

Social Science: Federal Agencies Agree To End Covert Support

Twenty-one federal agencies have taken a pledge to refrain from coactiveness in their support of American academicians who conduct social science research in foreign countries.

The intended effect of this pledge, which is included in a 14-point set of guidelines issued last month by the State Department, is to prevent any deception as to which agency is supporting a project and for what purpose. At the same time, the agencies, while not swearing off classified foreign area research in universities, have agreed to de-emphasize it in favor of assigning such research to nonacademic institutions. The agencies, which last year spent about \$35 million, in and out of universities, for research on foreign areas and international affairs, account for virtually all government support in these fields. The guidelines they have adopted, however, apply only to university-based social science research, and are particularly directed toward research supported by contracts, rather than project grants of the NSF type, which, by all accounts, have been above-board. Though all 21 agencies have agreed to abide by the guidelines, the State Department says that relatively few of them will have to alter their practices to be in conformity with the regulations.

The new code of conduct is the latest in a series of steps designed to dispel the mistrust created by Project Camelot (*Science*, 10 September 1965; 10 December 1965) and by recent revelations of secret support to scholarly organizations by the Central Intelligence Agency. Thus the guidelines explicitly ban covert support by requiring that "the fact of Government research support should always be acknowledged by sponsor, university, and researcher." The CIA, which is one of the 21 adhering agencies, has let it be known that it will abide by the rules. But when the guidelines, which the State Department describes as voluntary and unpoliced, are viewed against the suspicions that many foreigners are now said to feel toward the peregrinations of U.S. schol-

ars, it appears that they fall short of being undiluted balm. Furthermore, the promise of no more wife-beating that is implicit in some of the guidelines raises exciting questions as to what's been going on that will no longer be permitted.

The new ground rules are contained in a document, "Foreign Area Research Guidelines," issued by the Foreign Area Research Coordination Group, an interagency body that was convened by the State Department in 1964 for the purpose of examining problems related to the conduct of international social science activities. After the Camelot debacle, Secretary of State Dean Rusk raised the status of the group, and, though the 21 agencies are said to be members on a voluntary basis, FAR, as the group is known, has become the government's central mechanism for regulating the federal role in foreign area research.

Just how much conflict preceded the issuance of the new guidelines is not known. A State Department official said that representatives from all 21 agencies were involved in preparation of the document and that several non-government social scientists were consulted. And he added that the guidelines went through five drafts, though that number, he pointed out, is neither unusual nor significant in the place where he works. However, the substance of the guidelines suggests a barely resolved conflict between those who feel that the academic social sciences should be granted immunity from nonbenign employment and those who feel that the academic social sciences should be available to serve as the government sees fit.

Thus, one of the guidelines states that "the Government has the responsibility for avoiding actions that would call into question the integrity of American academic institutions as centers of independent teaching and research." And it goes on to say, "there are certain specialized research needs—sometimes involving foreign sensitivities—for which Government agencies

should continue to use or develop their own capabilities or those of non-academic institutions in order, among other things, to avoid possible embarrassment to academic research personnel and institutions."

But after having paid homage to the virtues of "independent teaching and research," and after having expressed the need for insulating the universities from work that might involve "foreign sensitivities," the guidelines oscillate to the view that "government-supported contract research should in process and results ideally be unclassified, but the practical needs of the nation in the modern world may require that some portion be subject to classification; the balance between making work public or classified should incline whenever possible toward making it public. . . . Nevertheless, other responsibilities of the government sometimes must prevail. . . . In exploring alternative courses of action, the government often needs research-based analysis and reflection which, if made public, could produce serious misunderstandings and misapprehensions about U.S. intentions. To abandon restrictions of these sorts altogether would impose serious limitations on the agencies' use of contract research." Then it swings back to the view, "The best guarantee that government-support research will be of high quality is to have its results exposed to peer-group judgment; open publication is the most effective means for this purpose." However, no reference is made to the fact that, under present government policy, all U.S.-supported foreign area social science research "related to foreign policy" is subject to government review prior to publication (*Science*, 24 Nov. 1967).

The guidelines candidly acknowledge that "one source of difficulty for the scholar overseas is the unfounded suspicion that all American researchers are covertly supported by the U.S. Government." Then follows the suggestion that "a policy of full disclosure of support will help to eliminate the suspicion of *all* [original italics] American research—whether private or government, classified or unclassified—and will allow that which is supported by government to be judged on its own merits." The authors of the guidelines, however, do not attempt to reconcile, on the one hand, their desire to allay foreign suspicion and, on the other, their own acceptance of the U.S. interest in pursuing "certain specialized research needs sometimes involving

foreign sensitivities." As was noted, they do suggest that such research needs should be handled by nonacademic institutions, but no attention is paid to the likelihood that perhaps it is a bit too much to expect suspicious natives, educated or otherwise, to be tuned in to the institutional peculiarities of American scholarship. Just who is working for whom at any given time is sometimes difficult to tell in the affluent American academic community, and the guidelines do nothing to clarify such matters. In fact, it is stated that they "were not designed to deal with consultant relations between an individual scholar and a government agency. . . ." Furthermore, the guidelines, in their suggestion that nonacademics be favored for classified duties, fail to note that an anthropologist in the employ of a Defense Department think-tank is not readily distinguishable from an anthropologist who works for a university. If the guideline writers think that the former can poke into sensitive areas without implicating the latter, then they are acting as though Camelot never happened.

However, the guidelines are not addressed to such matters, nor do they brush more than lightly over the relationship between foreign suspicions and classified research projects; nor is there offered any explanation of why the ban on covert support is applicable only to academic institutions. Is it permissible, let us say, for an intelligence agency to support foreign area social science research by a commercial contractor without the host country's knowing who is really behind the project? The new guidelines do not constitute any impediment to such practices, though presumably the State Department, as part of its post-Camelot review procedures, systematically screens government-supported foreign area research to avoid embarrassing situations.

On the issue of whether foreign governments are to be informed of the social science research projects that the U.S. supports on their territory, the guidelines are somewhat unclear. They state, for example, that "the [U.S.] government should under certain circumstances ascertain that the research is acceptable to the host government. . . . For example, when the U.S. Government supports a classified research project involving substantial field work abroad by scholars associated with American universities, sufficient information about the project should be

NEWS IN BRIEF

● **HARVARD DENTAL EDUCATION:** A committee appointed by Nathan W. Pusey, president of Harvard, has recommended that Harvard continue its graduate and postgraduate dentistry programs, but with changes in admission procedures, in curriculum planning and content, and in clinical training practices. Among the committee's recommendations were that dental students be admitted separately from medical students; that the dental faculty be more active in planning the dental students' first 2 years; and that dental students' clinical training be pursued in hospital settings rather than in the clinic of the School of Dental Medicine.

● **UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND:** A department in the University of Maryland's School of Medicine, tentatively known as the department of developmental research, has been approved by the university's board of regents. Samuel P. Bessman, professor of biochemistry and pediatric research, will head the department, which will be concerned with all phases of human development. The department will be staffed initially by members of the university's pediatric laboratory and senior members of the Rosewood State Hospital Research Laboratory.

● **DOCTORATE PRODUCTION:** The National Academy of Sciences has issued the sixth in a series of publications on the production of doctorates in the United States. Titled, *Doctorate Recipients from United States Universities 1958-1966*, the report traces the educational pattern followed by doctorate recipients and lists the number and types of degrees awarded by each university. Among the trends documented by the report is that public universities are steadily widening the gap of doctorate production over private universities. Of the top five universities in doctoral output, four are public. The report lists the top five as Illinois, Wisconsin, California at Berkeley, Harvard, and the University of Michigan. In 1920, four of the top five and 12 of the top 20 were private institutions. Other developments cited by the report include (i) doctorates in engineering have almost quadrupled since 1958; (ii) the ranks of states in doctorate production has remained "remarkably stable" since

1950—with New York in the lead; (iii) the time between baccalaureate and doctorate is 5.1 years for scientists; and (iv) most new doctoral recipients are first employed by colleges and universities. Copies of the report may be obtained for \$8.50 from the National Academy Printing and Publishing Office, 2101 Constitution Ave., Washington, D.C. 20418.

● **AUSTRALIAN SCIENTISTS ON VIETNAM:** In an advertisement in the November issue of *The Australian Journal of Science*, 677 Australian scientists, both in and out of the academic community, urged the Australian and U.S. governments to adopt UN Secretary-General U Thant's proposal toward preliminary negotiations on Vietnam. The advertisement said, in part, ". . . it is particularly to be deplored that a technologically advanced country such as Australia should spend vast sums of money and effort dedicated to the deliberate destruction of food and depletion of the necessities of life in a region of the world where the two greatest threats to humanity, excessive population growth and food shortage, exist side by side. . . ." A view differing from that of the Australians was made public 19 December when 14 American scholars and specialists on Asian affairs released a statement warning that a Communist victory in Vietnam would likely lead to larger, more costly wars. The specialists described themselves as moderate members of the academic community.

● **STAMLER ENDORSEMENT:** Four AAAS board members, signing as individuals along with 11 AAAS fellows, have sent a letter to AAAS Council members asking them to support Chicago heart researcher Jeremiah Stamler in his court fight against the House Un-American Activities Committee (*Science*, 8 Dec.). The signers stated, "It seems quite appropriate that we in science give whatever support we can to this important effort in behalf of constitutional rights. We need to be jealous of these rights if the atmosphere necessary for our intellectual freedom is to be safeguarded." The board members who signed the letter in support of Stamler were Barry Commoner, Hudson Hoagland, Alfred S. Romer, and H. Burr Steinbach.

communicated to the host government to convey a true picture of the character and purpose of the project." Why any foreign government that pretends to a scrap of sovereignty should tolerate a procedure that is so outrageously patronizing is not discussed.

Though it is clearly stated that the guidelines are directed toward contract research and may have only "some applicability" to grants awarded by "foundation-like" government agencies, two of the 21 agencies—the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities—quickly dissociated themselves from the implication that they have been doing anything that will now require alteration. Immediately after the issuance of

the guidelines, they demanded and received from the State Department a public statement to the effect that their policies and practices have all along been aboveboard. The demand was accompanied by a warning that, if the State Department did not clarify the situation, the two agencies would express their views in a letter to the *New York Times*, which had given front-page coverage to the announcement of the guidelines. On the following day the State Department issued a statement which said, in part, that "undisclosed funding has no connection at all with the majority" of the 21 agencies, and that NSF and the Endowment "have never found it necessary" to engage in secret funding.

Camelot, the guidelines, and other events are all manifestations of the arrival of a long-delayed mating season between government and the social sciences. A great mixture of motives, conflicting and overlapping, accompanies this liaison, but basic to the conflicts that are implicit in the newly issued guidelines is the fact that significant elements on both sides persist in striving for the impossible. They want the academic social sciences to partake of the presumed purity of the academic world and, at the same time, to serve as instruments of a government that quite readily acknowledges its involvement in some less than pristine activities around the world.

—D. S. GREENBERG

Deep Seabed: "Who Should Control It?," U.N. Asks

The international community's growing interest in the ocean floor and its resources poses an important and, for the present, unanswerable question: Will man's eventual use of the seabed lead to greater amity among nations or to greater tension and hostility? The tiny nation of Malta raised this question forcefully in the United Nations last August by proposing to put the seabed under international jurisdiction and control.

Under the Malta proposal, all non-peaceful uses of the seabed would be proscribed, and the net benefits from the exploitation of the seabed's resources would go primarily to the development of the poor countries. Malta defined the seabed as that part of the ocean floor which lies beyond present limits of national jurisdiction.

The Convention on the Continental Shelf, which became binding on signatory nations in 1964, declares that states shall have sovereignty over the seabed underlying their adjacent coastal waters down to a depth of 200 meters, and be-

yond that limit as far as the depth "admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas." This definition, drafted in 1958 when the then-existing state of technology offered little prospect of commercial operations at depths much greater than 200 meters, is becoming increasingly obsolete as ocean technology advances.

The lively reaction the Malta proposal has engendered both within and outside the U.N. indicates that, while the deep seabed is still remote and largely inaccessible, many people believe science and technology will bring the treasures of the deep within reach in their lifetime. This belief was evident in the late summer and fall from the protests of numerous members of Congress, and of the National Oceanography Association (NOA), an industry group, at the idea that the U.S. might hastily agree to put the deep seabed under the control of the U.N. or some other international agency.

The NOA and some of the protesters in Congress did not reject out of hand

the concept of internationalizing the seabed. They contended, however, that a sound legal regime can best be developed after more knowledge and experience have been gained. Internationalization, they argue, is not the only kind of regime conceivable for the seabed and may not be the best.

The opposing viewpoint, of course, holds that it is self-deception to believe that a legal regime allowed to evolve from experience and agreements among the maritime nations will represent the best interests of the world community. Such an evolutionary regime, it can be argued, is more likely to simply reconcile and ratify the acquisitive practices of technically competent maritime nations and large companies.

At the root of the Malta proposal is a belief that technological advances soon will permit the "rich" countries to use the seabed as a new arena for military and economic competition. In a U.N. speech on 1 November, Ambassador Arvid Pardo, Malta's representative at the United Nations, contended that establishing an international legal regime for the seabed is a task to be undertaken in a spirit of urgency.

Current international law encourages the appropriation of [the ocean floor] by those who have the technical competence to exploit it. . . . Present and clearly foreseeable technology also permits [the] effective exploitation [of the seabed] for military or economic purposes. Some countries may therefore be tempted to use their technical competence to achieve near-unbreakable world dominance through predominant control over the seabed. . . . The process has already started and will