

A Humanistic Science

Social Psychology and Human Values. Selected Essays. M. BREWSTER SMITH. Aldine, Chicago, 1969. x + 438 pp. \$12.50.

This compilation of 26 of Brewster Smith's many published writings (to which he has added opening and closing pieces, as well as one or two others that are new) may be taken as a fairly complete representation of what an able and wide-reaching social psychologist has done in the first 30 years of his professional life. What emerges illuminates both the man and his discipline.

The breadth of Smith's work will, I think, surprise even some of those who have long followed and admired it. The reprinted papers come from journals in political science, in higher education, in psychiatry, and in public health—not to mention several "standard" psychological journals—and from edited volumes dealing with topics as diverse as politico-economic development and cognitive consistency. There is also a wide range of problem-settings in these papers: Smith discusses his own studies of Peace Corps teachers in Ghana, of foreign students in America, of prejudice in school systems, and of "the moral orientations of protesting college youth." Four papers deal with aspects of mental health.

Many of the papers derived from special settings deal with theoretical issues. Thus studies of Peace Corps teachers are used to deduce "common strands" in individual competence—a favorite theme of Smith's. "Mental health as a rubric" emerges, under his analysis, not as a theoretical concept but as a "label for an evaluative psychological perspective on personality," and provides the occasion for warning that it is not the intrusion of values but the surreptitiousness of the intrusion that is scientifically regrettable.

For Smith, the concept "personal values" is a necessary one in the developmental "study of lives" (chapter 7). Borrowing from Clyde Kluckhohn, he describes values as "a particular class of personal dispositions: conceptions of the desirable that are relevant to selective behavior. [They] are attitudes, in the sense of object-directed personal dispositions. But they are a special kind of attitude, functioning as standards by which choices are evaluated. [They] pertain . . . to the realm

of the ought rather than that of 'is' or 'want'" (p. 102). The self-value, in particular, serves to link personality with society and culture. Here Smith draws more upon Heider than upon G. W. Allport (to whose memory the book is dedicated); in fact, he deplores the "lack of exact fit between the present conception and that underlying the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey *A Study of Values* [which] gets at consistent patterns of verbally expressed preferences" that are not necessarily "sustained by convictions about the preferable" (p. 103).

From the book as a whole, as well as from such passages as these, one concludes that Smith's "conception" serves as a guiding theme for the understanding in the study of lives rather than as a precise or an operational construct. Its serviceability is overarching rather than specific. One observation may serve to support this conclusion. In chapter 2, there appears a rather elaborate "conceptual map for the analysis of personality and politics." Among four panels of variables and processes that jointly contribute to political behavior, the term "value" appears but once (bracketed with motives and interests) among some dozens of concepts; the term "attitude" appears seven times. If the status of value in contemporary social psychology emerges as more overarching than undergirding, this is, I suspect, a faithful representation of the field as it is today.

The theme of "rationality" appears in the titles of almost the first and almost the last of Smith's papers and, less conspicuously, often in between. In the context of politics (chapter 2), individual decisions are rational insofar as they "are grounded in processes of object appraisal . . . in the sense that they represent a weighing of means-end relationships." If, as certain data suggest, "voters in the aggregate may look more rational than they do singly," it is because "irrational private components . . . vary unsystematically across persons." In chapter 26, individual rationality is considered as a developmental problem: How does a baby "acquire rationality and selfhood in interaction" with others? Overly severe or obscure challenges to adaptation foster irrationality, as does inadequate opportunity for social validation (although socially shared autisms may be objectively irrational). At any rate, Smith finds the crux of the devel-

opmental picture in socially transmitted rules of the game, together with "values associated with their use," all of which he labels "rational culture." Thus, "rationality is a social achievement . . . and rational thought a social process" (p. 378). G. H. Mead, Piaget, and John Dewey are duly noted as sources of "clues."

Theoretical questions of *rationality* are not explicitly discussed in the same breath with those of *values*—the theme that shares the book's title role. (I find no indexed reference to either term that is also indexed for the other.) Many social psychologists solve (or avoid) the problem simply by regarding values as objects of study, appertaining to persons being studied but not to theorists or researchers themselves. Smith is clearly not one of them, as is evidenced by his very personal and forthright introductory chapter, from which the following excerpt is relevant:

How to fit voluntaristic choice into a deterministic science is a truly basic psychological problem. . . . Like all knowledge, social psychological understanding is, of course, two-edged. My commitment is to its use in ways that augment human freedom, but knowledge can also be used manipulatively in ways that diminish it. Again, we encounter the self-fulfilling prophecy. Social psychologists who believe in the potentiality, if not the full actuality, of human freedom are likely to treat people, in and out of research, with the respect that causally enhances their actual freedom. . . . Those who do not hold this belief are likely to treat people in ways that tend to reduce them to the quasi-machines that fit the mechanistic theory. Here lies the danger of a social psychology that is artificially divorced from human values. My hope in these essays is to advance the development of a science of social man that begins to do justice to his humanity—a science of man that is for man, too.

THEODORE M. NEWCOMB
Department of Psychology,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

British Social Anthropology

Comparative Studies in Kinship. JACK GOODY. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1969. xviii + 262 pp. \$7.50.

The author is a distinguished member of the theoretical school of British social anthropology, and in many ways his work exemplifies a way of thinking about social anthropology which emerged from the intellectual primacy

of Radcliffe-Brown in the '30's and '40's and has held the high middle ground among our transatlantic colleagues since. Ten of his numerous papers are reproduced in this book.

The British school seems to adhere to three axioms about social anthropology. The first is that a prolonged immersion in the life of alien peoples should be the central experience in the training of an anthropologist; one result of this emphasis has been a succession of detailed, finely wrought studies of non-Western (particularly African) societies. Second, the British, with some notable exceptions, largely eschew statistical formulations in favor of broader-ranging generalizations based on native theory and practice. Third, and perhaps most important, British social anthropology sees social structure as central, as *the* independent variable, and explains belief systems, ritual, economic activity, and so forth in terms of their relation to social organization based in kinship and group formation. This view of social enquiry has changed over the past decade, but it nevertheless pervades much of the material in this book.

The ten essays can be grouped into four parts, for the purposes of discussion: general social science issues (one essay), "bread and butter" issues (five essays), dynamic formulations (two essays), and divertissements (two essays). The general essay is a think piece devoted to the future of social anthropology. Goody sees British anthropology becoming more like American sociology, that is, more quantitative and statistically oriented, as though the future lay in beta weights and regression equations. This comes about as the subjects of anthropological enquiry become more Westernized, or decolonized, and their growing sophistication and *amour propre* demand a Kinsey approach rather than paper-and-pencil or "mud hut" efforts.

"Bread and butter issues" are the stuff of British social anthropology. They include the principles of group formation in traditional society and the processes of integration and fission. Consistent attention has been paid to jural rules—the conscious moral principles that order behavior in the domestic and political group. Social models have been generally built up from a focus on the individual, and attention has been paid to the manner in which his social identity is constructed by virtue of his participation in organizations of increasing size and complexity. Comparative studies have been important, the idea

being that through comparison implicit measures of sociological constructs can be effected. Here two important clarifying essays appear. One is on the comparative study of descent groups, that is, subgroups of a society recruited on the basis of their kinship to each other through males (patrilineal), through females (matrilineal), or through both matrilineal and patrilineal (double descent). The question whether a society can be said to be characterized by double descent if the complementary line (matriline in a patrilineal society and vice versa) is recognized in a shadowy or residual fashion is raised but not settled. It is probably not very significant one way or the other, in the long run, but it is certainly useful for anthropologists to know what each other is talking about when they use these typological constructs, and the essay has proved valuable for that. Another essay, "The mother's brother in West Africa," is devoted to the evaluation of the notion of linearity, patrilineal and matrilineal. It has often been assumed that the "strength of linearity" in a society is both important and measurable, and correlates (divorce rate, strength of sibling bond, bride wealth) have been suggested on the basis of a putative measure of lineage strength; but so far we have not even managed an ordering relation, let alone anything more powerful—which suggests that perhaps notions like linearity are not very useful as ethnological constructs or for theory construction. Nevertheless, for the practicing ethnographer, such constructs are ineluctable; they organize a great many data and correspond to the way the subjects conceptualize their social world.

Like many other British social anthropologists, Goody is impressed by typology. He suggests, for example, that we should distinguish between kinds of incest (given the type of social system in which it is embedded) and kinds of adultery, in the hope that, if the anthropologists could only be reliable in their class assignments, comparative work could be carried out with productive accuracy, and the ideal of a comparative sociology could be realized to a greater degree than at present.

It is when Goody passes from the traditional concerns of his colleagues to the field work and to problems of dynamics that his ethnographic and synthetic gift comes to the fore. In an interesting essay on inheritance, social change, and the boundary problem, he

takes as his independent variable not some element such as patrilineal descent but rather a relation, a process of interaction between social categories, and finds that he can explain socioeconomic variables by reference to that relation. In his conclusion he suggests: "An analytic frame that fails to allow for . . . conflict of interest and for the preventive measures associated with it has distinct limitations for a social scientist. A dominating interest in 'structure' can lead to a neglect of the dynamic forces that make both for continuity and change" (p. 141). His collation and analysis of a large quantity of intractable data are admirable. Similarly his handling of his data on assimilation in another essay reveals much of importance, hardly summarized in his statement: "While there are a number of factors involved in these differences in incorporation, marriage policy is overwhelmingly the most important: for most purposes the situation in Northern Ghana can be summarised in the proposition that the rate of incorporation . . . varies directly with the rate of marriage. . . . For outmarriage is more than an index of assimilation: it is the main mechanism whereby integration is achieved" (pp. 171-72).

These collected essays cannot be regarded as an introduction to British social anthropology, for they assume some prior knowledge. They are carefully reasoned expositions of the traditional subject matter. They are more than that, as well. When they deal with the rich data of Goody's field experience they become original and exciting, particularly when they deal with whole regions or cultural areas.

HENRY A. SELBY

University of Texas,
Austin

Studies in Carcinogenesis

Occupational and Environmental Cancers of the Urinary System. W. C. HUEPER. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1969. xx + 466 pp., illus. \$20.

As an investigator who has made numerous and substantial contributions to the field of chemical carcinogenesis and was the first to produce indisputable bladder cancer in animals with 2-naphthylamine, Hueper is well qualified to summarize this subject. The book contains 89 useful tables and has a bibliography of almost 1300 references.