New England Journal of Medicine is archival, a journal of record, Ingelfinger says its function is educational—to carry the latest in medical knowledge to its 130,000 subscribers—and likens it to *Harper's* and the *Atlantic Monthly* in that it is a general, rather than a specialty, magazine in its field. Its archival role, he maintains, is secondary.

Ingelfinger's second point in explanation of his position on dual and prior publication has its roots in his attitude about what the public needs to know, and when, about peer review. "I ask you," he demanded of the participants at the Hershey meeting, "why a university man must tell you what he is doing in research until he is done. What is the rush?"

Ingelfinger believes that there is precious little going on that must be reported in depth by the news media in advance of scientific publication. He responds to reporters' contentions that they need full texts and data in order to report accurately by saying, "Although they pride themselves on reporting accurately, there is no assurance that what they report is accurate in the first place." In this regard, Ingelfinger is frequently accused by reporters of wanting to censor science news. He says he merely thinks it worthwhile to have a man's work reviewed by his peers before it is broadcast to the public. It is one of the most difficult issues about which to reach any consensus.

In approaching the question one must confront the motives underlying the attitudes of those concerned. There is the competitive side of the problem. Reporters do not want to wait for months until the *New England Journal of Medicine* comes out after they've heard something at a meeting, any more than Ingelfinger wants to be second into print. And there is the growing willingness—even desire—of many scientists to talk to the press on the belief that publicity will help them when their grants come up for approval. Researchers who even 2 or 3 years ago demurred when approached by newsmen have changed their minds and no longer look upon a conversation with a reporter as a breach of scientific decorum. Indeed, the notion that the public has a right to know about what is going on in the laboratory even before a project reaches completion is gaining momentum. This attitude was carefully spelled out after an FASEB conference 2 years ago, but was buried in a lengthy report in the *Federation Proceedings*, May-June 1971.

Although Ingelfinger now concedes that he may be willing to reconsider his policy, he has been fighting for the last couple of years to convince the editors of other journals to adopt his policy and, indeed, is trying to get the 300-member Council of Biology Editors

Rainmaking: Stockholm Stand Watered Down for Military

During the sometimes stormy international environmental meeting at Stockholm, there were disagreements not only among different countries, but within national delegations too. It has been learned that, during a meeting of the U.S. delegation there, a Department of Defense (DOD) official admitted that possible military use of weather modification was a key consideration in an official U.S. attempt to dilute a recommendation on climatic changes.

At Stockholm, Recommendation 218 of the work of Committee III was, like all hundred-or-so planks, discussed among the U.S. delegates before being taken up as official business. This plank required all governments to "carefully evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects and disseminate their findings . . ." and to "consult fully other interested states when activities carrying a risk of such effects are being contemplated or implemented."

The language of the recommendation sounds innocuous enough; however, the United States planned—successfully—to water it down even more. The U.S. position paper argued for the insertion of two phrases ("to the maximum extent feasible" and "wherever practicable") in the recommendation.

According to the U.S. official paper, the reason for the insertion was realism: ". . . The mechanisms by which man's activities might affect the climate are to a great extent imperfectly known," it said.

But according to sources present at an informal meeting of the U.S. delegation on 5 June, William Ruckelshaus, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), questioned the need for the United States to dilute this language. Ruckelshaus, it is said, persistently questioned the position papers' reasoning on this point. His comments apparently led into a discussion of weather modification, in which Robert M. White, administrator of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, and Lieutenant Colonel John Nolan, a DOD representative participated.

White allegedly asked Nolan if military uses of weather modification might pose a situation in which the United States would not notify other countries of effects on their climate. Nolan replied to the effect that that was exactly the case.

Subsequently, the conference as a whole voted to add one of the two U.S.-suggested phrases to the language of Recommendation 218.

The within-group discussions of the U.S. delegation to Stockholm are confidential. Most of those contacted would neither confirm nor deny the details of this incident. However, some were willing to confirm certain aspects and to say that a thorough discussion of weather modification had taken place. Nolan, when asked about these accounts, replied that they seemed to him "a dry hole." The DOD position, he said, was that "Stockholm was not a place to get involved in defense issues."

About a dozen observers were present during the alleged conversation, as well as other notables such as Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., of Tennessee; two State Department officials, Lowell Dowd and Donald King; Fitzhugh Green, assistant administrator of EPA; and David Keaney of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff. The Nolan admission adds more weight to rumors and shreds of evidence that the DOD has pursued weather modification activities in the course of the Indochina war (*Science*, 16 June). At the very least, it seem clear that DOD considers these tactics potentially valuable militarily.—D.S.