port research—most strongly, perhaps, by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Vinson (D–Ga.). The military last year spent about half of the $14-billion-plus that went into federal research, so it is not surprising that Vinson might interpret an investigation of research operations as an incursion on his committee preserves.

Vinson pointed out that a new Armed Services subcommittee on research and development headed by Representative Melvin Price (D–Ill.) was formed this year and was, in fact, about to begin hearings of its own. Several other chairmen or influential members of science-oriented committees joined Vinson on Tuesday in assuring Rules members that their own committees are ready and able to keep a proper rein on research.

On Thursday, however, the resolution drew qualified support from House Commerce Committee Chairman Oren Harris (D–Ark.), whose committee this session embarked on reviews of the operations of the Food and Drug Administration and the Public Health Service, which are both under Commerce jurisdiction.

Harris expressed doubts about the value of the proposed new investigation if the committee merely collects and assembles data provided by the agencies, but said he would favor it if the committee makes an effort on its own "to put together all the facts across the board." Harris went on to say that such a committee would need an "ample and experienced staff," and he also expressed doubt that 1 year would provide sufficient time to organize and carry out such a study effectively.

Representative Laird urged that the committee not investigate individual projects but that it take a broader view and look at such things as the "complications of relations between government and the universities"—for example, "contract and overhead problems."

At the end of 2 days of hearings (more may be held but are not yet scheduled), the shape and scope of the proposed probe is far from clearly defined. The hearings, however, have served to put the discussion of congressional patronage of research into sharper focus than ever before, and, certainly, some of the key figures in the House have for the first time laid their cards on the table.

As for the prospects of the resolution itself, it requires action only by the House, and no group of sponsors is in a better position to see its proposal brought to the floor.—J.W.

Environmental Health Center: PHS Project Stalled on Several Counts; Site and Scope Are Still in Dispute

The Public Health Service's proposal for an Environmental Health Center, stalled for 3 years by congressional haggling over location, has now been stalled in a variety of other ways as well, and prospects for the center have never been more gloomy. Congressional politicking has by no means run its course and, within the administration, voices formerly acquiescent have begun openly questioning the wisdom of locating the center in Washington, as the PHS wants. Serious infighting, exacerbated by congressional pressures, has broken out within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare over the future of the department's water pollution control programs, which were slated to play an important role in the proposed center.

The center was first proposed by the Public Health Service in 1961, as a means of coordinating and emphasizing its growing programs in environmental health. Various environmental health units—food and milk protection, air pollution, water pollution, radiological health, and occupational health—already form a shadow environmental health bureau within the Service, and these would be transferred to the center as its nucleus. But the center was pictured on a grander scale, ultimately costing $60 million and employing 4000 to 5000 people on an annual payroll of around $45 million. The hope was that such a center would stimulate both research into and action on some of the country's growing environmental hazards.

Since 1961, the PHS has insisted that the center, to be effective, had to be located in the Washington area. Many reasons were adduced, including the alleged cultural and scientific superiority of Washington, but the case rested on the argument that many other government agencies had active programs in environmental health, some of them in conjunction with the PHS. Only in Washington, the PHS has repeated for 3 years now, could the necessary administrative coordination and scientific interchanges be accomplished. The PHS was also known to feel that only in Washington could it be assured of a strong voice in policy-making on environmental health problems.

Others, outside the Service, doubted that the Washington location was desirable, but the PHS pulled along with it, in the trail of its own conviction, two separate advisory panels, one convoked by the Surgeon General, the other, by the President's Science Adviser. Eventually the proposal found its way into two successive Presidential health messages to Congress; in the latest message, in February 1963, Kennedy specifically asked Congress to approve a Washington site.

All along, however, Congress has doubted that the Washington location was crucial, and it has twice rejected the PHS proposal. A variety of objections have been enumerated: Washington is too crowded; every agency wants to locate there; dispersal of key facilities is desirable in case of nuclear attack; and—a recurrent theme—"there is a place in my district that is just the spot." In all, between March 1961 and February 1963, at least 46 communications from congressmen and senators were received by HEW pointing to the value of locating the center in the deserted munitions plant or the old naval station or just somewhere on the spacious lands of the *n*th congressional district.

Hassle over Site

Congressionally inspired difficulties about the site were compounded within the PHS itself, which was unable, in the 1-year interval between the 1962 and 1963 appropriations hearings, to make a definite choice of a spot within the Washington area. This and other evidence of what its report called the "procrastination, indecision, and confusion in the executive branch" so irritated the House Appropriations Committee that, for the second straight year, it disallowed the $2,761,000 budget request, strongly recommending that, the next time around, the Service be prepared with "firmer plans" and "better evidence of support and cooperation." The Senate Appropriations Committee approved a Washington site, came through with $1,441,000—about half of what was requested—and had to fight an attempt on the floor to take even that away. Whether the Environmental Health Center will have any money this year, and if so, how much, awaits the decision of a House-Senate conference on the bill. But even if the PHS gets the money, its troubles will not be over, for, as the hitches have continued to multiply, supporters of the Washington site, always lukewarm, have turned distinctly cold.

Why the President's chief advisers,

who do not regard Washington as a scientific mecca, went along with the PHS proposal when all the time they would have preferred to locate the center near a significant university research complex is not such a dark mystery. The Public Health Service is an old and powerful agency: within HEW it forms a stable cadre on which the transient, politically appointed Secretary must rely. Outside the Department, especially in Congress, it has powerful friends. More often than not, the PHS gets its own way in matters pertaining to health, and when the PHS insisted on Washington for its environmental health center, the President's advisers appear to have felt they had to go along, fearing that otherwise there might be no center at all. The support was qualified by the understanding that the Surgeon General would recruit a top-notch scientific director for the new center from outside the PHS, no director has yet been appointed. The displeasure of the President's advisers is a not very secret secret.

If all the delay was a wedge for reopening scientific doubts, it also reopened some political possibilities —a combination that may force the PHS to alter its demands. One of the more persistent petitioners for the center has been Governor Terry Sanford of North Carolina, an early political ally of President Kennedy's. Shortly after a recent visit by Sanford to the White House, it was made known that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Anthony Celebrezze, had been instructed "not to push" for locating the center in Washington—despite the fact that the President himself had urged that it be constructed there. Sanford would like to see the center in North Carolina's Research Triangle Park, a designated area between the University of North Carolina, North Carolina State College, and Duke University. He has some impressive support for his request.

In an opinion solicited by Governor Sanford, Oscar Ewing, the former administrator of the Federal Security Agency (HEW's predecessor) suggested that the Public Health Service's interests in the center were more administrative than scientific. "A research project," Ewing said, "should be located where the researchers can concentrate on their work and be freed from the confusion and interference generated by massive administration and massive operations—both of which are present in Washington." One gets the impression, Ewing continued, that "care in administering the project is far more important than the discovery of environmental health dangers and the development of effective means of control."

Between the scientists and the politicians, the question of the location of the Environmental Health Center is as open as it has ever been.

The PHS and Pollution

Underlying the spectacle is the widespread feeling in Congress and parts of the administration that the Public Health Service, while it is good enough on the research end, is not the most satisfactory standard-bearer for the tough war on environmental health hazards. Enforcement of anti-water pollution actions, for example (a responsibility until recently wholly within the jurisdiction of the PHS and state governments), requires stepping on the important toes of local officials and large industries in the area affected by pollution. The Public Health Service, nurtured in a gentler tradition of joining with the states to fight things like contagious diseases that everyone was against, has not adapted easily to the tougher regulatory role now required of it. Sometimes the PHS sees health dangers and shuts down commercial distribution of fish or clams from polluted waters, but only rarely has it seen the long-term economic necessity of actively promoting a river clean-up.

Conservation-minded congressmen and senators, seriously alarmed about the future of the nation's water supply, have waged a long battle for a separate agency to enforce antipollution measures. Three years ago, in the first stages of the battle, responsibility was divided between the PHS and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, with the Secretary given power to initiate enforcement procedures in polluted interstate waters. This arrangement proved satisfactory neither to the states (who prefer to deal with obliging PHS officials), to the PHS, or to the congressmen and senators who are interested in cleaning up the waters. Secretary Celebrezze, in response to criticism, has only in the last 2 weeks made a serious attempt to initiate enforcement procedures, for four polluted rivers. Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.), a champion of stronger federal action, has a list of 90 rivers on which he thinks abatement steps should be begun immediately. Dingell also has a plan to take enforcement out of HEW altogether and give it to the Interior Department.

Whatever case there might have been for retaining pollution control within the PHS was seriously damaged when, in hearings of the Senate Public Works Committee in June, it came to light that Robert J. Anderson, chief of the PHS Bureau of State Services, acting head of the shadow environmental health bureau, and the man slated for an important, if not the top, position in the proposed center, had taken it upon himself to assure local officials in Massachusetts that the PHS would not initiate any anti-pollution procedures on the Merrimack River. Anderson's action, and his inability, under questioning, to perceive anything extraordinary about it, was interpreted by the committee as a classic instance of the PHS belief that local authorities will carry through on cleaning up the rivers. The committee, unlike the PHS, would like to see more aggressive federal intervention and more results.

Increased criticism, and Celebrezze's belated discovery that the administration's feeling about a Washington site for the Environmental Health Center was not as enthusiastic as his PHS officers had led him to believe, have created the beginnings of a breach between the Secretary and the PHS. What will come of it is not clear, but the Secretary, who a few months ago supported the PHS and vigorously opposed a Senate Public Works Committee plan to place all pollution programs in a separate agency within the Department but outside the PHS, has quietly let the committee know that he has changed his mind. Celebrezze is apparently now willing to go along with the plan, at least to the extent of removing the power of enforcement from the PHS, while perhaps leaving supervision of related research under its control.

Why the Public Health Service officials want enforcement authority is something of a mystery, but want it they do, and it had been vaguely anticipated that enforcement activities as well as research would be shifted to the new center. The absence of this authority will seriously alter the PHS vision of the Environmental Health Center and, together with the other obstacles, further diminish the chances that the center will get under way soon.—ELINOR LANGER