

Sex Control, Science, and Society

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Using various techniques developed as a result of fertility research, scientists are experimenting with the possibility of sex control, the ability to determine whether a newborn infant will be a male or a female. So far, they have reported considerable success in their experiments with frogs and rabbits, whereas the success of experiments with human sperm appears to be quite limited, and the few optimistic reports seem to be unconfirmed. Before this new scientific potentiality becomes a reality, several important questions must be considered. What would be the societal consequences of sex control? If they are, on balance, undesirable, can sex control be prevented without curbing the freedoms essential for scientific work? The scientific ethics already impose some restraints on research to safeguard the welfare and privacy of the researched population. Sex control, however, might affect the whole society. Are there any circumstances under which the societal well-being justifies some limitation on the freedom of research? These questions apply, of course, to many other areas of scientific inquiry, such as work on the biological code and the experimental use of behavior and thought-modifying drugs. Sex control provides a useful opportunity for discussion of these issues because it presents a relatively "low-key" problem. Success seems fairly remote, and, as we shall see, the deleterious effects of widespread sex control would probably not be very great. Before dealing with the possible societal effects of sex control, and the ways they may be curbed, I describe briefly the work that has already been done in this area.

The State of the Art

Differential centrifugation provided one major approach to sex control. It was supposed that since X and Y chromosomes differ in size (Y is consider-

ably smaller), the sperm carrying the two different types would also be of two different weights; the Y-carrying sperm would be smaller and lighter, and the X-carrying sperm would be larger and heavier. Thus, the two kinds could be separated by centrifugation and then be used in artificial insemination. Early experiments, however, did not bear out this theory. And, Witschi pointed out that, in all likelihood, the force to be used in centrifugation would have to be of such magnitude that the sperm may well be damaged (1).

In the 1950's a Swedish investigator, Lindahl (2), published accounts of his results with the use of counter-streaming techniques of centrifugation. He found that by using the more readily sedimenting portion of bull spermatozoa that had undergone centrifugation, fertility was decreased but the number of male calves among the offspring was relatively high. His conclusion was that the female-determining spermatozoa are more sensitive than the male and are damaged due to mechanical stress in the centrifuging process.

Electrophoresis of spermatozoa is reported to have been successfully carried out by a Soviet biochemist, V. N. Schröder, in 1932 (3). She placed the cells in a solution in which the pH could be controlled. As the pH of the solution changed, the sperm moved with different speeds and separated into three groups: some concentrated next to the anode, some next to the cathode, and some were bunched in the middle. In tests conducted by Schröder and N. K. Kolstov (3), sperm which collected next to the anode produced six offspring, all females; those next to the cathode—four males and one female; and those which bunched in the center—two males and two females. Experiments with rabbits over the subsequent 10 years were reported as successful in controlling the sex of the offspring in 80 percent of the cases. Similar success with other mammals is reported.

At the Animal Reproduction Labora-

tory of Michigan State University, Gordon replicated these findings, although with a lower rate of success (4). Of 167 births studied, in 31 litters, he predicted correctly the sex of 113 offspring, for an average of 67.7 percent. Success was higher for females (62 out of 87, or 71.3 percent) than for males (51 out of 80, or 63.7 percent).

From 1932 to 1942, emphasis in sex control was on the acid-alkali method. In Germany, Unterberger reported in 1932 that in treating women with highly acidic vaginal secretions for sterility by use of alkaline douches, he had observed a high correlation between alkalinity and male offspring. Specifically, over a 10-year period, 53 out of 54 treated females are reported to have had babies, and all of the babies were male. In the one exception, the woman did not follow the doctor's prescription, Unterberger reported (5). In 1942, after repeated tests and experiments had not borne out the earlier results, interest in the acid-alkali method faded (6).

It is difficult to determine the length of time it will take to establish routine control of the sex of animals (of great interest, for instance, to cattle breeders); it is even more difficult to make such an estimate with regard to the sex control of human beings. In interviewing scientists who work on this matter, we heard conflicting reports about how close such a breakthrough was. It appeared that both optimistic and pessimistic estimates were vague—"between 7 to 15 years"—and were not based on any hard evidence but were the researchers' way of saying, "don't know" and "probably not very soon." No specific road blocks which seemed unusually difficult were cited, nor did they indicate that we have to await other developments before current obstacles can be removed. Fertility is a study area in which large funds are invested these days, and we know there is a correlation between increased investment and findings (7). Although most of the money is allocated to birth-control rather than sex-control studies, information needed for sex-control research has been in the past a by-product of the originally sponsored work. Schröder's findings, for example, were an accidental result of a fertility study she was conducting (4, p. 90). Nothing we heard from scientists working in this area would lead one to conclude that

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there is any specific reason we could not have sex control 5 years from now or sooner.

In addition to our uncertainty about when sex control might be possible, the question of how it would be effected is significant and also one on which there are differences of opinion. The mechanism for practicing sex control is important because certain techniques have greater psychic costs than others. We can see today, for example, that some methods of contraception are preferred by some classes of people because they involve less psychic "discomfort" for them; for example, the intrauterine device is preferred over sterilization by most women. In the same way, although electrophoresis now seems to offer a promising approach to sex control, its use would entail artificial insemination. And, whereas the objections to artificial insemination are probably decreasing, the resistance to it is still considerable (8). (Possibly, the opposition to artificial insemination would not be as great in a sex-control situation because the husband's own sperm could be used.) If drugs taken orally or douches could be relied upon, sex control would probably be much less expensive (artificial insemination requires a doctor's help), much less objectionable emotionally, and significantly more widely used.

In any event both professional forecasters of the future and leading scientists see sex control as a mass practice in the foreseeable future. Kahn and Wiener, in their discussion of the year 2000, suggest that one of the "one hundred technical innovations likely in the next thirty-three years" is the "capability to choose the sex of unborn children" (9). Muller takes a similar position about gene control in general (10).

Societal Use of Sex Control

If a simple and safe method of sex control were available, there would probably be no difficulty in finding the investors to promote it because there is a mass-market potential. The demand for the new freedom to choose seems well established. Couples have preferences on whether they want boys or girls. In many cultures boys provide an economic advantage (as workhorses) or a form of old-age insurance (where the state has not established it). Girls in many cultures are a liability; a dowry which may be a sizable economic burden must be provided to marry them

off. (A working-class American who has to provide for the weddings of three or four daughters may appreciate the problem.) In other cultures, girls are profitably sold. In our own culture, prestige differences are attached to the sex of one's children, which seem to vary among ethnic groups and classes (11, pp. 6-7).

Our expectations as to what use sex control might be put in our society are not a matter of idle speculation. Findings on sex preferences are based on both direct "soft" and indirect "hard" evidence. For soft evidence, we have data on preferences parents expressed in terms of the number of boys and girls to be conceived in a hypothetical situation in which parents would have a choice in the matter. Winston studied 55 upperclassmen, recording anonymously their desire for marriage and children. Fifty-two expected to be married some day; all but one of these desired children; expectations of two or three children were common. In total, 86 boys were desired as compared to 52 girls, which amounts to a 65 percent greater demand for males than for females (12).

A second study of attitudes, this one conducted on an Indianapolis sample, in 1941, found similar preferences for boys. Here, while about half of the parents had no preferences (52.8 percent of the wives and 42.3 percent of the husbands), and whereas the wives with a preference tended to favor having about as many boys as girls (21.8 percent to 25.4 percent), many more husbands wished for boys (47.7 percent as compared to 9.9 percent) (13).

Such expressions of preference are not necessarily good indicators of actual behavior. Hence of particular interest is "hard" evidence, of what parents actually did—in the limited area of choice they already have: the sex composition of the family at the point they decided to stop having children. Many other and more powerful factors affect a couple's decision to curb further births, and the sex composition of their children is one of them. That is, if a couple has three girls and it strongly desires a boy, this is one reason it will try "once more." By comparing the number of families which had only or mainly girls and "tried once more" to those which had only or mainly boys, we gain some data as to which is considered a less desirable condition. A somewhat different line was followed in an early study. Winston studied 5466 completed families and

found that there were 8329 males born alive as compared to 7434 females, which gives a sex ratio at birth of 112.0. The sex ratio of the last child, which is of course much more indicative, was 117.4 (2952 males to 2514 females). That is, significantly more families stopped having children after they had a boy than after they had a girl.

The actual preference for boys, once sex control is available, is likely to be larger than these studies suggest for the following reasons. Attitudes, especially where there is no actual choice, reflect what people believe they ought to believe in, which, in our culture, is equality of the sexes. To prefer to produce boys is lower class and discriminatory. Many middle-class parents might entertain such preferences but be either unaware of them or unwilling to express them to an interviewer, especially since at present there is no possibility of determining whether a child will be a boy or a girl.

Also, in the situations studied so far, attempts to change the sex composition of a family involved having more children than the couple wanted, and the chances of achieving the desired composition were 50 percent or lower. Thus, for instance, if parents wanted, let us say, three children including at least one boy, and they had tried three times and were blessed with girls, they would now desire a boy strongly enough to overcome whatever resistance they had to have additional children before they would try again. This is much less practical than taking a medication which is, let us say, 99.8 percent effective and having the number of children you actually want and are able to support. That is, sex control by a medication is to be expected to be significantly more widely practiced than conceiving more children and gambling on what their sex will be.

Finally, and most importantly, such decisions are not made in the abstract, but affected by the social milieu. For instance, in small *kibbutzim* many more children used to be born in October and November each year than any other months because the community used to consider it undesirable for the children to enter classes in the middle of the school year, which in Israel begins after the high holidays, in October. Similarly, sex control—even if it were taboo or unpopular at first—could become quite widely practiced once it became fashionable.

In the following discussion we bend

over backward by assuming that actual behavior would reveal a smaller preference than the existing data and preceding analysis would lead one to expect. We shall assume only a 7 percent difference between the number of boys and girls to be born alive due to sex control, coming on top of the 51.25 to 48.75 existing biological pattern, thus making for 54.75 boys to 45.25 girls, or a surplus of 9.5 boys out of every hundred. This would amount to a surplus of 357,234 in the United States, if sex control were practiced in a 1965-like population (14).

The extent to which such a sex imbalance will cause societal dislocations is in part a matter of the degree to which the effect will be cumulative. It is one thing to have an unbalanced baby crop one year, and quite another to produce such a crop several years in a row. Accumulation would reduce the extent to which girl shortages can be overcome by one age group raiding older and younger ones.

Some demographers seem to believe in an invisible hand (as it once was popular to expect in economics), and suggest that overproduction of boys will increase the value of girls and hence increase their production, until a balance is attained under controlled conditions which will be similar to the natural one. We need not repeat here the reasons such invisible arrangements frequently do not work; the fact is they simply cannot be relied upon, as recurrent economic crises in pre-Keynesian days or overpopulation show.

Second, one ought to note the deep-seated roots of the boy-favoring factors. Although there is no complete agreement on what these factors are, and there is little research, we do know that they are difficult and slow to change. For instance, Winston argued that mothers prefer boys as a substitute for their own fathers, out of search for security or Freudian considerations. Fathers prefer boys because boys can more readily achieve success in our society (and in most others). Neither of these factors is likely to change rapidly if the percentage of boys born increases a few percentage points. We do not need to turn to alarmist conclusions, but we ought to consider what the societal effects of sex control might be under conditions of relatively small imbalance which, as we see it, will cause a significant (although not necessarily very high) male surplus, and a surplus which will be cumulative.

Societal Consequences

In exploring what the societal consequences may be, we again need not rely on the speculation of what such a society would be like; we have much experience and some data on societies whose sex ratio was thrown off balance by war or immigration. For example, in 1960 New York City had 343,470 more females than males, a surplus of 68,366 in the 20- to 34-age category alone (15).

We note, first, that most forms of social behavior are sex correlated, and hence that changes in sex composition are very likely to affect most aspects of social life. For instance, women read more books, see more plays, and in general consume more culture than men in the contemporary United States. Also, women attend church more often and are typically charged with the moral education of children. Males, by contrast, account for a much higher proportion of crime than females. A significant and cumulative male surplus will thus produce a society with some of the rougher features of a frontier town. And, it should be noted, the diminution of the number of agents of moral education and the increase in the number of criminals would accentuate already existing tendencies which point in these directions, thus magnifying social problems which are already overburdening our society.

Interracial and interclass tensions are likely to be intensified because some groups, lower classes and minorities specifically (16), seem to be more male oriented than the rest of the society. Hence while the sex imbalance in a society-wide average may be only a few percentage points, that of some groups is likely to be much higher. This may produce an especially high boy surplus in lower status groups. These extra boys would seek girls in higher status groups (or in some other religious group than their own) (11)—in which they also will be scarce.

On the lighter side, men vote systematically and significantly more Democratic than women; as the Republican party has been losing consistently in the number of supporters over the last generation anyhow, another 5-point loss could undermine the two-party system to a point where Democratic control would be uninterrupted. (It is already the norm, with Republicans having occupied the White House for 8 years over the last 36.) Other forms of im-

balance which cannot be predicted are to be expected. "All social life is affected by the proportions of the sexes. Wherever there exists a considerable predominance of one sex over the other, in point of numbers, there is less prospect of a well-ordered social life." "Unbalanced numbers inexorably produce unbalanced behavior" (17).

Society would be very unlikely to collapse even if the sex ratio were to be much more seriously imbalanced than we expect. Societies are surprisingly flexible and adaptive entities. When asked what would be expected to happen if sex control were available on a mass basis, Davis, the well-known demographer, stated that some delay in the age of marriage of the male, some rise in prostitution and in homosexuality, and some increase in the number of males who will never marry are likely to result. Thus, all of the "costs" that would be generated by sex control will probably not be charged against one societal sector, that is, would not entail only, let us say, a sharp rise in prostitution, but would be distributed among several sectors and would therefore be more readily absorbed. An informal examination of the situation in the U.S.S.R. and Germany after World War II (sex ratio was 77.7 in the latter) as well as Israel in early immigration periods, support Davis' nonalarmist position. We must ask, though, are the costs justified? The dangers are not apocalyptic; but are they worth the gains to be made?

A Balance of Values

We deliberately chose a low-key example of the effects of science on society. One can provide much more dramatic ones; for example, the invention of new "psychedelic" drugs whose damage to genes will become known only much later (LSD was reported to have such effects), drugs which cripple the fetus (which has already occurred with the marketing of thalidomide), and the attempts to control birth with devices which may produce cancer (early versions of the intrauterine device were held to have such an effect). But let us stay with a finding which generates only relatively small amounts of human misery, relatively well distributed among various sectors, so as not to severely undermine society but only add, maybe only marginally, to the considerable social problems we

already face. Let us assume that we only add to the unhappiness of seven out of every 100 born (what we consider minimum imbalance to be generated), who will not find mates and will have to avail themselves of prostitution, homosexuality, or be condemned to enforced bachelorhood. (If you know someone who is desperate to be married but cannot find a mate, this discussion will be less abstract for you; now multiply this by 357,234 per annum.) Actually, to be fair, one must subtract from the unhappiness that sex control almost surely will produce, the joy it will bring to parents who will be able to order the sex of their children; but as of now, this is for most, not an intensely felt need, and it seems a much smaller joy compared to the sorrows of the unmated mates.

We already recognize some rights of human guinea pigs. Their safety and privacy are not to be violated even if this means delaying the progress of science. The "rest" of the society, those who are not the subjects of research, and who are nowadays as much affected as those in the laboratory, have been accorded fewer rights. Theoretically, new knowledge, the basis of new devices and drugs, is not supposed to leave the inner circles of science before its safety has been tested on animals or volunteers, and in some instances approved by a government agency, mainly the Federal Drug Administration. But as the case of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) shows, the trip from reporting of a finding in a scientific journal to the bloodstream of thousands of citizens may be an extremely short one. The transition did take quite a number of years, from the days in 1943 when Hoffman, one of the two men who synthesized LSD-25 at Sandoz Research Laboratories first felt its hallucinogenic effect, until the early 1960's, when it "spilled" into illicit campus use. (The trip from legitimate research, its use at Harvard, to illicit unsupervised use was much shorter.) The point is that no additional technologies had to be developed; the distance from the chemical formula to illicit composition required in effect no additional steps.

More generally, Western civilization, ever since the invention of the steam engine, has proceeded on the assumption that society must adjust to new technologies. This is a central meaning of what we refer to when we speak about an industrial revolution; we think about a society being transformed and not just a new technology being introduced

into a society which continues to sustain its prior values and institutions. Although the results are not an unmixed blessing (for instance, pollution and traffic casualties) on balance the benefits in terms of gains in standards of living and life expectancy much outweigh the costs. [Whether the same gains could be made with fewer costs if society would more effectively guide its transformation and technology inputs, is a question less often discussed (18).] Nevertheless we must ask, especially with the advent of nuclear arms, if we can expect such a favorable balance in the future. We are aware that single innovations may literally blow up societies or civilization; we must also realize that the rate of social changes required by the accelerating stream of technological innovations, each less dramatic by itself, may supersede the rate at which society can absorb. Could we not regulate to some extent the pace and impact of the technological inputs and select among them without, by every such act, killing the goose that lays the golden eggs?

Scientists often retort with two arguments. Science is in the business of searching for truths, not that of manufacturing technologies. The applications of scientific findings are not determined by the scientists, but by society, politicians, corporations, and the citizens. Two scientists discovered the formula which led to the composition of LSD, but chemists do not determine whether it is used to accelerate psychotherapy or to create psychoses, or, indeed, whether it is used at all, or whether, like thousands of other studies and formulas, it is ignored. Scientists split the atom, but they did not decide whether particles would be used to produce energy to water deserts or super-bombs.

Second, the course of science is unpredictable, and any new lead, if followed, may produce unexpected bounties; to curb some lines of inquiry—because they may have dangerous outcomes—may well force us to forego some major payoffs; for example, if one were to forbid the study of sex control one might retard the study of birth control. Moreover, leads which seem "safe" may have dangerous outcomes. Hence, ultimately, only if science were stopped altogether, might findings which are potentially dangerous be avoided.

These arguments are often presented as if they themselves were empirically verified or logically true statements. Actually they are a formula which en-

ables the scientific community to protect itself from external intervention and control. An empirical study of the matter may well show that science does thrive in societies where scientists are given less freedom than the preceding model implies science must have, for example, in the Soviet Union. Even in the West in science some limitations on work are recognized and the freedom to study is not always seen as the ultimate value. Whereas some scientists are irritated when the health or privacy of their subject curbs the progress of their work, most scientists seem to recognize the priority of these other considerations. (Normative considerations also much affect the areas studied; compare, for instance, the high concern with a cancer cure to the almost complete unwillingness of sociologists, since 1954, to retest the finding that separate but equal education is not feasible.)

One may suggest that the society at large deserves the same protection as human subjects do from research. That is, the scientific community cannot be excused from the responsibility of asking what effects its endeavors have on the community. On the contrary, only an extension of the existing codes and mechanisms of self-control will ultimately protect science from a societal backlash and the heavy hands of external regulation. The intensification of the debate over the scientists' responsibilities with regard to the impacts of their findings is by itself one way of exercising it, because it alerts more scientists to the fact that the areas they choose to study, the ways they communicate their findings (to each other and to the community), the alliances they form or avoid with corporate and governmental interests—all these affect the use to which their work is put. It is simply not true that a scientist working on cancer research and one working on biological warfare are equally likely to come up with a new weapon and a new vaccine. Leads are not that random, and applications are not that readily transferable from one area of application to another.

Additional research on the societal impact of various kinds of research may help to clarify the issues. Such research even has some regulatory impact. For instance, frequently when a drug is shown to have been released prematurely, standards governing release of experimental drugs to mass production are tightened (19), which in effect means fewer, more carefully supervised technological inputs into society; at

least society does not have to cope with dubious findings. Additional progress may be achieved by studying empirically the effects that various mechanisms of self-regulation actually have on the work of scientists. For example, urging the scientific community to limit its study of some topics and focus on others may not retard science; for instance, sociology is unlikely to suffer from being now much more reluctant to concern itself with how the U.S. Army may stabilize or undermine foreign governments than it was before the blowup of Project Camelot (20).

In this context, it may be noted that the systematic attempt to bridge the "two cultures" and to popularize science has undesirable side effects which aggravate the problem at hand. Mathematical formulas, Greek or Latin terminology, and jargon were major filters which allowed scientists in the past to discuss findings with each other without the nonprofessionals listening in. Now, often even preliminary findings are reported in the mass media and lead to policy adaptations, mass use, even legislation (21), long before scientists have had a chance to double-check the findings themselves and their implications. True, even in the days when science was much more esoteric, one could find someone who could translate its findings into lay language and abuse it; but the process is much accelerated by well-meaning men (and foundations) who feel that although science ought to be isolated from society, society should keep up with science as much as possible. Perhaps the public relations efforts on behalf of science ought to be reviewed and regulated so that science may remain free.

A system of regulation which builds on the difference between science and technology, with some kind of limitations on the technocrats serving to protect societies coupled with little curbing of scientists themselves, may turn out to be much more crucial. The societal application of most new scientific findings and principles advances through a sequence of steps, sometimes referred to as the R & D process. An abstract finding or insight frequently must be translated into a technique, procedure, or hardware, which in turn must be developed, tested, and mass-produced, before it affects society. While in some instances, like that of LSD, the process is extremely short in that it requires few if any steps in terms of further development of the idea, tools, and procedures, in most instances the process is long and

expensive. It took, for instance, about \$2 billion and several thousand applied scientists and technicians to make the first atomic weapons after the basic principles of atomic fission were discovered. Moreover, technologies often have a life of their own; for example, the intrauterine device did not spring out of any application of a new finding in fertility research but grew out of the evolution of earlier technologies.

The significance of the distinction between the basic research ("real" science) and later stages of research is that, first, the damage caused (if any) seems usually to be caused by the technologies and not by the science applied in their development. Hence if there were ways to curb damaging technologies, scientific research could maintain its almost absolute, follow-any-lead autonomy and society would be protected.

Second, and most important, the norms to which applied researchers and technicians subscribe and the supervisory practices, which already prevail, are very different than those which guide basic research. Applied research and technological work are already intensively guided by societal, even political, preferences. Thus, while about \$2 billion a year of R & D money are spent on basic research more or less in ways the scientists see fit, the other \$13 billion or so are spent on projects specifically ordered, often in great detail, by government authorities, for example, the development of a later version of a missile or a "spiced-up" tear gas. Studies of R & D corporations—in which much of this work is carried out, using thousands of professionals organized in supervised teams which are given specific assignments—pointed out that wide freedom of research simply does not exist here. A team assigned to cover a nose cone with many different alloys and to test which is the most heat-resistant is currently unlikely to stumble upon, let us say, a new heart pump, and if it were to come upon almost any other lead, the boss would refuse to allow the team to pursue the lead, using the corporation's time and funds specifically contracted for other purposes.

Not only are applied research and technological developments guided by economic and political considerations but also there is no evidence that they suffer from such guidance. Of course, one can overdirect any human activity, even the carrying of logs, and thus undermine morale, satisfaction of the

workers, and their productivity, but such tight direction is usually not exercised in R & D work nor is it required for our purposes. So far guidance has been largely to direct efforts toward specific goals, and it has been largely corporate, in the sense that the goals have been chiefly set by the industry (for example, building flatter TV sets) or mission-oriented government agencies (for instance, hit the moon before the Russians). Some "preventive" control, like the suppression of run-proof nylon stockings, is believed to have taken place and to have been quite effective.

I am not suggesting that the direction given to technology by society has been a wise one. Frankly, I would like to see much less concern with military hardware and outer space and much more investment in domestic matters; less in developing new consumer gadgets and more in advancing the technologies of the public sector (education, welfare, and health); less concern with nature and more with society. The point though is that, for good or bad, technology is largely already socially guided, and hence the argument that its undesirable effects cannot be curbed because it cannot take guidance and survive is a false one.

What may have to be considered now is a more preventive and more national effective guidance, one that would discourage the development of those technologies which, studies would suggest, are likely to cause significantly more damage than payoffs. Special bodies, preferably to be set up and controlled by the scientific community itself, could be charged with such regulation, although their decrees might have to be as enforceable as those of the Federal Drug Administration. (The Federal Drug Administration, which itself is overworked and understaffed, deals mainly with medical and not societal effects of new technologies.) Such bodies could rule, for instance, that whereas fertility research ought to go on uncurbed, sex-control procedures for human beings are not to be developed.

One cannot be sure that such bodies would come up with the right decisions. But they would have several features which make it likely that they would come up with better decisions than the present system for the following reasons: (i) they would be responsible for protecting society, a responsibility which so far is not institutionalized; (ii) if they act irresponsibly, the staff might be replaced, let us say by a vote of the

appropriate scientific associations; and (iii) they would draw on data as to the societal effects of new (or anticipated) technologies, in part to be generated at their initiative, while at present—to the extent such supervisory decisions are made at all—they are frequently based on folk knowledge.

Most of us recoil at any such notion of regulating science, if only at the implementation (or technological) end of it, which actually is not science at all. We are inclined to see in such control an opening wedge which may lead to deeper and deeper penetration of society into the scientific activity. Actually, one may hold the opposite view—that unless societal costs are diminished by some acts of self-regulation at the stage in the R & D process where it hurts least, the society may “backlash” and with a much heavier hand slap on much more encompassing and throttling controls.

The efficacy of increased education of scientists to their responsibilities, of strengthening the barriers between intrascientific communications and the community at large, and of self-imposed, late-phase controls may not suffice. Full solution requires considerable international cooperation, at least among the top technology-producing countries. The various lines of approach to protecting society discussed here may be

unacceptable to the reader. The problem though must be faced, and it requires greater attention as we are affected by an accelerating technological output with ever-increasing societal ramifications, which jointly may overload society's capacity to adapt and individually cause more unhappiness than any group of men has a right to inflict on others, however noble their intentions.

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15. Calculated from C. Winkler, Ed., *Statistical Guide 1965 for New York City* (Department of Commerce and Industrial Development, New York, 1965), p. 17.
16. Winston suggests the opposite but he refers to sex control produced through birth control which is more widely practiced in higher classes, especially in the period in which his study was conducted, more than a generation ago.
17. Quoted in J. H. Greenberg, *Numerical Sex Disproportion: A Study in Demographic Determinism* (Univ. of Colorado Press, Boulder, 1950), p. 1. The sources indicated are A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century*, Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, vol. 11, p. 85, and H. von Hentig, *Crime: Causes and Conditions* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1947), p. 121.
18. For one of the best discussions, see E. E. Morison, *Men, Machines, and Modern Times* (M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966). See also A. Etzioni, *The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes* (Free Press, New York, 1968), chaps. 1 and 21.
19. See reports in *The New York Times*: “Tranquillizer is put under U.S. curbs; side effects noted,” 6 December 1967; “F.D.A. is studying reported reactions to arthritis drug,” 19 March 1967; “F.D.A. adds 2 drugs to birth defect list,” 3 January 1967. On 24 May 1966, Dr. S. F. Yolles, director of the National Institute of Mental Health, predicted in testimony before a Senate subcommittee: “The next 5 to 10 years . . . will see a hundredfold increase in the number and types of drugs capable of affecting the mind.”
20. I. L. Horowitz, *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot* (M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967).
21. For a detailed report, see testimony by J. D. Cooper, on 28 February 1967, before the subcommittee on government research of the committee on government operations, United States Senate, 90th Congress (First session on Biomedical Development, Evaluation of Existing Federal Institutions), pp. 46-61.

NEWS AND COMMENT

Behavioral Sciences: Report Bids for a Bigger Role

Three years after the fall of Project Camelot, the ill-fated, Army-financed study of social change in Latin America, it is beginning to be possible to see Camelot as a milestone for the social and behavioral sciences rather than as a permanent millstone.

It is true that federal funds for support of research abroad are now harder to come by, and that Camelot embarrassed American social and behavioral scientists working abroad and raised practical difficulties for many of them. It is also true that, as a consequence of Camelot, the effect of military support of social science research abroad on U.S. foreign relations has been sharply

questioned, particularly by Senator Fulbright. And it appears that Congress has adopted a more critical general attitude toward the social sciences.

On the other hand, the cause of the social sciences has found new champions in Congress, who, for example, advocate creation of a separate National Social Sciences Foundation (NSSF) and of a Council of Social Advisors. And, more concrete, many of the imposing number of federal education and social programs established in the middle 1960's provide not only funds for research by social scientists in the universities but opportunities for them to work as researchers, advisers,

and administrators in the programs themselves.

It would take a Pollyanna with a masochist streak to say that Camelot was an unalloyed blessing for the social and behavioral sciences, but it did force a facing of facts and prompted a much-needed effort to define what the relationship between the federal government and the social and behavioral sciences should be.

One result of this effort is a report, *The Behavioral Sciences and the Federal Government*,* published this month by a committee of prominent behavioral scientists who have worked under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. This Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences was formed late in 1965, with Donald R. Young, visiting professor at Rockefeller University, as chairman; Gene M. Lyons, Dartmouth, was later

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