

# Book Reviews

## Democratic Policy Making

**Representative Government and Environmental Management.** EDWIN T. HAEFELE. Published for Resources for the Future by Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974. xiv, 188 pp., illus. \$8.95.

The nature of representative government is one of those eternal puzzles that imaginative scholars can address with every sort of intellectual key. The dilemmas do not cease to incite; the complexities do not dissolve; the applications of an argument to substantive problems of unmistakable importance are legion. Edwin Haefele has said some interesting and provocative things about representative institutions. The substantive starting point of his argument is the set of problems falling under the heading of environmental management, but in most respects this is a fortuitous circumstance rather than a necessary precondition to the more general argument, which is essentially as follows:

Representatives in a legislative body have differing distributions and intensities of preferences regarding public policy. If they are free to bargain and trade, says Haefele, preferences will be aggregated to result in social choices approximating the relative strength of intensely held preferences. Moreover, if there exists a nondoctrinaire two-party system the representatives, in turn, will reflect accurately the preferences of their constituents. Haefele shows that such a party system can produce the same policy outcomes as would occur if everyone were in the legislature.

It is crucial in this argument that policy choices be made in legislative bodies rather than by executive, administrative, or judicial agencies, since only in legislatures, as a rule, is vote trading a legitimate mode of action. Moreover, it is necessary that the legislature be all-purpose rather than ad hoc or special-purpose, in order that

vote trading across issue sets be possible. Thus Haefele is critical of single-purpose agencies—school boards, regulatory commissions, or environmental agencies. Their members cannot trade off weakly held for strongly held preferences, and therefore intense minorities may often be excluded from policy benefits.

Haefele proposes the General Purpose Representative (GPR), to be frequently elected from small and presumably homogeneous districts, as the structural unit on which to build a better system. Every policy-making body would be made up of the GPR's from whatever geographical range was required to gain efficient administrative control of a problem. A watershed would not be the same as an airshed, or a library district, or a judicial circuit. The same GPR's, however, would serve in various institutional arenas, and they could trade off intense preferences across issue areas and achieve the desirable aggregate social result that Haefele believes possible.

This is a very interesting idea with applications of particular use in redesigning the governmental structures of metropolitan areas. But as a comprehensive principle the GPR would surely fall under the weight of excessive responsibility. Haefele's argument requires the GPR to know the value put by his constituents upon each alternative and how to bargain effectively about the issue set in one or more legislative arenas. The information costs to the representative would be staggering. That is a major reason why legislative bodies have delegated so much rule-making authority to administrative agencies. The legislators cannot figure out what policy result they want. It would take too long to find out. So delegate to others, and hope that the end result will not be disastrous.

Haefele not only assumes that somehow representatives will know their

preferences and have a good sense of the coalitional situation; he thinks they also will want to make the substantive choices themselves. In fact, however, legislators, like the rest of us, often want mainly to finish the agenda and go home (or wherever), and they seize the chance to solve their problem through delegation rather than authoritative value allocation. Still, Vietnam taught us something about the costs of excessive delegation of authority; Congress now is full of good intentions regarding the recapture of legislative responsibility; the Whig theory of government is in better favor than it was for more than a century. Haefele's approach to institutional design fits into this set of concerns, and it helps.

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## Cereal Proteins

**Nutritive Value of Triticale Protein** (and the Proteins of Wheat and Rye). JOSEPH HULSE and EVANGELINE M. LAING. International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 1974. 184 pp., illus. \$7.50 Canadian.

Triticale may be the Missouri mule of the cereal world but with a difference—this hybrid is fertile. Like the mule this hybrid may combine the desirable features of both parents—wheat and rye—and be superior to either. Since there are thousands of varieties of wheat and a number of varieties of rye, the possibilities are almost endless.

Although triticale is not new, serious research on this cereal began at the University of Manitoba in 1954, and these studies were later extended and intensified by collaboration with the Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT). This cereal is now beginning to take its place in commerce, an estimated one-half million hectares having been planted in 1971. If future research fulfills expectation, it may partially replace wheat or rye because of increased yield or other desirable qualities or provide a crop in areas not ideally suited to either of the parent cereals.

The protein content of different varieties or samples of wheat and rye varies over a wide range. Much of this difference is due to genetic factors although