Warren Weaver's excellent remarks have long been needed. When we alter our language we should be sure that we are progressing, not retrogressing. . . .

F. BRUCE SANFORD
*U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Seattle, Washington*

I was delighted to read Warren Weaver's editorial making a plea for a return to good English and away from the sloppy, slipshod, and short-cut methods used by many today. . . .

FREDERICK D. ROSSINI
*University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana*

. . . I agree thoroughly with Weaver's viewpoint. . . . The mere use of certain incorrect words . . . or the lack of certain forms of punctuation in writings of many people is no basis for making that . . . "correct."

A. A. FLEMING
*College of Agriculture, University of Georgia, Athens*

. . . The precision of a language generally reflects the mental precision of the users of that language. . . .

FRED PLUM
*Department of Medicine, University of Washington, Seattle*

### Dominance of the Military

It is easy, at this stage of the societal sciences, to contest any general theory of social causes, and it is equally easy to accuse Fred Cook of holding the same bogeyman image of the military that he says the military holds of the Soviet Union [*Science* **138**, 797 (1962)]. If Cook meant to imply that the military establishment and its prime contractors are the single, hidden, omnipotent, and irresistible determinant of all major policy choices he would be wrong, and D. S. Greenberg's critique would be appropriate. If, on the other hand, he is claiming that a certain type of amoral strategic thinking (pioneered by the military) and a certain set of expectations for the cold war (engineered by the press and by industry) have been gradually encapsulating even those who consider themselves quite removed from the military, his case seems sound. Educators, scientists, and backers of many forms of civil-rights and social-welfare measures now feel impelled to justify their endeavors by citing the potential value of these en-

deavors to the cold war. Even the peace groups argue for one form of deterrence in preference to another, and the assumption that the Soviets intend to risk evasion of a test ban, should one be agreed on, is rarely if ever questioned.

While informed liberals rejoice at the passing of the McCarthy era, a college president hastily dismisses a college professor for protesting the naval blockade, and the press, of its own accord, restricts coverage of antimilitary views and activity. Reasonable nonmilitary men now claim that American military aggression against Cuba is right, while protesting a history of similar Russian moves. Adlai Stevenson, no military prototype, now defends the double standard for overseas missile bases, and the concept of brinksmanship, once a political liability, has become a prerequisite of political viability. Even the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which the Department of Defense has supported consistently, falls into the safe pattern of sponsoring research which is restricted to technical problems or which is based on the assumption, not on evidence, that strategic thinking offers answers to questions of policy.

Greenberg shows that we are still in a strongly pluralist society and that the military establishment itself is neither monolithic nor uniquely potent in its endeavors. But it is not the potential for military dictatorship of 9 million members of Birch-type organizations which worries me most. Far more insidious than the known and hated dictator is the establishment's wide sowing of seeds of fear, hate, and worship of cold efficiency throughout the culture. And it is we, not the dictators, who insure the annual increase in military appropriations and in the sphere of influence of the military. It is the intellectual community which now stands paralyzed in a drift toward war.

The real test of military dominance is not whether a President (who was a former general) could lessen military pressures to break the testing moratorium, or whether the Air Force asks for even more than it receives, but whether any force, hidden or open, can stem the growth of the power and thought of the military before these create the conditions which necessitate a major, unwanted war. If I were suddenly to see all the economic gravy that is going into counterforce dramatically converted into credits to underdeveloped countries to buy American food and hard goods; if I were to see industrial states such as Michigan, which have lost the arms race, winning the peace race, then I would be happy to applaud corrections of Cook's exaggeration. Till then, the warning is critical. Patterns plainly observable in our own culture are the "invisible hand" of the gods of war.

MARC PILISUK
*Department of Psychiatry,*
*University of Michigan, Ann Arbor*

Greenberg's "Who runs America?" is an able presentation of convincing evidence. I wonder though if he is not missing the real point—which is, as I see it, that the military-industrial complex is not a faceless monster in the Pentagon but a way of life and a frame of mind which includes you and me and the guy across the street. The question should, perhaps, be not "Who Runs America?" but "What Runs America?"

It is beside the point to argue that we have not launched an all-out war against the U.S.S.R. or that we may differ as to the maximum amount that it is practical to raise by taxation, or that Birch-ites and white supremacists do not get everything they want, or that some generals have sometimes been restrained. Very much *to* the point is the fact that liberals and conservatives, rich and poor, white and black. Northerners and Southerners, farmers and city dwellers, take it for granted that an increase in military spending is the proper response to every challenge and that they will fight, shoulder to shoulder, any attempt to dismantle even the most archaic military installation in their area or to cancel the most useless contract for military hardware made in their state. We may disagree as to how the pie should be cut, but we never question the need for an ever-larger pie.

We think of the United States as a peace-loving, friendly, altruistic champion of freedom and democracy. We shall some day have to face the fact that we are the most formidable military power that ever existed—and probably the nation which has done more than any other nation in history to militarize the entire world. The Chinese who are now attacking India are using the training—and probably the weapons—which we gave them to defeat

communism. The Latin-American nations, which feel that they must choose between progress and catastrophe, are pointing out that the millions we gave them have just about covered the cost of the military establishments we have urged upon them. In Cuba, as in China, we helped an unpopular, undemocratic, and corrupt military dictatorship eliminate every alternative to communism—and then wondered why communism took over. It is largely because of our subsidies that Germany has been remilitarized, and that France is ruled by one general who spends most of his time struggling against other generals.

The fact that we are not at war does not prove the impotence of our military establishment: most military leaders sincerely want peace. It was said of Hitler, though, that he did not want war—he merely insisted upon the fruits of victory. It may be said of us that we did not want war—we merely insisted upon an all-out armament race. The question is, Can we have the one without the other?

WILLIAM PALMER TAYLOR
*416 Ross Avenue, Hamilton, Ohio*

## The Dispassionate View

D. S. Greenberg's account of the Cuban crisis (9 Nov., p. 670) does not reflect the dispassionate, even-handed treatment of data which one expects in the pages of *Science*. I have reference to statements such as "the Soviet gambit in Cuba reflects a capacity for deceit that will amply support those who contend that the Soviets cannot be trusted . . . ," or "Bits and scraps of . . . diplomatic intercourse . . . do nothing to improve the Soviets' badly tarnished reputation for veracity."

Both Walter Lippmann and the New York *Times* reporter Max Frankel published accounts of the famous meeting of Kennedy and Gromyko of 18 October, 4 days before the United States imposed its quarantine. According to both sources, Kennedy never confronted the Soviet foreign minister with evidence of the missiles and bombers in Cuba, even though in his address to the nation the President claimed that the evidence was in his possession at that time. Furthermore, the President told Gromyko that the United States was basing its attitude on the assumption that the build-up of Russian arms in Cuba was defensive. Other New York *Times* articles revealed that, prior to the Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, the administration was actively lining up support for a move against Cuba. Duplicity was not confined to one side.

Psychologists and anthropologists have for years called attention to perceptual distortions resulting from ethnocentrism. The actions of in-group members are viewed with compassion if not with esteem, while the same actions displayed by members of the out-group are seen as unjust and reprehensible. As scientists, it is incumbent upon us to recognize this biasing of perceptions, and to take appropriate control measures to negate the effects. This is no less a responsibility in the area of international relations than it is in the laboratory where the ethics of science compel us to view both the positive and the negative evidence with respect to hypotheses. Greenberg's article fails in this respect, from my point of view.

Fortunately, Greenberg provides a clue to one of the essential conditions that may assist in bringing about a healthier relationship between the major powers and reduce perceptual distortions across international boundaries. A portion of his article is an evaluation of the "black box" system for policing a nuclear test ban. He says, "It is felt that in an atmosphere of *trust*, the black box approach would do nicely for verifying observance of an underground test ban. But if the duplicity involved in the Cuban operation is any indication of Soviet *trustworthiness*, the difficulties that frequently attend the operation of complex equipment could easily set off charges of bad faith and deception" (italics added). May I suggest that the development of trust cannot be guaranteed by any treaty, but underlies all treaties. It grows by evidences of trust initiated by one party and reciprocated by the other. As scientists, we can contribute toward the development of this essential ingredient of arms control by taking a less ethnocentric view of ourselves, and by carefully assessing data indicative of duplicity or integrity on the part of the opposition.

F. KENNETH BERRIEN
*Department of Psychology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey*

Berrien is contending that the United States is guilty of duplicity because it did not notify the Russians that it was aware of their attempts at deception. It is possible that he has ascended to a