overlayer which has an essential role in human societies, particularly modern ones, and in the understanding of our future. Actually, the state, and political processes in general, may be seen as a set of giant mechanisms whose function is to guide social processes and change.

Much more is dealt with in Mackenzie's volume, from the significance of the study of primitive tribes and "stateless politics" to the contributions of linguistics to the study of political culture; from the ancient roots of political science to recently constructed data archives. For all these the reader must turn to the volume itself.

Mackenzie's deep concern with the great issues of political life, with the prerequisites and components of freedom, social justice, and peace, are evident throughout the volume, but they take a second place. His main focus is on the development of tools and disciplines for the study of these prerequisites and components. Here this British political scientist—born in 1909—is very much *au courant* and "American"; whether a more humanistic social science may not contribute more to the study of political life than his volume implies remains to be seen.

In closing, it seems proper to mention that Mackenzie summarizes this reviewer's voluminous prior work in three succinct pages which are remarkable for their accuracy and fairness. The repeated reference to my departure from the scene is, however, at least slightly premature.

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Through a Glass Darkly

The Year 2000. A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years. HERMAN KAHN and ANTHONY J. WIENER. Macmillan, New York, 1967. xxx + 431 pp., illus. $9.95.

The Future as Nightmare. H. G. Wells and the Anti-Utopians. MARK R. HILLEGAS. Oxford University Press, New York, 1967. xii + 200 pp. $5.75.

From the dark art of the necromancer, the darker arts of the soothsayer, the magician, the gypsy's tea leaves, the witch who describes the future by interpreting the entrails of some recently dead creature, we have emerged into the gray art of forecasting.

Man has, probably forever, wished to foretell the future, though it is a relatively modern phenomenon that any considerable number of persons should wish to predict fairly precisely in time and quantity, to predict for more than a brief span of time, and—this is most revolutionary—to predict alternative outcomes of current policies in order to make the prediction something more than the astrologer's irrational reading of meaningless signs.

A popular indoor sport among some intellectuals in recent years has been to turn on "hate" sessions directed ineffectually at the senior author of *The Year 2000.* Because Herman Kahn has seen fit to face objectively the possibilities of our common anxieties—the universal holocaust—in sensible books with titles like *On Thermonuclear War* and *Thinking about the Unthinkable,* certain silly self-styled liberals have tried to make that rational man into an advocate of devastation. It was never true, it is not true, and let's bury that idea as fast as possible.

What are Kahn and Wiener about? Well, they are not about forecasting, exactly. They seek to portray a series of "surprise-free" futures, extrapolating (not in a silly way) past trends. Those future states are defined narrowly and then, by introduction of options and uncertainties, within broader limits. But all this is set within a framework of policy decision, informed by the notion that some portion of the future will be what current decision-makers decide that it will be, plus or minus the anticipated or unanticipated consequences.

To describe the Kahn-Wiener book briefly would be unfair. Just to quieten otherwise uninformed critics: (i) the authors know that the longer the predictive span, the greater the chance that quite unpredictable events will make a difference; (ii) they know that unique events are unpredictable (though I should have welcomed a professional face-saving statement about probabilities of classes of events); (iii) they recognize—praise be to them—that calculations of the future, and how to modify it, are no longer abstruse academic pursuits (rarely practiced) but are the real business of real people working with various models of social change. That the models of social change employed are inadequate should not surprise us. That the options available—the display of which is the major purpose of this book—should not be entirely cheerful should surprise us no more.

Why the study of the future, and why counter-utopias that sound a threatening and therefore admonitory note—witness *The Future as Nightmare* by Hillegas—should have come upon us in these last few years will be given an interpretation, after the event, by my colleagues who think that they are specialists in "sociology of knowledge." Such explanations are likely to be more persuasive than conclusive. Certainly interest in the future is closely related to the growth of explicit planning in public and private affairs, and the emphasis on rational decisional processes that go beyond mere judgment and experience. In any event, the market for rulers and french curves useful for extrapolating trends, not to mention crystal balls, must be very good these days.

What remains interesting is the attempt to follow through on the implications of current events and past trends in order to formulate wiser courses for the future. The notion is that one should distinguish between those future states that are desirable and intended, and those that are undesirable and unintended. (Any card-carrying sociologist can make a fourfold or eightfold table out of those distinctions.)

Kahn and Wiener construct a "standard world" for the end of the century, with considerable attention to its economic and technological state but without neglect of its political, cultural, and attitudinal state. They then proceed to introduce other possibilities that are somewhat less "surprise-free" but not out of the question; these alternative formulations go under the rubric of "canonical variations." Nor do the authors neglect wholly undesirable future states. In addition to a chapter on thermonuclear war there is one blithely titled "Other twenty-first century nightmares," with attention to chemical and electronic controls of behavior, genetic controls to permit breeding for specific traits, psychological manipulation, and similar horrors. "The evolution of society may produce the devolution of man."

I shall not here summarize the contents of these volumes, for such summaries let the lazy presume that they have read the books. I have, rather, reacted to these books, for I think they are important and worthy of close inspection. But since we are often re-

quired to make choices, I should dip into the Kahn-Wiener volume, and dip deeply. The analysis of frightening states of the future from literary sources offered by Hillegas strikes me as scholarly, and a timely reminder that viewing the future with alarm is not an invention of the current "futurologists."

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Lessons from Scandinavia

The New Sweden. The Challenge of a Disciplined Democracy. FREDERIC FLEISHER. McKay, New York, 1967. xiv + 365 pp. $6.50.

The Social Programs of Sweden. A Search for Security in a Free Society. ALBERT H. ROSENTHAL. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1967. xx + 193 pp. $6.

Sweden presents to Americans a unique aspect among the world's nations: it is the only society widely regarded as "ahead of America." What it means to be "ahead" is ambiguous. One of its meanings, however, is clear: Sweden, as a highly developed nation with the highest standard of living in Europe, has resolved certain problems of modern society that America has not yet fully faced. The Swedish solutions most challenging to Americans are in the problem areas of sex, alcoholism, and economic security.

As a deep and durable mode of personal relationship, sex has been a "social problem" in every organized society. Even the most primitive forms of social organization included—often began with—codes regulating sexual behavior, from incest tabus to more sophisticated marriage rules. The regulation of sex has been an important indicator of the state of all the arts and sciences in the social environment. We do not yet know how to interpret this valuable indicator in a general way, but we already know enough to doubt any general law that postulates a linear relationship between sex and society. There are examples at hand to disprove any hypothesis which asserts that more "advanced" societies also have more "advanced" sex codes. In part, this is an artifact of the present limitation of our measurement techniques. Even an aggregate measure of sexual activity (which the Swedes appear to have derived as a Pareto function of the ratio between childbirths and the sales of condoms) teaches us little about the effect of sex on the "quality of life" as experienced in a particular society—and a fortiori in the typological constructs which we call "developed" and "undeveloped" societies.

The point was illustrated a few years ago by the studies of marriage rules in the Kariera and Tarau societies made by mathematician John Kemeny of Dartmouth. Kemeny's analysis showed that "their procedures could have been considerably improved [in terms of their own value-goals] if they had been in a position to use modern algebra to design the rules." The question immediately arises: What would the Kariera and Tarau societies have to *become* in order to put themselves in a position to use modern algebra to improve their marriage rules? The next question: If they *could* use modern algebra, would they then be content merely to improve their marriage rules, or would they (as seems more likely) seek new rules more "appropriate" to a society that can use modern algebra?

This is the question faced by Fleisher's book. *The New Sweden* is a worthwhile effort to survey the existing social scene. Written in brisk, journalistic style, it aims at revealing the whole social context in which contemporary Swedes are seeking to solve their problems of sex-and-society in the context of security-and-society. An indicator of its serious purpose is the treatment of the Swedish suicide rate, usually believed by Americans to be the highest in the world. I quote Fleisher:

> Violence in Sweden tends to be inner directed. The rates for violent crimes are very low, about one tenth of the rates for murder, manslaughter, and rape in the United States, whereas nearly twice as many suicides are reported. Sweden's suicide rate ranked ninth in the world, according to figures released by the World Health Organization (WHO) late in 1966.
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> Swedes, who justly pride themselves on the accuracy of their official statistics, believe that their propensity for suicide is exaggerated. They argue that pressures for the concealment of suicide as a death cause are almost nonexistent. Their figures may seem high, but those in other countries would be much higher if the strong religious and moral reasons for concealment were removed.

The new Sweden portrayed by Fleisher is "ahead" of all other societies, including America, mainly in its reliance upon the public forum for the articulation of social norms and the regulation of individual behavior. The secular trend of postwar Sweden has been away from legislation and to education as a mode of social control. Education, which the Swedes appear to regard even more reverently than the Americans, is broadly construed to include all means of supplying public information and shaping public opinion.

Fleisher's account of alcoholism in the new Sweden is another case in point. Though generally regarded as the modern world's heaviest drinkers, the Swedes are here reported (on page 25 but unhappily without documentation) to consume "less" alcohol than the French, Italians, Germans, Danes, or Americans. The more pointed moral, however, is that the Swedes have moved steadily—since their two "October revolutions" of 1955 and 1965—from legislation against intemperance to education for temperance in their handling of this problem. Since sex and drink are two important social problems facing Americans today, it is clear why an American student of the new Sweden subtitles his book "The Challenge of a Disciplined Democracy."

It is equally clear why A. H. Rosenthal subtitles his book on the new Sweden "A Search for Security in a Free Society." Rosenthal's book has a narrower compass than Fleisher's, but it takes deeper soundings within its range. Among its assets is a foreword by Marquis Childs, author of the classic account *Sweden: The Middle Way*, which first alerted Americans to the challenge of a prospering democracy that could rise above the confrontation of communism versus fascism in the 1930's. Childs stresses that the exaggerated accounts of Swedish alcoholism, sexuality, and suicide have led Americans "to ignore the real contribution that Sweden has made in a half dozen fields, and particularly in the fields of social security and public health."

Rosenthal addresses himself particularly, as his title indicates, to the social programs of Sweden. His purpose is comparative to all and specific to Americans: "This book was undertaken on the premise that a description of the major Swedish social programs would be of value to Americans and others seeking to improve the social programs in their own countries." The book is exemplary in its coverage—social security programs, health insurance, public health, welfare, and related programs. It even includes a chapter, which should grip every American reader concerned