and the pressure for change? Despite the proliferation of proposals to alter the system, there was little support for the plans offered by the Marshall Commission and later endorsed by the President. It may be true, as the Harris poll indicates in *Newsweek*, that only 40 percent of the public thinks the draft works fairly. But other polls also say that a majority is opposed to a lottery, although it is not clear whether most people really understand the President's proposals.

Much of the discussion of the draft was stimulated by uneasiness about the war in Vietnam or outright opposition, feelings that hardly bothered either Armed Services Committee. Some leading proponents of reform of the structure of the Selective Service System were Republicans (relatively junior ones at that) and their criticism was labeled "political." From the committee's vantage point, as from the military's, the main objective of the Selective Service Act is to get men for the army. The calls for a volunteer army, for example, made little impression not only because they originated both from critics of the war and from Republicans, but also because a volunteer army was unacceptable to the military.

The Administration, as advocates for the Marshall Commission, did not help very much. The President, or his aides, did little to push the proposals. He may not have thought they needed pushing—after all, up until the conference the framework of the Administration's plans had survived. Or, faced with what has generally been a reluctant Congress, the President may have been content to let nature take its course. The Defense Department, formally entrusted with bearing the package to Congress, was not very persuasive. The Department was not a long-standing lottery advocate, and, as recently as early 1966, had not favored the idea in public testimony.

The anti-lottery, anti-reform forces also had a powerful, if silent ally, the Selective Service System. Though Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, the head of the System since 1941, had publicly reversed his long-standing opposition to the lottery, there was no question where his, and the system's, heart lay. As Sen. Russell noted once while defending the conference bill on the floor: "It is significant to me, in reading these communications [against the conference bill] here today, that we have not had anything from General Hershey objecting to this bill. He has not expressed any displeasure with it."

The main opposition to the lottery was in the House Committee where the lottery was viewed as inflexible and "change for the sake of change." In contrast, the Senate included nothing about the lottery in its bill. There were a variety of other differences between the two bills, but most were settled in favor of the House. Nothing is more significant to the shape of the new draft legislation than the fact that the Senate version, generally leaving much more discretionary authority to the President than the House bill, was virtually destroyed in conference.

Just why this happened is difficult to explain. Conference committees have always been mysterious, holding executive sessions and keeping no records. A number of factors, however, seem to have been at work. The Senate was under time pressure: the censure of Sen. Thomas J. Dodd (D–Conn.) was a few days off, and Russell, fearing extended controversy, reportedly wanted to get the draft bill approved before the Dodd debate began. Moreover, the positions of the House and Senate committees were not so far apart as their bills indicated. (For example, the House had written a guarantee of undergraduate student deferments into its bill; the Senate made a similar recommendation in its report. The House included the lottery veto in the bill; the Senate noted several misgivings about the lottery in its report.) Finally, the House Committee's interest in draft legislation was more thoroughly established than the Senate's. The House Committee held two sets of hearings on the bill and appointed a civilian panel, headed by retired General Mark W. Clark, to make recommendations. The House conferees, drawn from the committee, were stubborn: they knew what they wanted and were determined to get it.

This setback to reform, however, may have obscured the draft debate's more lasting significance. Most fundamentally, the debate spotlighted a long-ignored subject and gave public currency to such ideas as the volunteer army. Once the war in Vietnam is over, there may yet be another reconsideration of Selective Service and proposals rejected this time may fare better then.

The debate also seemed to make some subtle changes in existing assumptions about the draft. The old assumptions favored educational and occupational deferments on the grounds that the draft was not simply a device for supplying men to the military, but one for serving the nation's manpower needs in many areas. The Selective Service System calls this "channeling" and believes it has helped—through deferment policy—direct men into scientific, engineering, and teaching careers "which are essential to national interest." Regardless of the impact or desirability

New Criteria To Hurricane Study

New criteria, broadening the area of operation, will be in effect this year for Project Stormfury, a series of cloud-seeding experiments designed to reduce the force of hurricanes. The changes were announced by the Environmental Science Services Administration and the U.S. Navy, which jointly operate the project.

In past years, hurricanes were considered eligible for seeding only when they were in a fixed geographical area between Bermuda and Puerto Rico. In the forthcoming experimental period, 8 August to 15 October, it was announced, "project officials will use forecasts of hurricane tracks and positions to select storms for experimentation, instead of the fixed area—based on purely climatological guidelines—used in previous years."

"Under the new criteria," the announcement continued, "a hurricane will now be considered eligible for experimentation only when the official Weather Bureau forecast indicates there is less than a 10 percent probability of the hurricane center reaching within 50 miles of a populated land area within the next 24 hours."

The change in criteria followed a recommendation by a five-member panel, headed by Noel E. LaSeur of Florida State University.