

is generally said; these are reported to be as much as 50 percent more than those of its competitors.

Whatever the nature and quality of the advice, it is obvious that considerable effort goes into presenting a facade designed to infuse confidence into even the most skeptical prospective client. Thus, an official of Booz, Allen & Hamilton says, "We choose our Americans carefully. They're gentle and reflective, not brash and pushy." According to one report, McKinsey formerly prescribed especially conservative attire for its men in London. These regulations have since been relaxed, and it is a fact that McKinsey men are to be seen hatless on the streets. As for fees, a newspaper here quotes a McKinsey official as saying, "We don't look at our profit picture . . . Judaic-Christian ethics and client self-interest both will operate to ensure that bread cast upon the waters will return manyfold." Each of the three says that it turns down far more business than it accepts, and, at times, the impression is conveyed that jobs are accepted because of their intrinsic intellectual interest, not because they bring in money.

Having had the rare opportunity to look deep into the innards of a great variety of European business organizations, a number of the men associated with the consulting firms are in general agreement on one point: money can drive American executives to greater productivity, but their English counterparts require things other than money. As one of the consultants explained it, on the basis of several years' experience, "The big problem is to motivate senior and middle management. Stock options are almost valueless. So, you have to use other things for incentives, such as a car, a house or a flat, lunch in the directors' dining room, holidays, and things of that sort."

Why does European industry rely so heavily on American consulting firms when there are many European-owned firms competing for business? The head of one American office here explained that "the dynamism that's associated with American management is attractive to lots of these people." Another pointed out that the best thing that has happened to American consultants was publication of *The American Challenge*, which warned that American-owned industry in Europe was running away from its European competitors. Another noted that American consultants are paid 50 to 100 percent more than their European counterparts, and generally

can cite experience with the type of American industry that is worrying European managers. "An American firm," said one American, "carries an aura of professionalism with it that the European firms find difficult to duplicate."

The Bank of England has employed several British consulting firms for management studies, and, in fact, the British firms are, in number and volume of business, far larger than their American competitors. The Americans, however, have run away with the prestige business.

With student unrest and various other currents now running through European society, it would be interesting to have some idea of the ideological implications of the advice that these firms are pouring into some of Europe's most powerful and influential institutions. The clients, of course, rarely talk about the advice they are getting, and the consultants say as much, though, in the style that is commonplace in the expert business, they insist that their advice is apolitical, objective, and without implications beyond the immediate subject matter. Perhaps that is the case in some instances, but when vast industrial enterprises undergo an administrative reworking, the effects are not contained within the factory fence. Furthermore, the American consultants, with their professional backgrounds in American industrial ideology, are virtually tone deaf to the possibility that more is not better, and that higher output is not undiluted benefaction. In this connection, it is interesting to look

at a talk that one of them recently delivered before a European marketing conference. "The traditional thrift of Europeans," he noted with pleasure, "has been replaced by an eagerness to spend and a willingness to go into debt. There is a growing dissatisfaction with the old and the established, and an intense desire to improve, experiment, to try new products and services—to demonstrate affluence. Europeans have even recently come to believe in planned obsolescence. The atmosphere has been created not only by peace and a long, and almost unbroken, period of prosperity, but by a new, young and optimistic generation who catalyzed the revolution. . . . Consider the impact of television. Both the commercials and the programs themselves flood the consumer with new products and a vision of a better living standard. . . . A well-to-do Europe is moving at an ever-increasing pace to true affluence."

Since reflections on the evils of mass production often emanate from those who pleasurably possess cars, refrigerators, and comfortable housing, critics of the speakers' viewpoint might first consider the condition and source of their own comforts. Nevertheless, the efficiency of American industry is not unrelated to the social irresponsibility with which much of it has been permitted to operate, and, whatever it is that the consultants are whispering into the ears of their European clients, it is to be hoped that there is someone else around to point out that making more, cheaper and faster, is not the whole answer to making life better.—D. S. GREENBERG

Campaign Postmortem: Contrasts with 1964

Now that the dust has settled from the presidential campaign, it is possible to perceive, at least dimly, the dimensions of the political drives launched this year in the scientific and engineering communities. The contrasts with 1964 seem striking. The Republicans did much better this time lining up scientific and engineering support, while the Democrats did worse than 4 years ago. Overall, political activity seemed much less intense and extensive.

Who "won" the race this year for supporters in the technical communities

depends on what yardsticks are used for measuring. The Democrats lined up the most prestigious group of scientific backers, with most of them coming from academic life. The Republicans seem to have enlisted more engineers and industrial scientists and may well have conducted the most effective campaign at the local level.

By any measure, political activity seems to have fallen off sharply from the frantic pace set in 1964, when the technical community mobilized to an unprecedented degree in support of

Lyndon Johnson's campaign against Barry Goldwater. In 1964, according to reports at that time (*Science*, 11 and 18 December 1964), the "Scientists and Engineers for Johnson" group established 48 state chapters, opened local headquarters with full-time, paid staff members in almost all states, enlisted over 50,000 scientists and engineers on their membership rolls, raised some \$500,000, and financed a half-hour nationwide television show, more than 100 newspaper advertisements, and 3000 spot radio broadcasts. This year, by contrast, the level of political activity seems to have dropped by an order of magnitude—the number of scientists and engineers who signed up as backers of one candidate or the other seems to have totaled, at most, in the thousands, while the number of dollars they raised was measured in the tens of thousands. Moreover, there were few, if any, headquarters opened up by local "scientists and engineers" groups.

Why was there less activity this year than in 1964? Almost certainly, the key reason is that there was no Barry Goldwater running. Goldwater's candidacy provoked such hostility from the nation's scientists, who shuddered at the idea of his hand being placed on the nuclear trigger, that the massive drive of 4 years ago might best have been labeled "Scientists and Engineers Against Goldwater." Other factors which weakened political activity this year include the late and disorganized campaign launched by the Democratic Party; the divisive forces that splintered the nation this year (many scientists who had backed Eugene McCarthy's bid for the Democratic nomination never did quite reconcile themselves to joining Hubert Humphrey's scientific group); and, perhaps, the lack of such intimate ties with the White House as existed in 1964 when the Democratic campaign among scientists was run by an in-law of the President's wife.

Humphrey's efforts to line up scientific support were hindered by a poor start and lack of time. The Vice President's political operatives sent telegram appeals to hundreds of leading scientists and engineers both before, and immediately after, the Democratic convention, but the response was so poor that there was essentially no "Scientists and Engineers for Humphrey" organization as late as 6 weeks before election day. Late in September, the Humphrey forces—under the new direction of two volunteers who had formerly served with the President's Office of Science

and Technology, Peter S. Bing, a Los Angeles businessman, and David Z. Robinson, vice-president for Academic Affairs at New York University—set about recruiting distinguished "names." They succeeded far better in this effort than the Republicans, though for some reason the extensive membership lists from the 1964 campaign were not available to them. By election day, the Humphreyites had enrolled 14 Nobel laureates, 134 members of the National Academy of Sciences, and 9 members of the National Academy of Engineering (there is some overlap in these figures). Of some 1500 persons solicited for membership, more than 300 joined the national group, including 39 former members of McCarthy's scientist support group. But the Humphreyites had little success attracting engineers, partly because they concentrated on academic scientists and virtually ignored industry, perhaps partly because engineers are a more conservative group than scientists. One mail appeal to some 500 engineers is said to have resulted in only one or two acceptances.

Fund Raising

The Humphreyites raised some \$9000 through the national organization (the extent of collections by local scientist groups is unknown), but the effort got under way so late that the organization was able to spend only half its money and turned the rest in to cover office and operating expenses. Most of the money spent covered the cost of two television broadcasts in California, but the group also mailed out press releases and campaign literature, held a press conference, and paid for advertisements in several campus and local newspapers.

At the local level, roughly a score of "Scientists and Engineers for Humphrey" groups are said to have been established. The Boston area group was one of the most active, recruiting more than 100 members, distributing 10,000 copies of a New York *Times* editorial endorsing Humphrey, holding press conferences and financing 20 radio spots and a full-page ad in a Boston newspaper. However, according to Lester Birdsall, a key staff member in the Humphrey effort, "Because of the time factor we did very little on local organization—and I'm convinced that local organization is the key to a successful campaign."

The Republicans, who conducted an anemic campaign among scientists and engineers in 1964, got organized

much more swiftly this time than the Democrats. Shortly after the Republican convention in early August, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, started to recruit a committee of scientists, engineers, and industrial administrators to support Nixon. On 10 September the Nixon camp bolstered Strauss's efforts by giving him a sizable staff, headed by J. T. Martin, a Washington, D.C., patent attorney. The staff ultimately included 22 volunteers, ranging from attorneys to industrial officials to the general manager of a shoe store chain. A few staffers were engineers but none seems to have had extensive contact with the scientific community.

On the national level, the Republicans sent appeals to about the same number of scientists and engineers as the Democrats, namely 1400 to 1500, of whom 201, as of 1 November, had agreed to join the Nixon group. The list included three Nobel laureates and about 43 members of NAS-NAE. The Nixon group made no effort to collect money at the national level, but roughly \$1500 trickled in anyway, Martin says.

The Nixon group concentrated its efforts on setting up local organizations. It claimed to have 136 such organizations functioning in various states, cities, universities and government research installations by 1 November. Fragmentary reports reaching national headquarters indicate that by 1 November 10 of the local organizations had mailed out some 25,000 letters, while various groups had sent out 127 news releases.

There are no reliable figures available on membership recruitment or fund raising at the local level for either party, but given the fact that the Nixon group started its efforts to establish local organizations on 23 September, before the Humphreyites had even organized their national staff, it seems likely that the Republicans were more successful at the grass roots than the Democrats.

Whether the support of scientists was significantly helpful to either candidate this year remains undemonstrable. But there is a certain irony in the fact that 4 years ago, when the election was so lopsided that no particular campaign effort seemed important, the scientists and engineers jumped into the political fray with great zest, whereas this year, when the election was so close that small groups had an unusual opportunity to "make a difference," the scientists were more lukewarm in their political response.—PHILIP M. BOFFEY