mote policies on trade, investment, and finance which would be favorable to development.

Under the Peterson report formula, AID's principal heirs would be a new U.S. International Development Bank and a U.S. International Development Institute. The bank would make capital and technical assistance loans for "selected programs of special interest to the United States" and would also support cooperative programs worked out by developing countries and international agencies. The bank would have authority to borrow in the public money market, but its government backing would permit it to set terms appropriate to development financing.

The new development institute would administer technical assistance programs not directly linked to projects financed by the bank; its research and training objectives are outlined in the section of the Peterson report section that says the institute should ". . . seek new breakthroughs in the application of science and technology to resources and processes critical to the developing nations. The Institute would concentrate on research, training, population problems, and social and civic development. It would work largely through private organizations and would rely on highly skilled scientific and professional personnel. It would seek to multiply this corps of U.S. talent and experience by supporting local training and research institutions. The Institute would be managed by a full-time director and a mixed public-private board of trustees."

This prescription by the task force sets forth a range of R & D activities which AID has aspired to but has never achieved, in part because of the historical and political context in which the aid program developed.

In the early postwar period of aid to European countries and Japan, a combination of loans and technical assistance proved adequate to spur the reconstruction of war-damaged economies. No serious research program was necessary to make U.S. aid more effective. In the next phase, a large flow of American foreign aid funds went to less developed countries on the peripheries of the Soviet Union, such as Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Foreign aid in this era was implicitly connected to the U.S. containment policies, and, despite the shift in the nature of the problems facing the aid program, the aid mechanisms created for dealing with industrialized nations were not extensively modified and not much serious research was undertaken.

In the middle and late 1950's, as the focus of the American aid effort shifted to the underdeveloped nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, it became clear that economic development was being hindered by deficiencies in health and education and by the weakness of public institutions in general and that development would be a complex, long-term undertaking.

After Sputnik, most federal agencies sought to improve their efforts at applying science and technology to their problems and AID was no exception. A knowledgeable group of advisers, many of them from outside government, urged that AID establish a centralized, well-financed research office which could initiate and finance research activities and serve as a link with universities, foundations, and private industry and with other government agencies.

The idea was championed at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration by Presidential science adviser Jerome Wiesner and was incorporated in the new AID organization which was the Kennedy incarnation of the aid program. Despite official approval, several things conspired to cause the research office to come a cropper in its first year. There was a certain indifference to the research effort among AID's loan-oriented top management and a hostility from lesser bureaucrats who saw research as a competitor for funds and status. In the research community at large, research on development problems was not very fashionable and strong research proposals did not pour in.

The Administration was determined to press ahead, however, and a staff for the research office was put together hastily, a sizable chunk of funds was allocated late in the year, and a number of grants rushed through. The upshot (*Science*, 17 May 1963) was a censorious report on the research program by a House committee, which embarrassed everybody connected with the effort and severely set back research in AID. The research office was really a victim of too much too soon.

Under a new AID administrator, David E. Bell, a moderately successful rehabilitation effort for research was carried out. First Joachim Weyl, former chief scientist at the Office of Naval Research, and then Albert H. Moseman, who had been serving as head of the Rockefeller Foundation's agricultural research program, were

David Sworn in as Top Science Aide

President Nixon officiated at the swearing in of his new science adviser, Edward E. David, Jr., on 14 September, and lauded him as a champion of both basic and applied research. Noting that David, executive director of communications system research at Bell Labs, had been active in research on aircraft antihijack devices, the President said that those who blame science for the problems produced by aviation, might also consider that without science, there would be no antihijack devices. Despite the fact that he is a "very practical man," the President said, David also has "a deep commitment to basic research." To which Nixon added, "Benjamin Franklin, when a balloon was flown, was asked, 'What good is it?' And Franklin replied," the President continued, " 'What good is a baby?' "

In attendance at the White House Rose Garden ceremony was the President's Science Advisory Committee, which, according to custom, elected David as its chairman. The Committee subsequently met with the President for about an hour.

Earlier in the day, David appeared before the Senate Labor and Public Works Committee to be confirmed as director of the Office of Science and Technology, Chairman Ralph Yarborough, of Texas, after having greeted him as "David Edward," first took up the nomination of Raymond L. Bisplinghoff as deputy director of the National Science Foundation. Among other things, Yarborough pointed out, Bisplinghoff was "professor of astronomics" at M.I.T. Senator Jacob Javits, of New York, was the only other member present, and he left after a few minutes. Virtually the only questions asked of the two nominees during the 20-minute hearing related to possible conflicts of interest, and these questions were few and friendly.—D.S.G.