

were worried about the mess the Court might be getting itself into; a few southern Senators complained about a further invasion of state's rights; but the common reaction was that it was just common sense to see that there was a limit to how far someone's voting rights could be diluted without violating the Constitution, and that there would be something wrong if a citizen could not go to the courts to protect this right. Senator Goldwater found it a fair decision. The *Wall Street Journal* said it was happy neither with the idea of the Court expanding its powers, nor with the likely political results, but that, after all, something was obviously wrong and it could not see where the Court had any choice but to intervene. This mood was apparent before the decision was made: such conservative publications as the *Journal* and *Reader's Digest* had run articles on the unfairness of the state apportionments, and such articles, appearing in such publications, made it easier for the Court to decide for intervention.

This mood, as reflected in the press and the polls and the statements of leading citizens, is going to continue to affect the Court: for precisely what it will try to do will be to avoid the appearance, in Frankfurter's terms, of "making their private views the measure of the Constitution." And this will necessarily involve, whether the Justices discuss it explicitly or not, a judgment of what the Court can say about the minimum standards of apportionment required by the Constitution that will be generally accepted as something more than the Justices' "private views of political wisdom."

The Court's Problem

The Court, for example, could solve its problem fairly easily by decreeing that at least one house of the state legislatures must be based on population, like the U.S. House of Representatives, with the requirements for the second house left undefined; perhaps to be apportioned, like the U.S. Senate, on an area basis if the individual state chose to do so. This has the great advantage, first, of being a neat and easily understandable principle, and second, of being acceptable as a particularly "obvious" or "reasonable" solution; that is, whether it is the best or fairest solution, it is at least one that is not likely to lead to any widespread feeling that the Justices are merely "making

their private views the measure of the Constitution."

This is about the minimum that can reasonably be expected to come out of the decision. It could leave a small rural minority with a veto over the majority in many states through an area apportionment of one house. But even this minimum would be enough to justify the national attention being given to the decision: it would lead directly to a substantial shift in power in the many states in which a majority of both houses are elected by a third or less of the electorate; it would encourage the state courts to intervene to protect rights under the state constitutions, something they have hesitated to do because of the Supreme Court precedents for refusing (until last week) to intervene in such "political" matters; and it would encourage use of the initiative and referendum to force more extensive reapportionments on the reluctant legislatures in those states which have this option by focusing the public's attention on the problem.

But the easy solution is not necessarily the best solution. A good case can be made, in particular, that there should be some limitation on the *extent* to which a state legislature could justify minority control of even one house by appealing to the parallel with the U.S. Senate. The parallel is far from exact. It is questionable, for example, that a political expedient accepted in order to get the smaller states to join the Union can properly be elevated into a principle of government to be unqualifiedly accepted even when it can be avoided—particularly when equal state representation has most often served to spread political power to the new states that have been admitted to the Union while area representation within the states has served, in fact quite clearly has been used, to prevent the spread of political power to the cities and to the suburbs that are developing within the states.

But to get into this sort of judgment would obviously complicate the Court's problem and raise the question of "private judgment." The Court wants neither to commit itself to an "easy" solution which it may later regret, nor to undertake a "hard" solution until the country has talked the problem out and some implicit guidelines appear to develop. And so we get precisely the kind of open-ended decision the Court handed down last week.—HOWARD MARGOLIS

New Office of Science and Technology Proposed by Kennedy To Strengthen White House Advisory Setup

The President last week sent Congress a plan to give his science advisory body a firmer footing in the governmental hierarchy.

The proposal calls for relatively modest departures from the present setup; but implicit in it is the recognition that the government lacks a central voice to speak to Congress and the nation on scientific matters, and also lacks a vantage point for a broad view of its vast involvement with scientific research and development. This involvement now runs to \$12 billion a year. The proposal represents a carefully worked out step toward institutionalizing that voice and vantage point without setting up anything resembling a scientific overlord.

Not the least of the pressures for the proposed reorganization has been a desire to head off a small but growing congressional interest in establishing a cabinet-rank Department of Science, an arrangement which appeals to those with an aversion to organizational untidiness and duplication. Although the proposed reorganization would provide a means of identifying such situations, the plan was prepared by men who hold to the view that untidiness and duplication in science are not necessarily undesirable, and that any attempt to dictate "efficiency" to the nation's huge, diverse, and dynamic science establishment would surely do more harm than good.

The formal channel for carrying scientific advice to the White House is through the President's special assistant for science and technology, a post that was established by Eisenhower after the first Soviet sputnik removed any doubts that science and government had better maintain an intimate relationship. At the same time, the Eisenhower Administration reactivated the President's Science Advisory Committee, a body of nongovernmental consultants that had played only a minor role since it was set up in 1951 to provide the Administration with advice on scientific matters. The special assistant became head of the Committee, supported by a staff of specialists that now totals ten persons. The whole advisory body was organizationally attached directly to the White House, with the special assistant occupying the role of personal adviser to the President, a position which made

him immune to congressional scrutiny. This arrangement has naturally been of considerable concern to congressional committees that deal with agencies deeply involved in scientific matters; as a result, there has been pressure for some means of giving Congress a chance to talk to the man who, in many respects, is at the top of the nation's science pyramid.

Access to Congress

Outwardly, Kennedy's reorganization plan amounts to little more than a reshuffle on paper, but its effect will be to give Congress access to his top science adviser, as well as to give his science advisory body explicit authority to survey scientific efforts throughout the government.

At the heart of the plan is the establishment of an Office of Science and Technology, which will be located in the Executive Office of the President and will be on an organizational par with such other presidential advisory bodies as the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers. The new office will be headed by a director, subject to confirmation by the Senate, and, like the Budget director and head of the economic council, he will be outside the official White House family and therefore, as the tradition goes, will be available for congressional appearances.

Establishment of the new office and post of director will not, however, affect the position of special assistant to the President for science and technology. Present plans call for retention of that position, and, while the President is holding off on announcing a nominee for director, pending congressional review of the reorganization plan, it is understood that both positions will be held by his present science adviser, Jerome B. Wiesner. A division of the jobs would, of course, be something of an administrative monstrosity; the maintenance of the title of special assistant to the President, however, provides the director with a convenient refuge in his relations with Congress.

Wiesner feels that there is a useful purpose to be served in providing Congress with the Administration's views on scientific matters. But many of these matters—involving, for example, his reported opposition in Administration councils to a resumption of nuclear testing—are of such sensitivity as to warrant more than the usual shielding against congressional inquiry. Although

all Executive Department officials can take refuge in Executive privilege—as Defense Secretary McNamara did recently when he refused to give inquiring Senators information on the specific work of his speech censors—Wiesner will have the option of deciding whether his interlocutors are speaking to Special Assistant Wiesner or to Director Wiesner, the former a confidential adviser to the President, the latter the head of an office which tradition says comes under congressional scrutiny. In any event, it is Wiesner's hope that he will be able to ration his appearances before Congress—if for no other reason than that they require a great deal of preparation and he is quite busy; and he also hopes that the new Office of Science and Technology will help provide some harmony between the nation's overall science needs and those areas—such as medical research—which have captured Congress's imagination and are generously supported while other fields are not faring too well.

Review Functions

The existing Science Advisory Committee and its staff have not been without the authority to take that broad view, simply because the mandate of the Committee is quite broad and it could look wherever it pleased. The reorganization plan, however, stresses the Administration's interest in this matter by assigning the Office of Science and Technology the science review functions that have been held but not exercised by the National Science Foundation.

The 1950 Act establishing the NSF called upon the Foundation to "evaluate scientific research programs undertaken by agencies of the Federal Government." This could be a politically perilous task even for the heartiest of government agencies, since research appropriations usually have congressional supporters who (i) believe a particular research effort is of great scientific importance and/or (ii) who are pleased to see research expenditures go to their constituents and want to maintain the flow.

NSF, as a newcomer on the governmental scene, has had no desire to become involved in the hostilities that would inevitably result from the exercise of this function, a fact which Kennedy's reorganization message blandly recognizes with the observation that "the Foundation, being at the same or-

ganizational level as other agencies, cannot satisfactorily coordinate Federal science policies or evaluate programs of other agencies."

To some extent, the coordinating function has been carried on by the Federal Council on Science and Technology, comprising representatives of the major federal agencies engaged in research and development. The Council, which is an in-house counterpart to the outside consultants comprising the Scientific Advisory Committee, will be retained under the reorganization, but will probably become more active, especially as an instrument for accomplishing the goals of the reorganization.

The new office of science and technology's elevated position next to the White House is expected to give it a viewpoint and prestige that were not available to the NSF or the federal council. But it will actually have little more to rely on than status and superior information when it seeks to fulfill Kennedy's directive calling for "review, integration and coordination of major Federal activities in science and technology. . . ."

"The goal," according to one of the persons who helped draft the reorganization, "was to put the Office of Science and Technology in a position where it could use the authority of the White House to stimulate the various agencies toward a broader view of the country's scientific needs. But we wanted to accomplish this without setting up any sort of czar system that might cause these agencies to fear that their own needs and interests might be trampled. For the first time we will be able to undertake a general assessment of what the Federal government is and is not doing in science. This review in itself can stimulate better coordination and bring support for areas that have received too little attention."

Research Support

At the same time that it is expected to accomplish these goals, the Office of Science and Technology is expected to offer the Administration a means for interesting Congress in a general view of federal support for scientific research. To some extent, this is now attempted through the budgetary process; the research appropriations requested by the various agencies are channeled through the Bureau of the Budget, where they are reviewed, and usually sliced, to keep them in har-

mony with the overall budget. Although the Bureau of the Budget tries to use its fiscal powers to achieve some harmony in federal support of research, it has lacked the broad outlook that the Office of Science and Technology is expected to supply. When the bureau's results are placed before Congress, they are dispersed among the various subcommittees of the Appropriations committees and what comes out is each subcommittee's judgment on its particular subject, a judgment that is generally taken without reference to the nation's overall research activities. When the amounts voted exceed the budget requests, the President can refuse to spend the additional money, as he did with some \$60 million appropriated this year for the National Institutes of Health. The results of such a refusal are generally unpleasant: In the case of the NIH funds, Kennedy found himself berated for holding back money that might save lives, a charge that he tried to refute at a press conference by stating that NIH actually got more than it requested and its budget had to be considered in the context of all national needs.

It would be unrealistic to expect that the new science advisory setup will instantly bring Congress around to a comprehensive view of federal support for research. Wiesner's availability for testimony before Congressional committees will, however, provide the Administration an opportunity to present such a view, with the hope that Congress will keep it in mind at appropriation time.

Political Dividend

The shift of the science advisory body from the White House staff to the Executive Offices will be a paper move, not involving the relocation of a single desk. But it will produce a minor political dividend, since it results in a cut in the White House staff, the size of which is usually a subject of campaign charges by the party outside the White House. The reduction in White House staff, of course, will be exactly compensated for by an increase in the Executive Offices staff, but since that staff is technically outside the President's personal retinue, it is less suitable as a subject for political attack.

The reorganization plan takes effect 60 days after it was submitted unless it is vetoed by either house of Congress, which is generally regarded to be an extremely unlikely event.—D. S. GREENBERG.

Announcements

AAAS Socio-Psychological Prize

Through the generosity of an anonymous donor, the AAAS offers an annual prize of \$1000 for a meritorious essay in socio-psychological inquiry. Recent winners of this prize and the titles of their essays have been: Irving A. Taylor, "Similarities in the structure of extreme social attitudes"; Stanley Schachter, "The psychology of affiliation"; Robert Rosenthal, "Three experiments in experimenter bias"; and Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss, "Experimental studies of interpersonal bargaining."

The conditions of competition for the prize to be awarded at the 1962 annual meeting, Philadelphia, Pa., 26–31 December, are as follows:

1) The contribution should further the comprehension of the psychological-social-cultural behavior of human beings—the relationships of these hyphenated words being an essential part of the inquiry. Whether the contributor considers himself to be an anthropologist, a psychologist, a sociologist, or a member of some other group is unimportant as long as his essay deals with basic observation and construction in the area variously known as social process, group behavior, or interpersonal behavior. For ease of reference in the rest of this statement, this general area will be called "social behavior."

2) The prize is offered to encourage studies and analyses of social behavior based on explicitly stated assumptions or postulates, which lead to experimentally verifiable conclusions or deductions. In other words, it is a prize intended to encourage in social inquiry the development and application of dependable methodology analogous to the methods that have proved so fruitful in the natural sciences. This is not to state that the methods of any of the natural sciences are to be transferred without change to the study of social behavior, but rather that the development of a science of social behavior is fostered through observation guided by explicit postulates, which in turn are firmly grounded on prior observations. It may be taken for granted that such postulates will include a spatial-temporal framework for the inquiry. It may properly be added that the essay should foster liberation from philosophic-academic conventions and from dogmatic boundaries between different disciplines.

3) Hitherto unpublished manuscripts

are eligible, as are manuscripts that have been published since 1 January 1961. Entries may be of any length, but each should present a completed analysis of a problem, the relevant data, and an interpretation of the data in terms of the postulates with which the study began. Preference will be given to manuscripts not over 50,000 words in length. Entries may be submitted by the author himself or by another person on his behalf.

4) Entries will be judged by a committee of three persons considered well qualified to judge material in this field. The judges will be selected by a management committee consisting of the chairman and the secretary of the Section on Social and Economic Sciences and the executive officer of the AAAS. The committee of judges reserves the right to withhold the prize if no worthy essay is submitted.

5) Entries should be sent to Dael Wolfe, Executive Officer, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1515 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington 5, D.C. Entries should be submitted in quadruplicate. Each entry should be accompanied by six copies of an abstract not to exceed 1200 words in length. The name of the author should not appear anywhere on the entry itself but should be enclosed on a separate sheet of paper which also gives the author's address and the title of his essay. Entrants who wish to have their manuscripts returned should include a note to that effect and the necessary postage. To be eligible for consideration for the prize that will be awarded at the 1962 annual meeting of the Association, entries must be received *not later than 1 September 1962*.

A 1-hour report on advances in **heart and artery surgery** will be presented over NBC-TV on 23 April at 10 P.M. Henry Swan, of the University of Colorado, specialist on cardiovascular surgery, will offer informative comment and converse with surgeons during four major operations taking place in different cities.

A consortium of nine American universities has completed an agreement to provide technical **engineering assistance to India** in development of the Indian Institute of Technology at Kanpur. The project, supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development, will be administered by Educational Services, Inc., under the policy direction of representatives from each of the American