

## Fredrickson May Head IOM

If he decides to accept the job, Donald S. Fredrickson will become the second president of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, succeeding John R. Hogness who will assume the presidency of the University of Washington in Seattle.

Fredrickson is the first among four candidates whose names were submitted last November to academy president Philip Handler by the governing council of the institute. At present, he is director of intramural research at the National Heart and Lung Institute, where he has worked since 1953.

The council's unanimity in putting Fredrickson at the top of its list was considered surprising in some quarters because his background is almost exclusively in basic biomedical research rather than in biomedical policy, which is the institute's main business. (As a scientist, Fredrickson, who earned his M.D. from the University of Michigan Medical School, is known for his contributions to the field of inherited lipoprotein disorders, particularly as they relate to heart disease.) Nevertheless, he has been very active in the institute since its inception and is a member of its council and executive committee. The fact that he was elected to the academy last year is also seen as a point in his favor by those who conducted the research for Hogness's successor.

No deadline has been set for Fredrickson's response to the institute's offer, but there is speculation that he will have made up his mind by the time he returns from Europe in mid-January.—B.J.C.

not by the departments, but in the White House on the basis of the reports of special task forces. This approach had been tried during the Kennedy Administration, but the real initiative was taken by Johnson.

As one veteran of the Executive Office in that era put it, "Johnson felt he had to have a hundred bills a year. You can't even have a hundred bad bills a year, but every year he had those task forces working."

There is a consensus that during the Nixon Administration there has been a further strengthening of the powers of the President's personal staff and of Executive Office agencies like OMB at the expense of the departments. What the long-term effects of this will be are far from clear. Inevitably, the new arrangements have altered OMB's relationships with Congress, with the departments, and with other elements of the President's staff. What is most elusive is the change in the way that the budget agency has traditionally looked at its own functions.

Schultze suggests that this traditional view can be understood in terms of "role playing." On the one hand, for example, the President needs a Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare who is loyal to him but is also compassionate and aware of the need to

put more resources into health, education, and welfare. The President also needs a counterbalancing, relatively hard-nosed, analytical input which is not politically oriented. In the past, the President has relied for this kind of advice on the White House agencies—the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), the Office of Science and Technology, but principally OMB.

In the case of an education bill, for example, OMB should ask, "Are you playing up to the National Education Association or the chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee on education?" OMB should look at substantive matters, but with a fiscally fishy eye, says Schultze. "For the system to work, a President needs a lot of personal contact with Cabinet officers; there should be a lot of head-to-head discussion between Cabinet officials and the analytical group. These should not be naysayers, but rather a group of professional skeptics. (Schultze believes that Cabinet officers need their own counterparts to OMB's analysts.) OMB should keep the President informed on alternatives, and the budget office should be resigned to being overturned—but not too often."

Schultze and others who argue the case for the traditionalist view emphasize that the budget process has to be salted heavily with adversary relation-

ships played out in front of the President, and they also emphasize that the President must ultimately make the choices. This obviously loads the schedule of an already heavily burdened President, and those who believe that the budget affords the President his chief instrument in making effective policy tend to take a technocratically brusque view of the time a President spends on political or ceremonial pursuits. As one former senior official put it, "A President spends an awful lot of time on crap."

The advocates of competitive interplay feel that the President should not be screened from seeing policy people in government. But how completely has the ideal been achieved in the past? President Johnson had a voracious interest in the details of government, and a fund of information built up during three decades in Washington, but it appears that the adversary process was only partially carried out. Particularly as the Vietnam war preempted Johnson's attention, the range of subjects in which he participated personally in the final stages of budget review narrowed. In some areas of economic policy, for example, Johnson continued to meet with three or four of the chief actors—the Secretary of the Treasury, the chairman of CEA, the director of BOB, and the head of the Federal Reserve System. But when it came to education policy or science policy, it was "all done by staff," says one senior official.

### Not So Much the Arbiter

During the first Nixon Administration, this trend accelerated, reinforced by the President's own lack of enthusiasm for give-and-take with relays of policy protagonists and by his immersion in foreign policy issues. Since his second term began, the distractions of Watergate have further reduced Nixon's time to act in the traditional role of budget arbiter.

In part because Congress has been controlled by the Democrats, the Nixon Administration has placed less emphasis on new legislation and more on reappraising existing programs and reallocating resources. Because of this and because of a passion for making government more businesslike, there has been an accent on the management arts. The Nixon Administration, however, has pursued the old aim of using the budget to pursue its policy goals. A second article will discuss how, in the process, OMB has changed and how it has remained the same.—JOHN WALSH