management, the House Armed Services Committee last year proposed to eliminate the Defense Secretary's authority to appoint an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis.

Laird Approach Emerges

The management and bureaucratic power issues were thrashed out in a series of meetings last spring and summer between Laird, his deputy, David Packard, the Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries and the assistant secretaries of defense. The Joint Chiefs won the right to initiate military force plans. The post of Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis was retained, but its function was drastically altered. Instead of drawing up the basic documents of the military program, Systems Analysis in the future will review military strategy and program proposals forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments. Also it will issue "fiscal guidance" specifying how much each service may plan to spend in each of the functional defense program areas: strategic forces, tactical air forces, and so on.

When the services submit their detailed recommendations to the Secretary, Systems Analysis may comment or make alternative proposals. These, however, are frankly regarded by Laird as "devil's advocacy." Last year challenges raised by Systems Analysis had relatively little impact on the fiscal 1971 budget proposals, which basically followed military recommendations.

(For example, it was widely reported last year that Systems Analysis had opposed the following weapons systems, for which provision is made in the fiscal 1971 budget: the B-1A strategic bomber, also known as AMSA; the F-111; the F-14 Navy fighter with its associated Phoenix missile; the F-15 Air Force fighter; a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; the S-3, a new carrier-based antisubmarine warfare aircraft; and the entire antisubmarine warfare carrier force.)

Throughout the transitional period of 1969 the acting head of the systems analysis office was Ivan Selin, 32, an electrical engineer and mathematician, who formerly served Enthoven as deputy for strategic systems. But Selin came to realize that lingering resentment of the "whiz kids" in Congress and the military made it difficult for him to continue in the job. He resigned, effective 31 January, to set up a consulting firm. His successor is Gardiner L. Tucker, 44, who was the principal deputy director of defense engineering and research. A physicist, Tucker previously served as Director of Research for International Business Machines.

On 21 January the Pentagon announced that the functions of DDR&E would also be changed "in line with the participatory management philosophy of the Secretary of Defense." In the future, most research and weapons projects are expected to originate in the military services, subject to broad policy and fiscal "guidance" from DDR&E. The amount of monitoring by the DDR&E staff will be sharply reduced.

Military officers directing development projects will be held more directly accountable for costs, performance, and schedules. The direct chain of command for project managers has been drastically shortened, bypassing, for example, direct supervision by DDR&E as well as by various staffs in the military departments.

The important questions about the new management style at the Pentagon are these: Will controlling and reducing defense spending become easier or more difficult in coming years as a result of the changes? And will the system encourage the most effective and balanced use of defense resources?

Many senior defense officials who have served both Laird and McNamara say the new management system is an improvement that retains the best features of the McNamara revolution while giving the military a more responsible role. "McNamara forced the services to learn systems analysis and cost-effectiveness techniques. That's why they are now in a position to take on a larger role in defense planning and budgeting," one official said recently.

Others, more pessimistic, believe Laird has no real interest in the analytical approach to defense planning and is unlikely to challenge priorities set by the military. They say he sees his job as one of getting the most money for defense that the fiscal and political situations permit, dividing it among the services, and keeping friction to a minimum. "If the Navy, to keep 15 carriers afloat, decides to reduce flying hours, ship maintenance, and logistical backup, that's the Navy's prerogative, in Laird's view," said one analyst. Others described the fiscal 1971 budget process as "pure Charlie Wilson."

But the optimists argue that it is unfair to judge Laird's qualities as a defense architect on the experience of 1969 alone. There will be more time for consideration of the major post-Vietnam defense issues in the coming year, they say.

There are two other forces at work which lend credence to the view that the next defense budget may be considerably smaller. One is the Administration's work on alternative national strategies and defense programs. This study, started early last year, draws heavily on the office of Systems Analysis at the Pentagon, on the National Security Council staff at the White House, and on the State Department, for its analytical work. More important, it is integrated with planning done by domestic affairs advisers to the President in order to show roughly what additional domestic options are gained or lost by swings in defense spending.

The second force is Congress, which has become increasingly aware of the salient defense issues. In the last 2 years a number of publications have aired the recommendations of Defense Department "insiders" and former officials for reducing defense spending. Political pressure to carry out these recommendations is likely to increase in the coming year.

In taking a more skeptical approach to defense questions, both the Administration and Congress have drawn upon intellectual capital accumulated by McNamara's "whiz kids." So while the Pentagon power balance is shifting, politicians on the other side of the Potomac are in a better position than ever before to challenge the traditional military view that reducing defense spending necessarily reduces national security.—ANDREW HAMILTON

RECENT DEATHS

Horace R. Cayton, 66; sociologist, University of California, Berkeley; 22 January.

Austin C. Cleveland, 80; former professor of psychology; Oklahoma City University; 19 January.

Richard Evans, 67; former professor of botany, University of Wisconsin; 20 January.

Donald E. Flieder, 45; professor of oral medicine, Marquette University; 15 January.

Francis C. Frary, 85; former director of research, Aluminum Company of America; 4 February.