reminded him that Edward Teller and Weinberg had once testified to the effect that the United States is lagging in applied science. Pickering replied, "I am a little bit surprised . . . because it seems to me in this country over the past couple of decades we have demonstrated some remarkable achievements in the area of applied science."

Daddario cited pollution as a problem toward which available knowledge was not being rapidly applied. Pickering replied that it was a matter of priorities, and that, if the Congress wanted to expand work on pollution, the federal laboratories could handle the job.

Several days later, when AEC Commissioner Gerald F. Tape testified, this optimistic forecast seemed to have been forgotten. Tape related that, in November 1966, Representative Chet Holifield, then chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, wrote to the Bureau of the Budget to urge that the AEC's laboratories be used for pollution research. Tape continued: "Early last year, AEC Chairman Seaborg wrote to the Secretaries of Commerce, Interior, and HEW expressing our desire to identify facilities and talents at AEC laboratories which might be used in support of pollution control efforts. We have as a result had a series of meetings with representatives of these departments and identified a number of areas of direct interest. To date, only two relatively small programs are being considered and discussed."

The subcommittee did not inquire as to why this purportedly flexible and responsive system of federal laboratories has been able to mount only two relatively small programs during the 18 months since Holifield made his request.

What was perhaps the most revealing testimony came from Joseph M. English, director of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory at the Georgetown University Law Center. Pointing out that various federal laboratories have done research that seems to have relevance to crime control, English noted, however, that the laboratories lack funds to develop these findings into useful hardware and techniques: "Discussion does not produce hardware. Nor does it educate and train police laboratory experts in its use," English stated. "In my investigation so far, I have yet to find any Federal laboratory facility, and I must interject at this point that I have just begun this phase, . . . which had funds it could commit to the work necessary to develop the promise of work already done so that it would be useful as a police aid. . . . Unfettered funds in significant amounts at the disposal of Federal laboratory facilities may help matters. But I am not at all certain that they will in view of the 'mission' orientation which is so evident in the Federal Government establishments . . . and in view of the almost total lack of awareness throughout the American community, public and private sectors alike, that there is such a thing as scientific crime detection and control as a legitimate area for research effort and support."

This testimony evoked a few questions from the subcommittee, but at that point the members were called to a vote on the floor of the House, and the hearings ended.

—DANIEL S. GREENBERG

Newark: Negroes Demand and Get Voice in Medical School Plans

Many medical schools are situated in or near inner-city slums, and indigent patients from these blighted areas traditionally have been important in the training of students. But no tradition has developed of allowing slum residents an effective voice in any aspect of the schools' plans. On the contrary, the tradition has been that, insofar as questions concerning the impact of these institutions on community health and other problems have been considered at all, the schools themselves have decided them. Officials of the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry have discovered, however, that the rules of the game have been changed, particularly when a medical school moves into a Negro slum area.

When the college persisted last year in its plans to move from Jersey City to a large site in Newark's Negro community, it was accused by many of contributing to the tensions which led to the riots of last July. Moreover, the black community, strongly supported by state and federal officials, blocked the relocation plans until the college recently met most of its demands.

Among other things, the community wanted, and eventually got, a major reduction in the size of the site to be acquired (thus, fewer families would be displaced); a detailed commitment to mount programs for providing community health services and training health workers; and the college's cooperation in setting up a community health council, in which Negro neighborhoods would be strongly represented. Moreover, since the city administration wanted the college brought to Newark, the issue could be and was used as a weapon by the Negro leaders as they successfully pressed local and state officials for more and better housing and jobs and for a powerful, if not decisive, voice in various other matters affecting life in the black community.

The college's encounter with an aroused and militant Negro community arose from a very special conjunction of circumstances and events. The first of these was the college's critical need to establish a new home.

The college was originally established by Seton Hall University in 1954 and given quarters leased from the Jersey City Medical Center. It was taken over by the state of New Jersey in July 1965 after Seton Hall had found the college's large annual deficit too much to bear. Later that year, because of difficulties with the city administration, the trustees decided that the institution should leave Jersey City, and that the program in clinical medicine should be moved immediately to Newark's City Hospital and to the Veterans Administration Hospital in East Orange.

This awkward arrangement pleased no one, and a number of faculty members left, some of them taking their research funds with them. Severely short of space, with its basic science

and clinical programs separated, and lacking permanent chairmen for several departments, the college faced a crisis. Its accreditation was in danger and its very existence in jeopardy.

Had there been no outside pressures, the college no doubt would have chosen for its new location a 138-acre pastoral site in suburban Madison, as recommended by a committee of medical educators, which had noted the land-poor condition of most urban medical schools. But Newark wanted the college, and ultimately was successful in getting it because of the city's political power and its demonstrated need for a new institution capable of providing jobs and improving health services for its rundown Negro neighborhoods. Also, the college, in which $71 million in state and federal funds would be invested, was viewed by state as well as city officials as important to Newark's regeneration.

A final step in the city's campaign was to offer the college 185 acres, although it had initially offered less than a third of the 150 acres requested. However, as Donald Malafronte, administrative assistant to Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio, has since admitted, the new offer was simply a political ploy. According to Malafronte, the city never expected to have to deliver more than 30 acres or so, believing that the college trustees were less interested in acreage than in having an excuse not to come to Newark.

Whatever City Hall's intent, the offer and its subsequent acceptance by the college caused alarm in the black community. For years, Newark, like other cities, had been carrying out various slum clearance projects in its Negro neighborhoods with scarcely more than a token effort to obtain the advice and consent of the residents. A few years earlier, an offer by the city to clear a large site for a medical college probably would have aroused no strong protest. But now residents of the area were becoming increasingly militant. The cry "black power" was in the air.

The controversy over the college's relocation plans was the more intense because of the growing distrust between City Hall and many black leaders. Although Negroes helped to elect Mayor Addonizio in 1962 and again in 1966, many Negroes had become disaffected. They deplored such things as the city's failure to relieve the shortage of housing and its refusal to set up a civilian review board to hear complaints against the police. They also suspected that, with Newark's population already more than half Negro, the mayor was using slum clearance to keep Negroes on the run and politically disorganized.

The area on which the college planned to build had to be declared blighted if it was to be cleared. The public hearings held by the City Planning Board last spring were stormy and bitter, and community tensions increased, as the federal and state commissions which investigated the July riots were later to note. Yet even after the riots, President Robert R. Cadmus and the college trustees refused to relinquish any part of their site option.

But pressure against the college's relocation plans continued to build up, and some of it was menacing. For example, at a protest meeting in December a black militant said, "The rebellion in July was nothing compared to what will happen if the medical school is built."

"Model Cities" Violation Charged

Later, two of the community groups protesting the college's plans lodged a formal complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the agency on which the city was depending to make the land available for college use. Prepared by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the complaint contended that the plans, by calling for too much land and failing to provide adequately for community health needs, violated the Model Cities Act of 1966. Noting that the college site was in a "Model Cities" neighborhood, the complainants held that the act requires that federally supported projects in such neighborhoods be designed and coordinated in such a way as to assure a favorable impact on the community.

Already HUD had indicated that, pending some settlement of the site controversy and other issues, it would keep the college project stymied. In an effort to break the impasse, the college trustees announced in late December their willingness to reduce the size of the site by about a third and to adjust the site boundaries so as to displace fewer families. This offer was promptly rejected by the black community's leaders, despite the trustees' warning that, unless quickly assured of a Newark site, the college would go elsewhere.

The Negro leaders, and particularly the young militants, had their own urgencies, for failure of their protests might cost them their following. Governor Hughes and his administration were also on trial. In 1966 the state Department of Community Affairs had been established and Paul N. Ylvisaker, a former urban affairs specialist for the Ford Foundation, had been named commissioner. The medical school dispute was a major test of this new agency's ability to cope with a complex and aggravated urban situation. After a summer of disastrous urban rioting, HUD and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (to which the college had applied for construction grants) also were under pressure to help bring peace to Newark.

On 10 January, in a letter to Governor Hughes, Under Secretary Robert C. Wood of HUD and Under Secretary (now Secretary) Wilbur J. Cohen of HEW, citing their authority under the Model Cities Act, set forth seven conditions that would have to be met in order for the college project to proceed. One was that the medical school and the city discuss neighborhood problems with representatives of the black community and "resolve any differences." The other conditions were more specific, calling for such things as consideration of the "social impact" of removing land from residential use and assurances that the medical school would increase the scope and quality of medical services offered the neighborhood.

The Wood-Cohen letter fixed the parameters for the negotiations that occurred in February and early March between the black community, on the one hand, and the college, the city, and the Newark Housing Authority, on the other, with the state playing largely a mediator's role. Commissioner Ylvisaker and New Jersey's chancellor of higher education, Ralph A. Dungan, had met with Wood and Cohen shortly before the letter was prepared and were agreed that the college should respond to its demands. But just how reasonable the Negro leaders would be in the negotiations no one could foretell. A key figure in the black community's protest against the college plans was Junius Williams, a senior law student at Yale who represented a group of young militants organized as the Newark Area Planning Association. Before the negotiations began, Williams was viewed by some as irreconcilable. That he should have been so regarded is not surprising. President Cadmus recalls that, on one oc-

casion, Williams said to him, "We want power, baby, and don't you forget it."

If the black community kept its demands reasonable, however, there was no longer much chance of the trustees abandoning plans to build in Newark. Chancellor Dungan had asked Cohen whether construction grants would be available if the college switched to a suburban site. "The answer was ambiguous," Dungan now recalls. "While it was not certain that money would not be available for a medical school on another site, the implication was that a school in Newark would have a relatively high priority."

(As Cohen explained to this reporter, his professional advisers feel that Newark, with its services, facilities, and evident medical needs, is the best place in northern New Jersey for the college. If approved for support by the Surgeon General's National Advisory Council, the college would deserve a high priority because of its potential social and economic value to Newark and its Model Cities neighborhood, Cohen indicated.)

In order for negotiations to begin, a not fully answerable question had to be decided: Who represents the black community? As things turned out, the principal negotiators for the community were Junius Williams and Harry Wheeler, a 44-year-old junior high school history teacher and coordinator of the Committee Against Negro and Puerto Rican Removal. The community was not exclusively represented by those at the negotiating table, however. The meeting was open, and Chancellor Dungan, who presided, allowed anyone attending to speak up freely. To ensure that all viewpoints were heard, state representatives made use of time between the six bargaining sessions to consult with Negro politicians, ministers, and others.

While there was by no means complete harmony, the black community, or at least its more articulate self, displayed considerable unity, and its negotiators proved remarkably competent. They lacked technical expertise in some areas of discussion, but they received help from the staff of the state Department of Community Affairs and from the college itself, through Clyde Sullivan, an associate professor of community and preventive medicine.

Cumbersome and sometimes rancorous as the negotiations were, substantial agreement finally was reached on all points in the Wood-Cohen letter, and the bargaining ended on a note of mutual goodwill. The black community had scored a sweeping success, but a success attributable not so much to black power as to the reasonableness of the Negroes' demands, the leverage provided by the Wood-Cohen letter, the skill of the state mediators, and the enlightened self-interest of the college and the city. For the record, however, Junius Williams says, probably correctly, "None of this would have happened without last summer's rebellion, when black people tried to burn the town down."

Even prior to the negotiations the college trustees had decided that the site would have to be limited to about 58 acres, which, after all, is a far larger site than that occupied by, say, the Yale Medical Center in New Haven or the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center in Philadelphia. But Cadmus was determined that the college make no commitments interfering with its control over its internal management. One such management question raised during the negotiations concerned the college's relationship to Newark City Hospital. This 630-bed institution, which adjoins the college site and is soon to be taken over by the college, is known to most Negroes as the "butchershop." The college's plan has been to upgrade the hospital, once administrative control has been achieved, and use it as a clinical resource for its teaching program and a principal means of providing community health care.

City Hospital a Buffer?

The new 272-bed teaching hospital, on the other hand, will be a referral hospital for the entire state. The black community's negotiators were afraid that City Hospital would not be much improved and would be a buffer between the college and the community. "What we really wanted was a total redesign of the college, with City Hospital becoming the teaching hospital," one of the negotiators told *Science*. "But they just weren't going to do that. They would have pulled out first."

The black community did get assurances that $2.5 million will be spent immediately on the rehabilitation of City Hospital. It was also promised an ambitious "outreach" program whereby the college, by setting up neighborhood health centers and by other means, would develop new ways to combat such community health problems as the high incidence of tuberculosis, venereal disease, and maternal and infant mortality.

Most of the things the college has agreed to do to improve community health services, it would have done anyway, Cadmus says, though there is little evidence of much past interest by the faculty in improving the health of the poor. Because of the negotiations, if for no other reason, community medicine is now assured a high priority.

The future of the college is still uncertain, but its prospects are brighter now than they have been for many months. HUD has released for the college's use a small tract of land on which temporary facilities are to be built and has reserved funds for the purchase and clearance of the larger tract the permanent campus is to occupy. HEW's decision on the construction grants was recently deferred, principally to await further status reports on preparations for the college's move to Newark.

Probably the single most important factor in resolving the college's conflict with the black community was the Wood-Cohen letter. Some people, such as Cheves Smythe, secretary of the Liaison Committee (for accreditation) of the Association of American Medical Colleges and the American Medical Association, found that letter a disturbing indication that agency officials are joining in some of the evaluative functions heretofore performed largely by medical "peer groups" and placing an undue emphasis on the service component of medical education. But President Cadmus disagrees. The letter, he observes, provided a bargaining mechanism which allowed the college to show it was not indifferent to community concerns. "But we weren't pushovers," he says. "We gave everything we felt was proper, nothing we felt was improper."

Although Newark did not escape trouble altogether following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., no major blow-up occurred. In fact, the Sunday after the King murder, an estimated 25,000 persons, Negroes and whites, took part in a "march of understanding." If peace is returning to Newark, settlement of the medical school dispute is not alone responsible but, provided all the agreements are faithfully carried out, a major source of tension has been eliminated. Indeed, the record seems to bear Cadmus out when he says, "We negotiated in good faith. They can no longer say, 'We can't get whitey's attention.'"

—LUTHER J. CARTER