For a long time the Academy has been eclipsed by the emergence of the White House science office as a center for initiative in federal relations with research. The people running these two institutions are all old friends and associates and share a concern for the well-being of science; thus, there is a built-in inclination to work together and, particularly, to avoid letting the public view any dissension in the ranks of science. But the White House Office of Science and Technology (OST) is an implement of the political process, while the Academy is the representative of science, and institutional loyalties have a way of assuming critical importance, even between old friends. Such was the case when the Academy and the National Science Foundation became quite angry with each other over who was to take the rap for the Mohole mess. There are no similar botches awaiting resolution, but basic research, which is the primary constituency of the Academy, is coming under serious financial pressure as the Johnson administration puts increasing emphasis on the application of science to social needs. And, while OST is fully sympathetic to the necessity of nurturing basic research without demanding a sure payoff, the Viet-Nam crisis is impinging on Johnson's budgetary freedom, and the money has to come from somewhere. Already there are reports that increased costs and budgetary pressures may seriously affect the Mohole project. After all, it is not hard to imagine budget-weary politicos having a hard time understanding why the U.S. government should lay out $100 million for a few yards of buried rock.—D. S. GREENBERG

Social Sciences: Cancellation of Camelot after Row in Chile Brings Research under Scrutiny

A Presidential order early in August directed the Secretary of State to set up machinery for the clearance of all federally supported social sciences research abroad which might impinge on American foreign relations. The action dampened but did not quench a controversy ignited early this summer in Chile.

The President issued the order about a month after the Army canceled a research program—dubbed Project Camelot—designed to produce a better understanding of the dynamics of revolutions in foreign countries.

The furor was generated when word of preliminary soundings in behalf of the project in Chile reached unsympathetic ears. A Communist newspaper in Santiago started things with charges of intrusion by the American military into Chilean affairs, and the case became something of a *cause célèbre* in Chile and beyond. The American ambassador to Chile, Ralph Dungan, who apparently had not been consulted about Camelot, protested vigorously, and in short order the Army announced cancellation of the project. Research projects of various kinds were to have been carried out in several countries under the banner of Camelot by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), whose parent institution, American University in Washington, D.C., held the contract with the Army.

The incident attracted congressional attention, and early in July hearings were held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee's subcommittee on international organizations and movements. The subcommittee chairman, Dante B. Fascell (D–Fla.), appears willing to accept the view that social sciences research abroad can be of value, but he is a strong advocate of better coordination.

Camelot, on the other hand, roused the wrath of Senator J. W. Fulbright (D–Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Fulbright made no bones about viewing Camelot as an unwarranted incursion by the Defense Department into the field of foreign relations, and he also expressed general misgivings about the value of behavioral sciences research.

An investigation of Camelot was known to be under consideration by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but the idea has been put aside, at least for the fast-waning, present session. On 25 August, however, weeks after the President's order was issued, a stinging statement by Fulbright was read into the *Congressional Record* (Fulbright was ill that day), and Senator Wayne L. Morse (D–Ore.) followed with an even more acrid reprise.

Perhaps the strongest section of Fulbright's statement was his declaration, "I am personally concerned with such projects as Camelot because I believe there lies beneath the jargon of 'science' in which these studies abound a reactionary, backward looking policy opposed to change. Implicit in Camelot, as in the concept of 'counterinsurgency,' is an assumption that revolutionary movements are dangerous to the interests of the United States and that the United States must be prepared to assist, if not actually to participate in, measures to repress them. It may be that I am mistaken in this interpretation; if so, I would be greatly reassured to have convincing evidence to that effect."

So far, except for the hearings, little has been said on or off the record in behalf of Camelot and behavioral sciences research. The Defense Department policy seems to be to keep its upper lip stiff and tightly buttoned, and the State Department, which was initially more talkative, adopted the same policy. Social scientists associated with the government, either by Civil Service tenure or contract, who know about Camelot and its upshot have been equally taciturn.

It should be noted that the Camelot affair brought to the surface feelings which lie not far below it about federal support of behavioral sciences research. The House Appropriations Committee, for example, this spring cut funds requested by the Defense Department for behavioral sciences research from $22.9 million to about $20 million. In its report on the appropriations bill the committee observed, "Some of the areas being pursued in behavioral sciences appear not to offer any real promise of providing useful information. Other studies appear to be concerned with trivial matters on which intelligent people should not require studies in order to be informed."

The Senate, acting after the Chilean incident, put a finer point on the House cuts by specifying that $1.1 million earmarked for Camelot—the full amount—be withheld.

The point to be kept in mind is that Congress has appropriated funds on an increasing scale to the military for behavioral sciences research, but its misgivings, too, have perhaps been increasing.

SORO, the current center of attention, has been one of the Army's chief surrogates in performing social sciences research. Its annual budget lately has represented perhaps a tenth or better of funds spent by the military on behavioral sciences research.

The organization was established 10 years ago, principally to permit consolidation of psychological warfare studies then being made for the Army by nonprofit research groups engaged primarily in other lines of research. SORO specialized first in problems of mass media communications in overseas areas. In the late 1950's the organization began to branch out by making studies of revolutionary activity. In 1958 SORO was awarded a contract, which has been

continued, to prepare "area handbooks" designed for the orientation of Army people serving abroad, particularly in more exotic locales. Funds for the handbook program came from the office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, but the bulk of SORO's research activities has been financed through the office of the Chief of Research and Development.

When President Kennedy took office, his interest in "unconventional" warfare and counterinsurgency tactics resulted in a higher level of funding and a wider variety of assignments for SORO.

A current brochure of the sort that goes to new or potential employees summarizes SORO activities as research applied to "psychological operations, unconventional warfare, civic action in developing nations, military aid and assistance programs, remote area military operations, technology of behavioral and social sciences, internal wars and internal security, counterinsurgency information and analysis."

Until this year SORO based its research mostly on secondary sources. Its performance apparently satisfied the Army, but had inspired little interest in the behavioral sciences research community at large. SORO, however, did attract attention when it moved out of the library and into the field. The stage was set for Camelot in late 1964 by a recommendation from the Defense Science Board, which reports to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Defense Department and is made up of high-level scientists and science administrators from inside and outside the government.

As SORO director T. R. Vallance told the Fascell subcommittee, the Defense Science Board "recommended that SORO increasingly orient its research activities to the collection of primary data in overseas locations and correspondingly reduce its reliance on library material and other secondary sources."

One result of this recommendation was the conceiving of Project Camelot. As Vallance described it to the subcommittee, "This is a major project of a basic research nature designed to produce a better understanding of the processes of social change and mechanisms for the established order to accommodate change in an effective manner.

"This is an outgrowth of continuing interest in the government in fostering orderly growth and development in the newer countries of the world. The Army's increasing role in military assistance and counterinsurgency has focussed attention on the need to better understand the processes of social, political and economic development, and how the rapid changes in society which many U.S. programs foster can be accommodated without a breakdown of the social order. The opportunity provided by these socio-political breakdowns for penetration and possible takeover by Communists points to the continuing need for objective assessment and research. The problem of anticipating social breakdown and its attendant violence and destruction is one of the problems toward which Camelot is directed."

The circumstances under which Camelot came a cropper are still not clear. Reportedly, however, an anthropologist on his way to Chile on non-Camelot business volunteered to take some soundings for Camelot in Chile. The arrangement was informal, and while there are differing accounts of how well the State Department was kept abreast of the development of Camelot, it appears that word of the impending spadework never got through to American diplomats or the Chilean government.

Repercussions from the Camelot incident in Latin America are serious and persistent, if a report from Baltimore *Sun* correspondent Nathan Miller out of Santiago, published 1 September, is accurate. Basing his story on talks with informed American diplomats and university scholars and Latin American scholars and researchers, Miller said that the Camelot affair "has seriously damaged prospects for independent academic research in the hemisphere."

Among social scientists in the United States, concern over Camelot appears to be fairly widespread, but agreement on its immediate significance or long-run implications is not.

A fair number of behavioral scientists seem to feel that the military services should not sponsor behavioral sciences research under any circumstances. Their reasons range from straight anti-militarism to a pragmatic fear that investigators working abroad on funds provided by the military will automatically be pilloried regardless of the merit of the research they are doing.

At the other extreme are those who argue that the military services have provided the major federal source of funds for support in the behavioral sciences and that the military as patrons have a good record in not imposing conditions which would infringe on the freedom of inquiry of investigators. (NSF last year provided slightly more than $10 million for social sciences research, about half the amount expended by the military services.)

There remains a certain intramural contentiousness among the branches of the social scientists. In talking about Camelot, for example, political scientists are inclined to ascribe the eruption in Chile to a lack of political sensitivity of other breeds of social scientists.

What unites most social scientists, however, is concern over the shape the State Department regulations will take.

(As this issue went to press, the State Department announced creation, within the Department, of a Foreign Affairs Research Council, with Thomas L. Hughes, director of the Bureau of Research and Intelligence, as chairman. According to the announcement, the research council "will formulate Department policy for review of [foreign area] contract research, examine certain individual government-sponsored projects, and consider means to reduce foreign policy risks." No details on staffing, organization, or procedures for the council were included in the announcement.)

One anxiety is that the clearance process will be extended to all federally sponsored social science research projects, and that projects funded by NSF and NIH, for instance, will be screened for their potential effect on foreign relations. The fear seems to be that if such projects are approved by State, it will be assumed that the investigators are furthering United States foreign-policy objectives and they will be regarded as "agents" of the military.

Some observers feel that the job of deciding which projects will not injure American foreign relations and, at the same time, will represent worth-while social science research is difficult, and that the State Department is not naturally endowed to do it well. Traditional Foreign Service methods for gaining and evaluating information do not make great use of the techniques of current social sciences research. And the Department's own program of research has been costing something like $125,000 a year, a very small fraction of the money allotted in the military services budget for social sciences research. In fairness it should be noted that the State Department has asked for a doubled budget this year; as for the past, it is generally much easier for the military than for the State Department to get funds from Congress.

State reportedly plans to create a review section of about 16 people compe-

tent to review social science projects. Critics say that such a section would be operating in an indifferent, even hostile, atmosphere, and that the experience of other agencies has shown that it is impossible to attract first-rate scientists unless an agency is administering a respectable research program of its own.

State Department regulations, when they are published, may banish these objections. But the delay in their publication—caused, it seems, by lengthy interagency negotiations, vacations, and a bureaucratic hope that time will cool a controversy—has heightened suspense and nourished rumors.

There is a surprising degree of agreement, in and out of government, that studies with the objectives of Camelot are necessary. At a time when stage-managed "wars of national liberation" are emerging as the number-one foreign policy problem for the United States, the potential contributions of social sciences research abroad can hardly be ignored.

Project Camelot can be viewed as a reaffirmation of the old saw, "It ain't what you do, it's the way you do it." At the lowest level, the name Project Camelot, with its echo of military jargon, its quixotic ring, and its cloak-and-dagger aura, was regrettable in the context of Latin American sensitivities.

Federally sponsored field research in the behavioral sciences can be, and is being, done in Latin America. SORO itself has such work in progress, out in the open and with the cooperation of local governments. The United States Information Agency has for some years conducted opinion surveys abroad by means of questionnaires—which are currently a symbol of Yankee meddling in Latin America—but USIA hired local concerns to make their surveys and apparently had very little trouble. Camelot, doubtless, has made things more difficult.

One major lesson to be drawn from the Camelot reversal is that social sciences research would profit from the kind of apparatus constructed in the years when the physical and life sciences began receiving major support from federal agencies. SORO, for example, lacks the support of a distinguished board like the RAND Corporation, or a consortium of universities like that which backs the Institute for Defense Analyses. Perhaps more to the point, projects are not scrutinized by review panels made up of outside experts such as those NSF and NIH depend on.

The social sciences began to receive sizable sums for research from the federal government only recently, and the fraternity is years behind the physical scientists in developing solidly founded relationships with the federal government. It is revealing that the behavioral sciences committee of the National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council signed a contract with the Army only last March for advisory services in the general area of social conflict. It is even more revealing that an *ad hoc* committee formed to undertake the task held several meetings and then voted to dissolve itself early in June (before Camelot came apart). It is known that some members of the committee took the view that certain aspects of the Army program were impractical and ill designed, and that this hastened the dissolution. The committee, in putting itself out of business, however, urged that closer supervision by the scientific community of the kind of projects it had been looking at was highly desirable.

Camelot is probably an episode rather than a calamity, but it should be a plain warning to social scientists, who seem to talk a lot about infrastructure, that they had better do something constructive about their own.—JOHN WALSH

Education: U.S. Institutions Prepare African Students for Development Tasks at Home

African students first began coming to the United States in substantial numbers in the late 1950's, and since that time American colleges and universities have had a rare opportunity to leave their imprint on the development of a growing number of nations of Africa. They appear to be doing just that, although the development problems of Africa are so vast that they yield slowly to efforts at increasing the supply of trained manpower.

The African students here numbered 6800* last year, and the total may rise again this year; for the past 6 years the rate of increase of Africans studying here has been greater than that for the students of any other geographic area. Although the Africans represent only about 8 percent of the 82,000 foreign students in the United States, their potential influence on the future of the countries from which they have come is quite obviously very great. One need only cite the familiar example of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, educated at Lincoln University and the University of Pennsylvania, to make the point. The U.S. government, most of the African governments, the American academic community, and a number of private agencies all have been consciously engaged in encouraging the flow of young minds from Africa to our institutions. Africa's historic ties having been largely with the former colonial powers of Europe, it is not surprising that of the 45,000 Africans reportedly being educated outside their own continent, two-thirds are attending institutions in Britain and France; but two new poles of attraction for African students—the United States and the communist bloc—now are beginning to assert strong educational influence of their own on Africa. Africans studying in the bloc countries—over 6000 last year—are comparable in number to those studying here. The bloc, despite some embarrassing and well-publicized incidents involving African students, continues to recruit them in large numbers.

Understandably, some persons in Congress and in the institutions and private agencies which administer African student programs now feel that the time is ripe to take a look at how the students are faring here. The Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee held 4 days of hearings in June on African students in the United States and issued its report last month. Although nothing alarming was discovered, certain weak points were uncovered, and the U.S. government was urged to adopt a "more positive role" to see that the students reach their educational goals.

Africa's urgent need for university graduates is evident. When Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) became independent last October the country was pitifully short of the trained civil servants needed to fill positions that had been staffed by Britons. In Uganda last year, of the more than 700 teachers, only 30 were Africans, the remainder being largely British and American. Similar manpower shortages are easily cited for other African nations.

Everything else being equal, it would be better to train more African students at home and have fewer go

* Includes 1279 from the United Arab Republic. Statistics on African students should be viewed with caution. Some authorities believe they often are off by 15 percent or more.