

Space Accord: NASA's Enthusiasm for East-West Cooperation Is Not Shared by Pentagon

The budding space cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union has intensified strains between this country's civilian and military space programs.

In viewing the prospects for East-West space cooperation, it would be incorrect to ascribe any decisive weight to the apparent lack of enthusiasm in some parts of the Defense Department, especially among Air Force men. Kennedy is personally committed to, and intimately involved in, the development of a space accord; regardless of Defense Department sentiments, the U.S. is vigorously pursuing agreement on a number of joint space efforts with the Soviets. At the same time, however, the Defense Department's concern over the military implications of space are exerting a difficult-to-measure, but still significant, influence on the position the U.S. is taking in the formative days of East-West space cooperation. With the preliminary talks at the U.N. further buoying hopes for an early start on some joint efforts, the Air Force does not seem to share the enthusiasm of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which is eagerly inclined to explore any cooperative endeavor in which the Russians seem interested.

Friction over the assignment of civilian and military space roles has existed since the dominant position in space exploration was assigned to civilian authority, with the Air Force given a supporting part. The division of responsibilities has been an unappetizing one for the Air Force. With varying intensity, many of its leaders have argued that the Soviets see no distinction between civilian and military space capabilities. This viewpoint was recently reflected by Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay—something of a latecomer to the advocacy of space development for military purposes—who stated that "the Soviets already have recognized the importance of these new (space) developments and they are moving at full speed for a decisive capability in space. If they are successful," LeMay warned, "they can deny space to us." The Air Force, which is quite reasonably not oriented toward cooperative endeavors with the Soviets, takes little comfort from efforts to join hands with the Russians

Editor To Become Vanderbilt Dean

Graham DuShane is resigning the editorship of *Science* to accept appointment as Professor and Chairman of the Department of Biology and Dean of the Graduate Sciences at Vanderbilt University. The latter position is a newly created one that will give Dr. DuShane responsibility for graduate research and education in the natural sciences, engineering, and medicine. He will go to the new post on 1 September.

After receiving his doctorate in zoology under Ross G. Harrison at Yale University in 1934, Dr. DuShane held a research associateship at the University of Iowa and a National Research Council fellowship at Stanford. From 1936 to 1946 he taught at the University of Chicago, and in 1946 became professor of biology at Stanford.

In 1956 he came to the AAAS as editor of *Science* and *The Scientific Monthly*. Under his editorship the two journals were combined, and the



resulting *Science* has grown steadily in quality, influence, and readership. We who have worked with him on the AAAS staff have much reason to know that his new colleagues at Vanderbilt are to be congratulated.
—DAEL WOLFLE.

in a barely explored area that seems certain to have great military potential.

The NASA-Air Force conflict was reflected in this country's decision to exclude the data on Lieutenant Colonel John Glenn's orbital flight from the data submitted to the U.N. space register, a directory of space launchings that was initially proposed by this country and was endorsed by the Russians. Press reports last week erroneously stated that the United States had reversed its position and had submitted the data from the Glenn flight to the register. What actually was involved, however, was a hair-splitting operation of great delicacy: data on the flight were submitted to the U.N., but the submission was not to the register.

The exclusion and the subsequent submission of data to the U.N. were justified by the State Department on the grounds that the resolution establishing the register deals only with objects launched "into orbit or beyond"—language which the State Department says the U.S. interprets as covering only those objects that are in space at the time of registration. NASA officials say privately that this interpretation is

preposterous, and they apply that description to the State Department's explanation that the sole purpose of the register is to assist in tracking operations by telling the world what is aloft, and just where it is. The State Department—which is the mouthpiece for these interpretations, not their originator—also offers the theory that any other view of the register's function would make it into a historical record of space launchings, and this, the theory continues, was not the U.N.'s intention. (Carrying through with this interpretation, the United States, in its periodic submissions to the register, has not submitted data on objects which are no longer in orbit.)

Insofar as the actual registration data are concerned, the decision to exclude Glenn's flight was meaningless, since the register consists of nothing more than information on the purpose of the launching, the date of flight, apogee, perigee, and the angle of inclination to the equator—information that was broadcast to the world. As if in contrition, following a caustic editorial in the *New York Times* and a hint of protest from the Russians (who