

Daddario: Scientific Community's Friend on the Hill Is Leaving

Representative Emilio Q. Daddario (D-Conn.), the scientific community's most unselfish, energetic, and irrelevant political friend, is departing Congress, leaving as mementos to his special concern a grotesquely revamped National Science Foundation and, of most recent vintage, the record of summer-long hearings on that shopworn phantom, the need for a national science policy, otherwise known, in the present-day context, as more money.

Pressed into service by a party machine that needs him to run for governor, Daddario will be grievously missed by the leaders of the scientific community, but not because he was able to deliver the funds they imploringly sought from Congress. That was something he clearly wanted to do. But delivery was beyond his power, simply because the vagaries of the congressional committee system located him in a position where he could exhort, recommend, and illuminate—but not disburse money. Rather, he will be missed because, as chairman of the subcommittee on science, research, and development of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, he voluntarily embraced the scientific community and gave it a forum for pleading its case before a Congress that had become indifferent and even hostile toward research. And he did this from a fairly narrow legislative base, skillfully maneuvering his subcommittee, after its creation in 1963, among such well-established legislative giants on Capitol Hill as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the various committees that have staked out health-related matters as their special concern.

It can be reasonably argued that, in befriending the scientific community, Daddario was engaging in a rare act of political altruism and public service, for it is hard to see what he himself got out of it politically, in Congress or among his constituents, and it is easy to see how he might well have derived greater political benefit by riding the vogue of public disenchantment with science. Daddario's House colleague Henry Reuss of Wisconsin did just that,

with a Government Operations subcommittee, before tiring of the subject, and so did Fred Harris, for a time, with a similar subcommittee in the Senate.

As for recent fellow champions of research, such as the late Representative John Fogarty of Rhode Island or his Senate counterpart in medical affairs, the now-retired Lister Hill of Alabama, it was a quasi-mystical, uncritical faith in research, rather than a cool assessment of its place in national life, that more likely than not accounted for the fervency of their support. The late Representative Albert Thomas of Texas, who presided over the financial affairs of the National Science Foundation for its first dozen years, saw the light when some prize, such as the ill-fated Mohole venture, landed near his congressional district. And Thomas' successor in that subcommittee chairmanship, Joe L. Evins of Tennessee, has shown signs of appreciating science ever since a redrawing of boundaries put the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in his district—and NSF started putting substantial funds into Oak Ridge.

But Daddario goes into the record books as a dispassionate, disinterested friend, who arrived in the subcommittee chairmanship at a time when the blank-check era for science was ending

and Congress was beginning to ask embarrassing questions. One of his first acts as chairman was to hire the National Academy of Sciences to produce a series of studies on why the government should support basic research, and to what extent. The ensuing report, *Basic Research and National Goals*, did a stout job of sermonizing to the existing true believers, but it cannot be demonstrated that it brought forth an additional penny or changed any attitude one whit. Nevertheless, the relationship between Daddario and the Academy flourished, principally because he, alone of all congressmen, was willing to listen to that prestige-laden but generally ignored organization. As one Academy official said, "I don't know where it's getting us, but he's all we've got."

Just where it did get science in its relations with the federal government is perhaps open to some debate. The most favorable assessment would conclude that the slight improvements that have recently taken place in the financial fortunes of NSF can be attributed at least in part to the steady din of ominous warnings and statements of distress sounded before Daddario's subcommittee. But if Daddario's operation was a success, how are we to account for the following declaration by Academy president Philip Handler at the subcommittee's hearings on national science policy? "Our national apparatus for the conduct of research is not yet dismantled, but it is falling into shambles. Morale of the scientific community is lower than at any time since World War II. New fields of scientific exploration clamor for attention and for funding."

Scarcely a triumphant communiqué, though it might be argued that grounds for an even drearier report would have existed but for Daddario's efforts.

Since NSF, more than any other federal agency, embodies the principle of federal money for science controlled by scientists, its financial anemia has consistently distressed the leaders of science. Early in his involvement with science, Daddario picked up this concern, but in his desire to do something, and especially to attach his name to a significant piece of legislation—a goal that otherwise evaded him through his congressional career—he bounded off in a direction that produced perplexity among some of the very scientists whom he had befriended. Barred by congressional jurisdictional lines from giving NSF more money (only the appropriations committees can do that), he made



Emilio Q. Daddario

15 Top Economists Oppose SST

Most of the opposition to the controversial supersonic transport (SST) project has been based on a feeling that the SST does not warrant a high national priority and on fears that the SST will cause annoying, perhaps even catastrophic, environmental problems. But last week, as a crucial Senate vote on continued financing for the controversial project was drawing near, 15 of the nation's leading economists, reflecting both conservative and liberal viewpoints, declared in separate statements that the SST would be an unwise investment for the government to make. The statements, which had been solicited by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and by the Sierra Club, both SST opponents, were inserted in the Congressional Record by Fulbright on 15 September, together with the statement of a single economist who gave the project a qualified endorsement.*

A constant strain running through the opponents' comments was the belief that the SST should stand or fall in the competitive marketplace. As Milton Friedman, of the University of Chicago, expressed it: "If the SST is worth building, the market will make it in Boeing's interest to build it without a subsidy; if a subsidy is needed, the SST should not be built." As for assertions that the project is too mammoth to be financed by private companies and banks, Richard R. Nelson, of Yale, noted that Boeing recently was able to borrow more than \$500 million to finance the 747 jumbo jet, and Merton J. Peck, also of Yale, noted that the automobile industry regularly finds private financing of \$500 million each year for its model changes. Thus the two economists suggested that the SST program, which will cost an estimated \$1.6 billion over several years for prototype construction, should be able to find private financing if it were really a good investment.

Most of the economists rejected contentions that the SST is needed so that the U.S. aircraft industry can maintain its technological lead and thus continue to sell planes abroad in sufficient quantities to avoid possible adverse balance of payments problems. Indeed, many of the economists argued that the future balance of payments situation and the impact the SST will have on it are unpredictable, and that such considerations should not rank high in considering the merits of the SST anyway. "What we need are efficient exports that can pay their way . . . not contrived, subsidized additions to our balance of payments," said Paul Samuelson, of M.I.T. Friedman called the balance of payments argument "a complete 'red herring' as is obvious if you reverse the question and ask whether, if somehow our balance of payments were to move toward a large surplus, Boeing would then urge that the SST project be dropped."

As for contentions that the SST program is needed to spur employment in the sagging aerospace industry, Samuelson had this to say: "Any way that the U.S. government or anyone else spends a billion dollars on goods will make a billion dollars worth of jobs, and it would be a return to the outmoded depression philosophy of makework—in which men are hired to do useless things like digging holes and filling them up again . . . if we were to succumb to the make-jobs argument."

The sole supporter of the SST was Henry Wallich, of Yale, a consultant to the Treasury, who noted that while "the gains from faster and more frequent travel seem small," nevertheless "we must proceed on the assumption that supersonic transports will fly, ours or someone else's" and consequently the United States "had better proceed to capture such economic advantages as are to be had by building the plane." Not what you could call a hearty endorsement.—PHILIP M. BOFFEY

* Opponents of the SST included Kenneth J. Arrow, Francis Bator, William M. Capron, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Wassily Leontief, all of Harvard; W. J. Baumol, Princeton; Milton Friedman, Chicago; Walter W. Heller, Minnesota, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Kennedy; C. P. Kindleberger, Paul Samuelson, and Robert M. Solow, all of M.I.T.; Richard R. Nelson, Merton J. Peck, and James Tobin, all of Yale; and Arthur M. Okun, Brookings, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Johnson. The sole SST supporter was Yale's Henry C. Wallich.

use of what little power was available to him and reorganized the Foundation. A lot of the statesmen of science felt that money, not organization, was the problem. But, when friends are scarce, one tends to indulge their obsessions.

Whereas the original NSF Act specified that only the director was to be appointed by the President, the Daddario version gave the White House responsibility for appointing also the deputy director and four assistant directors—all of which is a lot of Presidential appointments for what is, after all, a relatively small agency. The idea, of course, was to give NSF greater political visibility on the Washington landscape, and to move it away from the notion that it fares best out of the mainstream of White House concern. Whether this is the case remains to be seen, but, almost all along, it has been Congress, not the White House, that has remained unpersuaded about the role and importance of NSF.

Other Daddario-inspired changes increased NSF's authority to support applied research; this, since it was unaccompanied by any wherewithal, produced diplomatically suppressed groans among the Foundation's basic research clients. And then the revision replaced NSF's open-ended financial authorization and put NSF in the class of those federal agencies that must annually go to Congress to have a ceiling set for their appropriations, before going on to the appropriations committees to plead for funds that actually reach that ceiling. Since House appropriations hearings, which are usually the crucial ones, are held in closed session, the new arrangement did guarantee the scientific community an opportunity to state its case publicly, in Congress, and there is now an assurance that, even post-Daddario, the opportunity remains. The underlying assumption, of course, is that Congress is responsive to rational argument.

The National Science Policy hearings, involving 28 witnesses over 15 days, spread out from 7 July to 17 September, can be viewed as Daddario's farewell to the science-government relationship.

The cast of characters was, in large part, so familiar that the official transcript shows the chairman and many of the witnesses addressing each other by their first names. Equally familiar was the consensus that emerges from over 1000 pages of statements and dialogue: NSF needs more money; NSF should be the centerpiece of fed-

eral support for basic science, but should not occupy a dominant role, since the mission-oriented agencies should retain a significant presence in support of basic science. Characteristically, the witness roster stuck to the center of the ideological road in its selections. As was the case throughout Daddario's tenure, no place was given to those who feel that serious questions can be raised about the values and objectives of contemporary research. This, however, is not surprising. Daddario never represented himself as other than a friend of the existing order. He might admonish it to respond to the needs of political reality, but he was not prescribing a fundamental shakeup.

As for what, if any, science policy the United States should adopt, there was a good deal of agreement at the hearings that it is difficult to accommodate scientific activities within a set of words that will both stimulate research and meet social and political preferences. Many worthy things were said on and around this subject. Among them was an observation by Myron Tribus, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology.

"Many people appear to be concerned with establishing a science policy because there has been a recent decrease in the rate of growth of science funding. I believe that many people are espousing a need for a better definition of science policy, when in fact they want more money. This type of thinking should be disabused. Science policy is not the same as more money in support of science. Rather, today we need a national science policy as a tool to enable us to make better use of limited funds. Further," Tribus continued, "the enunciation of a national science policy should not be equated with a commitment to fund it. The process of funding must be fought over and over with each budget cycle. What is important is to have a science policy which makes that struggle more rational."

Daddario's other principal achievement in his chairmanship was to bring the murky subject of technology assessment to some prominence in Congress. The field is obviously so important but so immature, so poorly formulated, and so studded with well-intentioned confusion spreaders and not a few self-serving charlatans, that a good public

discussion, prior to pouring concrete, is precisely what is called for. Through extensive hearings, Daddario's subcommittee provided just that, and now, at least, there is a good public record available for those concerned with the problem.

All in all, Daddario's 7 years as chairman were mainly concerned with providing such a record on critical matters that the rest of Congress and most of the public tended to ignore. The remarkable thing is that he did so much with so little, and the pity is that the peculiarities of congressional power kept him from a position where he might have done more.

Daddario's successor in the chairmanship will be John W. Davis, of Georgia, an attorney by training who has served in Congress since 1961. He has not been an especially active member of the subcommittee, but ascendancy to a chairmanship often provides a spur to interest and activity. One measure of the feeling of friendlessness that prevails today in Washington among research leaders is that some of them see a favorable sign in the fact that Davis is an amateur astronomer.—D. S. GREENBERG

Peace Corps Physicians: Reflections on the Future

Put more than 200 physicians who have served overseas in the Peace Corps into the posh, pastoral setting of the Airlie House conference center south of Washington for a weekend, ask them to consider the theme "Health Care in the Seventies: Crisis and Opportunity," and the results are fairly predictable. The 2-day meeting on 12 and 13 September mixed varying proportions of reunion, recruiting, and discussion of reform of the health care system. The conference produced no cosmic conclusions, but it did offer some interesting reflections by doctors who in age and attitude represent a group who will play a pivotal role if there are to be major changes in health services in the seventies.

Assembled, the Peace Corps physicians (PCP's) or "Peace Corps docs,"

as they are likelier to call themselves, would surprise anybody expecting a homogeneous group. At the conference they displayed a full range of regional accents and of political, tonsorial, and sartorial styles, although in all sectors the moderates predominated.

The returned PCP's divide historically into two groups. From the establishment of the Peace Corps early in the Kennedy Administration until 1967, service in the Peace Corps satisfied a physician's military obligation. Many PCP's of that era are frank in saying that this fact influenced their choice of the Peace Corps. In that period most PCP's served directly after completing their internships. Since the draft law was changed in 1967, increasing numbers of PCP's have been recruited from among doctors already in

practice. There is no upper age limit for recruiting, and the median age of PCP's abroad has risen to about 40.

Overseas, the PCP's primary responsibility is the care of Peace Corps Volunteers in the host country to which the doctor is assigned. Often the PCP's are also responsible for the technical direction of public health programs operated by Peace Corps workers. In addition, however, practically all PCP's become extensively involved in voluntary work in which they use their medical skills. Patterns vary greatly but most typically, it seems, Peace Corps doctors work in local hospitals and collaborate with local physicians in disease control and other public health projects. The wives of PCP's—there have been only a few women among the roughly 300 PCP's so far—are usually much involved both in dealing with volunteers and in other projects.

The PCP signs up for 2 to 4 months of training and no less than 30 months overseas. Annual pay ranges between \$13,000 and \$23,000 according to stage of career, plus the sort of fringe benefits and perquisites accorded State