The Administration of Foreign Policy

The jacket on **Conduct of the New Diplomacy** (Harper and Row, New York, 1964. 315 pp. $6.50), a new statement of James McCamy's considered judgment (or rejudgment) of his 1950 study, *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs*, promises "an analysis of the way the American government executive is organized to carry out the new diplomacy—the way the nation makes and administers foreign policy—and how well the mechanism is working."

The first sentence begins thus—"The process by which a decision in foreign policy is made is intricate almost beyond analysis." McCamy tells why this is so in terms of the interplay among the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Congress, and by treating the facts at home and abroad in which this policy must be set. Though McCamy subsequently reserves his harshest strictures for the Eisenhower administration's "silly" handling of the U-2 incident, which he sees as a typical example of that administration's foreign policy, and admits the necessity of secret intelligence and sound appraisals as the basis for "making" foreign policy, he is often quite unclear in treating the question of *how* foreign policy actually is made (and executed). Oddly enough, the nature of the struggle with communism, the bearing of the Cold War, whether we have or can look for a détente with communism, Chinese or Russian, do not appear in McCamy's catalog. Perhaps he takes them for granted—it may be that he takes them too much for granted.

A great deal of the condemnation of the way in which the U-2 incident was handled leaves unclear the question of whether the President should (or could) have simply washed his hands of the whole matter, or whether the basic need for following Soviet missile capabilities and war preparations required an adequate knowledge of Soviet activities, knowledge which at that time could be obtained only by U-2 flights. Turning the problem over to the military, and thus getting the C.I.A. out of the Executive Office of the President, does not touch the problem. A denial by the President, or the British practice of disowning any espionage vehicles, would hardly have served, as McCamy seems to imply. We were caught red-handed, with an agent who, having failed to act as agents normally are supposed to do, was certainly in a fair way to "sing," as he did. It may have been that his overflight was so vulnerable that this was expected. We should, if we had not defended our action, have stood branded as inept liars as well as self-confessed criminals. Instead, we defended our use of the only available means of inspection that the Soviet refusal of "open skies" policy had left us, inspection with which we sought to avoid the risk of nuclear destruction by secret preparations for a surprise attack. If we had not developed other means of inspection, now operational, we could hardly have "agreed" to stop U-2 flights, even in order to get Mr. Khrushchev to the Summit.

As far as the official inquiries revealed (open inquiries were later held), the U-2 flight confirmed intelligence estimates that corrected overestimates of exaggerated Soviet production of both planes and missiles. The information gained by U-2 flights kept us from being frightened into following Soviet pressures and left the Soviets only the desperate gamble of Cuba as an advanced missile base with which they could (and did) later attempt to force us into a "Pugwashed" frame of mind.

This instance reveals one of the exaggerated characteristics of an otherwise comprehensive and useful book: its judgment on this point appear to be uninformed and more opinionated than soundly grounded. In his previous book (1950), McCamy, perhaps as a result of his background in the Bureau of the Budget, took a dark view of the State Department's efforts to staff itself with experts who could assess the bearing and effects of economic, technological, and commercial and material policies, an area in which the Bureau was necessarily expanding its own interest. He felt that no department, no matter how central its policy importance, should expand to deal, even critically, with matters properly allocated to other departments. If any such centralized collection of expert staffs should be produced, it should be in the Executive Office of the President.

This judgment, which would have, if implemented rigorously, crippled the Department of State in protecting its policy role, and even more in carrying out its enormous housekeeping functions and priorities for overseas programs through its heads of missions, is now succeeded by a still more questionable judgment. McCamy finds that the Department of State needs to be "trumped" by what amounts to transferring the top policy coordination of foreign policy, like the "evaluation" of intelligence, to the Executive Office of the President. One would have thought that, in fact, the Security Council had already done this with respect to processing the whole of policy where the President's big chips are down, aside from the President's inevitable retention of judging his own political policies and estimates.

Perhaps there has been too much "layering" of White House staff in the past. McCamy's proposal, so often offered in various forms by others, of a superduper secretary in the White House, an Assistant President for Foreign Affairs, would painfully downgrade the position of the Secretary of State, or that of any other cabinet officer who had to take over the task of unifying all our diplomacy, from surplus agricultural disposal programs to lining up U.N. policy with our various alliances, science advisers, A.I.D., Treasury, Trade (Commerce), and domestic policy "backwashes" abroad, or who had to deal with the political impact of various minority nationalities or religious "frontlashes" at home. Getting and retaining someone to run the State Department, someone who would be more than an office manager, and keeping his lines to the White House clear and smooth, would be a wonderful and fearful struggle. We have already tried the Harry Hopkins route, and an installment of the superduper secretary under Truman, with Averell Harriman refereeing foreign aid, Defense, and State for the President. The results did not help to provide a coherent foreign policy or program, both of which are desirable, as McCamy sees them.

With McCamy's plea in "The need for thinkers," with his well-documented efforts to get at the facts about the experience and training of those normally available for career foreign service and State Department posts, even with the "myth" of untrained, noncareer diplomats, one may express sympathy and gratitude for his emphasis. Clear lines of authority are needed. But they are rarely achieved by exhortation, and they are difficult to work out without some machinery for priority in policies applied to interagency programs, which nothing in the present setup of the Bureau of the Budget provides, except by default through the overall method of agency ceilings.

The machinery of the National Security Council could effectively reintroduce the technique of the wartime "requirements committee" by using some experienced high-level advisers, who have time to think. Such advisers, at least the few at the top, should have had enough high-level experience not to meddle, but to give the President a reasoned prebudget review of what interagency programs, or those affecting the whole of national security and foreign policy, need in the way of timing, support, and attention, whether they should be stepped up or phased out.

McCamy is pointing to a need. His direction could use more precise indications of ways, means, and location. No doubt the Bureau of the Budget has a highly competent and informed staff available on assignment to act under such skilled policy direction. But the Bureau itself is not equipped to set the policies that it is to apply, despite the final report of the Jackson Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee.

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Biochemistry

Advances in Lipid Research. vol. 1. Rodolfo Paoletti and David Kritchevsky, Eds. Academic Press, New York, 1963. xiv + 418 pp. Illus. $14.

The inauguration of still another series of *Advances* has its somber side. Another shelf is to be lined with volumes that will silently reproach those of us who, although we feel that we should, somehow cannot find the time to grapple with even these *condensations* of research areas, which are made so conveniently (tantalizingly?) available to us. Still, if we cannot stop the world of biochemistry, we must do our best to keep up with it, and the review article is currently our best hope. Until the computers begin to exercise more refined judgments and show deeper correlational potentials, we shall continue to rely heavily on adequately motivated flesh-and-blood reviewers for our orientations and briefings. Academic Press continues to be effective in motivating editors, who in turn continue to be effective in motivating authors, who in turn continue to be effective in motivating readers, including this one.

I found many of the articles in this first volume extremely useful and provocative. D. S. Robinson, for example, has written carefully and critically on clearing factor lipase. Instead of simply omitting mention of papers in which questionable results are reported, a tendency among some reviewers, Robinson considers such papers and makes an honest attempt to assess their significance in relation to the available evidence. I. B. Fritz has contributed a comprehensive and provocative review of studies on the role of carnitine in fatty acid metabolism, a field opened up by work in his laboratory. H. Danielsson has written a nicely balanced review that covers mechanisms of cholesterol conversion to bile acids and of sterol excretion per se, together with an extensive discussion of regulatory mechanisms.

Other chapters are "The structural investigation of natural fats" (M. H. Coleman); "Physical structure and behavior of lipids and lipid enzymes" (A. D. Bangham); "Recent developments in the mechanism of fat absorption" (J. M. Johnston); "Vitamin E and lipid metabolism" (R. B. Alfin-Slater and R. S. Morris); "Atherosclerosis—spontaneous and induced" (T. B. Clarkson); "Chromatographic investigations in fatty acid biosynthesis" (M. Pascaud); and "The plant sulfolipid" (A. A. Benson).

Of course, most readers who pick up the volume will expect to get an organized survey of a few selected topics from the mixed menu. From my own experience, I would guess that they will not be disappointed. Certainly those working more or less directly on some aspects of lipid research will welcome the availability of this new series. It is to be hoped, however, that the editors will not feel obligated to produce their volumes with a relentless frequency that might exhaust the supply of more capable reviewers and unnecessarily burden us well-intentioned keeper-uppers with the broad area of lipid research.

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Survey and Sourcebook

Primary Embryonic Induction. Lauri Saxén and Sulo Toivonen. Logos Press, London; Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963. xii + 271 pp. Illus. $8.75.

The current explosion of interest in developmental biology has caused many nonembryologists to confront and begin an almost hopeless excursion into the mountains of literature on embryonic induction in the Amphibia. It is fortunate, therefore, that a virtual panacea is now available in this penetrating analysis by Saxén and Toivonen.

The history of work on the primary induction phenomenon, wherein the axial mesoderm of amphibian embryos induces formation of adjacent central nervous system tissue, serves as an introduction to various experimental approaches used in studying the problem. The bulk of the volume is then devoted to a summary of what is known of inducing and responding tissues and of mediating factors in the interaction. The final part is an extensive theoretical section in which the major explanatory theories of the various European and Japanese schools are treated fairly and extensively while they are being compared to the authors' personal hypotheses.

The essential conclusions are that at least two chemical mediators are involved in induction of the brain-spinal cord system, and that complete characterization of the substances is still unfinished. The authors rightfully emphasize the difficulties encountered in interpreting experiments in which a substance is applied to a tissue on one day, the tissue is ignored for a week, and then a questionably accurate (histological) assay is employed in garnering results. Discussion of experiments on secondary (that is, organ) induction and cytodifferentiation in Amphibia and higher vertebrates allows one to see how the primary induction system may be separated into component parts in