenko has been committed, released, and recommitted to mental hospitals on and off since 1964. The day Nixon arrived in Moscow, Grigorenko was told that he would be released from his mental institution within hours; that afternoon he was drinking port in his home and talking with Western newsmen about his release. Whether the Nixon visit or pressure from American diplomats had anything to do with Grigorenko's release is unknown; he was, however, one of the 83 cases whom Sakharov wanted the authorities to reconsider.

Sakharov's hunger strike left him too weak to attend another major dissident event planned for the summit—an unofficial, scientific seminar to help Jewish scientists who had lost their jobs keep up to date in their work. But the authorities obviously thought the meeting was a potential political bombshell that could embarrass them while Nixon was in Moscow. Seminar leaders, including its principal, Alexander Voronel, were all arrested and held during the President's visit. Police agents gathered outside Voronel's apartment building at the hour the meeting was to start to stop anyone from going in. According to the New York Times, three Soviet scientists appeared at 10 a.m. and tried to enter, including one who "sprinted from hiding in a clump of bushes into the building . . . clutching a bundle of papers under his arm." After Nixon left, the activists were reported to have been released.

Some 120 papers had been submitted for the Voronel seminar from scientists in Israel, Western Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and these will be published anyway. On the eve of Nixon's arrival in Moscow, however, a delegation of American organizers of the seminar met Acting Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco to express their disillusionment with détente. Soviet authorities, they said they told Sisco, "may not be aware of the intensity and magnitude of American scientific disenchantment." Two members of the group, Christian Anfinson and Julius Axelrod, both Nobel laureates at the National Institutes of Health, announced on the same day they would not welcome in their laboratories any Russian scientists "who cooperate in the persecution of other scientists."

Anfinson later explained, "I've had a lot of Russian visitors whom I consider working friends. But some of these have . . . signed letters denouncing Sakharov, to name the most recent instance. I would be reluctant to accept them or their junior colleagues as visiting scientists to spend time working in my lab."—DEBORAH SHAPLEY

#### Maryland Scientists' Hunger Strike Averted

Four researchers at the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center were abruptly fired last month after they publicly lambasted the center for its management, research, and personnel policies. The group promptly announced it would start a hunger strike on the center's premises, but was talked out of this action by the Federation of American Scientists, which instead fixed them up with civil rights lawyer Leonard Boudin. The case is now before the federal district court in Baltimore.

The four researchers say they were fired in malicious retaliation for having exercised their right of free speech. Center director Albert A. Kurland, whose decision was backed by Neil Solomon, Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, says the scientists were most definitely fired "for cause" and their

The agreed-upon limit of 150 kilotons may have more of an effect on the Soviet testing program than on the U.S. program. The United States has detonated one device that large in 2½ years, whereas the Soviet Union has

exploded six, including some of megaton and multimegaton yield in the past year. The 21-month delay in the limitation, however, is expected to allow the Soviets to finish proof-testing their new multiple warheads, or MIRV's.

## Briefing

public utterances had nothing to do with it. He noted that two of the scientists had been sacked last year and provisionally reinstated. In the letter dismissing the scientists, though, they were accused not only of "lack of positive performance" but of "having seriously breached expected employee conduct by taking public actions which were not in the best interest of the center."

The researchers' complaints are legion: they accuse the management of corrupt and wasteful practices, and say that they were passed over for promotion although they were the only ones doing any real work around the place. They also say the center, a state facility, has been losing money doing research for private drug companies on over-the-counter drugs such as Sominex and Tums, which have little bearing on mental health.

The scientists' complaints, initially made by the two researchers who were temporarily fired last year, have received considerable local attention. The state, in its biennial audit of the center completed last March, said that it did look as though the center was losing money on private research contracts and suggested that health officials find out whether the state was receiving benefits to justify the costs. Then the state legislature, prompted by this concern, held 2 days of hearings on the center's relationship to industry and to a private organization that has been acting as a conduit for public and private funds to the center. Meanwhile, Secretary Solomon has appointed a panel of independent research scientists to evaluate the research center. Finally, Maryland's Department of Fiscal Services is conducting reviews covering the center's organizational structure, policies, plans, and research programs.

So whether the four sacked scientists are finally judged to be malcontents or heroes, they seem to have set in motion activities that could significantly affect the future of the research center.—C.H.

### NAS Denies Photo to Columbia Journalism Review

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has refused to provide the Columbia Journalism Review with a photograph of NAS President Philip Handler. The photo was to have illustrated an article prepared for the Review by Daniel S. Greenberg, the former news editor of Science, who now publishes Science & Government Report.

The refusal, which Handler says he knew of in advance, was explained by Howard J. Lewis, director of the NAS Office of Information, in a letter to Elie Abel, dean of the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism which publishes the Review. Lewis said:

"Phil Handler's secretary passed on to me a request from the Review for a photograph of Phil to illustrate an article by Dan Greenberg on 'Science and the Media.' As you may know, Greenberg covers the Academy fairly regularly in his newsletter. His treatment of Phil in those pages has been, in my view, so offensive (except when the Academy has criticized some other part of the establishment) that I must decline the request. There are times when one's obligation to the media conflicts with a respect for personal dignity, and this is one of them.

"Greenberg is unquestionably a key figure in the journalism of science and public affairs. It is unfortunate that he so dominates that sparse terrain, many mistake him to have a central view."

Lewis later explained that he refused to send off the photo as "my own, tiny boycott . . . a small gesture of defiance against the fact that institutions have to respond like cows being led to slaughter while people like Greenberg get to go free."

Greenberg, commenting on the fact that his piece in the Review would not be illustrated said: "For years, people have been saying I wasn't getting the picture. Now they're right."—D.S.

One of the clear disappointments of the summit was its failure to limit deployment of multiple warheads.

Before the meeting, U.S. arms control authorities had expressed hope that nonnuclear nations might interpret a threshold test accord as a gesture of good faith. Such a gesture, they said, might encourage nations like Japan, Brazil, Argentina, India, and Pakistan to become parties to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Privately, however, some U.S. officials conceded before the summit that a limit as high as 50 to 100 kilotons would be hard to defend as a gesture of good faith.

Anti-Ballistic Missiles. The two sides have agreed to give up one of the two ABM installations permitted under the interim limit on ABM's signed in 1972. For the United States, this means agreeing not to build an ABM site near Washington, D.C., which Congress has already refused to pay for. The interim ABM agreement, which expires in 1977, remains one of the Nixon Administration's signal achievements in arms control.

Environmental and Chemical Warfare. U.S. and Soviet representatives will hold talks later this year on possible means of limiting the use of "environmental modification techniques" in warfare. This agreement comes 6 weeks after the Pentagon's first public acknowledgement that it had conducted rainmaking experiments in Indochina during the Vietnam war.

In the summit meeting's final communiqué, the two sides also agreed to consider a "joint initiative" this year in the multination Geneva disarmament talks aimed at limiting "the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare."

The communiqué also committed the two sides to negotiate a new interim agreement on strategic offensive weapons that would extend to 1985; the present accord expires in 1977.

Scientific Exchange Agreements. Building on the broad 1972 agreement to cooperate in fields of science and technology, this year's summit produced a few additional projects but no major expansion of U.S.—Soviet scientific ties.

An agreement to exchange information on energy R&D may focus on natural gas and geothermal steam development as a start (nuclear power is covered by a long-standing agreement between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and its Soviet counterpart). There will also be exchanges of data