from industry, but the enterprises are not yet willing to contribute their share of the financing."

The government in this highly decentralized system would like to confine its financing to special projects. It would like to coordinate research, and not be its principal benefactor. What the government has in mind is illustrated by the so-called macro-projects, which are aimed at bringing several institutes together to conduct long-range studies in areas that are important to the society as a whole. The macro-projects are still in the formative stage, but Damjanovic expects the Federal Assembly (which must approve such large-scale expenditures) to approve money, before the end of this year, for projects on the resources of the Adriatic Sea, scientific and technical information, the ecology of Yugoslavia, and the "science of science," or how science is organized and conducted. Plans are in the works for many other macro-projects, but, as Kostic said, "if everything is important, nothing is important," so somebody has to set priorities. The Federal Council, however, is "reluctant to set priorities," according to Damjanovic, and so the macro-projects will be selected according to the amount of interest shown by scientists and the technical competence of the proposed plan of attack. "We would like these projects to be carried out more by exactness than by intuition," Kostic said.

The organization of scientific research in Yugoslavia is still in the experimental stage, as any scientist or science administrator here will tell you. "Nothing is so sacred that it cannot be changed," Damjanovic said in a recent interview, "and I, for one, hope that the experimental period in science lasts for a long time here." There are all sorts of proposals for increasing the contacts between science and the economy and for stepping up the interaction with foreign countries. "But Yugoslavia is the first country to try this system," Pavicevic said, "and we must take from abroad only what is good for us." There are also plans to improve technical education, which many here see as the best way to develop a scientific base. Damjanovic is excited about the future of a new program, recently approved by the Federal Council, which will provide direct grants to young scientists just out of the university.

But the role of the state in the Yugoslav system is still being defined. "The coordination from the Federal Council has not been very good," Damjanovic told *Science*, "and we want to make it better. We will continue to finance small projects, and we have been very encouraged by the response to the macro-projects. We hope to help with money, but we do not want to direct the research. The important thing is to keep the decision-making apparatus as open as possible." And, as Kostic said, "the interaction with industry will come in time, as the economy sees the need for science. Now, it is important to establish the system of participation and self-government, on which all future development in this country will be based."—ANDREW JAMISON

A Harvard senior and former Science *news intern, Andrew Jamison traveled in Eastern Europe this summer.*

Antipoverty R&D: Chicago Debacle Suggests Pitfalls Facing OEO

Early in August President Nixon made public his plans for reform of the welfare system including a major overhaul of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) which had been the vanguard of the Johnson antipoverty program. The White House statement at the time said "it is in the Office of Economic Opportunity that social pioneering should be a specialty. It is the OEO that should act as the 'R and D' arm for government's social programs."

What Nixon prescribed for OEO is not a new departure but an expansion of OEO activities as a social experimenter and a contraction of its work of administering large, continuing programs. The idea is that OEO should spin off its successful experiments to "operational" agencies as was already being done with the Head Start program for preschool children.

A major question raised by the Nixon reform proposals is the fate of the community action programs (CAPs) which were a characteristic and controversial feature of the Johnson War on Poverty. Touchstone of the CAPs was the principle that people affected by antipoverty programs should have a direct role in planning, organizing, and operating such programs. The doctrine of "maximum feasible participation of residents" as it was expressed in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 proved to be the most significant innovation in welfare politics since the federal entry into the field during the Depression.

Nixon is following a hallowed and often politically profitable tradition of applying the new broom to an area of policy with which his immediate predecessors in office are closely identified. But in tackling the welfare system he is compelling the first real national scrutiny of a structure which has grown by a process of steady accretion since the New Deal and has come under increasing criticism. Strongly implied in the proposed reforms is a rejection of the theoretical base supplied by social and behavioral scientists and government planners for social programs, particularly those aimed at social change.

Revision rather than repudiation of basic theory is probably a more accurate way to describe what the Administration intends. In fact the Nixon proposals appear to be strongly influenced by what is being called the "Moynihan scenario," after Daniel Patrick Moynihan, an established urbanologist and now Nixon's assistant for urban affairs. Moynihan was, in fact, himself a New Frontier intellectual, having served in the Labor Department in both advisory and policy-making posts under Arthur Goldberg and Willard Wirtz, and participated in the design of the antipoverty campaign. Moynihan is author of the recent *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*. The title of the book is a play on the words of community action programs' charter. The book is a survey of poverty policy which, by and large, Moynihan finds deficient. Moynihan's preference seems to be for what he calls in his book an "employment strategy" rather than programs which stress organizing the poor, and the

Nixon reforms would put heavier emphasis on more conventional education and job training programs and on income support.

The fate of the Administration's reform proposals remain in limbo like many other programs on which Congress has so far failed to act. The revised Economic Opportunity Act, which contains most of the major antipoverty programs, has yet to emerge from committee in either house of Congress, and the programs are operating hand-to-mouth on a limited extension of funding. Whether Congress will accept the Nixon recommendation for a 2-year extension of the law and then finance his program is, therefore, far from clear. In the case of OEO, however, a good deal can be done through administrative initiative to reorganize the agency, and the new OEO director, former Illinois Congressman Donald Rumsfeld, is moving briskly ahead.

To succeed in its assigned role of "social pioneering," OEO must continue to be a risk-taking agency. It is doubtful that it can avoid the political controversy and resulting criticism from congressional sources that has given the agency a deep sense of insecurity.

The Woodlawn Project

To appreciate the pitfalls that face OEO it is instructive to consider the agency's experience, for example, with a manpower training program involving teenage gangs on Chicago's South Side. The project encountered opposition from local officials and police, was investigated by a succession of local and federal agencies, and finally was aborted by OEO. The project achieved such prominence nationally as a result of the attentions of the Senate investigations subcommittee headed by Senator John L. McClellan (D–Ark.) that the Blackstone Rangers, one of the street gangs involved, became something of a household word outside Chicago. What is much less well known is that an evaluation study of the project commissioned by OEO and being done by a University of Chicago team was derailed after the McClellan committee subpoenaed raw research data gathered by the study team.

Under fire was the Youth Manpower Project of The Woodlawn Organization (T.W.O.), one of the more successful of the community organizations that have emerged in the big cities in the 1960's. A well-known sector of Chicago's black ghetto, Woodlawn is afflicted with poor housing and health, and a high crime and unemployment rate, particularly among young males. In the early and middle 1960's, the area was troubled with street gangs, notably the two strongest rival groups, the Blackstone Rangers and Devil's Disciples. For the Woodlawn Organization, it was natural to view a federal manpower training project for gang youth as a way to meet both unemployment and crime problems. What distinguished this Woodlawn project was that it was the first major attempt in a federally financed program to use the gang structure. T.W.O. with its strong tradition of "self determination" approved the approach and OEO seems to have been anxious to give it a try.

The project was beleaguered even before it began. Chicago Mayor Richard Daley took a dim view of the proposal since funds would be controlled by the community organization, while he argued that his office was ultimately responsible and accountable. Daley wanted a city employee named to head the project and a deadlock ensued with the result that a T.W.O. staff member had to serve as acting director during the life of the project. Chicago police fundamentally opposed a project they felt would strengthen criminal gangs and for the most part acted accordingly.

The plan required that gang leaders be involved as "subprofessionals" in the project and that gang members carry the main burden of recruiting, instruction, and follow-up work in the community. The subprofessionals received no substantial training for the jobs and since the program could be described as dropouts teaching dropouts, the purely educational aspects of the program were acknowledged by nearly everyone to be unsatisfactory. Defenders of the project, however, note that crime in the Woodlawn area showed a relative decline during the term of the project and that reaction in Woodlawn at the time of the killing of the Rev. Martin Luther King was less violent than in other Chicago neighborhoods. The actions of gang leaders and members in the project were credited with "cooling" the situation in their territory.

The need for an objective appraisal of the operations and results of the project was acutely felt by OEO and the agency enlisted Irving A. Spergel, a professor in the School of Social Service Administration at the University of Chicago. Spergel headed a research team which undertook an evaluation study of the project. The project ran from 1 June 1967 to 31 May 1968, but the evaluation study did not get under way until November 1967 and most of the data gathering was concentrated in 3 months in the following spring under conditions which the researchers describe as "internal tension, adverse publicity, government investigation and police pressure."

Visitors from Washington

In April Spergel had a visit from investigators of the McClellan committee who said they were looking into financial aspects of the project. Spergel and his colleagues were strongly apprehensive about the investigators' interest in their data. The gang members at the four training centers—two operated by the Rangers and two by the Disciples—had been only mildly cooperative with the researchers. The questionnaires revealed what a researcher called "significant information on individuals," and the study team had pledged that the research materials would be kept in strict confidence. The blow fell when the committee issued two subpoenas on 21 June and 15 July, the first demanding access to data gathered during a 5-week period at the two Ranger centers and the second implementing an interest in all information the study team had compiled.

At one point, a committee investigator, who had looked at the research files in pursuit of insights into the financial workings of the project, had taken away some documents, amounting to about 80 pages. He had written to Spergel apologizing and saying he had mixed them with his own papers when he rushed off to catch a plane. He returned the documents but noted he had made copies.

The crucial issue, however, was the question of whether to honor the first subpoena. Spergel consulted the university counsel who took a strictly legalistic view: the university was not hiding anything and ought to respond. Refusal to respond would invite the committee to file contempt of Congress charges. Impromptu legal advice available indicated that the confidentiality of research material is legally very much in doubt. The fact that an answer had to be given almost on instant notice on a summer Saturday morning doubtless influenced the decision to give way and

perhaps to fight another day. Besides, Spergel was assured verbally that the data would be kept confidential.

In alarm, the evaluation study staff met and decided to terminate data collection the day after there was a sign that the confidentiality pledge had been breached by the committee. Shortly after, a newspaper account of the Senate investigation indicated a committee source had revealed information taken from study records. The evaluation team stopped gathering data and began a "mopping up" operation with data on hand. Two versions of the report have been completed but so far OEO has not released an approved version.

Social scientists at Chicago and elsewhere are understandably concerned about the unchallenged subpoena of raw, unevaluated research data by federal authority. The prognosis for social and behavioral scientists conducting federally sponsored research on federally financed projects is especially cloudy—the youth involved in the Woodlawn project were technically federal employees and Spergel a federal contractee. The OEO was in a poor position to make a stand on the issue since it was under critical scrutiny from a Congress considering the question of the agency's very existence.

Lesson of Woodlawn

One lesson of Woodlawn for social scientists might well be, as one researcher put it, to steer clear of street gangs as a subject for study. But the gang phenomenon is very close to the heart of the urban poverty syndrome. And the Rangers and Disciples represent a form of the youth gang which may be acquiring special significance. The street gang has typically followed a pattern of growth and decline over a fairly short period. The gang is created by tough and forceful leaders, usually in their early teens, and then, after several years, casualties from arrests and gang fighting and the pull of jobs and family responsibilities take their toll on key gang members and the life cycle of the gang moves toward its end. Both the Rangers and Disciples started as typical but particularly successful fighting gangs, but grew to exceptional size by subduing and absorbing neighboring rival gangs until both claim memberships in the thousands. Some gang leaders and some outsiders see an evolutionary process at work which will enable these gangs to set political goals and wield substantial power at least in matters which affect black people. Both gangs use "nation" in their titles, which reflects a new sort of self-consciousness and aspiration. But there are many obstacles to the transformation of these gangs into some new form of indigenous community organization with a broadened mission. A practical one, for example, is that younger members, who are attracted to the gangs by the tradition of courage and loyalty to the fighting gang, are also hard to control.

The McClellan committee has devoted much attention to the Rangers in its long-running hearings on Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders. The committee seems generally to accept the police view that the Woodlawn youth project and others like it are folly since they simply reinforce the criminal gang structure. The committee in its hearings has heard a lot about gang crimes ranging from the extraction of protection money from school children, through check fraud to murder. The committee has seemed anxious to keep reiterating that the power of the gangs is based on violence or the threat of violence. The record, in fact, is a violent and shameful one, but what it fails to impart is a sense of the ghetto life that produces the gang.

There can be little argument that gangs are worth researching. But there are difficulties that run deeper than the hostilities of city hall and of Congress. For social and behavioral scientists the difficulties seem to be of two kinds. As the researchers in the Woodlawn evaluation study attested, gathering data in the open community is not easy. In the ghetto the feeling is growing that social scientists are "experimenting with blacks," not helping them, and resistance is growing rapidly. And, as one social scientist said, researchers normally have few contacts in the gang world and no matter how much goodwill they have, "lack empathy." Some professionals, he observed, "are upset because they can't control the situation. It's not a nice, neat methodological package."

Then there is the "committed" social scientist. As one OEO research administrator said, "The young turks coming out of college may not have effective training in research . . . They become identified with a cause and there can be a serious question of whether these professionals can maintain their objectivity."

Nixon's new marching orders for OEO seem to have left more questions unanswered than otherwise. But changes already under way in the agency indicate the Administration's intentions. There has been a strong feeling in OEO that some of the early demonstration projects lacked "replicability," and the Nixon blueprint calls for a tightening up of the structure of OEO so that it will be possible to move in a more orderly way from research and development to the program stage with ideas that work. Agency control will be strengthened, apparently with a greater stress on financial accountability up and down the line. Regional offices are being restructured and it would appear that federal professionals will be given a stronger hand in planning and organizing projects.

Budget Increase Asked

The Nixon budget calls for an increase in OEO R & D funds from under $35 million in the last fiscal year to about $46 million in the current year. Congress seems even less close than it was before its recess to agreement on what to do about the Nixon proposal for a 2-year extension of the poverty act and a total budget of about $2 billion split roughly half and half between manpower training and education programs and a variety of community action projects.

The CAPs themselves, it appears, will continue to be controversial, but are likely to survive. Even Moynihan, although critical, seems to regard them as a permanent feature of the welfare landscape. The success of the Administration's overhaul of OEO will probably depend less on the organizational changes it makes than on what sorts of projects it funds. The President himself emphasized that OEO to fulfill its mission must take risks and make mistakes. It will be instructive to see how adventurous the new research project will be, for example, with gangs.

In one draft of the evaluation report on the Woodlawn youth project the authors quite reasonably commented, "The hazards of evaluation research have been multiplied and serious questions must be raised as to whether adequate research can be performed under conditions of great organizational hostility, high level politics, and continued threat of action project termination." A lot could depend on whether that is read as an epitaph or a challenge.

—JOHN WALSH