

to reduce. If "the edge of objectivity" in science, as Charles Gillispie has recently pointed out, requires us to take physical and biological nature as it is, without projecting our wishes upon it, so also we have to take man's social nature, or his behavior in society, as it is. As men in society, scientists are sometimes the agents, sometimes the objects, of resistance to their own discoveries (40).

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Science and the News

Grand Strategy: The Administration Has a Problem That It Would Rather Not Deal With in Public

The Administration, as noted here last week, faces an interesting and delicate problem in dealing with the relationship between elements in the Defense Department and three closely tied organizations which advocate an unrelentingly aggressive prosecution of the Cold War in terms which take on a coherent meaning only in a context of preparing for a surprise nuclear attack on Russia sometime within the current

decade. The basis for this interpretation of the "Forward Strategy" put forth by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania was reported in this space last week. The Research Institute has been financed primarily by a tax-free educational foundation, the Richardson Foundation, whose director of research, Frank Barnett, is also director of research for the Institute for American Strategy, another educational foundation, which is devoted to influencing the public to support the overt aspects of the Forward Strategy.

Public notice has been attracted to the relationships of these organizations with the Defense Department through an article by Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, of Dartmouth, published in the March 1961 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, and by Senator Fulbright's memorandum on right-wing activities by the military.

"The activities of the institute," Lyons and Morton wrote, "began to expand with the series of strategy seminars it has sponsored during the past 2 years. This program started with the National Strategy Seminar, sponsored jointly by the institute and the Reserve Officers Association in the summer of 1959. It was repeated in 1960 and both acted as catalysts for regional seminars held in different parts of the country. What is particularly striking about the National Strategy Seminars is that through the authorization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Institute for American Strategy in effect took over the responsibility of training reserve officers on active duty, even though the

National War College, whose facilities were used, had been giving courses on strategy to senior officers of the three services as well as civilians for the past 10 years. At the same time, while the government paid for allowance, travel, facilities, and services, the Richardson Foundation provided the funds for other expenses, including the cost of developing a curriculum for the seminars, hiring a staff, securing speakers, and purchasing books and other materials to be distributed to the students without charge. The task of developing the curriculum was turned over to the Foreign Policy Research Institute and [its director, Robert] Strausz-Hupé brought his own staff to the National War College. The interrelationship of the Institute for American Strategy and the Foreign Policy Research Institute with the National Strategy Seminar was thus intimately established."

Administration Policy

Neither the Eisenhower nor the Kennedy Administration has shared the Forward Strategists' premise that planning must be based on the assumption that the Cold War can be resolved only by a total victory of one side or the other, nor the assumption that such a total victory, even if achievable, would solve the world's problems any more effectively than the total victories of the two World Wars solved the world's problems. Lacking these assumptions, neither administration could accept the "Catonian policy" (after Cato's dictum: "Carthage must be destroyed") recommended by the Forward Strategists.

What prevented the conflict between the views from becoming apparent during the Eisenhower Administration was that the Strategy Institute program for indoctrinating reserve officers and business and education leaders, and through them the general public, is different from the Forward Strategy itself in a number of interesting ways, but most importantly in muting the implication that the Forward Strategy must culminate in a surprise nuclear attack on Russia. This is no impediment to the Forward Strategists since the culmination of the strategy would be a decision in the hands of a few key men. What is necessary is merely to indoctrinate the lower-echelon groups to support the idea that a more aggressive prosecution of the Cold War is necessary, to press the Administration in power to carry out an aggressive program, and, if this fails, to support the election of a presi-

dential candidate who will carry it out. This and other differences between *A Forward Strategy for America* and *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*, both published by the Research Institute within a few months of one another, make *American Strategy* more palatable to the broader audience at which it is aimed, and at the same time make more subtle the disparity between the government's policy and the institute's policy: one aimed at educating the public to understand the menace of the Cold War, a policy endorsed by Eisenhower as a proper activity of the military, and the other at educating the public to the need for a really aggressive prosecution of the Cold War, which Eisenhower rejected as likely to make an all-out war inevitable.

But the line between the two approaches is not easy to draw until the policy recommendations become explicit. *American Strategy* was faced with the problem of how to make the appeal for a more aggressive Cold War strategy convincing without offering some concrete examples of the aggressive new policies, or, on the other hand, how to offer concrete examples without offending the Administration by recommending policies it would regard as reckless. *American Strategy* solves this dilemma by recommending a number of programs which at once sound suitably aggressive for a sufficiently naive audience and at the same time sufficiently absurd so that they could not be taken seriously by anyone in a responsible government position.

Thus the concluding section of *American Strategy*, under the heading "Responses to the Challenge," includes three papers: the first is a reprint of an article by Dean Acheson, which has a number of blunt and shrewd things about the nature of the Cold War but does not recommend anything particularly in contrast with already accepted government policy; the new policies come in the two concluding papers by David Sarnoff, chairman of the board of RCA, and Frank Barnett, the research director of the Richardson Foundation and of the Strategy Institute. Both are concerned mainly with mounting a great psychological warfare campaign against the Communists. Thus the recommendations in the section, "Responses to the Challenge," consist of 11 pages for Acheson's review of a wide range of generally accepted American policies, and 33 pages for examples of *American Strategy's* new policies,

which consist of a letter Sarnoff wrote to Eisenhower in 1955, and on which no action seems to have been taken, and Barnett's windup article called "What is to be done" (after Lenin's famous pamphlet outlining a proposed policy for the Bolshevik wing of the Russian radical party). Barnett's article is full of talk of "amateurs at chess and politics," "science of conflict," and "power technique," and it contains a number of curious recommendations, none of which, though, seem likely to terrify the Russians. The most ambitious of these is a recommendation for a separate cabinet department for "psychopolitical warfare" which would have "at least the status and budget of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare," on the grounds that "if we are driven into a thermonuclear corner where we can only choose either to surrender or cremate the earth, there will be no health, education, or welfare." Barnett does not make clear what this organization would do with a budget of upwards of \$4 billion a year; indeed the proposal is merely tossed out, after a two-paragraph introduction, with half a dozen related projects, after which Barnett moves on to his next proposal for "citizen experts in political warfare."

Needless to say, *Forward Strategy* contains no more than token support for such stuff, nor for any proposal like that offered in another article in *American Strategy* which suggests we might best deal with the need for foreign aid by encouraging businessmen to set up branches of their corporations in the underdeveloped countries. *Forward Strategy* does suggest, though, how the same organization could put out two such different books, united mainly by a common demand for no appeasement and a tough policy toward Russia: one is aimed at an audience which might read at least a little of a book of short articles, many of them by well-known people, on the problems of the Cold War, particularly if the book is given to them (10,000 copies have already been given away) or costs, in any case, only \$1.45. The other is aimed at the more elite audience that will pay \$5.95 for a book on strategy by a group of scholars whose names carry no familiar ring.

"The policy-makers should always bear in mind," says *Forward Strategy* in a statement which seems to apply to *American Strategy*, "that the general public does not care deeply about strategy, and hence has little opinion

about it." And earlier in this section on public opinion: "Central to any Forward Strategy must be the thesis that there is no substitute for victory . . . It cannot be reiterated too strongly that the precondition of any national Forward Strategy must be the cultivation of the American people's 'will to win.' All public statements by responsible officials, all policies, all actions must be examined in the light of this axiom." In the light of this axiom it is clear why *American Strategy* devotes two chapters to debunking disarmament and has never a word to say that might suggest that minimizing the likelihood of a nuclear war might be a sensible consideration in dealing with the problem of *American Policy in the Nuclear Age*: for even to talk of such things suggests one is willing to settle for something less than total victory. This total victory approach also suggests why there is such strong support for the Forward Strategy among the better-informed admirers of Senator Goldwater, who is the only leading American political figure who is bluntly for total victory and against disarmament.

Conflict

The Eisenhower Administration, partly because of the indirect approach of *American Strategy*, never came to grips with the disparity between its policies and those of the Forward Strategists to which it was indirectly lending support, even though the approach of *American Strategy* was being used in the National Strategy Seminars for 2 years before the book was published last fall.

But the situation was bound to lead to conflicts with the new Administration. The publication of the books, the growth of the program, and the frequent appearance at the strategy seminars of speakers and materials from the far right of American politics all attracted attention. The new Administration prided itself on holding a more explicit concept of over-all American strategy than the Eisenhower Administration, and therefore would be more conscious than the previous Administration of the disparity between Institute programs and Administration programs. The new Secretary of Defense, more than any of his predecessors, was interested in knowing what was happening and in establishing control over everything that was going on in the Pentagon. All of this was bound to put an end to the comfortable relationships of the Forward Strategists with the Defense Department.

It is only possible to piece together what is happening, for the very nature of the problem requires the Administration to try to hush up the whole business, so far as this is possible. A public debate on the question is bound to have ugly effects both at home and abroad. At home the Administration would have to deal with charges that it is soft on Communism, and that it is persecuting patriots whose only offense is that they want America to win the Cold War. But to answer these charges by making the issue explicit would provide the Communists with a lovely windfall of evidence that even the American government admits there is some truth to the charge that American militarists are plotting a nuclear war.

The Administration's approach, therefore, has been to proceed as quietly as possible. As a number of reporters have found, it is difficult to get officials who know what is going on even to discuss the subject, although this evasiveness may have an adverse effect in giving the impression that the influence of the Forward Strategists is much more of a problem in the Pentagon than it really is. For instance, press officers at the Pentagon assure inquirers that a recent directive tightening control of military public information and education activities in the hands of the civilian Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs does not really indicate a change in policy at all, merely an essentially meaningless clarification of a previous directive. Nevertheless it is perfectly clear that steps are being taken: Officers who were always glad to accept invitations to speak at Cold War seminars now are, quite suddenly, too busy. The long-standing policy requiring clearance for public statements on nonmilitary matters is being enforced. The conservative *National Review*, which should know, reports that a Research Institute government contract has been sharply cut. Active supporters of the Forward Strategy will apparently be transferred to duties where they can do no harm, as unostentatiously as possible, one gathers, by allowing them to complete their current tour in a given post, and then seeing that they are replaced by officers with views closer to those of their Commander in Chief, or, for that matter, to those of the great majority of the elected officials of both parties.

What is doubtful is that all of this can really be carried out quietly. Thus far the debate over the Fulbright memorandum has been pretty much limited to the question of extreme right wing

activities carried out under an aura of official sponsorship. This was the main topic of Fulbright's memorandum, which said nothing more about the Institutes than to suggest that their relationship with the Defense Department ought to be re-examined to see whether it did not imply official support for views at variance with the Administration. Yet this latter point is the more subtle, and hence more exploitable, issue; it can be reduced to a charge that what the Administration is really after is not extreme right wingers using their official position to promote their private views, but anyone who is patriotic enough to be truly anti-communist. From Senator Goldwater's viewpoint this is a very tempting issue: at once a righteous one, and a politically promising one.—H.M.

Note: This report, perhaps unavoidably, has given the entire movement associated in one way or another with the Forward Strategy a more monolithic character than it actually has. It should be emphasized, for one thing, that this reporter does not know just how large a body of active supporters the Forward Strategists have within the Pentagon, within the Strategy Institute, or even within Strausz-Hupé's own group at the Research Institute. The three principal authors of *Forward Strategy* are Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, an army colonel who had been attached to the Research Institute on temporary duty, and Stephen T. Possony, a political scientist on the faculty of Georgetown University who has been frequently employed by the National War College. These three, as they point out in the book's preface, "are alone responsible for the conceptual framework of this book and for the specific views advanced," and even the eight associate authors of the book, who contributed to one chapter or another, do not necessarily subscribe to the over-all view of the book.

There is no question that the Forward Strategy has broader support than merely the book's three principal authors. At least some of the leaders of the Strategy Institute, and its supporters within the Pentagon, are surely aware of how well the Strategy Institute's approach to alerting the public to the menace of the Cold War fits in with the notions of how public opinion should be influenced that are presented in *Forward Strategy*, and of the contrast between this approach and that of the current and earlier Administrations'. On the other hand, it is certain that many

of the people associated with the Strategy Institute programs are not active supporters of the Forward Strategy and, indeed, this applies to at least some of those who have been most prominently associated with the Strategy Institute. It is, after all, not very difficult for an organization to get people to lend their names or a certain amount of assistance to a movement to strengthen American awareness of the dangers of the Cold War, and it does not follow that people who have become associated with the movement are active supporters of what, on closer inspection, seem to be the ultimate goals of the movement.—H.M.

Fecundity and Foreign Aid

The much-debated foreign aid bill, which was en route to congressional approval this week, occasioned a new respectability for official concern about the world's population boom and the attrition it imposes on our efforts to raise living standards in underdeveloped nations.

The bill itself contains no provisions for population control, and American aid officials point out that this country is not directly spending a cent—nor has it proposed to—on lowering the birth rate anywhere in the world.

What is notable on the status of the subject, however, is that the existence of a population problem is now openly afforded recognition, from the White House downward. This is a small change, but a significant one, and it has elevated the spirits of some old-time campaigners for population control, who were inured to official indifference. For example, Robert Cook, president of the Population Reference Bureau, a private organization devoted to collecting and distributing information on population studies, commented in an interview last week that "things have changed so greatly in the last 6 months that it's hard to believe it's the same world."

Others, not nearly so optimistic, nevertheless thought the new Administration's general willingness to come to grips with problems, combined with the subject's new-found respectability, hold out more promise for their goal than they are used to living with.

A search for the source of their optimism leads to a comparison of the responses Eisenhower and Kennedy made at presidential press conferences to similar questions on birth control and

its relation to the foreign aid program.

Eisenhower (2 Dec. 1959): "I cannot imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or governmental activity or function or responsibility. This government has not, and will not make, as far, as long as I am here, have a positive political doctrine in its program that has to do with this problem of birth control. That's not our business."

Kennedy (19 July 1961): "... this is a decision which goes very much to the life of a country, and it is a personal decision and a national decision which these countries must make. The problem is not altogether an economic one. We help countries which carry out different policies in this regard and it is a judgment, in my opinion, which they should make."

Kennedy's statement is not a violent departure from his predecessor's, and both statements implicitly recognize that overpopulation happens to be a problem principally in lands where racial sensitivities are high. Aside from the impossibility of imposing population policies on these lands, this country would give the Soviets a Cold War propaganda bonus if it were to seek to regulate the world's dark-skinned birth rate. However, nations seeking help according to the criteria of the Kennedy formula have found it, though it can be argued the scale has been limited.

One of the countries which we help and which has made a decision to decelerate its population growth is India. Though none of the American funds that go to boost India's economy are slated for birth control, India plans to spend some \$200 million of its own funds to lower its birth rate during its new 5-year plan. This outlay, in part, is made possible by large-scale American support to other Indian projects, which otherwise would require resources now scheduled for the birth-control program. In addition, the Ford Foundation has granted India \$603,000 this year for training and research in family planning and pilot projects.

Following Kennedy's press conference response and his statements on population growth in connection with the Alliance for Progress, a number of Administration officials have spoken out—not vigorously, but along lines that were usually restricted to private conversations in the previous Administration.

For example, last week, Rowland Burnstan, assistant secretary of commerce for international affairs, spoke

on the Alliance for Progress at a management program sponsored by the Columbia University Graduate School of Business. Noting that "the 'population explosion' in Latin America is one of the fundamental aspects of the development problem," he warned that while population growth can be a blessing, it can also lead to political and economic instability if employment does not keep pace. He added: "Analysis of data for recent years shows that efforts in Latin America both by local governments and under the assistance programs of the United States have not reached the minimum results required." Then he dropped the subject.

Not surprisingly, in congressional discussions over the foreign aid bill, there was no effort by supporters to impede its difficult path by emphasizing the view that an uncontrolled population boom was diluting our efforts to raise living standards in the underdeveloped lands. On several occasions, Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, warned Administration witnesses that they had better not be oblivious to the subject, and James Reston, the *New York Times* correspondent, who is both friendly to and influential in the Administration, wrote that "Nothing is surer than that there will be a decisive revolt against foreign aid one day if the population problem is not faced."

Both in Congress and the Administration there are vivid memories of what occurred 2 years ago when it was officially acknowledged that the problem exists and that the government should do something about it. The acknowledgment was in the so-called Draper Report, produced by the President's Committee To Study the United States Military Assistance Program, which, as a high-level body, presumably with the President's ear, attracted considerable attention. The report called for the United States, on request, to help recipient countries "in the formulation of their plans designed to deal with the problem of rapid population growth. . . ."

The Roman Catholic Church reacted sharply to this call for open government involvement in birth control, in contrast to the Church's relative inactivity in regard to efforts that in effect are subsidized by the government, such as the Indian program. In a strongly worded statement, the Catholic bishops of the United States declared that "United States Catholics believe that the promotion of artificial birth pre-

vention is a morally, humanly, psychologically, and politically disastrous approach to the population problem." Adding that American Catholics are dedicated to expanding resources and improving distribution to meet population growth, they warned: "They will not, however, support any public assistance, either at home or abroad, to promote artificial birth prevention, abortion or sterilization whether through direct aid or by means of international organizations."

President Eisenhower's press conference statement, quoted above, came a week after the bishops' statement and removed the subject from official dialog.

The growth of open discussion of the subject is most apparent in the Administration, and least apparent in Congress where, even before the lacerating school-bill fight, there was no disposition to make Congress the arena for a struggle over birth control.

A "crash program of research" in population control, as was proposed by a group that ran full-page advertisements in the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal* this week, would have to go the congressional route, and signs of receptivity on Capitol Hill are not visible.

Nevertheless, there is considerable work going on in this country and elsewhere, and with varying results, it is making itself felt in some of the underdeveloped lands about which we are most concerned, although not yet in the overwhelmingly Catholic nations of Latin America, where the population is expected to triple before the turn of the century.

Among some proponents of population planning, the hope is that the Church's interest in social well-being and order, combined with new developments in family planning, will make it possible to implement programs that have been effective elsewhere.

One method of oral contraception, which employs progesterone to suppress ovulation temporarily, has led John Rock, a Catholic physician who participated in its clinical testing, to express "the confident hope that the medication will prove acceptable to my Church, since it merely gives to the human intellect the means to suppress ovulation."

There are Catholic moralists who feel that Rock's medicine is better than his theology, but experience in a number of places, including Puerto Rico, suggests that doctrine may not be an insurmountable difficulty.

Announcements

A "science community" **research center** has been established in the Philippines by the National Science Development Board, a member of the International Science Foundation. Initially the center will consist of an administration building, a science hall, and an auditorium for Filipino scientists, engineers, and supporting technical personnel. The laboratory facilities will be made available to government scientists and to any other qualified research workers who wish to take up residence in the community.

The U.S. Public Health Service is soliciting inquiries concerning participation in or initiation of **regional institutes for public health educators**, to provide information and discussion on current research findings and activities in the field. (School Health Section, Division of Community Health Practice, USPHS, Washington 25, D.C.)

Meeting Notes

The Society for **Social Responsibility in Science** will hold its annual meeting at Harvard from 8 to 10 September. (Michael Rice, 365 Harvard St., Cambridge 38, Mass.)

The first international symposium on the **science of fire-fighting** will be held during the 140th national meeting of the American Chemical Society, which opens in Chicago on 3 September. The symposium, jointly sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences and ACS, will include a survey of current fire research in this country and abroad. (ACS, Division of Fuel Chemistry, 733 3rd Ave., New York 17)

Scientists in the News

Paul M. Gross, of the department of chemistry, Duke University, and president-elect of the AAAS, has been named chairman of a special committee established to develop long-range objectives for the environmental health programs of the Public Health Service.

The second Russian medical scientist to visit the United States arrived last week for extended research work under a special U.S.-U.S.S.R. scientific exchange program, signed in 1959. **Noko-**

lai P. Yelinov, deputy director of the Leningrad Chemical-Pharmaceutical Institute, will spend 4 months at the Laboratory of Infectious Diseases of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. The first Russian exchange scientist to do research under this program was **Fedor G. Uglov**, head of the Chair of Hospital Surgery at the Pavlov Medical Institute, Leningrad. Uglov spent 2 months at Baylor University's College of Medicine last spring.

Nevin S. Scrimshaw, recently appointed director of nutrition research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has been awarded the Order of Rodolfo Robles by the government of Guatemala in recognition of the achievements of the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama, which Scrimshaw had headed since its establishment in Guatemala City in 1949.

F. Earle Lyman, chief of the extramural programs branch, National Institute of Dental Health, has been appointed to the newly created position of assistant director of the institute. He is succeeded by **Robert C. Likens**, research chemist in the institute's Laboratory of Biochemistry.

Recent faculty appointments at Stanford University:

Calvin F. Quate, research director and vice president of Sandia Corporation, will become professor of applied physics and electrical engineering.

John D. Krumboltz, psychologist at Michigan State University, will become associate professor of education and psychology.

Frank Kral and **John T. McGrath**, faculty members of the University of Pennsylvania's School of Veterinary Medicine, have been honored by the American Veterinary Medical Association for outstanding contributions to the advancement of veterinary medicine. Kral received the association's 12th International Congress Veterinary prize; McGrath received the Gaines award and medal.

James G. Thomson, head of the pathology department of the University of Cape Town, Union of South Africa, is serving as exchange professor of pathology at the University of Miami School of Medicine. **W. A. D. Anderson**, head of the School of Medicine's department of pathology, is taking Thomson's place in Cape Town.