News and Comment

Cold War Thaw?: Several Signs in Recent Months Suggest that East-West Relations Are Improving

Over the past few months the Soviet-American antagonism index has generally pointed downward, sufficiently so to raise rational expectations of some sort of peaceable turn in the cold war.

Expectations of this kind have risen many times before without any permanently happy results; thus, past performance suggests that no more than cautious hope is in order. Furthermore, the evidence is not exclusively in the direction of a détente. Though Kennedy and Khrushchev are praising peace with unusual vigor, they continue to salt their public statements with conventional cold-war affronts. Nevertheless, a number of apparently significant things have happened recently, some of them unprecedented in East-West relations, and it is on the basis of these events that hopes are currently rising.

Briefly, these include the reopening of nuclear test ban negotiations this week in Moscow; a continued worsening of the Sino-Soviet relationship; the completion of the so-called hot-line agreement; and, as a background for these occurrences, a series of conciliatory public remarks by both Kennedy and Khrushchev. It has also been disclosed that, since last fall's Cuban crisis, the two leaders have exchanged some 40 pieces of secret correspondence; this suggests that they may be saying some unusually kind things to each other, since there is little point in employing secrecy to carry on the usual cold-war abuse.

The source of greatest hope is the fact that the worsening of the Sino-Soviet relationship has been accompanied by a relatively conciliatory, though still indefinite, Soviet approach to the nuclear test-ban issue. It is not yet clear whether the Soviets mean business on a test ban. On this side there are encouraging nose counts, but there is little certainty as to how the Senate would react to a test-ban proposal (and, therefore, some question about the administration's maneuvering room), and there is no certainty whatsoever as to how mad the Soviets and the Chinese actually are at each other, or what the Sino-Soviet dispute may have to do with Soviet interest in a test ban. Even if the Russians and the Chinese are very angry indeed, no one can say for sure just what effect this will have on the Russians' attitude toward the West. There is a tendency to conclude that if the Russians are mad at the Chinese they will find reason to cuddle up to the West, but it is, after all, conceivable that they could sustain anger in both directions and be nasty to us as well as to the Chinese.

Still, Khrushchev has now nibbled at the once flatly rejected U.S. proposal for a test-ban agreement of a kind that would sidestep the troublesome inspection issue—namely, a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water. Tests in these environments are said to be detectable without intrusion upon Soviet territory. Underground tests would be excluded from the ban, and both nations would be free to carry them out, although the proposal, as presented by the United States last August, called for self-imposed restraint on underground testing until means could be agreed upon for eliminating them, too.

The possible joker, however, is that Khrushchev has vaguely tied the test-ban issue to a nonaggression agreement between NATO and its Soviet-bloc equivalent, the Warsaw Pact nations. What sort of agreement he has in mind is not yet known; nor is it known whether he would insist that an agreement be part of a test-ban package. In any case, the administration—which is having a difficult time, as it is, holding NATO together—is not the least bit inclined toward a step that would tend to make the NATO nations reduce their concern about Soviet military designs on Western Europe. Whatever the reality of the military threat, a nonaggression pact would have the psychological effect of making the world appear to be somewhat less perilous, and it therefore would not encourage the NATO nations to change their somewhat relaxed attitude toward meeting their military commitments. Furthermore, the suggestion raises the likelihood that East Germany would present itself as a signatory of the pact—a step which would carry an implication of East German sovereignty and a permanent German split that the United States does not wish to acknowledge. Whether or not it is permanent, the split exists and is highly durable, but the goal of reunification helps buoy the spirits of the West Germans and discourages them from moving closer to General de Gaulle's anti-U.S. sentiments.

Thus, there is little likelihood that the administration is going to be willing to accept a hard and fast NATO-Warsaw agreement as the price of a test ban. At the same time, it is now clear beyond any doubt that the administration has a deep yearning to achieve a test ban, though the importance of a test ban is another complicated proposition in the international picture.

Happily, it would eliminate fallout from Soviet and American testing, but it would not end weapons development; it would simply make it impossible for Russia or the U.S. to attain absolute assurance that a new device works, or if underground testing were permitted make it more difficult and expensive to obtain such assurance. It certainly would not deter the French and the Chinese from testing in the atmosphere; nor, if other nations, such as Israel, should come to regard the possession of nuclear weapons as vital to their security, would the existence of an East-West test ban mean very much in their calculations. Nevertheless, whatever its worth, a test ban is important because it is so hard to obtain; if agreed upon, it would represent something of enormous significance in the way East and West regard each other's motives, good faith, and intentions. At present, the reservoir of ill-will is so broad and deep that any agreement, even if it involves an exchange of string quartets, becomes very important. Because the administration feels this way, it has responded warmly to Khrushchev's renewed interest in a test ban, and there is talk that if the Soviets will refrain from being too sticky on the nonaggres-

sion pact, perhaps some fuzzily worded agreement could be arrived at that would be acceptable to East and West and help promote a test-ban deal.

Of far less importance than the test-ban issue, but still of considerable significance, is the successful outcome of discussions on a "hot line"—the first explicitly agreed upon arms control measure between the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. Proposals for an open communciation line between Moscow and Washington have been around for years, but it was the breathtaking communication delays of the Cuban crisis—communication through existing diplomatic channels proved to be so slow that both sides resorted to public statements and international radio broadcasts—that provided the incentive for setting up the line. (It is scheduled to go into operation by 1 September.) This is indeed a modest agreement; it does not even venture near the crucial issue of the Soviet's phobia of international inspection, which is going to have to be dealt with before cooperative steps are taken to reduce the explosive content of the cold war. But it is significant, if for no other reason than that it is the first agreement which tends to make the military situation less volatile, if only by a small amount, and it was quickly agreed upon, with scarcely any bickering or attempts to extract a propaganda return.

The backdrop for the hot-line agreement and the resumption of the test-ban talks is an earnest appeal by Kennedy for both sides to take a new look at the cold war. This appeal, contained in a commencement address at American University, in Washington, D.C. was overshadowed by rapid and dramatic developments in the civil rights crisis, but in the long history of cold-war oratory it will probably occupy a major position. "Some say," Kennedy declared, "that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament—and that it will be useless until the Soviet leaders adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them to do it. But I also believe that we must re-examine our own attitude—as individuals and as a nation—for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward —by examining his own attitude toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the Cold War and toward freedom and peace here at home. . . .

"Let us re-examine our attitute toward the Soviet Union. It is discouraging to think that their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write. . . . it is sad to read these statements—to realize the gulf between us. But it is also a warning—a warning to the American people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.

"No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements—in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage. . . .

"Let us re-examine our attitude toward the Cold War, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last 18 years been different.

"We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace. Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death wish for the world."

(It is true that, a few weeks later, the President stood near the Berlin wall and said, "There are some who say in Europe and elsewhere 'We can work with Communists.' Let them come to Berlin!" The most reasonable explanation is that well-established reflexes die hard. Khrushchev, for his part, warmly responded to the President's American University address and then went off on a tirade about the United States' getting set to blow Russia off the map. But when the anger and affability in current public utterances are measured, it appears that there is a good deal less ardor for carrying on the cold war as usual.)

A critical question, of course, is the Senate's appetite for a test-ban agreement, a matter on which there is considerable uncertainty. An end run, through an executive agreement, is specifically barred by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. However, even if one were possible, the administration is not only concerned about getting an agreement; it is concerned also with getting one that will be politically viable on the domestic scene. The problem of proving the negative on the question of whether Soviet missiles are holed up in Cuban caves turned out to be a plague on the administration. It is likewise anticipated that a test ban without substantial means for proving that the Soviets are not testing would provide an opening for attacks that would be even more difficult to stifle. Moreover, it is apparent that the Senate would not accept an agreement unless it provided for such means. On the issue of inspection for underground testing, the administration has dropped its demands from 20 inspections down to seven, with a hint that it might go as low as six. But, while it is privately said by some officials that, in terms of the probability of catching a cheater, the three inspections offered by Khrushchev are not too much worse than six or seven, in terms of the opportunities for raising a domestic political storm, the dangers would be considerably greater. For example, it is not difficult to imagine the situation that might prevail if, by mid-year, the United States had only one inspection remaining and a spate of unexplained underground phenomena were detected in the Soviet Union. At that point it would be extremely useful to be able to assure the public that the United States still had the right to make four additional inspections as a guarantee against clandestine testing, and test-ban opponents would be hard put to belittle that fact in any attempts at political mischief-making. However, with only one inspection remaining, a particularly provocative underground event would confront the administration with a choice of passing up an inspection, and giving the opposition a field day, or performing an inspection and enduring the charge for 6 months that we were defenseless against the probability that the Soviets were blasting underground.

A ban excluding underground testing is, of course, an easy way around the in-

spection issue, and it seems to have substantial support in the Senate, although at present the openly stated support is far short of the necessary two-thirds vote required to ratify a treaty. Late in May, Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D.–Conn.), who has generally been skeptical of a comprehensive test-ban agreement, joined Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D.–Minn.) in sponsoring a resolution for a ban against testing in the atmosphere, in space, and under water. Thirty-two other Senators placed their names on the resolution; this was a pretty good turnout on an issue that was actually remote from active Senate consideration. Administration officials say an informal survey shows that support for the resolution is even greater, and they are confident that if the issue should come to a boil, the Senate will go along with the Administration.

—D. S. GREENBERG

Manpower: Senate Study Describes How Scientists Fit into Scheme of Things in Red China, Soviet Union

Ever since Marx, the status of a science has been claimed for Marxism by its exponents, and the Communist countries have cast scientists and technicians in leading roles in "Socialist construction." But the Communist passion for secrecy and the unavailability of statistics prevented Westerners from learning much about the supply, quality, and utilization of professional manpower behind the iron and bamboo curtains. In the past few years, however, because of exertions by scholars and government agencies here and because of some relaxation there, more has been learned on the subject, particularly in respect to the Soviet Union. And recently a Senate subcommittee published companion studies on staffing policies and practices in Communist China and the Soviet Union which touch on the organization of science and should interest both the specialist and, especially, the average curious reader.

The studies are *Staffing Procedures and Problems in the Soviet Union* and *Staffing Procedures and Problems in Communist China*, issued by the Senate Government Operations Committee's subcommittee on national security staffing and operations, which is chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington.

The Jackson subcommittee is neither a legislative subcommittee nor an investigative subcommittee in the ordinary sense of having the responsibility of overseeing the operations of a specific agency. Rather, it devotes itself to the study of the policy-making apparatus. Because its reports have been generally of high quality, the subcommittee has a good reputation on Capitol Hill. One of its studies, for example, on Science Organization and the President's Office, is regarded, on the Hill, as having contributed to the reorganization plan under which the new Office of Science and Technology was established.

When the subcommittee last year got a new title emphasizing national security and a charter to review the administration of national security and to make recommendations to improve it, the panel appeared to have changed direction somewhat and to be concerned primarily with staffing and operations problems involving the State and Defense departments and other security agencies.

The reports on Red China and the Soviet Union differ from typical subcommittee products in that they were prepared in direct cooperation with the Executive Branch. In fact, it appears that the subcommittee originated the idea and acted as editor and publisher and that the agencies—probably State, Defense, and CIA—contributed material. The staff is not at liberty to say. Presumably, it was deemed advantageous to make unclassified information available to the public and to scholars for discussion and possible correction.

Both studies devote sections to staffing of the party, the government, and the military and discuss the education systems as feeders of professional and managerial manpower. The report on the Soviet Union is the more extensive and detailed, reflecting the greater accessibility of reliable information, and this report is likely to be especially useful to Sovietologists because of its charts, which lay out the particulars of party and government organization and identify present and, in some cases, past office holders.

The reports make clear that the organization of science, like every other feature of life in the two countries, is fundamentally influenced by the principle of party control through centralization in government and the educational and economic systems. There are no checks and balances in government, no private sectors in education or the economy, such as tend to create compartments in Western society.

The principle of party supremacy, the report on China suggests, raises special difficulties at present in Red China because of the party's mistrust of intellectuals, which extends to scientists and engineers.

"Many well-trained scientists in China were educated in the Western non-Communist world," says the report. "The regime regards their political reliability as doubtful. The leaders cannot risk placing such men in policy-making roles. They are even hesitant about placing such men in positions of lower level authority without the constant and overriding presence of a politically proven party stalwart."

In his book *Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China*, published by the National Science Foundation, Leo A. Orleans tells how the brief period of ideological relaxation during the "let the 100 flowers bloom" period in 1957 led many a university intellectual to go out on a limb in criticizing existing conditions. The limb was soon sawed off, and the unreliability of the intellectuals had been confirmed in the eyes of the regime.

The report says that poor planning and bad management have marred China's scientific effort. Start-and-stop projects wasted time and manpower. The available technicians, inadequate in number, were in some cases misused. And party administrators sometimes "attempted to manage researchers as though they were machines with off and on buttons."

Scientific Manpower in China

The report summarizes the scientific manpower situation in China as follows.

"The major staffing problem in China's scientific organization is, of course, to find enough competent scientists and teachers. At the present time, they have in general a few qualified men backed by a large body of poorly trained and inexperienced personnel. They lack the large group of medium quality, experienced researchers of the kind that make up the main body of the scientific community in a technologically advanced society.

"China has a few well-trained and competent scientists in nearly every area of technology. Therefore, useful progress can be made in almost any scientific or engineering project of sufficiently high priority. However, there are not enough first-rate people around to make progress in more than a limited number of advanced projects at any one time. The rate of progress on