sion in Condit's text. The log-framing systems employed by early Scandinavian and Moravian settlers in this country are more fundamentally distinct than he seems to think; and this difference extends, morphologically, back into the prehistory of their respective homelands. And one can list important structures he does not include. He does not treat the extraordinary timber-framed roofs and belfries of two great churches in Providence—the First Baptist Meeting House (1775) and the First Congregational (1814). Overlooked also are the extremely interesting metal roof-framing systems employed by Ammi B. Young while he was supervising architect for the U.S. government in the 1850's, and the whole field of tented and pneumatic structures whose potentials the young German engineer Frei Otto has so brilliantly demonstrated.

But these are small flaws. For purposes of clarity, Condit has wisely not tried to list every project of a given category merely to show that he is aware of its existence—an all-too-common practice among art and architectural historians. Instead, every project mentioned is treated in some detail, and some 112 are illustrated. For reasons of clarity also (one assumes), he has omitted all documentation; there are only two footnotes in the book—and these document two direct quotations of no great significance. This technique undoubtedly makes more easily digestible his fact-packed text. But it also throws us completely upon the author's mercy. He is an established scholar, and his book bears the internal evidence of broad and careful research. Nevertheless, we are many times compelled to accept his word that this or that project marks the "first time" that such and such a theory was employed or new technique applied.

From a literary standpoint, Condit's approach to his material gives the book a monochromatic texture which makes sustained reading difficult. There is a mass of important data about many buildings, but this verbal information is isolated from the relevant illustrations, which are grouped in inserts but might better have been distributed through the text. The problem of literary style has its conceptual side as well. Admittedly, Condit deals with a complicated subject whose complexity increases geometrically with time. But there are surely more attractive methods of handling his materials than the one he employs. These materials fall into four categories: building type (church, house), structural form (truss, cantilever), structural material (steel, wood), and fabrication method (bolting, welding). Each of these categories has had its own phylogenetic development, and Condit's account would have been both clearer and more interesting had he followed them—for example, *trusses* from early wooden types to contemporary variants like the space frame and "bicycle" truss, or timber *fabrication methods* from mortise-and-tenon, through nails and bolts, down to modern glued-up laminates. Instead, he zigzags back and forth across the field, writing sometimes about steel bridges, sometimes about steel trusses, sometimes about steel skyscrapers. The shifting of these vantage points tends to obscure somewhat the dramatic evolution of his subject.

The illustrations in the book are excellent, many of them rare pictures of little-known structures. There is a very judicious list of suggested readings. The index is inadequate for such complicated material.

American Building marks a watershed for its field. It is certain to have a salutary effect on civil and structural engineers, all of whom should study it as professionals or students. It constitutes an important document to be read in tandem with histories of American architecture, including one, with an identical title, by this reviewer.

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Frauds and Follies

The Medical Messiahs. A Social History of Health Quackery in Twentieth-Century America. JAMES HARVEY YOUNG. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1967. xiv + 460 pp. $9.

In his journal for 1686, John Locke, physician and philosopher, put down some of the virtues of a specific known as the Wound Wood. "If any young or old troubled with the dysentery gripings of the bowels or fits of the smother, let them with this wood stroak the parts downward and it will ease the pain." Or again, "For a woman in travail if she be placed on a chair made of this wood she will bring forth easier and speedier." In all, Locke noted 26 medical uses of the Wound Wood for both men and animals. Today, from the vantage point of almost three centuries of accumulated medical and scientific knowledge, we smile knowingly at the miraculous claims made for such a pharmacopeia. Was this once the state of medical knowledge? Our poor ancestors—no wonder quacks abounded in Locke's England. Before our smiles freeze, and before we pride ourselves on current scientific enlightenment, let it be said that in 1966, with a scientific revolution under way in medicine and biology, a heightening of standards of medical education and care, a highly sophisticated pharmaceutical industry, and a government keenly aware of the necessity of regulating the manufacture and dispensation of medical products, Americans spent more than $2 billion for quack medicines and cures. It is this paradox of rationalism and antirationalism in medical treatment that James Harvey Young addresses himself to in *The Medical Messiahs,* the second volume of his inquiry into the history of medical quackery in the United States.

When Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur in his *Letters from an American Farmer* (1782) asked the question, "What is then this new man, an American?," he was not dealing with a new man, but rather with an ordinary man who held tenaciously to Old World beliefs, not the least of which was an abiding faith in a large number of nostrums and quack cures for coping with disease and promoting health. Early Americans, like their English forebears, dosed themselves with the like of Daffy's Elixir, Dr. Bateman's Pectoral Drops, and Turlington's Balsam of Life. If these specifics were discarded by the beginning of the 19th century, it was not because Americans had acquired new convictions and wisdom about the use of nostrums, but rather because they switched to such homegrown medicines and cures as Dr. Lee's Bilious Pills, Elisha Perkin's Electric Rods, Samuel Thomson's botanic cures, Henry Hembold's Bachu, and William Radam's all-purpose Microbe Killer. Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes of Boston characterized the patent-medicine makers who made fortunes at the expense of their neighbors' ills and infirmities as Toadstool Millionaires (a phrase that provided the title for Young's earlier book). In spite of such moral indignation, however, national belief in patent-medicine nostrums remained intact throughout the 19th century. It wasn't until 1906 that Congress passed a Pure Food and Drug Act that was in part designed to control some of the grosser manifestations of medical quackery.

The Medical Messiahs makes clear that the Pure Food and Drug Act did not succeed in either ending or controlling medical quackery. One of the important reasons for this failure was the way in which the law was administered. In the very first case brought by the Food and Drug Administration, against a nostrum called Cureforhedake Brane Fude, neither scientific testimony nor the intervention of a President of the United States proved sufficient to win a case that essentially had been ill prepared. In the years that followed, government officials were often hampered in prosecuting malefactors by lack of funds or of personnel. As one example, Young notes that it took the Food and Drug Administration a decade of litigation to clean up the labeling of a horse liniment which was being sold as a tuberculosis cure. At other times, the courts interpreted the law so conservatively as to deny various government agencies the power to extend effective control over the purveyors of quack cures and nostrums. Thus the Post Office Department, which was a key agency in fighting health promoters who used the mails to defraud, was unable to bring a notorious faith healer to book because it could not prove the extent to which mental influence could affect the physical condition of the body. The decision, known as the McAnnulty Doctrine, later served as a signal to ingenious quacks that they could operate with impunity in those areas where medicine or science had not yet spoken authoritatively or definitively.

For Young, reasons for the persistence of quackery are to be found not only in the failure of the administration of regulatory statutes and the seemingly unending procession of unscrupulous quacks and willing victims, but also in a congeries of factors including changing disease patterns, the state of medical care, the development of science and technology, and above all the extraordinary adeptness of the leaders of a billion-dollar business at using modern advertising to get something for nothing. One of the important features of *The Medical Messiahs* is Young's analysis of the role of modern advertising arts in the growth of medical quackery. Another is the fascinating collection Young has put together of case histories of modern medical quacks. They are a band of cutthroat entrepreneurs who make the legendary robber barons of American business history seem like boy scouts.

In the end, *The Medical Messiahs* stands as an indictment of a nation that has proved itself unable to translate scientific knowledge into effective legislative control in matters that affect the health and personal welfare of the entire population. It is an indictment of a nation that prides itself on its educational standards, but whose population can read only well enough to savor, not well enough to evaluate, the promises of advertising copy. It is an indictment of a nation that so fears the passage of time that it searches eternally for youth and the qualities of youth, conditioned by a vast advertising and communications industry to a belief in miracles and the imminent arrival of telegrams from heaven. It is superb social history.

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Accusation and the Accused

Controlling Delinquents. Edited by STANTON WHEELER, with the assistance of HELEN MACGILL HUGHES. Wiley, New York, 1968. xx + 332 pp., illus. $8.50.

The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice. AARON V. CICOUREL. Wiley, New York, 1968. xiv + 345 pp. $8.95.

In the great division of topics of study among the social sciences, sociology, as an academic latecomer, inherited the grimiest and least prestigeful ones: slums, immigration, poverty, and the other ills of a rapidly urbanizing society. Laymen wanted to know what could be done about the mess in our cities, and sociologists found their place in the scientific sun by trying to tell them. One of the problems they undertook to illuminate was that of the delinquent child. Vocal reformers had just begun to call attention to the children who played truant from school, stole, and seemed headed for careers in crime; and while the reformers were at no loss for immediate steps to take, they wanted to know why children did such things. Etiological theories were necessary so that programs of reform might be effectively planned.

Sociologists argued with psychologists and others who thought the causes of delinquency lay in the dynamics of the child's personality instead of the external variables of neighborhood and family. Until relatively recently, however, sociologists shared with their opponents the assumption that the phenomenon to be explained was unproblematic. Everybody knows a bad kid when he sees one; a delinquent is a delinquent.

Recent developments in the sociology of deviance, however, have not only questioned that assumption but have made its revision the basis of a new approach to questions of cause. Explanations depend on what is to be explained, and these newer theories propose that, before asking why people commit deviant acts, we first ask how the act came to be classified as deviant and how it happened that the particular actor came to be accused of having committed it. Accusation itself becomes problematic. Labeling theory, as it has come to be called, emphasizes the empirical and analytic independence of behavior and of the qualities that are imputed to it in accusations. Mistaken accusations, empirically common, show us the necessity of distinguishing between things we do and the reputations we achieve when it is thought we have done them. Unless we make the distinction, we may search for the causes of events that have never occurred while ignoring the causes of those that have.

Concretely, a child who is labeled a juvenile delinquent may never have committed any remotely criminal act, while children who have committed many such acts may go unlabeled. How many such errors occur is not known precisely, but Cicourel's careful analysis of official records discloses the tremendous ambiguities that surround a juvenile's assignment to delinquent status and our consequent inability to know what official delinquency statistics really measure. All this suggests