scientists as a class) overpowered their detachment in searching for truth. This led them, presumably, to collaborate with those other ranks (enumerated above) whose lack of intellect enabled flimsy sociological hypotheses to gain the stature of revealed truth.

Surely another reading of the evidence is possible: that a group of not very farsighted reformers, drawn primarily from the professions of law, social work, history, and literature, grasped at the most evident and most highly touted *novel* program idea around, and that it was transformed, through the perversities of the political process, from an exploratory notion into a cornerstone of the program. What started as an experimental feature of Mobilization for Youth became a requirement for every project in the antipoverty program. The reason was at least partly political, as Moynihan himself testifies:

> The President wanted action, not planning; wanted nationwide scope not target areas. . . . As a result . . . there was little life left in the notion of picking say, ten cities, and spending several years preparing them for the experiment.

The often frantic, usually contentious, frequently confused process of formulating new federal programs leads to decisions like that. When an idea has presidential backing, meets the political need for action, and has no reasonably matched competition, its time has come, and men must commit themselves to it if they are to survive in politics. Or so it would seem from Moynihan's account.

Need it always be so? Is there no possibility of genuine experimentation with social reform? Can we not design actions so that we can learn from them, test the admittedly incomplete theories and so add to the findings of social science? Moynihan, in recommending a role for social science, confines it to the measurement of results of social policy—in a word, to evaluation. This seems too narrow a role, for good experiments (which Moynihan approves of) need social science participation in planning and execution as well as in measuring outcomes. A skeptical social-scientific analysis of proposals for action, before they are tried out, might sometimes help. Nothing can substitute for intellect, to be sure, but even the inadequate conceptual tools of the social sciences can be a partial substitute for the genius that is not always on hand in every social planner. What Moynihan is railing against is what a majority of social scientists would also decry: the enunciation of partisan passions of politics as if they were dependable discoveries of science.

But what his analysis and remedy neglect is the much deeper problem of applying rational methods to the solution of social problems. How can we circumvent what seem to be two incapacitating liabilities introduced by the political process itself: the pressure to take all actions on a national scale, with the appearance of equity being introduced (most easily and most superficially) by insisting on uniformity of treatment; and the apparent necessity to overpromise and oversell an idea in order to gain political acceptance of it? This latter demand exacerbates the distortion of the problems we seek solutions for and prevents learning from experimentation, for it tends to force men to make premature commitments to the validity of an idea. Furthermore, the more dubious or uncertain they may have been before making a public commitment to an idea, the more firm they become in its faith and the more energetic in proselyting for it. Moynihan may know that anyway. If he doesn't, social psychological research can explain it and provide the evidence.

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Prisoners of War

Mass Behavior in Battle and Captivity. The Communist Soldier in the Korean War. Research studies directed by WILLIAM C. BRADBURY, SAMUEL M. MEYERS and ALBERT D. BIDERMAN, Eds. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968. xxx + 377 pp. $11.

It is now 16 years since a tenuous cease-fire ended the Korean War. Among the elements of that strange war that are best remembered today, the behavior of our prisoners of war stands out. The POW episode, with its lexicon of human behavior—"brainwashing," "collaboration," "give-it-up-itis"—still evokes strong feeling and opinions. In recent days, with the return of Captain Bucher and his *Pueblo* crew, the enigma arises once more. Again, as at the time of the repatriation of our Korean soldiers in 1953, the beating of breasts can be heard across the land. Why is it, many ask, that our boys give up without a struggle? And (as if to prove the assumption valid), why is it that others are so much stronger and more steadfast in their ideological and national purposes?

Although based on considerably less rigorous data than earlier studies of American captives, the analyses reported in this volume of the attitudes and behavior of enemy POW's captured by American forces during the Korean campaign are valuable, if for no other reason, because they help to demolish such invidious comparisons. As Morris Janowitz points out in his thoughtful foreword, the most astounding aspect of the behavior of the Chinese Communist prisoners of war is that at the time of repatriation 14,325 of the 21,014 Chinese captured refused to return home—this in contrast to the 22 Americans who refused repatriation among the 4450 offered it. The behavior of the Chinese fighting man was unprecedented in the annals of modern history; in effect, says Janowitz, the unfavorable image Americans drew of our own men was more nearly a portrait of the Chinese soldier.

The studies brought together here were conducted during the Korean War and its aftermath to provide the Army with a fuller understanding of the Chinese Communist indoctrination system and its influence on prisoner-of-war behavior. The field conditions for this research were hardly ideal, and the sampling of enemy POW's leaves much to be desired, but the data collected constitute the only materials describing in depth the Communist prisoners of war in Korea. The reader is provided with a detailed picture of the Chinese system of indoctrination and social control. The Chinese government had reason to believe that it had developed an effective set of controls over its troops, but when the control system was disrupted by defeat in battle, the individual soldier revealed the extent to which the norms of the system had not been internalized. In captivity the control system was partly reestablished; but again, significant numbers of soldiers deserted when given an opportunity to change allegiance.

When our own POW's left their shabby compounds for Panmunjom and freedom, there began among Americans a search for an appropriate stance to adopt toward the 3400 hollow-eyed repatriates and toward the world we knew

was watching us and them. Millions of Americans concluded, without any systematic evidence, that the record of our men in Korea was shameful. There were those who indicted all our POW's (together with their delinquent parents and teachers, who had never bothered to prepare the kids for an encounter with Chinese Communist interrogators), and drew invidious comparisons between the behavior of our men and the behavior of other national groups engaged in the Korean fighting—including the enemy forces. Events such as the riots in the prisoner-of-war compounds on Koje-do Island were taken as evidence that the Chinese and North Korean prisoners under the military control of the United States were fanatically active and rebellious against their captors. In contrast, our own men were passive or outwardly collaborative in captivity. The fighting men of other United Nations were tougher and more heroic, we were told.

This book, like the earlier studies of American POW's, helps to destroy such erroneous notions, and popular assumptions regarding thought reform as well. The data help to explain the behavior of POW's in more rational terms. Such factors as the battle situation, the nature of the journey to a campsite, the condition of the camp, and the day-by-day treatment they received from camp authorities explain the behavior of many POW's, whatever their national origin.

The widespread assumption that ideological conviction alone determined the enemy's military (including POW) behavior is opened to question here. Similarly, the widespread fear that large numbers of our men were ideologically converted by the enemy's exotic brainwashing techniques was not in the least supported by earlier research. Yet the brainwashing myth gained increasing currency during the post-Korean decade, even among those quite familiar with the contrary results of numerous studies. Cooperative activity, it was argued, must have been ideologically inspired. There are some today who hold to this belief, maintaining that we can strengthen the fiber of our warriors (many of whom have no better than a 9th-grade education) only by teaching them the virtues of Jeffersonian democracy as against the dialectic errors of Marxist communism. Although we at home are often clearly moved more by things than by ideas, we expect that our soldiers, by some miracle, will be otherwise, even in the sordid and deprived conditions of captivity. Research data have made it clear that collaborative behavior in the Korean compounds can be understood in terms that are altogether of this world, without reference to a magical world in which brains are laundered wholesale.

Our readiness to sit in uninformed moral judgment on our repatriated POW's was perhaps the only truly shameful element of the entire Korean episode. None of us can fairly condemn the men who suffered the indignities and privation of Korean captivity. Yet many did condemn them, without questioning how they themselves would have cast their lot.

The publication of these hitherto classified studies is intended to serve both readers who are interested in the China field and those who are concerned with political warfare and the consequences of captivity. The editors see the materials as more than an analysis of the impact of captivity—as constituting an important document about social relations and political integration in Communist China. Perhaps they are that. But even more important, it seems to me, is the fact that these data provide an excellent backdrop against which to view our harsh judgments of our own POW's.

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A Fit Home for Earth's Noblest Inhabitant

A Different Kind of Country. RAYMOND F. DASMANN. Macmillan, New York; Collier-Macmillan, London, 1968. x + 276 pp., illus. $5.95.

The Last Landscape. WILLIAM H. WHYTE. Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1968. ix + 376 pp., illus. $6.95.

Planning for Diversity and Choice. Possible Futures and Their Relations to the Man-Controlled Environment. A conference, Dedham, Mass., 1966. STANFORD ANDERSON, Ed. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968. xii + 340 pp., illus. $12.50.

The Fitness of Man's Environment. Papers delivered at a symposium, Washington, D.C., 1967. Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 1968 (distributed by Random House, New York). 250 pp. $5.95. Smithsonian Annual II.

One hundred and five years ago George P. Marsh warned that "the Earth is fast becoming an unfit home for its noblest inhabitant" and that if man continued in his ways he "would reduce it to such a condition of impoverished productiveness, of shattered surface, of climatic excess, as to threaten the depravation, barbarism, and perhaps even extinction of the species" (*1*). More than 60 years ago, Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, reminding his generation that they lived on a limited planet, predicted that man "will date the end of barbarism from the time when the generations begin to feel that they rightfully had no more than a life estate in this sphere, with no right to squander the inheritance of their kind" (*2*). As recently as a dozen years ago an inventory of our assault upon our environment (*3*) showed little indication that these messages had reached very many people.

But obviously times are changing. We are becoming more concerned about our environment and about our future. Conservationists and preservationists (both bad words in some circles) are being metamorphosed into "environmentalists" (a term now favored by Stewart Udall). The sense of urgency has evidently increased even since Ian Burton concluded in a somewhat Olympian overview a year ago that "it seems clear that the current wave of interest in environmental quality will continue for a while longer" (*4*). It is a rare newspaper, anywhere in the country, that does not publish almost daily some expression of concern about what we are doing to our environment, and editors are writing editorials about environmental quality that would have lost them subscribers and advertisers not too many years ago. The lawyers are waking up; the American Bar Association has started a new journal called *Natural Resources Lawyer*. Even that opiate of the masses, the TV, shows views of nasty lakes and rivers and besmudged cities, and the familiar fatherly voices that tell us what to think about things warn us that we must be concerned. Unfortunately the TV is somehow unreal, and one wonders whether this sort of effort will not simply make us more sclerotic, as do the action scenes from Vietnam that become confused with the artificial horrors of spy dramas. And in spite of everything there is still too much of the belief