the need to maintain its franchise of increasing administration requests at will.

When all was said and done, the Senate and House bills were adjusted, and the $738-million compromise was adopted. In defending the compromise figure on the House floor last week, Fogarty said it is "only $19 million less than the professional judgment figure of the Institutes." Thus, in addition to the Administration's budget, the NIH budget request, and the "citizens budget," a fourth kind—the "professional judgment budget"—was introduced. This is the total of all the individual budgets of each of the institutes comprising NIH (which had been pared down to meet the NIH leadership's request, which, in turn, suffered from the Budget Bureau's knife). In any case, the compromise is "enough to meet the demonstrable needs as seen by those directly responsible for the NIH programs," said Fogarty; at the same time, it is "no more than can be appropriately and effectively employed to further medical research as rapidly as available facilities and manpower will permit during the current fiscal year," he added.

The funds, after all that, will go to continue and expand present NIH programs in general; to expand the "specialized clinical centers" which were initiated last year and broaden their "disease categories"; and to create "special resource centers in which the principles, instrumentation, and techniques of the physical sciences and certain engineering specialties can be brought to bear on biomedical research," Fogarty said. The training and fellowship programs—Shannon, it will be recalled, wanted a "moratorium" on the training program fund increases—will be expanded because "strong representations" made to Congress indicated that a moratorium would "slow their momentum," Fogarty said.

Not all that the Administration wanted survived in the bill, either. Funds asked for the Food and Drug Administration, which as part of the Public Health Service has its budget considered together with NIH appropriations, were cut $580,000. This will keep FDA from having 30 inspectors and chemists to watch over the food additive situation. Congress in effect thus denied FDA "resources to carry out responsibilities which Congress itself assigned to the agency only three years ago," a Congressman said. Moreover, Fogarty prevailed against attempts to raise the overhead allowance on NIH grants from 15 to 25 percent; the Senate was willing to go along with the increase, which would have brought NIH overhead allowances in line with those of the National Science Foundation.

### Administration of Research Grants

Inevitably, along with the affluence, has come criticism of NIH. The best-documented is that of the House Committee on Government Operations report, "Health Research and Training," released this year after 2 years in preparation. It found NIH "not adequately organized to administer" research grants "with maximum effectiveness" outside its own laboratories, stating that long-term awards were not followed up after the first year and that funds were given automatically for up to 8 years afterwards. Another criticism was that the government has "little assurance" that funds are "used economically and with concern primarily for research performance rather than private gain. The committee has found disturbing evidence of abuse of grants by commercial firms," the report said. "Extravagance and financial irregularities" were found in NIH grants in support of medical meetings. These were criticisms of administrative sloppiness for the most part; much can be excused because of the size of the NIH programs and their rate of expansion. And NIH has moved to correct them.

The fundamental question is whether the money has been pumped into medical research too fast to be used soundly. There is no proof that it has not, although, on the other side of the coin, there is really no proof that it has. Lacking that, one is forced to the conclusion that, by and large, NIH has done a good job. Yet the uneasy feeling persists that NIH supports too much research—not too much in terms of government in science but too much in comparison to the rate of support of other agencies. Voluntary health organizations may not afford a good comparison in this respect, but the National Science Foundation does. The House report cited above brought this out, and in doing so it used words that implied criticism, though the criticism was not formally stated.

"NIH has allowed grantees an exceptionally high proportion of their budget requests," it said. "For all programs combined, successful applicants were allowed 95.3 percent of the total research funds they requested in 1960." Between 1956 and 1960, the rate was 93.7 to 99.4 percent. NSF, with admittedly less money at its disposal, granted a much lower proportion of budget requests: about 50 to 60 percent asked by new applicants, 75 to 85 percent on money asked for renewals. "Moreover, NSF is able to support only about one-third of the dollar value of total research proposals. NIH, by comparison, supported nearly one-half (one year it was 68 percent) of all new applicants and 94 percent" of continuing-grant requests. To sum it up, NIH gave 95 cents on the dollar to two-thirds of all new applicants; NSF gave 60 cents on the dollar to one-third of its new applicants.

### No End in Sight

With Congress feeling as it does, there is no end in sight to the accelerating rate of support of NIH. No group has taken more to heart Pasteur's words: "Take interest, I implore you, in those sacred dwellings [called] laboratories. Demand that they be multiplied, that they be adorned. These are the temples of the future, temples of well being and of happiness." Jones's committee of consultants to the Senate saw the government spending $2 billion a year by 1970 on medical research, and increasing its share of the nation's medical research bill from the present one-half to two-thirds.

Even those who most ardently push this trend must have disquieting moments in considering how long the public, and even Congress itself, will continue the force-feeding before asking the beneficiaries to produce a golden egg or two.—ROBERT C. TOTH

*While Howard Margolis is on vacation, his section will be written by guest reporters. Robert C. Toth, this week's guest, is on the staff of the New York* Herald Tribune.

## Disarmament Agency: It Gives Quest for Peace an Institutional Standing

The Administration last week enlisted broad congressional support for establishing a high-level agency to delve into the innumerable complexities of arms control and disarmament. A bill setting up the agency was approved by the Senate. A similar measure was sent to the House floor with the unanimous endorsement of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Although the small disarmament

body now in existence as a part of the State Department could have been expanded by Executive Order, the Administration showed concern for associating Congress with its decision to give disarmament an institutional standing in the government. This strategy provides a number of benefits, including some shielding against the far right's efforts to exploit disarmament as a political issue.

The principal motive for upgrading our disarmament organization came from the fact that the Soviets have generally fielded better disarmament teams. The personnel usually are drawn from the top levels of the foreign office, they virtually make careers of disarmament negotiations, and they have quick access to the top of the Soviet hierarchy for consultations. The United States effort, as has been lamented by many persons who have found themselves facing the Soviet team, has often been haphazard, and frequently has been at a governmental level far below the Soviet's.

The timing for congressional consideration of the Administration proposal was made particularly unpropitious by Soviet resumption of nuclear testing, the continuing tension of the Berlin situation, and our increased military preparedness. As was expected, Senator Goldwater and others argued that it is psychologically inopportune for the United States to emphasize an interest in disarmament when it is expanding and alerting its military establishment in response to Soviet threats.

(The timing, it might be pointed out, was a function of the slow grinding of the legislative mill, rather than any Administration attempt to use the proposal as a device to dramatize interest in peaceful solutions during the present tension. A similar bill was introduced by Kennedy when he was a senator. It was reintroduced at the beginning of the current session and reached the debating stage when it did without any deliberate efforts by the Administration or its backers.)

The opposition, however, was anticipated and was met by statements and testimony from an array of national figures with credentials that put them out of range of rational partisan attacks, thus assuring protection for supporters who feared their political flanks would be exposed to a charge of advocating disarmament in the face of Soviet truculence. Those on record in support of the proposed agency included former President Eisenhower; Henry Cabot Lodge; Alfred M. Gruenther; former defense secretaries Thomas S. Gates, Jr., and Robert A. Lovett; George B. Kistiakowsky, who served as Eisenhower's science adviser; and Herbert York, former director of Defense Research and Engineering.

Any congressional suspicions that the proposed organization would conflict with the interests of the Defense Department or the Atomic Energy Commission were dispelled, for the record at least, by the testimony of Roswell L. Gilpatrick, Deputy Secretary of Defense; General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Commissioner Leland J. Haworth of the AEC. They voiced carefully worded concern about the need for consideration of their agencies' views on disarmament issues, but otherwise hewed strictly to the Administration's arguments.

These were, briefly, that disarmament studies and negotiations have been an *ad hoc* proposition over the past 15 years, with personnel being hurriedly recruited from time to time—something like a "pick-up" softball team—whenever arrangements were made to meet with the Soviets. It was pointed out by the Administration that the stature of disarmament efforts in our government has varied over the years, sometimes because of the personalities involved and sometimes because of the outcome of power struggles within the executive branch.

### Stassen Ouster

In 1955, for example, Harold Stassen became chairman of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems. He presumably had the President's confidence until Secretary Dulles succeeded in moving Stassen first from the White House to the State Department and then altogether out of official existence. Responsibility was then placed largely in the State Department, with help on loan from various agencies and bodies, including the President's science advisers. Last fall, the State Department established a Disarmament Administration, staffed on an intergovernmental basis. In the many-layered State Department, however, a not-very-senior body, staffed by persons whose loyalties may lie with other agencies, does not generate the power to influence great departments and agencies, let alone the White House. The varying views of the State and Defense departments, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the White House staff resulted in our representatives undertaking enormously complex negotiations at Geneva 2 years ago while numerous issues were still unresolved within the government.

At hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, several of the men who have negotiated with the Soviets spoke cautiously but critically of the preparation that was made available to them. Frederick M. Eaton, former ambassador to the negotiations on comprehensive disarmament, declared that "the lack of adequate backup papers to support the American positions was very serious." And John J. McCloy, President Kennedy's disarmament adviser, testified, "I am surprised to see how well some of our negotiations have been conducted in the past by reason of the limitations which have been imposed on those who had to prepare for the negotiations . . . We have had I do not know how many people . . . called in to negotiate on rather an *ad hoc* basis, some . . . almost on the spur of the moment; proposals have been pulled together almost at the last minute."

While the White House, Senate, and House proposals differ in a few respects, they all show great concern for placing the agency in a position where it is guaranteed access to the White House and can employ private as well as governmental research services. In addition, in all versions the agency would be intimately associated with the State Department but would be assured a sovereignty of its own to command respect and attention throughout the executive branch. It would also be authorized to offer a top-level government salary scale, which, along with its permanent standing, would enable it to attract personnel who might shy away from precariously founded agencies. With a proposed budget of $10 million, it is expected that the agency would total about 250 persons, which is triple the present staff in the State Department's Disarmament Administration.

Aside from its value as an operational body in preparing for and conducting negotiations, the agency would meet the concern of those who see preparation for war firmly instituted and respected, while preparation for peace is an orphan.—D.S.G.