of the electron to the behavior of metallic junctions near the absolute zero; they span the distance from materials at the lowest temperatures to those in the interior of stars, from the properties of operators under time reversal to the behavior of attenuation coefficients just beyond the transition temperature.

I believe that I speak for my colleagues in theoretical science as well as myself when I say that our ultimate, our warmest pleasure in the midst of one of these incredible structures comes with the realization that what we have made is not only useful but is indeed a beautiful way to enclose a space.

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The Future of the Americas

Sol M. Linowitz

I cannot undertake to speak about the future of the Americas without speaking about the future of the world. You scientists, of all people, know that today all of us human beings are intertwined with one another. We are all together in a world of alarm and strife —a world that appears not to have quite made up its mind whether it is too primitive for peace or too advanced for war.

Our age has been called both the Age of Science and Technology and the Age of Anxiety. Both are accurate. Indeed, one feeds upon the other: as our scientific and technological competence has increased, so have our fears and anxieties. In the truest sense, this is a time of paradox—a time of unparalleled affluence and unprecedented need. It is a time in which there have been great advances in science and technology, and yet these are overshadowed by incredible advances in instruments of destruction. It is a time when man seems to have learned how to achieve most and to fear most, when he seems to know much more about how to make war than how to make peace, more about killing than he does about living. It is also a time in which the world fears, not the primitive or the ignorant man, but the educated, the scientifically trained, the technically competent man, who has it in his power to destroy civilization. It is a time in which we seem to know almost everything about know-how and very little about know-why. It is a time in which we can send men to walk the moon, yet witness the timeliness of Santayana's observation that men have come to power who, "having no stomach for the ultimate, burrow themselves downward toward the primitive."

In such a time, there can be no escape from facing front and asking hard questions. For in this nuclear age we can't hide, and we can't drop out. We can only choose where best to take our stand.

Irish poet Arthur O'Shaughnessy wrote: "Each age is a dream that is dying, or one that is coming to birth." The age that is coming to birth—indeed, the one that is with us already—is so changing and dynamic that no one can really know how it will be to live in it. We know that the habits of the past will not suffice for the challenges of the future. We also know that it has never been more important to reach for a world of peace and freedom —a world made safe for people.

If we are to move toward that goal, then we must realistically confront the terrible disparity in living standards between the so-called developed North and the underdeveloped South—between the world's "haves" and "have-nots"—a gap described by Barbara Ward as "inevitably the most tragic and urgent problem of our day." The tragedy is in the economic despair and emptiness that mark the lives of all too many in the developing countries; the urgency is in preventing a political re-

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action that could damage international peace and security.

We simply cannot continue to live in a world more than half enslaved by poverty, with only the minority free from want and the fear of want. There can be no security for anyone in a world of injustice and resentment, a world in which the future balance of power will ultimately be decided by men and nations now lumped together under the convenient and misleading label, "underdeveloped." In these closing years of the 20th century, there no longer exists—if ever there did exist—any meaningful demarcation between the world's economic and political problems. Just to categorize an issue as economic does not minimize its political ramifications. Coffee, sugar, and cocoa may be breakfast foods in the United States, but in Latin America and Africa they are the stuff revolutions feed upon. There is no longer any such thing as a separate or isolated area of concern, for what threatens peace and stability in one part of the world threatens peace and stability everywhere.

In confronting the problems before us, none of us can take refuge any longer in silence, indifference, or the vain hope that the status quo will save us—it cannot in an era of headlong and even breakneck change. It is against this backdrop that we must consider the future of the Americas—both as a hemisphere with its own problems and concerns, and as part of a world in turmoil and trouble.

What Is at Stake

Let me start by setting forth my own convictions about what we all have at stake here in the hemisphere. First, I believe that the future of international peace and security in our time will depend, in substantial measure, on what we are able to achieve here in the Americas. And I believe that for too long this fact has been overshadowed by dramatic developments in other parts of the world.

You will remember that over 10 years ago, the people of the Americas joined together in launching the Alliance for Progress, described as a peaceful revolution to overthrow poverty, underdevelopment, inequity, and dispair. The Alliance raised hopes and expectations in the hemisphere, expectations of a better life, better housing, better education, better health. As we well know, only a few—a very few—of these expectations have been fulfilled. The people of Latin America have made up their minds that these expectations will be fulfilled—with or without the United States. Today they are at a critical point of decision. If the United States does not join with the countries of Latin America in a commitment to work toward realizing the aspirations of the people of the Americas, then the future of the Americas will most certainly be one of tension, disharmony, and potential conflict.

My second conviction is that Latin America is being confronted with all the formidable problems that afflict the developing world. Here are unfulfilled agricultural and industrial potential, soaring birthrates, high mortality rates, widespread illiteracy, and rampant disease. As one walks the streets of all too many Latin American cities today, one is accompanied by poverty; and poverty is too often escorted by its companion, disease. One sees illiteracy on every hand, and yet that fact seems almost irrelevant. Books, after all, are not edible. If together we cannot find ways to deal with these problems in a mature, generous, and understanding manner, in this hemisphere where we share common bonds of history and geography, surely there is little reason to expect that they can be dealt with more effectively elsewhere in the world.

Third, at a time when the whole concept of international cooperation is being challenged at the United Nations and elsewhere, I believe that here in the Western Hemisphere we have the opportunity to establish a precedent for international cooperation, not only for other regions, but perhaps universally. Through the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank, and similar organizations, we are able to deal effectively with the entire sweep of relationships among nations—economic, social, cultural, political, and educational. In addition, the inter-American system could give new strength and meaning to all international organizations and could further the concept of international cooperation in a way that would foster the ultimate goal of world cooperation.

Because I have these deep convictions, I have been disturbed, during my experience as U.S. Ambassador to the OAS and since, to discover that all too many people—some in very high places—are unaware of what we all have at stake in Latin America and are not interested in its problems. In fact, the attitude toward Latin America all too often resembles what was once so aptly described as America's reaction to the United Nations: we know at once too much and too little—too much to have spontaneity and freshness of interest and too little to assure sound judgment. I am particularly dismayed that this should be true today, when we are at such a decisive moment in our relations with Latin America, when more than ever before we must be aware of what the future may portend for all of us.

Since the early 19th-century days of President Monroe, no responsible citizen of the United States has dared to suggest that Latin America can be either neglected or ignored, and for good reason. Latin America is in our home hemisphere. It should therefore be clear that a swing of interest on the part of the United States from too much to too little and back again is not the way to a better future, it is a shortcut to catastrophe. For when crises in Latin America occur, we are usually compelled to do our thinking too hurriedly and sometimes too late. Given these realities, there is no safe route for evasion.

Any policy of neglect would be especially disastrous now. Latin America has the fastest growing population in the world today. It is growing at the rate of about 3 percent, or 6.5 million people, a year. Its present population of 270 million will reach some 600 million by the end of the century. Latin America will then be twice as populous as the United States. And at present rates of economic and population growth it will be about ten times poorer.

Obstacles to Development

Clearly this gap underscores the urgent need for the countries of Latin America to summon the strength of will and the national determination to move forward aggressively in their programs of development. Yet Latin America's tools for this massive task of development are limited. The level of investment and savings is still considerably behind the needs. Over the last decade, domestic investment has gone up only 4 percent annually, whereas the Inter-American Development Bank estimates that a 6.5 percent increase is needed just to maintain a conservative per capita income-growth rate of 2.5 percent. At the same time, the jobs so urgently needed are not being created. One out of every four of Latin Ameri-

ca's potential workers is either unemployed or underemployed, and each year jobs must be found for 3 million more, with barely the hope of reaching half that goal. Nor is unemployment the only problem. Latin America's share of the world marketplace has fallen from about 10 percent 20 years ago to below 5 percent today. Without significant exports, Latin America's ability to exchange its goods for those of the rest of the world has dwindled, as has the region's ability to buy the goods it cannot produce efficiently.

The cause of this discouraging rate of development is not, as some critics have charged, simply a plot of the United States or other countries in the developed world. It is true that indifferent and misguided policies of the United States and other countries may have, at times, contributed to the problems, but they are certainly neither the cause of the difficulties nor the reason for their persistence.

The hard fact is that the process of development in Latin America is agonizingly long and arduous. It must start from the ground up; and the ground itself must first be cleared of jungle, the trail cut through the mountain, and civilization itself introduced before new farms can be laid out and made productive. Then factories must be built, along with houses, hospitals, and schools. Diseases must be stamped out; people must be trained; institutions must be built; attitudes and policies must change; and whole new traditions and ways of life must be established.

Just to look at the geography is to see the formidable nature of the challenge. One huge belt of land, thousands of miles wide, lies on the equator in the heart of the heat and fevers of the tropics. The Amazon River, unlike the Mississippi, flows through vast tracks of what are still sodden, malaria-ridden, impenetrable jungle wastelands, its waters patrolled by alligators and man-eating snakes. In contrast, the gentle, traffic-moving rivers of Europe have been channels of trade for a thousand years. In the United States, the South and West grew with the navigation of the "father of waters." But most of Latin America's rivers have not been of much use in opening up the interior. Long reaches of the Amazon have been a barrier instead of a link.

Neither North America nor Europe has any obstacle like the all-but-vertical Andes. Precipitous valleys, unscalable heights, distances that can be covered only by nimble-footed pack animals—these have been formidable natural barriers that to this day delay the growth of an internal traffic system, making it cheaper to ship goods from Buenos Aires to London or New York than to Chile or Peru.

Latin America has also lacked coal, the basic raw material of the first industrial revolution, and has had to wait for the 20th century growth of hydroelectricity to develop local power supplies. Like the rest of the developing world, Latin America is now on the threshold of a new age with nuclear power. But its past has been one of inadequacy in energy and natural resources. Minerals were either plundered early in its history, as in the case of gold and silver, or discovered late, as in the case of iron ore and copper. The Northern Hemisphere, sitting on top of coal seams with adjacent iron ore fields deposited near rivers and oceans, has had little concept of the obstacles to rapid growth that a basically inadequate physical endowment imposes on nations and peoples.

But perhaps these physical difficulties are less daunting than the political and social heritage of Latin America, of which we must also be aware. Fortunately for the United States, men like James Madison and Alexander Hamilton were able to achieve a political union early in the country's history, a union strong enough to hold together 13 weak, quarrelsome colonies clustered along the eastern seaboard, yet flexible enough to stretch across a whole continent as the nation grew westward.

Latin America, on the other hand, was colonized by some of the oldest and most self-consciously individualistic nations of Europe. It took another path, the way of Europe, and Simon Bolivar's dream of a united continent could not be realized. Not even a common Iberian culture was enough to counter the eager thrust of postcolonial nationalism. Vast differences among them were only intensified by natural barriers of treacherous mountains, rivers, and jungles. No one should underestimate the cultural richness of this variegated, diverse development. But as Europe is learning only now, the ministate in a nonunited continent is not the way to bring about rapid technological change and sustain firm economic growth.

And then there was and is the problem of land reform. Impoverished laborers bound to work on land they do not own—on vast estates managed by men who live for display, not work—cannot provide the capital, the innovating intelligence, or the technical skills needed to develop a productive agriculture, which in turn provides funds and markets for an expanding industry. Britain was able to launch the industrial revolution because serfdom vanished in the 14th century and four centuries later many outstanding men were making their living in banking and commerce. The United States surged forward because free farmers and free businessmen, with the exception of Southern plantation owners, built a continental economy. Germany and Russia were late arrivals to modernization precisely because they retained feudal power structures late into the 19th century. Japan was able to modernize more rapidly than any other nation because the reformers' first step, in 1868, was to root out the entire feudal structure.

The fact that so much of the best farmland in many Latin American countries still remains in the hands of a relatively few wealthy families, or in the public domain, patently checks full-scale growth and dams up perhaps the most important channel of savings.

Moreover, having arrived so late in the industrial process, Latin America, like other less developed areas, has suffered the disadvantages of deficiencies in capital equipment, in basic industries producing steel and machinery, and in men trained for the skilled positions in industry. They must export manufactured goods in order to grow soundly. Its newly developed industries are faced with the competition of long-established industries in the developed countries. Further complicating their industrial life is the establishment of labor-saving industry, alongside of outmoded industries, at a time when unemployment is being aggravated by the influx of rural inhabitants to the cities.

In the light of these challenges to the development of the continent, it is clear that the future of the Americas will depend on how effectively we can deal with these staggering problems—on how successful we are in helping Latin America rid itself of these social and economic clouds that darken so much of its immense potential.

Yet, at a time when the need for cooperation and coordination of effort is greater than ever, the United States and Latin America seem to be pulling further apart. The Alliance for Progress has been superseded by a policy of noninvolvement, in which slogans have replaced commitments. The effect has been that, at this critical time in

hemispheric affairs, Latin America and the United States are pursuing separate paths, each with apparent disregard for the other. Ironically, the Alliance for Progress was abandoned just when, despite its problems and failures, it was managing to achieve an annual average of 2.4 percent real per capita growth and was showing gratifying signs of progress in a number of areas. During the 1960's the United States contributed over $8 billion in bilateral aid and was responsible for much of the $6.5 billion in loans from international institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. More significantly, Latin Americans themselves had contributed at least 90 percent of the capital required to fuel development and build up a sizable infrastructure of public works projects and social programs.

Latin American Policy Overdue

On his recent visit to Latin America, U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers indicated his recognition of the fact that a new policy for Latin America is long overdue—one that would again set forth the common objectives of the nations of the hemisphere and would restore the spirit of cooperation and mutual commitment. What should be the outlines for such a policy? I will focus on the basic ingredients of such a policy in the following five vital areas.

1) *Common goals for the future.* It is urgent that the United States and the countries of Latin America promptly agree upon common goals for the future of the Americas and the commitments necessary to achieve these goals through multilateral cooperation. We have long since passed the point where statements of good intentions and lofty motives are sufficient to counter the tensions and antagonisms already aroused. What is needed is a new beginning—a credible and realistic partnership that must begin at the top. The President of the United States has already announced his intention of visiting Latin America later this year. Such a trip could be the occasion for a summit conference between the presidents and chief executives of all the countries of the Americas in order to discuss openly and freely goals for the future and commitments to be undertaken if the goals are to be achieved. From my participation in the summit conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in April 1967, I saw for myself what a real thrust toward hemispheric cooperation could result from such a summit conference at a time when it was sorely needed. In my judgment, such a summit conference is even more necessary today.

2) *Regional cooperation.* During his recent Latin American visit, Rogers stated: "Our policy is to encourage regional cooperation." Essential to full and effective regional cooperation is clear agreement on the role of individual governments in multilateral inter-American institutions and the responsibilities assumed by each nation by virtue of such membership. Above all, there must be full recognition of the principle of multilateralism, whereby decisions made represent the concerted judgment of the members and are divorced from the political control or influence of any one country. The OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other inter-American institutions can make great contributions toward regional development and progress and hemispheric cooperation. They are staffed by dedicated international civil servants who must be assured of the full support of all member governments in proceeding toward common objectives.

Some regional efforts, such as the Andean Pact and the Central American Common Market, should properly involve regional cooperation without U.S. participation. But in the OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other similar inter-American institutions, the need is clearly for full U.S. participation and commitment on a truly multilateral basis.

Recently a suggestion was put forward that the United States might consider withdrawing from full membership in the OAS in order that the OAS might undertake to deal with hemispheric problems as a wholly Latin American instrumentality. In my judgment, such a move would be inimical to the best interests of both the United States and Latin America. It would be regarded as a withdrawal by the United States from cooperation and commitment precisely at the moment when what is needed is increased commitment and cooperation by the United States in inter-American multilateral institutions such as the OAS.

A helpful step would be the participation of Japan and the European countries in lending institutions such as the International Development Bank. These nations have capital for investment in Latin America and could make available resources that could be well used for coordinated regional projects by the Inter-American Development Bank and the several regional counterparts. At the same time, the participation of these countries would assure that such institutions are truly multilateral, not dominated by the political influence, express or implied, of the United States.

It is appropriate to add one further word about the responsibility of nations as members of multilateral institutions. Some Latin American countries, frustrated by the apparent deafness of the United States to Latin American needs, have tended to make multilateral institutions sounding boards for complaints and charges. While their frustration is understandable, such a cacophony of complaints hinders the effective operation of multilateral institutions and exacerbates differences. Multilateral institutions can function effectively only when member nations agree upon their objectives and work together effectively to further their progress.

3) *Trade.* One of the foremost and urgent needs of Latin America has long been the growth of trade and industrial development. Here both Latin American countries and the United States can do much to assure essential progress. Latin American economic integration (the development of a common market) made considerable headway during the 1960's but has now come to a standstill. One of the most important steps Latin America could take toward dealing on an equal basis with the United States would be to achieve the economic strength that regional integration can give. Coordinated development of key industrial and agricultural sectors, withdrawal of quotas to flow of people, capital, and trade among countries—these are the essential keys to a better relationship with the United States, which has long championed integration of the development and trade of the region.

The United States could help to stimulate progress toward economic integration by offering to become a nonreciprocal member of a Latin American common market—opening up its own markets, but not insisting on the same from Latin America. Such a step might stimulate the countries of Latin America to push forward with their regional integration program, to set their export goals, and to develop ways to reach them.

Increased trade has long been an essential goal for Latin America. For

a number of years, the United States has promised a trade preference for manufactured and semimanufactured products of Latin America. The new trade bill put forward by President Nixon includes a proposal in that direction. But to Latin Americans it does not represent a clear and unambiguous assurance of the kind of general trade preference they have long been promised.

Today Latin America has a $2 billion trade deficit with the United States. While the United States is plagued with its own balance of payments problems, there is no reason why it should make its mark at the expense of Latin America. I would therefore propose that the United States allow Latin American manufactured and semimanufactured products, up to the $2 billion trade surplus, to come into the United States free of all duties and quotas. Such a step would be a significant one for Latin America and would be politically feasible in the United States, especially if Latin American countries would indicate their willingness to reduce their barriers against U.S. exports to the degree they benefit from increased exports to the United States.

4) *U.S. private investment in Latin America.* It is essential to develop a clear understanding between the countries of Latin America and the United States as to the precise relationship between the U.S. government and subsidiaries of U.S. companies operating in those countries. For conflict on this issue too often arouses antagonisms with widespread ramifications. It is time for the countries of Latin America and the United States to formulate together a code of conduct for responsible international companies. Such a code would specifically set forth the rights a U.S. company could expect and the duties it would have to the country in which it seeks to operate. Provision would be made for recourse to an international tribunal for resolution of any dispute, thereby avoiding unilateral action. Under such a code, a U.S. company could, in good conscience, call upon the U.S. government for help if it had been wronged. By the same token, the United States would be in a position to insist that U.S. companies fulfill their obligations to the country in which they were operating.

During recent years, various Latin American countries have, in pursuance of their national policies, imposed restraints and restrictions on U.S. companies and investments. Admittedly, some such limitations have been helpful to the developmental effort. But it would be appropriate for Latin American countries to reexamine restraints and restrictions imposed, in order to be certain that they are of benefit in advancing the countries' goals. Clearly, some such restrictions keep out vital goods, services, and capital with few or no concomitant gains for the local economy. In such instances, it would be valuable to remove the limitations and restrictions, not only because they are not beneficial, but also because they constitute formidable psychological blocks to cooperation and serve as a deterrent to further U.S. investment.

In the light of its great development needs, Latin America should be able to obtain the benefit of U.S. investment and technology on a more mutually fair basis. Perhaps a clearinghouse could be established in the United States that would undertake to provide Latin American countries with direct access to technical assistance from the smaller, noninternational U.S. firms and the individual technical experts that abound in the United States. In addition, the United States might try to help meet financial requirements by considering ways to facilitate floating Latin American bonds on local exchanges in the United States, perhaps supported by some kind of a guarantee program. Steps such as these could be both timely and helpful to further cooperation.

5) *Respect for differences.* Of critical importance to the future of the Americas is the need to respect differences among nations and to recognize that Latin America is seeking to fulfill its own destiny in its own way. Basic to this concept is the recognition of the fact that each nation must have the freedom to determine for itself its own political, social, and economic system; and when a particular government has been freely chosen by a country, that choice must be accepted and respected.

This means that the United States must be careful not to try to elbow its way in or to lecture the countries of Latin America on what they must do and how they must do it. Recognizing our own problems and our own unfulfilled aspirations, we can only approach the problems of others with humility. For if, with all our wealth and know-how, we continue to have such major difficulties in dealing with our own urban ghettos and rural blight; if, with all of our technological and scientific knowledge, people in the United States are still hungry; and if, with all of our commitments to democratic institutions, there are still those among us—even those in very high places—who resort to undemocratic means, then we should have some sense of the effort that will be required in Latin America as it seeks to achieve its own goals. In Latin America today there are frequently recalled the words of Spanish poet Antonio Machado: "Traveler, there is no path, paths are made by walking."

The 270 million people of Latin America are today trying to make their own path. In doing so, they need the cooperation, the commitment, and the support of the United States. With the assurance of our true partnership and our commitment to one another, we can all hope that we can yet move forward together toward a brighter tomorrow in a hemisphere free from war and free from want.