commander in the field must necessarily have great freedom of action to deal with the crises that confront him daily. But planning for the kinds of campaigns the commander may undertake, and the forces with which he should be supplied to undertake them, can give a larger role to analysts who are outside the chain of command, and whose professional background includes work in nonmilitary organizations—from universities to private research groups.

There should also be a larger role for these analysts in postauditing military operations, and a significant, perhaps primary, role for civilian policy leaders in leading an open, as well as an internal, debate on the implications of military choices and the decisions most appropriate to the nation's larger goals.

At the same time, a more effective flow of information to the top civilian authorities in the Pentagon on the execution of their policy directives is also needed. The military departments have their inspectors general at every level down to small units, but no inspector general function, broadly conceived, exists within the office of the Secretary of Defense. Although an inspector general cannot solve the problem of carrying out the intentions of the chief policy-maker down through all the layers of bureaucracy, he can flag those points where the process is breaking down.

Enthoven and Smith share this interest in strengthening the resources of independent analysis available to the President and the Secretary of Defense, but they are immediately concerned with seeing that the beachhead already established is not narrowed, a development for which they see evidence.

A main claim made for the McNamara dispensation at the Pentagon was that it freed the United States from a dependence on a strategy of "massive retaliation" and made possible a "flexible response." In the early days of the Kennedy era this meant increased spending on conventional warfare forces and a fascination with counterinsurgency techniques. In discussing this revision of strategy, the authors reconstruct the reasoning of the early 1960's. For example, General Maxwell Taylor is identified as an architect of the flexible-response doctrine designed to make it possible for the United States to react militarily without resorting to strategic weapons. Critics of the military stand these arguments on their heads and insist that the flexible response doctrine made Vietnam possible.

In the recently published The Pentagon Watchers: Students Report on the National Security State, edited by Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer, for example, General Taylor is portrayed as a protagonist of American intervention anywhere, anytime national interests, very broadly interpreted, are threatened. The new critics have little fondness for systems analysis, since, in their view, it simply makes intervention by the United States more effective.

Yarmolinsky and Co. and Enthoven and Smith, though hardly uncritical of the official policies or unaware of growing dissent against these policies, represent the pragmatists who have dominated United States strategic policy since World War II. Today it is opposite assumptions about the intentions of the Soviets and the Chinese more than differences over Vietnam which separate the pragmatists and their critics. And the two books under discussion never come fully to grips with the arguments of those who would say that enough in the terms of the pragmatists is too much.-John Walsh

Human Environment Conference: Slow Start toward Stockholm

A year from now, 1200 delegates from 130 nations will swarm into Stockholm to attend what is being billed as the first global conference on the full range of the earth's environmental problems. The United Nations, the sponsor of this huge gathering, hopes that it will spawn new international agreements to curb pollution of the air and sea, arouse new interest among nations in managing their resources, and stimulate cooperative research across the continents on conditions of the human habitat.

The U.N. officials who are trying to organize this undertaking are quick to concede that success or failure of the "Conference on the Human Environment" will be determined well before the delegates troop into Stockholm. Its level of achievement, they say, will depend on the level of interest accorded the meeting by participating governments. For the present,

however, interest seems somewhat less than enthusiastic.

Last week, members of Congress had a chance to hear about the expectations and preparations for the Stockholm meeting. But a 2-day colloquium organized by House and Senate committees to advertise the event appeared to generate little obvious excitement on Capitol Hill.

In addition to some 100 guests, invited mainly from university, industrial, and government science circles, only half a dozen of such environmental enthusiasts as Senators Hubert Humphrey and Edward Kennedy appeared at the old Supreme Court chamber in the Capitol Building to pay their obligatory respects and then quickly bow out. (Floor activities kept others, including Maine's Senator Edmund Muskie, from attending). Some reporters straggled out of the chamber early as the two-and-a-half hour ses-

sions overlapped the noon hour. Only one invited guest volunteered a question, and even that had little to do with what any of the nine speakers had to say.

Senator Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.), who presided over the colloquium with California's Representative George P. Miller,* had said that the meeting was meant to discuss the "status of scientific information as a basis for pending decisions on environmental problems . . ." Perhaps wisely, it largely skirted that issue, but a more practical purpose seemed implicit in the timing of the meeting. About a month from now, the State Department will ask Congress to foot a bill of still-undetermined size for U.S. participation at Stockholm next year.

Last week's colloquium was one of a series of similar meetings which the U.N. conference officials are attending around the world to drum up the interest of participating governments. Whether or not they succeeded here, they did provide a glimpse of the enormous difficulties inherent in bring-

^{*}Magnuson and Miller are the chairmen, respectively, of the Senate Commerce Committee and the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. Senator Howard H. Baker (R-Tenn.), the chairman of a citizens' advisory group to the U.S. conference delegation, also attended the colloquium.

NEWS & NOTES

• CORN BLIGHT WATCH: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) are planning an experimental ground and air study to monitor a possible revisitation of the southern corn leaf blight, which last year ruined 15 percent of the nation's corn crop. Selected areas in eight cornbelt states will be subjected to detailed ground observation, and NASA highaltitude aircraft will periodically take infrared photographs of about 45,000 square miles of corn-belt area.

Although the project is primarily an experiment designed to detect spread of the blight, USDA officials hope to be able to predict the course of the disease so that farmers can apply fungicides before it reaches their crops. The corn leaf aphid is thought to have caused the greatest loss incurred by a single disease to a single crop in one season in the history of agriculture. America's last big crop plague occurred in 1953 and 1954, when a wheat rust destroyed 25 percent of the bread wheat in the United States.

• FOREST STUDIES: Eight eastern universities have joined in a consortium with the United States Forest Service to study how to conserve and expand the remaining forests and natural environments of the heavily populated Northeast. The program, called the Consortium for Environmental Forestry Studies, has been established within the framework of the Forest Service's newly created Pinchot Institute for Environmental Forestry Research.

• FUND TO AID COLLEGE IN-**VESTING:** A new nonprofit organization has been established to supply colleges and universities with professional management of investments from their endowment funds. The corporation, called the Common Fund for Nonprofit Organizations, is designed to be of particular aid to institutions with small endowments (up to \$3.5 million). The Ford Foundation is giving grants totaling \$2.8 million for the setting up of the fund, which is eventually expected to become self-supporting. The fund's board of trustees, which is headed by Dartmouth College vice president John F. Meck, anticipates that 25 to 50 institutions will entrust an average of \$1 million each by 1 July, when the fund starts operating.

ing together 130 nations to talk productively—even about a matter seemingly as urgent, universal, and apolitical as degradation of the biosphere.

A key point that emerged from the 2-day discussion was that governments of many developing nations have yet to be convinced to take more than a pro forma interest in the proceedings at Stockholm. Further, there is good reason to believe that next year's conference will suffer the crippling effects of old political and cultural wounds such as the division of Germany; indeed, that particular issue, unrelated to environment as it is, has already intruded on conferences preliminary to the main show next year. And perhaps of most immediate concern, conference officials admit that preparations for next year started late and that there is little time to waste.

Sweden's Proposal

The suggestion for a global conference on the environment came from the Swedish delegation to the U.N. in 1968. Such a meeting was regarded as a logical step beyond a flurry of more parochial conferences that the U.N. had sponsored on selected environmental issues since the mid-1950's. There had been a series of international meetings to examine world population growth. The first was a 1954 meeting in Rome that produced a prediction that by 1980 the world population would reach 3500 million. (That figure was passed before 1970.) Other meetings dealt with radiation hazards and the exploitation of unconventional energy sources—geothermal tides, and sunlight. An arm of the U.N., the Economic Commission for Europe, dealt with water pollution on that continent in 1961. Yet another big conference in Geneva in 1963 focused on the application of science and technology to underdeveloped nations.

A General Assembly resolution, adopted in December 1968, established the Stockholm conference, but thereafter the wheels of organization slowed drastically. At the end of 1969, a staff report of the Secretary General urged that a conference staff be gathered as quickly as possible in the new year and that an executive secretary be appointed "immediately." But it was not until last November that the U.N. selected Maurice F. Strong, a former director of Canada's \$400 million foreign aid program, to put it all together by the summer of 1972.

Originally, Strong told last week's colloquium, the conference objective was merely to "alert the world to the environmental crisis." But the natural course of events soon made that goal superfluous. "This is no longer our main emphasis," he said. "Concern has accelerated so quickly since 1968 that we now see the prime task of this conference as translating this concern into action"

This is likely to prove a staggering order for international diplomacy. To fill it, Strong is attempting to orchestrate a bewildering profusion of preliminary activities. Working under a \$1.9 million budget, he directs a 27member preparatory committee and staff from Geneva. While that group polishes up an agenda, five "intergovernmental working groups" drawn from the "prep comm" are trying to come to tentative agreements on such matters as the creation of a global monitoring system for pollutants, means of abating marine pollution, and the drafting of a "declaration on the human environment." Strong's staff is also beginning to receive the first of the "basic papers" requested from U.N. member-governments outlining each nation's key environmental concerns (15 are in preparation by groups culled from U.S. government agencies). Regional meetings to promote the conference are scheduled in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. And finally, Strong has enlisted Rene Dubos, of Rockefeller University, and Barbara Ward, the British economist and writer, to lead several dozen scientists in producing a massive "State of the World Environment" report to be completed by the end of the year.

All of this activity is itself worthwhile, Strong said. But he cautioned that "success or failure will depend in the last analysis on the level of political will with which the governments are armed when they arrive at Stockholm."

Winning the "will" of the developing nations before next June, however, may require overcoming some deep-harbored suspicions about the motives of the environmental movement.

Francesco di Castri, an ecologist at Chile's Austral University, noted that, in nations where the economy is closer to the margins of human survival, governments naturally "resist establishing controls that could limit in any way the rate of industrialization." Further, di Castri indicated that a number of Latin

American governments look on ecology as merely a professional extension of birdwatching or as "simply the antipollution science," whose chief impact might be to increase the cost of building factories and digging mines.

Strong tended to agree. But he said that, while the term "environment" had yet to acquire a charismatic appeal among developing nations, the issues it embraces—especially those of exploding urban populations—are of "real and growing concern to them."

Similarly, B. R. Seshachar, a zoologist at Delhi University and president of the Indian National Science Academy, said that it was "extremely important that the developing countries do not obtain the impression that advanced countries are attempting to thwart development," by using pollution-control as an excuse to slow industrialization.

But if the U.N. conference next year

must contend with the reluctance of the poor, it seems that the petulance of the wealthy may be a problem too.

An East-West Flap

Christian A. Herter, Jr., the U.S. State Department's chief representative to the U.N. conference, told the colloquium that a diplomatic dispute over the status to be accorded East Germany during a pan-European environmental conference in Prague earlier this month had "nearly wrecked" the conference. The Prague meeting had been organized by the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, and its purpose was to generate interest in the main event next year. Soviet delegates, Herter said, blocked proceedings for 5 days in an attempt to win membership privileges for the German Democratic Republic. "They nearly took it to the breaking point," he said, but the confrontation ended in "harmony" when participants

agreed to demote the meeting to a "symposium," connoting a lesser meeting of experts, not of governments.

Senator Magnuson asked whether the German dispute might surface at Stockholm, and whether mainland China, with one-third of the earth's population, might be invited to attend.

In a burst of extreme optimism, Herter replied that, "We don't know what effect [this issue] will have at Stockholm, but I hope that it may be resolved by the two Germanys before the 1972 conference." China's attendance, he said, may be settled by a U.N. membership vote this fall.

Through it all, Maurice Strong remains buoyant: "Stockholm will be neither the beginning nor the end. . . . It will be, I trust, the launching pad for a major new international quest for global knowledge about the relationship between the human race and its earthly habitat."—ROBERT GILLETTE

Drug Efficacy Study: FDA Yields on Fixed Combinations

Our problems persist; in fact, they hardly ever change character or form. There are times I feel condemned like the mythical Sisyphus, who, you may recall, had to push a heavy stone up a steep hill in Hades, only to have it always roll down again when he approached the top.—W. H. Conzen, outgoing chairman of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and president of Schering and Plough, Inc., discussing the problems of the drug industry.

In the above statement, Conzen is referring to the rocks of regulation that the federal government occasionally hurls into the drug manufacturers' valley of profit. And, in spite of the way they view their grim fate, Conzen and his colleagues have been quite successful over the years in pushing the government's rocks up that steep hill and out of their valley.

Just in the past few weeks, the drug companies have brought sufficient pressure on the Food and Drug Administration to lessen the impact of the agency's new drug effectiveness policies. Based on the 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, the effectiveness policies mark a major turning point in the regulation of prescription drug sales. The outcome of the current con-

frontation over these policies between the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry will have far-reaching implications for American medicine. Included among the issues in contention are the questions of whether controlled studies should replace empiricism in the determination of which drugs are put on the market, and the "rights" of doctors to treat their patients with anything they choose.

Passed in the wake of the thalidomide tragedy, the 1962 amendments require that drugs be shown to be effective, with respect to the manufacturers' claims, before they are put on the market. Prior to 1962, the drug companies had only to demonstrate product safety. The 1962 amendments applied not only to new drugs but also retroactively to all drugs introduced between 1938 and 1962. Thus, FDA was faced with the monumental task of evaluating the validity of over 10,000 claims made for some 3000 drugs, including most of the commonly prescribed drugs in the country.

After a 2-year grace period followed by a 2-year delay, FDA turned to the National Academy of Sciences and its National Research Council to implement the study. The NAS-NRC established 30 panels, each consisting of six academic and medical experts, to evaluate the claims of a certain group of remedies. On the basis of the scientific literature, information from the manufacturers and from the FDA, and "the experience and informed judgment of the members of the panel," the drugs were classified into a series of categories: effective, probably effective, possibly effective, ineffective, ineffective as a fixed combination, and a catchall category of effective but doubtful about certain claims.

At the conclusion of the NAS-NRC study, which spanned the 3 years from 1966 to 1969, the panelists said in their final report that they found a "deplorable situation" in the quality of the labeling of the drugs and in the quality of the evidence submitted by the drug manufacturers to back up their claims of effectiveness. They rated only 20 percent of all the drug claims as effective and 39 percent of the individual