NSF Directorship: Why Did Nixon Veto Franklin A. Long?

The delicate web of understandings between scientists and the government seemed to be ripping apart last week. The precipitating cause for the sharp drop of scientific confidence in government was the revelation that the White House had, at the last possible minute, vetoed on political grounds Franklin A. Long's appointment as director of the nonpolitical National Science Foundation.

Nixon's rejection of Long, which was first publicly revealed by *Science* (18 April, p. 283), provoked a storm of protest among scientists and among congressional leaders, such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Representative Emilio Q. Daddario, whose support is crucial to NSF and to other science agencies. And, in a somewhat audacious act for a governmental body, the prestigious National Science Board criticized the vetoing of Long in a 21 April statement. The Board stated that it "deeply regrets" the administration's break with past practice of keeping the NSF and the choice of its director out of politics.

Despite a week of Presidential crisis over Korea and Vietnam, the Long furor received enough national press attention so that President Nixon was asked to explain his action at his 18 April news conference. Nixon replied:

. . . "The determination was made by members of the White House staff that his [Long's] appointment, in view of his very sincere beliefs opposing the ABM, would not be in the best interests of the overall Administration position. . . . [To] have at this time made an appointment of a man who quite honestly and quite sincerely—a man of eminent credentials, incidentally—disagreed with the Administration's position on a major matter of this sort—we thought this would be misunderstood. My staff thought that, and under the circumstances I approved their decision not to submit the recommendation to me."

Though the President shouldered responsibility for the decision and said it was based on disagreement with Long's ABM views, the more *Science* has looked into why Long was rejected, the more apparent it has seemed that other factors were involved. Full details of the Byzantine maneuvering that led to the blocking of Long's appointment will probably never be known, but opposition from the Republican side of Congress seems to have been a major factor in persuading the White House that the Long appointment should be dropped. Both Everett M. Dirksen, the Senate Republican leader, and Representative James G. Fulton, the senior Republican on the House Science and Astronautics Committee, which has authorizing responsibility for NSF, told *Science* they opposed the appointment.

Dirksen said that, when the White House asked him what he thought about appointing Long, he replied that he "didn't think it was a good idea." He said he had no "personal hostility" toward Long and was not worried about any effect the Long appointment might have on the upcoming Senate ABM voting, but merely felt that "a person with his viewpoints, especially on the ABM, certainly didn't fit into the team."

Fulton, meanwhile, claimed major credit for blocking the appointment. "I stopped it," he said. "I take the responsibility." When asked why he opposed Long, Fulton's initial response was, "I have my own type of candidate and it is not Franklin A. Long." Fulton's candidate is the president of a large eastern university, which happens to be Fulton's undergraduate alma mater. Fulton said that he stopped the Long appointment by organizing opposition "at three different levels in the White House, one of which is very close to President Nixon."

Talks with White House staff members give further credence to the idea that congressional opposition played an important part in stopping Long's appointment. One White House aide said that he had never heard of Long's appointment until a Republican on the House Science and Astronautics Committee approached him during the week of 6 April and complained about the choice of Long rather than the congressman's "candidate." The chief White House aide who handles congressional clearance of Nixon's nominees, Harry Fleming, said that he found opposition to Long "everywhere" in Congress. (Fleming declined to name members who were opposed.) It was Fleming's office which originally informed Fulton that Long was slated for appointment. After being asked if Fulton was correct when he claimed credit for stopping Long, Fleming replied that "the strong personal opposition of the ranking Republican on a crucial committee has to be very seriously considered. After all, they control the purse strings."

Discouraging Talent Hunt

The congressional opposition to Long seems to have been a cruel final blow administered in the late stages of a dishearteningly difficult and lengthy search for a new NSF director. *Science* has pieced together the outlines of the story by interviewing knowledgeable sources in the scientific community, the administration, and the Congress.

The tale starts with the National Science Board, the policy-making body for NSF, which has the statutory responsibility to nominate candidates for the NSF directorship. The term of the present NSF director, Leland J. Haworth, expires on 30 June, and while Haworth has not publicly evinced any particular desire to retire, the Nixon administration, even before taking office, made known its intention to appoint a new director to head the nation's basic research agency. Thus it was up to the Science Board to come up with some recommendations, and the board complied, suggesting two candidates—Emanual R. Piore, vice-president of International Business Machines Corporation, and H. Guyford Stever, president of Carnegie-Mellon University, who had served as chairman of Nixon's advisory task force on science. Both men had told the Science Board they would seriously consider the NSF job if it were offered, but, after formal negotiations with Lee A. DuBridge, Nixon's science adviser, both decided to withdraw their names from consideration.

The ball was then tossed back to the Science Board, which was asked to come up with some more names. The Science Board nominated two more

men, one of whom was Franklin Long, of Cornell. (The identity of the other man and the status of his candidacy are not known at this writing.)

Long in many ways seemed an ideal choice. He had had extensive Washington experience on the President's Science Advisory Committee (1961–66), as the first assistant director for science and technology in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1962–63), and as an adviser to various military agencies. He was an eminent physical chemist and member of the prestigious National Academy of Sciences. He had administrative experience as vice-president for research and advanced studies at Cornell. Moreover, he was available, for he was about to resign as vice-president at Cornell to return to teaching.

DuBridge Backed Long

By all accounts, Long was endorsed for the NSF directorship by science adviser DuBridge. Long was first approached about the NSF directorship in late February. After a number of discussions with DuBridge, he decided the opportunity at NSF looked promising, and he agreed to take the job. Subsequently, according to knowledgeable sources, Long was actually told by DuBridge that the appointment was all set.

At one point, plans were made for Long to meet with the President, and for an announcement of his appointment to be made, but the plans had to be postponed because of President Nixon's involvement in the funeral of the late President Eisenhower. Then a new date was set—Friday, 11 April. Long was tentatively scheduled to meet with the President at about 3 p.m. to conclude formal discussions, and a public announcement was to have been made shortly afterward, probably at the Friday afternoon press briefing for White House reporters.

As late as Friday morning everything still seemed in order. The appointment had been approved by members of the congressional delegation from New York, Long's home state; both NSF and Cornell had biographies of Long ready to release to the press at the time of the announcement; and Long left for Washington still believing he would meet with the President to conclude formal negotiations. But when Long arrived in Washington he found, according to a statement he later released to the press, that "the situation had changed and that new



James G. Fulton (Pa.), the senior Republican on the House Science and Astronautics Committee, was one of the few people to oppose Franklin A Long as director of the National Science Foundation. "I stopped it," Fulton said of the Long appointment, "I take the responsibility."

elements of a political nature relating to the antiballistic missile system had arisen." Both the meeting with the President and the formal announcement were canceled. Long met with DuBridge, but not with Nixon.

White House Fears

Neither Long nor DuBridge will discuss details of what transpired at their meeting, but knowledgeable sources say DuBridge revealed that the stumbling block was Long's opposition to the ABM. These sources say DuBridge told Long that political advisers in the White House were apprehensive that appointment of an ABM opponent to a high federal post might jeopardize the administration's efforts to win congressional approval of the ABM. The White House is said to have feared that Long's appointment might be misconstrued as evidence that the Nixon administration was not firm in its desire to win approval of the ABM. There were also fears that ABM opponents in the Senate might use confirmation hearings on Long's appointment to embarrass the administration by focusing attention on the fact that Nixon's own Science Foundation director opposed the ABM. The hearings would be held by the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, which includes Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), a leading ABM opponent and a leading contender for Nixon's job. Kennedy is the chairman of the Senate subcommittee which oversees NSF and helps determine NSF's budget authorization.

DuBridge has continually refused to discuss Long's rejection with *Science*, both before and since the story was published. However, in his only public statement on the matter—made to the New York *Times*—DuBridge implied that Long understood the administration's political problem and therefore voluntarily withdrew. "He could see, and was informed of the critical political situation on the hill," DuBridge is quoted as saying. "So by mutual consent we terminated our discussions of the post." This seems to be considerably less than a full explanation of what happened.

Alternatives Offered

According to knowledgeable sources, DuBridge told Long he could have the NSF post if he agreed to support the President's proposed Safeguard ABM system, or if he agreed to have his appointment held up until after the crucial voting on the ABM in Congress. Alternatively, DuBridge asked Long to withdraw his name from consideration and to devise a suitable "personal reason" for doing so. Long is said to have found the three alternatives "totally unacceptable," so the discussions were terminated. DuBridge is said to have told Long he was "really sick" about the whole incident.

Ironically, Long has never taken a public stand on Nixon's Safeguard system, and he is said to have scrupulously avoided making any public statements on the matter because he expected to become NSF director and didn't want to involve the agency in political controversy—a vain hope as it turned out. Long has, however, previously gone on record as opposing the ABM concept, most recently in an article in the December 1968 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, which was published before Nixon came out with his revised ABM plan. Sources close to Long insist that Long's ABM views, and his long-standing liberal record on arms-control matters, were well known to the Nixon administration and had, in fact, been discussed between Long and DuBridge well before the fiasco of 11 April.

Although Congressman Fulton probably hit hard at Long's ABM views when talking to the White House staff members and may well have alerted some key political staff members to Long's reservations in the matter, it is

clear that Fulton is not primarily motivated by opposition to Long's position on the ABM. Indeed, Fulton opposes deployment of the ABM. What Fulton emphasizes is that Long is not "my type of candidate." Fulton's candidate is Eric A. Walker, 59, former chairman of the National Science Board, president of the National Academy of Engineering, and president of Pennsylvania State University for the past 13 years. Walker has told the Penn State trustees that he wants to resign by June 1970. Fulton said he had not talked to Walker about the NSF directorship.

In a telephone interview with *Science*, Walker said he didn't realize he was Fulton's candidate for the NSF directorship, and continued, "I know Jim, but I haven't talked to him for three months." Walker said his last conversation with Fulton concerned NASA. Walker's own comment on the blocking of the Long appointment was: "My feeling is that people are hollering before they know the facts. If a man has taken a public stand on something it can be a handicap to being a good administrator of NSF. Sometimes it's good to have a faceless man in that kind of position."

Fulton's Other Objections

In addition to having his own type of candidate, Representative Fulton mentioned other reasons for opposing Long. He said that his opposition had nothing to do with the fact that Long is a Democrat: "Of course it isn't politics; it concerns the direction I want NSF to go." Fulton said that he wanted NSF to be an agency supporting the natural sciences exclusively, and that he did not want NSF to get mixed up in controversial matters like social science support or "integration of the schools." When asked, Fulton did not explain why he thought Long would change the direction of NSF in these ways, except that Long is, in Fulton's opinion, a "controversial figure." Fulton said, "I don't want these controversies brought into the NSF." On several occasions, Fulton asserted, Long was a "fence-sitter" or a "fence-straddler." As support for his allegation, Fulton said that, first, Long had served as a consultant to the Army and as a member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board from 1956 to 1963, "where he supported the ballistic missile"; second, that Long was now opposed to developing a ballistic-missile defense; and third, that Long had served as an assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In Fulton's opinion, serving in these three different capacities was intellectually contradictory, represented "a checkerboard of thinking," and reminded him of "Alice in Wonderland."

When Fleming's office called Fulton during the week of 6 April, the congressman gave an immediate "no." "And when I say no, it's no," Fulton said. Fulton explained that he was close to Nixon, being a co-chairman for Nixon in Pennsylvania during the campaign, one of the first seven congressmen to support Nixon, and one of a small group of congressmen to receive a silver medal from Nixon for his services.

Javits' Role

When Fulton learned of the plan to appoint Long, he said he contacted Senator Jacob K. Javits, the senior Senator from Long's home state of New York. When he contacted him, Fulton said, Javits had not even been informed of the intention to appoint Long. "Javits backed us up" in opposing Long, Fulton said, and explained that he and Javits were longtime friends. Although Javits would not speak to *Science* about the Long veto, a spokesman for Javits was authorized to say that, although Fulton called Javits about Long, Javits never did take a firm position, either for or against Long's appointment.

Although Javits' position on this appointment may have helped Fulton in his effort to stop Long, some of the other Republican legislators consulted on the appointment approved Long. Republican Charles E. Goodell, New York's junior Senator, told *Science* that he had been consulted by the White House in advance, had supported Long's appointment, and would try to reverse the White House decision. Howard W. Robison, chairman of the House Republican delegation from New York and the representative from the district in which Long lives, told *Science*, "I approved and endorsed Long instantly and most enthusiastically." After the Long veto was revealed in the press, on 17 April, Robison wrote a letter of protest to the White House and asked that the veto be rescinded. "The whole thing is regrettable; an error of judgment has been made," Robison said, adding that the veto of Long would not only be unpopular in academic circles but would be "hurtful to gathering support for the ABM in Congress." As have several other sources, Robison singled out White House aide Bryce Harlow as one of those who advised Nixon that it would be a mistake "on political grounds" to appoint Long.

Very few congressmen seem to have been consulted in advance on the Long appointment. *Science* was not able to find the evidence to support Harry Fleming's contention that he found congressional opposition to Long "everywhere." Democrats seem not to have been consulted at all. Not even key Republicans like Charles A. Mosher (Ohio), second-ranking Republican on the House Science and Astronautics Committee, and Senator Winston Prouty (Vermont), senior Republican on the NSF and education subcommittees, seem to have been consulted about Long.

Kennedy Statement

The veto of Long aroused the wrath of key Democratic legislators in the chambers of Congress. Senator Kennedy, who is chairman of the authorizing subcommittee for the National Science Foundation, took the Senate floor on 18 April and said: "I share the distress of the scientific community, as outlined in the 18 April issue of *Science* magazine, that the administration appeared to have chosen an outstanding leader of the scientific community, Dr. Franklin A. Long, to serve as the next director of NSF, and then had reversed its decision. The NSF is engaged solely in civilian, nonmilitary research; it will benefit no one if the apolitical status of the NSF is changed."

Daddario, the chairman of the House subcommittee which handles the NSF authorization, was even more critical and accused the Nixon administration of "sacrificing the National Science Foundation on the altar of the ABM." He said it is "absurd" to involve the NSF directorship in the ABM issue and wondered if NSF should be henceforth considered part of the Defense Establishment.

The Long affair provoked quick cries of indignation from the scientific community. The governing board of the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB), the nation's largest biology group, charged, in a formal resolution, that the rejection of Long was "both unfortunate and in error and potentially serious in its longterm effects on American science." The federation happened

to be holding its annual meeting in Atlantic City and was able to respond immediately to the news of Nixon's rejection of Long.

Eminent individual scientists have also deplored the Nixon administration's action. All four previous science advisers, in response to queries from *Science*, said they were upset over the implications of the Long incident.

James R. Killian, Jr., science adviser to the late President Eisenhower, called the rejection of Long "troubling" and said it is "urgently important" for the Nixon administration to reaffirm the nonpolitical nature of the NSF directorship so that the foundation can "command the confidence it must have."

George B. Kistiakowsky, Killian's successor as science adviser to Eisenhower, said he was "gravely distressed and troubled about the mixing of military issues into the process of appointing the director of an agency that has nothing to do with military policies."

Jerome B. Wiesner, science adviser to the late President Kennedy, said he is "very troubled" at the "politicalization" of the science foundation and at the notion that the Nixon administration "will systematically exclude" opinions it doesn't like, with the result that "people with contrary scientific opinions will be very reluctant even to talk about a post in the Administration."

And Donald F. Hornig, science adviser to former President Johnson, said he is "deeply distressed" at Long's rejection because Long is a "first-class man" and because he (Hornig) wouldn't like NSF to become a political agency.

Another prominent member of the science establishment, Robert L. Sproull, chairman of the Defense Science Board, said he is extremely dis-

Nixon Science Budget Cuts Less Severe Than Feared

When President Nixon sent his revised 1970 budget to Congress last week, science cuts were less sharp than had been originally feared. With the exception of the National Science Foundation, whose budget was left untouched, every major science-related agency received some cuts, but in most cases the slashes were not deep wounds. Hard hit were funds for higher education. Conspicuously absent from the Nixon budget was any mention of new funds for the Supersonic Transport Program (SST).

With Nixon's revisions of the Johnson budget in hand, Congress will now have an opportunity to make its cuts. Leading congressional figures have already indicated that the Nixon cuts are not deep enough and that sharper reductions will probably be made by Congress. The cuts may well come in the form of limitations on expenditures, as they did last year.

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was one of the biggest dollar-losers. From the $2.4-billion figure in the proposed Johnson budget for 1970, $78.6 million was eliminated. About $25 million of this cut resulted from Nixon's earlier decision to reorient the ABM system to a scaled-down "Safeguard" program. A general slowdown in operations accounted for another $30-million cut. The light-water breeder-reactor program was reduced by $10 million; the 200-Bev national accelerator program was cut by $6 million, to $127 million, and a $1.5-million food irradiation program was canceled.

National Space and Aeronautics Administration (NASA) funds were also reduced by a net $45 million, from the $3.87 billion that had been proposed in the Johnson budget. Hardest hit were NASA's space sciences and applications programs ($41 million) and its advanced research and technology programs ($13 million). In general, the NASA cuts were in the unmanned space science programs, while the manned programs—the Apollo moon-landing operation and the Saturn 5—received an $86-million boost, whereby the number of possible manned moon landings is increased and additional instrumentation for future flights is provided for. NASA's nuclear rocket program, which includes the development of a specialized nuclear engine system (NERVA), will remain at a $36.5-million funding level.

The total Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) budget did not change as much as expected, but programs for higher education suffered. According to HEW, funds for university facilities and construction were reduced by $107 million, on the grounds that "colleges and universities should be encouraged to finance construction from non-federal sources." HEW has indicated that federal funding in the form of subsidized interest on private loans will be stressed. College work-study programs and a program to strengthen developing institutions were reduced by $6 million. Scientific activities abroad, which are funded under special foreign-currency programs, were slashed from about $15 to 3.5 million.

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) budget was cut by $47.4 million from the Johnson request of $1.5 billion. NIH research grants were cut slightly—$7.8 million from a total of $634 million. NIH's research manpower development program, which provides training for researchers in the health sciences, was cut by $11 million. On the other hand, aid to medical schools was increased by $5 million—action which was taken, NIH says, to meet a national need for more trained physicians.

The total National Science Foundation budget, some $497 million, remained unscathed. It includes a new $10-million program for interdisciplinary studies relevant to problems of our society and the modern environment, and $5 million for a National Sea Grant Program.

The Nixon budget makes no mention of new funds to start construction of a prototype for the SST. It does make available, as did the Johnson budget, funds estimated at $92.7 million leftover from previous years, for continued research and development. Sources say that if Nixon consents to continuing the SST program, which has already cost the government nearly $500 million, he could take the money from his contingency fund or ask Congress for a supplemental appropriation, but, as of this writing, the President has not approved plans to move ahead with construction of the SST.

—MARTI MUELLER

NEWS IN BRIEF

• **HARVARD ESTABLISHES EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH CENTER:** Harvard University's newly established Center for Educational Policy Research will be directed next year by David Cohen, a professor of education at Harvard, who succeeds Christopher Jencks, on leave from the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington. The center, affiliated with the Harvard Graduate School of Education, was created to provide policy makers, particularly government officials, with a more informed basis for their decisions affecting education. Researchers from the center will study policies of integration, compensatory education, and environmental factors in order to analyze the effects of various school policies on student attitudes and achievement. The center, established in January, has received a $250,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation.

• **KIDD NAMED TO AAU:** Charles V. Kidd, a member of the staff of the President's Office of Science and Technology (OST) has been named director of the recently formed Council on Federal Relations of the Association of American Universities (AAU). The AAU Council was created to promote a productive relationship between the federal government and universities engaged in graduate education and research. Since 1964 Kidd has been the executive secretary of OST's Federal Council for Science and Technology, which coordinates government research and development programs.

• **SWEDEN BANS DDT USE:** Sweden has become the first country in the world to officially ban the use of the pesticide DDT. The Swedish government has decided to ban the use of DDT and its derivations for 2 years in an attempt to determine if levels of DDT in plants and animals can be significantly reduced. Swedish action follows a technical report by Stockholm scientists who claim that DDT is present in ever-increasing amounts in higher forms of wildlife. The DDT ban may also have been generated, in part, by reports from an international conference in Stockholm in which scientists claim that DDT in remarkably small quantities may affect human metabolism. It has been reported that the Swedish government plans to encourage that the DDT ban be extended to its neighboring countries, particularly Norway, since it is recognized that a local ban may have a limited effect.

• **ROLE OF FOUNDATIONS TO BE STUDIED:** In a self-policing measure aimed at avoiding extensive legislative regulation of tax-exempt organizations, a group of foundation leaders has created a national panel of individuals from independent private organizations to review the role of philanthropy and to study the relationship between foundations and the government. The 13-member foundation study panel, formed at the Council of Foundations meeting in New Orleans at the urging of John D. Rockefeller III, consists largely of businessmen and a few members of the academic community. The study follows heavy criticism of tax-exempt organizations in February hearings conducted by the House Ways and Means Committee (see *Science*, 28 February 1969).

• **PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:** A new environmental quality control council is being created by President Nixon to coordinate interagency action on environmental problems. At this time the eight-member council, chaired by the President, has been organized to include Vice President Agnew and the secretaries of six departments, including Interior and Health, Education, and Welfare. Lee A. DuBridge is slated to be executive secretary. The Council is expected to establish an environmental policy on such issues as pollution, conservation, and resources.

• **UNIVERSITIES RESEARCH ASSOCIATION ENLARGED:** The Universities Research Association (URA), Inc., of Washington, which operates the National Accelerator Laboratory at Batavia, Ill. for the Atomic Energy Commission, has increased its membership to 50 institutions by adding Case Western Reserve University and the State University of New York at Stony Brook. H. Guyford Stever, president of Carnegie-Mellon University, was elected chairman of the URA Council of Presidents, URA's ruling board, and W. Allen Wallis, president of the University of Rochester, was elected vice-chairman.

appointed" because he expected Long to be a "very strong and imaginative director" of NSF.

H. Guyford Stever, one of the two nominees who turned down the NSF directorship before Long was approached, commented that he didn't think that partisan views should be considered in choosing the NSF director but added: "No administration can withstand within itself an activist against itself."

The President is not required to appoint a scientist as NSF director, and he is under no obligation to pick a candidate nominated by the National Science Board. But DuBridge told *Science* he would not support a candidate who had not been recommended by the board, and DuBridge, in fact, has already asked the board to come up with more names. The board, in its recent statement criticizing the President's action, said it will continue to advise on qualified candidates and that its advice "will, as in the past, be based on the scientific and administrative competence and experience of the proposed candidates, the criteria which should be governing in the appointment of a director of the National Science Foundation." The politely worded rebuke to the President was approved by all of the 21 board members who could be reached. The statement was released over the signature of Philip Handler, board chairman, who was one of the first prominent scientists to express opposition to the Administration's action. The two board members who are government officials—Clifford M. Hardin, secretary of agriculture, and Haworth—were not asked to support the statement.

The Long incident seems to be one of those sorry affairs where there are many more losers than winners. In fact, there may be no winners at all, except possibly Dirksen and Fulton.

The NSF, which has been staggering under the burdens of a tight budget and a lame-duck director, is clearly a big loser, for it faces serious morale problems and an even more uncertain future. Almost everyone concerned predicts that it will be exceedingly difficult to find a new NSF director, partly because scientists may be unwilling to do anything that might be interpreted as a slap at Long, partly because few scientists will want their colleagues to think they got the job by submitting to—and passing—a political Wassermann test.

DuBridge, who had made such a

promising start as science adviser (*Science*, 21 February), has also suffered unfortunate losses. His key role in an incident that embarassed the administration may have shaken his standing at the White House. And the fact that he was obviously overruled by White House political advisers has hardly enhanced his stature in the eyes of the scientific community.

I. I. Rabi, Nobel prize-winning physicist and a personal friend of the late General Eisenhower, wonders if DuBridge "now has a tin can tied to his tail—is he serving as 'yes man' or can he express himself?" And former science adviser Hornig believes the incident is "undoubtedly going to complicate the role of the President's science adviser," and makes it "very difficult" for DuBridge.

Nixon also appears to be a big loser. It remains to be seen whether the veto of Long will bolster the Administration's fight for the ABM, as Nixon apparently hoped, or will actually weaken the Administration's hand by focusing attention on the opposition and by indicating that the Administration thinks its congressional support on the ABM issue is shaky.

But there is little doubt that the Long veto will undermine the professed efforts of Nixon and DuBridge to "heal the breaches" between the government and the scientific community which have developed over the Vietnam war, the ABM, and various military issues. The incident will make it more difficult for the White House to attract scientific talent, and it raises questions about Nixon's seriousness in professing his desire to be exposed to all points of view.

As far as *Science* can determine, these are the major elements of the rejection of Franklin A. Long as director of the National Science Foundation. Although Long's views on ABM seem to have been an important cause of his rejection, these views may well have been made visible as a result of some rather mundane politicking by Republican congressmen. If the consequences of this politicking had not been so profound, this whole episode would make a bizarre and engrossing story. Because it has been so drastic in its results, we can only conclude that the rejection of Franklin A. Long, and the manner by which that vetoing was accomplished, marks one of the most disruptive episodes in a usually harmonious relationship between the federal government and the scientists.

The long-time alliance between science and the federal government is, to say the least, strained. This alliance has been, for the most part, a smoothly working gentlemen's agreement during the past quarter century. In return for their cooperation with the government and for the reticence of scientific leaders on many political questions, scientists have received federal funds and a large measure of influence in determining who will direct the federal scientific effort and how the funds will be distributed.

NSF has a strong symbolic significance to the scientific community. Probably without realizing the implications of what it was doing, the White House has severely shaken scientific confidence that the relationship will continue as it has in the past. In contrast to his stated intentions, President Nixon has widened the breach between the federal government and the scientific community. For the good of all parties, it can be legitimately hoped that the President will try to bridge the gap that has been created by his politically motivated rejection of Franklin A. Long.—PHILIP M. BOFFEY and BRYCE NELSON

Universities: Industry Links Raise Conflict of Interest Issue

Berkeley, Calif. The close professional ties with the oil industry of university experts in such disciplines as geology, geophysics, and, particularly, petroleum engineering have complicated efforts of California officials and federal authorities to deal with problems raised by the oil leak in the Union Oil Company offshore well in the Santa Barbara Channel.

California's chief deputy attorney general, Charles O'Brien, has publicly complained that experts at both state and private universities turned down his requests to testify for the state in its half-billion-dollar damage suit against Union and three other oil companies.

It is understood, also, that the President's Oil Spill Committee, created last February, has been discussing formation of a subpanel to study the question of the Union well in the channel, and that some difficulties have been encountered in enlisting university engineers with the required expertise because of conflicts of interest, apparent or real.

In California, interest in the issue was kindled by press and television reports of O'Brien's remarks at a Santa Barbara civic club meeting on 8 April. O'Brien said that petroleum engineers at the University of California campuses at Santa Barbara and Berkeley and at the privately supported University of Southern California refused to testify, and indicated that they did not wish to risk losing industry grants and consulting arrangements.

In an article in the San Francisco *Chronicle* of 17 April, reporter Michael Harris quoted Berkeley professor of petroleum engineering Wilbur J. Somerton as saying he had declined to appear as a witness and that he viewed his obligation to the community as that of supplying it with well-trained petroleum engineers. "We train the industry's engineers and they help us," he was quoted as saying. According to Harris, Somerton noted that he was not at present consulting for the oil industry and that he and his colleagues obeyed the spirit of the university regulations on consulting assignments for industry.

Somerton last week was not talking to reporters and referred questions to Berkeley dean of engineering George J. Maslach, who was looking into the implications of the exchange between Somerton and state officials.

Maslach said that no departmental or university rule had been transgressed. At Berkeley, as at most universities, rules on faculty consulting focus on preventing interference with academic activities. The dean did say, however, that what was still to be determined was whether the matter raised any "question of privilege and tenure" which would fall in the