

Letters

U.S. Strategy

There appeared recently in "Science and the news" two articles entitled, respectively, "Grand strategy: The views of the Administration and the War College do not seem to coincide" [*Science* 134, 543 (25 Aug. 1961)] and "Grand strategy: The Administration has a problem that it would rather not deal with in public" [*ibid.* 134, 602 (1 Sept. 1961)]. Both articles are signed H.M. The references in both articles to the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania contain a number of errors which require correction.

1) You are free to ascertain, by direct inquiry to the Department of Defense, the relationship of this institute with the National War College. In any case, this relationship has not been as stated in the article. Furthermore, may I call attention to the fact that it is not the mission of the National War College to train "promising young officers." The great majority of the students of the National War College hold the rank of colonel or of Navy captain. Their median age is a matter of record.

2) Both articles contain comments purporting to show that a publication of the Foreign Policy Research Institute entitled *A Forward Strategy for America* (Harper, New York, 1961) contains proposals for preventive war. In support of this allegation the author of the article quotes from chapter 2 of the book. Specifically, he quotes a part of a passage (p. 15) that reads as follows.

In the Cold War, the Soviet Union has one overriding advantage, namely, its freedom to opt for a sudden surprise attack. The United States, on its part, has deliberately rejected this option for moral reasons and has done so despite the enormous military disadvantages which the rejection entails. American strategy—a strategy dictated by moral considerations—facilitates a Soviet strategy of all-out war. But it does not ease necessarily the over-all strategic problem of the Soviets. If the Soviet Union were to rely on a strategy of piecemeal conquest, the very success of Soviet "nibbling" could push the United States

into a nuclear conflict at some point where its vital interests left no other choice. Unless the United States could be induced to surrender or be subverted by an internal revolution, both of which contingencies are most unlikely, a reversal of American strategy toward pre-emption may, sooner or later, be in order. *Precisely because of the devastating power of nuclear weapons and because the United States continues to be the only other major nuclear power besides the Soviet Union, a reversal of U.S. strategy remains possible almost to the last minute.* Even at a moment when the United States faces defeat because, for example, Europe, Asia and Africa have fallen to communist domination, a sudden nuclear attack against the Soviet Union could at least avenge the disaster and deprive the opponent of the ultimate triumph. While such a reversal at the last moment almost certainly would result in severe American casualties, it might still nullify all previous Soviet conquests.

The italics are those of the text. This passage is quoted here in full. It is perfectly clear that this passage does not contain any policy proposal. It gives our understanding of the impact of nuclear weapons upon international politics. Anyone is welcome to debate the logic of our understanding; no one can find in it a recommendation for American strategy.

In chapter 5 of the same book the authors do advance proposals for an appropriate United States strategic posture. They preface their proposals with the following words (p. 119).

A policy of preventive war, however, is anathema to our sense of values. Moreover, a preventive war must be launched by surprise; preparations for it must be made in secret. The open societies of the West practically rule out such a policy choice.

The authors' enumeration of the requirements of an appropriate U.S. military posture begins with the following statement (p. 124).

First, we need a basic deterrent posture, i.e., invulnerable offensive forces for second-strike attack on the U.S.S.R. Invulnerability implies that we decide what kind of residual capability we need to implement our strategy and then make certain that at least this percentage of our retaliatory force will be safe even after we have absorbed the first blow.

This, as far as can be determined from public statements of the Kennedy Administration, is the current U.S. policy toward nuclear war. There is a question of judgment as to the degree of preparations which the U.S. must make to fulfill its military commitments, particularly to have an invulnerable second-strike force. It is essential in dealing with American strategy to consider the role of nuclear weapons. We do not consider their use inevitable. In fact, the book states (page 6): "*the reality of our age is, however, that the most important battles may not be fought by exchanges of nuclear firepower, but, like the conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, will consist of maneuvers and diversions designed to achieve a decisive advantage by one side or the other*" (the italics are those of the book). The central concern of the book is how the United States can best coordinate all its efforts—diplomatic, economic, psychological and cultural—toward the creation of a world environment in which freedom might flourish. In order to attain this end, the United States must search for policies and create capabilities that will permit it to choose an alternative other than total surrender or total war—a dismal choice which the Communist rulers seek to force upon us. Again, as far as one can determine from policy statements, President Kennedy is pursuing a policy which is generally consistent with that proposed by the authors of *A Forward Strategy for America*.

The writings published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute do not contain any proposals for preventive war. No member of this institute has, in writing or by word of mouth, advocated that the United States embrace a strategy of the first strike.

3) The second article by H.M. refers to a report by a secondary source according to which a government contract granted to an unidentified research institute has been sharply cut. No government contract that has been entered by this university on behalf of this institute has been cut.

4) The same article states that "even the eight associate authors of the book [*A Forward Strategy for America*], who contributed to one chapter or another, do not necessarily subscribe to the over-all view of the book." *A Forward Strategy for America* was published 8 months ago. During this period none of the "eight associate authors of the book" have expressed any disagreement

with the "over-all view of the book." The book was prepared in close consultation with the individuals listed as contributors to the book. During the course of these consultations they were free to voice their dissent with the "over-all view." Not a single one did; not a single one has done so since.

5) The same article contains the following statement: "This report, perhaps unavoidably, has given the entire movement associated in one way or another with the Forward Strategy a more monolithic character than it actually has."

I know of no movement—"monolithic" or otherwise—associated with the "Forward Strategy." I herewith state categorically that the Foreign Policy Research Institute is not associated with any "movement." A political movement—and the author of the article can have no other movement in mind—must be organized in order to justify the term. This institute has no connection with any political movement aimed at promoting any particular set of political doctrines or strategic concepts. Members of this institute, like most Americans, are members of one of our two

great political parties and of a variety of civic, professional, and scientific organizations. The Foreign Policy Research Institute has no affinities except those that are explicit in its status as a research group within the University of Pennsylvania.

6) The author of the two articles seeks to establish a covert relationship between *A Forward Strategy for America* and another book published previously by the Foreign Policy Research Institute—namely, *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*. According to H.M., the purpose of the latter book was to soften and prepare the way for *A Forward Strategy for America*, which, according to him, maintains that the U.S. must prepare for launching a surprise attack against the Soviet Union. Although this assertion is made repeatedly, H.M. is careful to protect himself by an ingenious literary device against the charge of having disregarded the actual text of both books. He concedes that the book does not contain a proposal for a policy of striking "a surprise knock-out blow" at the Soviets. Yet he has mastered this problem by writing as follows:

This policy is not specifically stated in the book; it is merely the only realistic policy that follows from the premises of the book, and the members of the Foreign Policy Research Institute consider themselves, above all else, as realists.


His conclusion thus boils down to an attempt to read our minds rather than our writings. This procedure can be characterized in various ways; it cannot be mistaken for scientific method.

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I could argue with a number of the points in Strausz-Hupé's letter, but overall there is no doubt that the articles contain substantial flaws. I think the letter of censure is well deserved.—H.M.

Drugs and the Kefauver Bill

The following statement appeared recently in "Science and the news" [*Science* 134, 89 (14 July 1961)]: "Kefauver has produced evidence that a sizable proportion of the new drugs patented and put on the market are not in any significant way new. They involve merely minor changes in the molecular structure of an already avail-



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
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