Our chief negotiator, Arthur Dean, has suggested that we hope to counter the Russian concern about espionage by telling them something of how much we already know about their military strength and disposition. His point, presumably, will be that the Russians aren't endangering their security by opening themselves to inspection because even if our inspectors acted as spies they could not, under the kind of scheme we are proposing, tell us anything of vital importance that we have not already been able to learn through such devices as the Midas (spy-in-the-sky) satellites, the long-range radar surviellance of Soviet missile testing, and other conventional and unconventional means of gathering intelligence.

But, again, this would apply primarily to such matters as pinpointing the sites of potential targets. It would be of little use if the Russians simply did not feel comfortable about the idea of making available to the world data that would show an unfavorable balance of strategic power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Pentagon here believes that this unfavorable balance of strategic power exists, but there is not only a considerable range of uncertainty about the extent of the U.S. advantage, but the very important fact that, as a number of public opinion surveys have shown, a large part of the world believes the advantage lies in the other direction. The Russians have made great efforts to convince the world that they are overtaking the capitalist giant; they have succeeded in convincing a great part of the world that they have actually outdone the giant in military power; and therefore they can hardly be anxious to demonstrate that their pretentions are ill-founded.

The problems for the Russians on this point go beyond a concern with a general effort to cultivate the view that Communism is the wave of the future. For the estimates of Soviet strength have an effect not only on the American willingness to take a firm stand on a matter like Berlin, but more importantly on the willingness of the American allies and even its own public to support a firm position.

For reasons such as this, the Soviet stand on controls over existing armaments is not so unreasonable as it is sometimes presented, if by reasonable we mean only that we could credit the Russians with the best of motives and still find something of an understandable basis for their position. Any nation in the Soviet position would have similar misgivings about the kinds of controls we are asking for. But that we can find understandable reasons for the Russian attitude, of course, hardly makes the Russian position acceptable: It is perfectly reasonable for the Russians to want to do something about Berlin, a western island in the midst of the most unsuccessful of the East European satellites; but that the Russians really have reason to be unhappy about Berlin, that they are not just trying to be nasty in pressing us there, hardly argues that we should give up Berlin. The Russians have serious reasons, beyond their vague charges of possible espionage, for shying away from controls over existing armaments; recognizing this does not solve anything: that it may be "reasonable" for the Russians to oppose controls does not make unreasonable our insistence on these controls. But it is useful to bear such considerations in mind in trying to understand why, despite the convincing professions of sincerity on both sides about the importance of avoiding nuclear war, it is so difficult to make even a little progress on formal agreements to lessen the chance of war.

We will apparently have a good deal of time to dwell on these problems. Again, as of the middle of this week, all signs pointed to a lengthy conference. Ambassador Dean and his counterparts were spending some of their spare time last weekend looking for houses to rent for the long stay.—H.M.

East-West Exchange: Signing of Pact Renews Program for Another 2 Years

That biennial testimonial to East-West distrust, the Soviet-American exchange program, was renewed earlier this month, after 5 weeks of negotiations.

The new agreement, which is the third since 1959, runs for 2 years and governs scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and athletic exchanges. Under the agreements, a once near-absence of traffic between the two countries has been replaced by a carefully regulated, tit-for-tat exchange. The flow has never become heavy—the State Department estimates that the total number of persons involved, outside of tourists, has never exceeded 7000 annually—and the program has often been attended by charges of bad faith from both sides. Unquestionably, the exchange program provides, or results from, a better state of affairs than that which prevailed in pre-exchange days, but its very existence reflects the tensions and distrusts of the Cold War. Except for a minor agreement with Romania, the United States government has no exchange agreement with any other nation; nevertheless the traffic between the U.S. and many minor countries easily exceeds that between the U.S. and Soviet goliaths.

The new agreement, as was the case with its predecessors, is not to be regarded as an understanding that specified exchanges will actually take place, but rather that there is an interest in such exchanges and there is therefore a good chance that they will come about. In the previous agreement, for example, it was stated that "both parties shall provide for an exchange of one delegation of specialists for studying problems of radio broadcasting and television, consisting of three or four persons, for a period of up to three weeks."

The State Department reports that, without explanation, the Soviet delegation called off its visit 6 days before it was to arrive; the exchange never took place. Other exchanges never come within even 6 days of fulfillment; they simply do not get beyond the talking stage and, sometimes, they do not get that far.

The differences between the old and new exchange agreements are not very substantial, but they follow the pattern of differing national interests that have prevailed since the first exchange program went into operation. The Soviets have shown a keen interest in getting a look at American science and technology, though, at the same time, they have displayed no enthusiasm for giving American visitors access to their laboratories, industrial plants, and scientific meetings. Over the years this has been a source of friction, with the State Department charging that the Soviets are wrangling invitations from private parties in this country, while American specialists interested in going to the Soviet are at the mercy of a central authority in seeking invitations. The State Department, with its visa authority, can, of course, control the flow of Soviet visitors, but it has had little success, no matter what the leverage, in moving the Soviets on this issue.

"The Soviet interpretation of the

reciprocity clause is that it applies to reciprocity on invitations," a State Department official said, "and since invitations are not too difficult to solicit from American institutions, they get a lot more than our people get."

The Soviets, possibly embarrassed by charges that they were not living up to the previous agreement's stipulation that scientific exchanges "shall take place on a basis of reciprocity," insisted on the addition of "as far as possible" in the new agreement. Ultimately, the U.S. agreed to the insertion of that loophole, but it extracted a number of concessions in the area with which this country has the greatest concern: cultural and informational contacts with the Soviet people.

The first of these was Soviet agreement to expand the circulation of *Amerika*, and *USSR*, the slick, monthly magazines which each country publishes for distribution in the other. The circulation of each at present is 52,000 monthly; it was agreed that within 2 years, in stages, the circulation will be raised to 100,000.

The magazines have themselves been a source of irritation between the two nations, since Soviet citizens apparently snap up *Amerika* while American readers, who find no dearth of slick material on the Soviet Union, have not shown very much interest in *USSR*. The newsstand returns of *USSR* have aroused the Soviets to send back bundles of *Amerika*, with the claim that there is no demand for them, although westerners in Moscow report there is a black market for the magazine.

It must be stressed that the agreement to expand circulation does not mean that the expansion is inevitable, nor is there any certainty about what will happen in regard to what the State Department considers one of the most significant additions to the exchange program: an agreement to permit the use of commercial channels for the distribution of newspapers, magazines, books, and other publications.

The agreement has no significance for the circulation of Soviet printed matter in the United States, since such material is abundantly available in bookstores or through the mails. But American publishers find that the Soviet restrictions on the circulation of U.S. publications make it virtually impossible to get through to any large number of Russian readers. The State Department is somewhat dubious of the likelihood that the Soviet government will open its distribution channels to a free flow of American publications, but it regards the new provision to be of the utmost importance, and it is hopeful that U.S. publishers will quickly put the agreement to a test.

Although scientific exchanges are governed by provisions of the exchange agreement—and may also be carried on outside the agreement—a good number of these exchanges are covered in a subagreement between the National Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Details of the inter-Academy agreement have not been released, since it is awaiting approval by each academy and is technically subject to revision. It is understood, however, that relatively few changes were made, and the principal ones reflect an American interest in working out lengthier stays for Americans visiting Soviet scientific institutes. The previous agreement provided for stays of 1 month, and in a few cases, of 5 to 6 months. A number of persons who participated in these exchanges have reported that the time was generally inadequate for fruitful work. Under the new agreement, the period has been extended up to 10 months.

The new agreement provides for another exchange of students, instructors, and researchers at Soviet and American universities, a program that received wide attention when it was first announced, but which has not produced altogether satisfactory results, at least from the American point of view.

The exchange last year was supposed to total up to 50 persons, but, according to the State Department, only 38 participated on each side. Many of the Americans involved were discouraged by restrictions on their access to research materials. Their unhappy reports have apparently had an effect on qualified persons who might follow in their footsteps; the State Department has doubts that this part of the program will thrive unless American students can look forward to more agreeable conditions.

The exchange program development of most widespread interest is that the Soviet Union will open its borders and concert halls to the Benny Goodman orchestra. Goodman is already a favorite of Soviet youth, via Voice of America broadcasts and bootleg recordings. The U.S. will also send the Robert Shaw Chorale and the New York City Ballet, and, in return will fare quite nicely: the Bolshoi Theater Ballet, the Leningrad Philharmonia Symphony Orchestra, and the Ukranian Dance Ensemble.

At Soviet insistence it was also agreed to exchange five- to six-member delegations on the "Clothing Industry: Study of techniques, technology and organization of production in the clothing industry." The United States delegation tried to broaden this study to include clothing fashions, but the Soviets would have none of that and successfully insisted on sticking to the needle and thread part of the subject.—D.S.G.

"Institute of Arts and Letters": Swiss Government Appears Dubious

The Swiss government advises that Americans would do well to react skeptically to invitations to accept "election" to a Swiss organization that calls itself the International Institute of Arts and Letters. A life fellowship in the "Institute" costs $60 and carries with it the privilege of enscribing "F.I.A.L." after one's name.

According to the "Institute's" literature, "regular Membership of the Institute is limited to seventeen hundred and sixty Fellows and Corresponding Members 'qualified by notable achievements in Arts and Letters or in Sciences and other fields of culture.' " One letter of invitation offers, upon request, a "survey of the 300,000 volumes of publications distributed under the auspices of the Institute which found the best reviews in more than 400 important newspapers of the continent."

The Swiss embassy in Washington reports that about 50 inquiries concerning the "Institute" have been received during the past 6 months, many of them from some of the more eminent names in American science.

One recipient of a request to "allow" the Institute's council to "elect you as a Life Fellow" sent an inquiry to the American embassy in Bern, which forwarded to him the following reply from the Swiss Department of Interior:

"We regret exceedingly that we are not in a position to give you any particulars concerning the Institute . . . although we have been asked repeatedly for information about it. The Department has never had any dealings with this Institute, which, as far as we have been able to ascertain, has no status in the cultural life of our country. Unfortunately, it is also not possible for us to obtain reliable information regarding