neering personnel they need. Heavy spending will be necessary before large-scale development of the mineral resources of the continental shelf can begin. The discovery and evaluation of the shelf's mineral deposits will be expensive. Extraction and recovery of the minerals will require a costly development of mining technology.

Even once lots of money is available for a large "in-house" effort by Interior, an ambitious program of marine resource development will demand a major effort by industry. Industry, of course, will have to put up the risk capital for marine mining, just as it has done in exploiting offshore oil reserves. The Bureau of Mines has established a small research center at Tiburon, California, on San Francisco Bay, where it has been collaborating with three industrial firms (Lockheed, International Minerals and Chemicals Corporation, and Merritt, Chapman, and Scott) in the development of marine mineral production technology.

The bureau will also tap the expertise of the universities and oceanographic institutions. Congress recently gave Interior general authority to contract for research. In the past, the Bureau of Mines has lacked broad contracting authority, and were it not for the fact that many of its research centers are located on or near university campuses, the bureau's ties with academia would be quite limited.

Interior's efforts to develop an integrated program for marine resources should show up potential conflicts as well as permit a more comprehensive survey of marine resources. For example, marine mining could cause pollution problems jeopardizing fishery and recreation resources. The government's record up to now in resolving conflicts in the use of natural resources has been poor. Success in avoiding such conflicts in the future development of marine resources would be a substantial achievement in itself.

Interior hopes to get still another benefit from an integrated oceanography program. It expects the program to reinforce its argument that Interior's scientific programs—especially those of the Geological Survey—are vital to the success of its mission as the government's department for the conservation and development of natural resources. Assistant Secretary Cain, keeping the faith, expresses confidence that the Geological Survey and the science programs of other Interior agencies will never be separated from Interior to form a new environmental science agency. "I haven't the slightest fear of that," he says. "Our position is too strong."

—LUTHER J. CARTER

The Senate Revolt: Protesting U.S. Overcommitment Abroad

Those who served with Lyndon B. Johnson in the Senate know from first-hand experience that Johnson is no foreign policy expert, and, indeed, that he was not even much interested in the subject before he assumed the Presidency. Consequently, they are even less inclined to assume that his foreign policy proclamations are Holy Writ than are most other Americans.

This familiarity with the President's interests is one reason why a fairly large group of senators this session staged the biggest congressional revolt in recent decades against a President's foreign policy decisions. Of course, this familiarity was not, of itself, sufficient to breed such an uprising; a catalyst was needed, the catalyst, whether acknowledged or not, was always Vietnam.

The most important personal change which sparked the Senate revolt this year was the growing alienation of Foreign Relations Committee chairman J. William Fulbright (D–Ark.). Fulbright's foreign policy break with the administration gave a respectability and momentum to Senate dissent which had been lacking in previous sessions.

For Fulbright, as for several other senators, President Johnson's quick decision to send troops into the Dominican Republic in 1965 set the stage for the Vietnam dissent of 1966. After holding hearings on the Dominican intervention, Fulbright spoke, in September of 1965, in criticism of the U.S. Dominican decision. The angry White House response which greeted Fulbright's speech seemed to cut the once strong cord between President Johnson and Fulbright. The Dominican intervention made senators, such as Fulbright, who had given general support to the President's Vietnam policy wonder whether the President had a tendency to shoot from the hip whenever the word "Communist" was mentioned.

But even more important than the Dominican intervention in fomenting senatorial dissent was the ever-growing cost and threat of the Vietnam war. The 1966 session started with the somber report of the presidential mission led by Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield (Mont.) and George D. Aiken (R–Vt.). The report warned that the military situation in Vietnam was "open-ended" and offered "only the very slim prospect of a just settlement by negotiations or the alternative prospect of a continuance of the conflict in the direction of a general war on the Asian mainland." This grim message forced many Senators to pay even more serious attention to the dangers inherent in the Vietnam war.

Despite the mollifying influence exerted by the December-January pause in the bombing over North Vietnam, Congress began to express dissatisfaction with Vietnam policy soon after the session opened in January. Without publicizing his intentions or the depth of his concern, Fulbright succeeded in getting his committee members to agree to hold hearings on Vietnam before most of them really knew what was happening. The occasion for the formal discussion was consideration of a $415-million aid supplement for Vietnam. The hearings soon revealed that Fulbright and a number of his committee members were upset by the whole direction of U.S. policy in Vietnam. At these hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dean Rusk received the most unfriendly treatment from Congress of his 5 year tenure as Secretary.

In the House of Representatives, dissent on Vietnam was much less open this year than it was in the Senate. The reasons for this are difficult to ascertain precisely, but several explana-

tions suggest themselves: the 2-year term makes House members more cautious, especially in an election year; the House has no constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs, and representatives usually do not regard it as their duty to have well developed views on foreign policy issues; representatives are more in awe of Johnson as President than senators, who better understand the human frailties of their former colleague; and most members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee are less independent-minded than members of the Senate committee. The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Thomas E. Morgan (D–Pa.), is regarded by the administration as a good "team player"; he does not ask for the same kind of wide-ranging analysis from his committee members that Fulbright encourages from his. Typical of the difference in attitudes is the fact that on at least one occasion this session the House committee vigorously applauded Secretary Rusk after his presentation; this was a far cry from the verbal brickbats which many members of the Senate committee kept hurling at Rusk.

In the House, what dissent on Vietnam there was was scattered. The main organizers of dissent were members of the liberal Democratic Study Group rather than members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. For instance, on 21 January, 77 DSG members sent a letter to the President urging him, in effect, to continue the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam. This cautious letter was the most significant expression of House discontent on Vietnam during the entire session.

Abrupt Response

President Johnson responded to the House letter in a somewhat brusque manner, but his reply to Fulbright and the 15 other senators who wrote on 27 January urging a continuation of the bombing pause was even more abrupt. The President reminded the senators that the Senate had enacted the SEATO treaty and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and he said he intended to act on their instructions. This chilling reply further alienated the Senate "doves," who then began to criticize the administration even more vigorously for considering the SEATO treaty and the 1964 Tonkin resolution to be indications of congressional approval for the administration's escalation of the Vietnam war.

It is difficult to pinpoint actual changes in administration policy which resulted from the Fulbright sessions, but the nationally televised hearings did have the effect of making dissent from the administration's policy more reputable, both in the Senate and in the country as a whole. Those who disagreed with Vietnam policy could now point to the testimony of Ambassador George F. Kennan or of General James Gavin to illustrate the intellectual respectability of their views. Critics learned from the hearings that many committee members shared their doubts about administration policy.

The Fulbright hearings also seem to have influenced the Senate's most rapidly rising "star," Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D–N.Y.). On 19 February, after attending the hearings, Kennedy announced that the Viet Cong should be allowed to participate in the formulation and implementation of a Vietnam settlement. Kennedy's disagreement with the administration's continuing escalation of the Vietnam war has been obvious from the time of that announcement, and his well-publicized dissent has encouraged other critics of the administration's policy to speak out.

On the other side, a few senators gave wholehearted support to the administration's Vietnam policy. Some, including Southerners Richard B. Russell (D–Ga.), John Stennis (D–Miss.), and Russell B. Long (D–La.), at times seemed to urge further escalation of the war. But, on balance, the Senate "doves" were more vocal and seemed more numerous than the Senate "hawks," at least among the Democrats.

Most of these "doves," however, were unwilling to take the political risks of voting against the appropriations required to support American soldiers in Vietnam. Both Houses overwhelmingly passed the early $13.1-billion supplemental appropriation for Vietnam and the later $58.1-billion military appropriation measure.

The Senate critics of administration policy are not only worried about the current war in Vietnam but are also concerned lest the conflict expand into an armed conflict with the great Communist powers. They are especially worried about the possibility of another Korea, with Chinese troops moving south to fight American forces. Some Senate critics are not convinced that the administration is fully committed to avoiding a war with China. They feel that some Executive officials would welcome an excuse to attack China, especially a chance to knock out China's nuclear capability. Senate critics would have more faith in the administration's assertions of peaceful intentions toward China if American planes would stop violating Chinese airspace and if the United States would quit bombing close to the Chinese border. The fear of a wider war involving China is evident in the comments of many of the Senate critics, including Fulbright. In an interview earlier this year, Fulbright told this reporter: "If Rusk's statements mean anything at all, they mean escalation to a military conclusion—a long protracted war, the possibility of a nuclear war."

Conciliatory Rhetoric

This concern about a possible war with China led many senators to welcome the China hearings which Fulbright called in March. While supporting U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, most witnesses wanted to see a more normal relationship between the United States and Communist China, testimony which seemed to prod the administration into adopting more conciliatory rhetoric toward Peking in subsequent months (*Science*, 14 October).

Encouraged by the national notice given the Vietnam and China hearings, Fulbright and his committee held June hearings on U.S. European policy. The committee members wanted to study this subject partly because they felt the administration was letting relations with NATO allies deteriorate by concentrating its top-level attention on Vietnam. The sessions did not attract as much attention as the earlier hearings had received, undoubtedly because it is now difficult to interest Americans in foreign policy problems not directly related to Vietnam. As in the sessions on Vietnam and China, those on Europe revealed that most committee members favor a more flexible policy than the administration does, and that Fulbright and other committee members are more sympathetic to the foreign policy positions of French President DeGaulle than the administration is.

Although serving on the Foreign Relations Committee gives prestige, senators still find the assignment frustrating. Except for approving ambassadorial nominations and a handful of foreign treaties, the committee's only formal influence on the administration's foreign policy is through the foreign

aid bill. This year, senators showed their displeasure with the administration by cutting the President's foreign aid requests. Fulbright led the attack, arguing that the Vietnam aid program had helped involve the United States in the Vietnam war. Many senators understood his arguments to mean that, if they disapproved of the Vietnam war or wanted to express concern over the extent of American overseas commitments, they should think carefully about their votes on the foreign aid bill. The committee, and the Senate as a whole, responded by slashing the 1967 economic aid authorization by $409 million and cutting the military aid authorization by $125 million. Although the House authorized a larger amount, the final appropriation of $2.936 billion was one of the smallest amounts ever voted for foreign aid.

During these debates one Senate veteran commented in an interview that the foreign aid uprising reminded him of what had happened in the Watts riots: "Senators are striking back because they feel they have no real influence. They feel that the President has gotten us into a war in Vietnam and could even start a war with China, without ever consulting the Senate. Senators feel neglected and impotent and they want the man down at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue to know they're hurting."

A Slap at Rusk

Senators expressed their frustrations not only by cutting foreign aid but also by changing the language of the foreign aid bill. They included the following sentence: "The furnishing of economic, military, or other assistance shall not be construed as creating a new commitment or as affecting any existing commitment to use armed forces of the United States for the defense of any foreign country." Inclusion of this clause was opposed by Secretary Rusk, and the sponsors obviously meant it as a slap at Rusk and other U.S. foreign policy officials. The provision remained in the version passed by Congress.

The Senate restrictions on foreign aid and the congressional hearings on Europe and Vietnam helped create a climate in which Senators began to ask more often if the United States were not overcommitted abroad. Even the conservatives began to wonder if the United States were not militarily overextended—a question forcefully posed in the important summer hearings held by Senator John Stennis's Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. Because of the size of the American troop commitments abroad, Senators doubted that the United States was prepared to respond militarily to a crisis in another part of the world.

From the hearings on Europe, many Senators concluded that Europeans no longer worried about a Soviet invasion and hence felt no need to field large armies or fulfill NATO commitments. Senators also worried about the great expense and the gold outflow entailed in maintaining six U.S. divisions in Europe, especially when the troops were needed in Vietnam. Others were angered by European refusal to send any soldiers at all to Vietnam.

This senatorial concern led the Democratic Policy Committee to adopt unanimously a resolution calling for a "substantial" reduction in the number of U.S. troops in Europe, a move in which the 13 committee members were joined by 20 other senators. Majority leader Mike Mansfield has led the fight for the resolution and has the strong support of Senator Stuart Symington (D–Mo.), Armed Services Committee chairman Richard B. Russell, Democratic whip Russell B. Long, and Fulbright. Mansfield has said that he believes one or two U.S. divisions in Europe will meet the American obligation as effectively as six divisions. Although the Senate did not take up the resolution this session, Mansfield served notice that he plans to introduce it again early next year.

The administration, however, has already shown signs that it will begin to withdraw troops from Europe, a development which may obviate the need for the resolution. If the Senate is able to force the administration to withdraw substantial numbers of soldiers from Europe, it will have exerted the greatest foreign policy influence over the executive in many years, a victory which may encourage senators to exert further pressure in other areas.

In the final weeks of the session Fulbright began to focus attention on the rapidly growing U.S. force in Thailand, which he regards as another example of a military commitment made by the administration without full congressional knowledge and consent. After holding closed committee hearings, Fulbright made a Senate speech on 3 October about U.S. military commitments to Thailand. He introduced poetic evidence to justify his doubts by asking: "Is our objective realistic? We—a white, western country—are trying to reform an oriental culture in our own image, ignoring the warning of the poet laureate of an older imperialism, Rudyard Kipling, who wrote:

> The end of the fight is a tombstone white
> with the name of the late deceased,
> And the epitaph drear: 'A Fool lies here
> who tried to hustle the East' "

President Johnson and his assistants might win more converts for his Asian policy by sitting down more often to exchange ideas with senators. But the administration tends to answer congressional misgivings with denunciation rather than dialogue, and this makes the chasm between the White House and the Congress grow progressively wider. Senators do not regard administration "briefings" as a substitute for consultation, and several comment that the administration even fails to inform the Foreign Relations Committee when it escalates the war in Vietnam.

Doves and Olive Branches

Senators are proud men, who resent a President who does not respect their prerogatives. Although "dove-like" senators are somewhat discouraged about the possibility of influencing the President's Asian policy, they are likely to keep waving their olive branches in the nonelection-year session which begins in January. Mansfield is important not only because he will continue to speak out on American policy in Asia and Europe but also because he will defend the right of less senior senators to offer alternatives to the President's policies. Fulbright and many of his committee disapprove of what they regard as the administration's willingness to act as policeman for the world. Having discovered the value of the educational hearing during the last session, the committee is likely to continue to make use of this device. The committee can be expected to launch another major series of hearings early next session to examine the proper position of the United States in the world.

Citizens who believe the role of the Senate is merely to ratify executive foreign policy decisions will be angered by senators again next year. But those who believe senators should give both critical advice and judicious consent to the executive will be grateful that the Senate will continue to criticize the President's foreign policy.

—BRYCE NELSON