

# Science and the News

## Grand Strategy: The Views of the Administration and the War College Do Not Seem To Coincide

A running debate has been going on in the Senate for nearly a month now over the Fulbright memorandum drawing the attention of the President and Defense Secretary MacNamara to what Fulbright sees as the excessive involvement of the military in politics. The bulk of Fulbright's memorandum, and all of the debate thus far in the Senate, has concerned itself with the tendency of "strategy seminars" and similarly named public education programs, sponsored or cosponsored by military organizations, to go beyond their stated purpose of alerting the public to the menace of the cold war to include speakers and literature which condemn large parts of the Administration's domestic program, such as federal aid to education, as steps toward socialism, which, in turn, is defined as merely a step toward communism. The military involvement in such programs has been based on a directive signed by then President Eisenhower in 1959 instructing the military to play a role in alerting the public to the menace of the cold war. Fulbright suggested that the Eisenhower directive, aside from the way it has been implemented, was a "basic error." "The American people have little, if any, need to be alerted to the menace of the cold war," he said. "Rather, the need is for understanding of the true nature of that menace. . . . There are no reasons to believe that military personnel generally can contribute to this need beyond their specific technical competence to explain their own role. On the contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, for believing that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves considerable danger."

In answer to this Senator Thurmond, of South Carolina, the States' Rights candidate for President in 1948, has been making a series of speeches arguing, quite bluntly, that the programs

are fine, and that the fuss over them is just a reflection of the liberals' annoyance at having the truth told about where their policies are leading, and, occasionally, that the campaign against military informational programs is, at heart, communist-inspired. Thurmond has been supported by Senator Goldwater and, in more restrained language, by Mundt and Case of South Dakota. Thurmond demanded that the Senate Armed Services Committee investigate the whole business, but Senator Russell, of Georgia, the acknowledged leader of the Southern conservatives and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has thus far ignored the request.

What is curious is that this debate over occasional right-wing activities of the military has drawn attention away from another, equally interesting, side of the Fulbright memorandum, which was concerned with the relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National War College with three closely tied organizations: the Institute for American Strategy, the principal sponsor of many of the strategy seminars Fulbright complains about; the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, which produced the basic text *American Strategy in the Nuclear Age* for the Institute for American Strategy programs; and the Richardson Foundation, a source of financial support to both. Fulbright asked that the relationship between these organizations and the Joint Chiefs and War College be "re-examined from the standpoint of whether these relationships do not amount to official support for a viewpoint at variance with that of the Administration" and whether this relationship "may give one particularly aggressive view a more direct and commanding influence upon military and civilian concepts of strategy than is desirable."

None of these organizations advocate the extreme right-wing views that frequently are presented at the strategy

seminars; indeed they officially advocate no particular view of domestic political questions, since their concern is with foreign policy. Extreme right-wing views have occasionally set the tone of the Institute for American Strategy seminars, but this apparently is not so much because such views represent the views of the Institute—indeed they conflict on such questions as foreign aid and cultural exchange programs—but because the basic foreign policy views of the Institute have so far won little support except from the far right, and the sponsors of the program are in no position to offend the followers of Senators Goldwater and Thurmond, without whom they would have virtually no politically active support at all.

There is, in any case, a feeling within the Institute that even if domestic welfare programs are not objectionable in themselves, their expansion draws resources away from the massive expansion of the defense budget which the Institute views as the real need. Thus, for the Institute, the far right is at once a source of political support, a source of speakers with a suitably hard line on communism, and a source of opposition to the tendency to expand domestic spending, when, in the view of the Institute, we are, essentially, at war, and the need is for expanding defense spending.

## The Forward Strategy

Since 1945 research institutes in foreign policy questions have been organized at about a dozen major universities, and of these the most curious is the Foreign Policy Research Institute, which, much more than other such groups, has set itself the task of developing and promoting the acceptance of a specific strategic doctrine. This is called "the Forward Strategy," and its basic premise is that Democracy and Communism are locked in a struggle to the death, to be resolved only in the destruction of one side or the other; that the communists have wholly committed themselves to win this struggle by any means, preferably short of but if necessary by nuclear war; and that the Western democracies, led by the United States, will probably lose this struggle unless we, too, wholly commit ourselves to victory, by any means, and at any price. As defined in the Institute's *A Forward Strategy for America*: "The priority objective of any American grand strategy is, by a broad margin, the preservation and enhancement

of our political system rather than the maintenance of peace. . . . Our policy must be based upon the premise that we cannot tolerate the survival of a political system which has the growing capability and the ruthless will to destroy us. We have no choice but to adopt a Catonic strategy." "Catonic strategy," of course, derives from Cato's dictum, "Carthage must be destroyed."

The Institute sees the relative readiness of East and West to commit themselves to this Catonic strategy as a test of the intrinsic worth of the men produced by the rival systems: "If the communists prove to have more courage, a stronger will, a more steadfast spirit, a clearer intellectual insight into conflict in the nuclear age, they obviously are the better men and deserve to win—and probably will."

### Strategic Considerations

The program recommended by the Institute involves an expansion all along the line of programs related to the cold war, including such things as economic aid and cultural exchanges, all of which are to be moved by a guiding philosophy which regards all as weapons of war. But the principal element is a prompt expansion of the military budget, to perhaps \$65 billion a year, to the point where we would have the power to win a clear victory over the Russians in a nuclear war even if the Russians should strike first with a surprise nuclear attack. With this clear military superiority, we would proceed to beat down the Russians, most directly, one gathers, by fomenting revolts in the iron curtain countries, perhaps within Russia itself, and moving in with our troops if the Russians should try to intervene. We would intervene regularly in countries where the communists have fomented guerrilla warfare, using, the book suggests, tactical nuclear weapons. What if the view of the Administration should prove correct and it is impossible, or at least impractical, to build our military forces to such overwhelming superiority to the Russians that we would win a clear victory even after a Russian first strike? The book is vague on this, but it is a very important question, for if we lack an overwhelming superiority in military strength, there are limits to how aggressive our cold-war policies can be, since the Russians would presumably at some point react as we have on the question of the freedom of West Berlin and simply insist that the limit

is being reached. At this point the Catonic policy breaks down, for it becomes not only a policy of destroying your enemy, but of destroying yourself as well. The Forward Strategy does not discuss this problem, and in fact is quite hazy in general when it comes down to the specifics of putting its policies into action. Indeed, in some chapters of the book the Catonic policy seems to be abandoned in favor of leaving open a hope for a gradual lessening of tensions. In part, this may derive from the book's diversity of authorship: the title page lists three principal and eight subordinate authors. In part it appears to derive from the same source that makes for vagueness and occasional inconsistency in political platforms: the book is written not merely to present a strategic doctrine as an intellectual exercise, but to win support for the doctrine, and there is consequently the temptation to put in a little something for everyone who might possibly be won over. But in large part, the haziness appears simply to reflect the fact that certain things cannot be stated very bluntly in public. For the message emerges clearly, even though it is never clearly stated: that we may not be able to gain the absolute nuclear superiority that might give us the power to effectively force a Russian surrender without resorting to nuclear war, but that during the 1960's we do have the ability to build a preponderance of nuclear power to enable us to win, in the authors' view, a satisfactory victory in a nuclear war, provided we strike the first blow. The winner of such a war, the authors have told us, would then be in a position to "subject to his writ the entire world."

### First Strike

The authors point out that we have rejected a strategy based on a surprise attack, but hastily add that this could always be changed *almost to the last minute* (their emphasis). Indeed, say the authors, "even at the moment when the United States faces defeat because, for example, Europe, Asia, and Africa have fallen to Communist domination, a sudden nuclear attack against the Soviet Union could at least avenge the disaster and deprive the opponent of the ultimate triumph. While such a reversal at the last moment almost certainly would result in severe American casualties, it might still nullify all previous Soviet conquests."

The strategy endorsed by the book emerges as one of building our armaments as high and as fast as we can

during the limited time when we still have a far stronger economic base than the Russians and while the U.S. and Russia remain the only two powers with major nuclear striking forces; to push the cold war, in all phases, as aggressively as possible; and sometime before the Russians feel strong enough or desperate enough to launch the first attack themselves, to strike a surprise knockout blow and, presumably, proceed to "subject to our writ the entire globe," thus making the world safe for democracy. This policy is not specifically stated in the book: it is merely the only realistic policy that follows from the premises of the book, and the members of the Foreign Policy Research Institute consider themselves, above all else, as realists.

This, of course, is a quite different strategy than the Administration seems to have in mind, which accepts neither the basic premise that the conflict can be resolved only by the destruction of one side or the other, nor the assumption that this Catonic strategy would really be a constructive step toward shaping the kind of world we wish to live in. Nevertheless, the Institute for American Strategy has so far been able to operate its public-information programs under an aura of government approval, and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, until very recently, at least, has been the principal adviser to the National War College on the global politics courses given to promising young officers.

The most recent major Strategy Institute conference, for example, was the 7th annual National Military-Industrial and Educational Conference, a 4-day meeting in April this year devoted to the necessity for improving teaching in schools regarding the dangers of Communism. The program announced that the conference was being held "under the auspices of the Institute for American Strategy in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare." According to a spokesman for HEW, the department's role was limited to giving permission, before the change in Administration, to use its name in what seemed a good cause. The program also contained a routine message of greeting from President Kennedy, such as the White House sends out on request to almost any reasonably prominent gathering that requests one. This conference was not one of those cited by Senator Fulbright as being dominated by extreme right-wing views, and it

would have been awkward for the White House to refuse to send a routine message of greeting. Such messages frequently go to groups, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, whose political views do not coincide with the Administration's. It is less clear why HEW should have let its name be used to give an aura of official sponsorship to the conference. A more serious problem, though, is the connection of these organizations with elements in the Defense Department, since it is not entirely inconceivable that officers indoctrinated by the Forward Strategists could arrange the triggering of a preventive war whether the civilian political leaders want it or not.

The Administration is faced with delicate and interesting problems in dealing with this whole situation, some of which will be discussed in this space next week.—H.M.

### A Lack of Enthusiasm in Detroit

No industry—least of all the much-berated American automobile industry—likes to concede either that its product may be less than wholly beneficial to public well-being or that it is a suitable object for federal regulation.

Perhaps this explains the auto makers' curious reaction to suggestions that they take an inexpensive, and apparently effective, step toward reducing the contaminants that are deposited into the air by the conventional gasoline engine.

The industry is going to take the step, says a spokesman for the Automobile Manufacturers Association, but only, says the spokesman, because it is easier to do that than to convince the public that the industry is the victim of some well-intentioned but misinformed do-gooders.

Under pressure from a variety of sources, and an outright 1964 deadline from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the manufacturers are on the way to adopting as standard equipment so-called blow-by devices. These are designed to reduce substantially the quantity of unburned gasoline that slips past the piston rings and into the air through the crankcase breather. The devices vary, but, according to the industry, they cost \$4 to \$6.50, installed, in California, where the industry, under pressure from the legislature, has "voluntarily" made them standard equipment over the past year.

Basically, the devices consist of a

tube that routes crankcase fumes back to the engine, where they are burned.

Unaffected by this device is the exhaust pipe, which emits an estimated 70 percent of automotive fumes. Its control is a far more complex, and far costlier, task.

Governmental attention, at present, is directed to the crankcase fumes, for these are now considered to be manageable. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare says it will not "blackjack" the industry into prompt efforts at control, and Secretary Ribicoff was willing to set his deadline for the 1964 models. At the same time, Senator Neuberger said that if the deadline is not met, she will introduce legislation to make blow-by control mandatory. HEW has conveniently drafted a bill for her, and it is on hand in her files as a warning to industry.

Without any apparent enthusiasm, the manufacturers concede that they are going ahead with plans to test and produce the device in time for the deadline, although the federal government is satisfied with currently available devices and requires them as standard equipment on all cars purchased for its civilian agencies.

For a group that has never hesitated in the past to tout production changes, real or imaginary, the auto industry has been strangely silent in public about the blow-by device, which, at extremely moderate cost, holds out the promise of considerable public benefit.

The industry has cited difficulties with one model that incorporated a blow-by device, but the California Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board has been told that in Los Angeles blow-by devices have been found trouble-free after 2.5 million miles of testing.

The auto industry insists, however, that "conditions are unique" in California, and that the device will be of little benefit elsewhere. In addition, at even \$4 per car, the industry points out, the device will boost the retail price of a year's production by \$25 million.

In any event, this modestly priced device, beneficial or not, has stirred the industry out of proportion to its cost or the mechanical problems involved.

In view of various proposals for federal action to require manufacturers to put more emphasis on public well-being in their designs—for example, seat belts as standard equipment—it is not surprising that anything resembling an opening wedge would be coolly received.

## Announcements

One of the objectives of the **Soviet Union's 1958-1965 Seven Year Plan for the improvement of public health** is a 350-percent increase in the production of drugs, medical supplies, and equipment for medical research. According to the Soviet report *New Technology in Medicine* (1960), now available in English, the U.S.S.R. has two institutes organized solely to coordinate these efforts, plus special bureaus to develop and modernize medical equipment. The report, translated by the U.S. Department of Commerce, discusses new developments in diagnostic procedures, modern therapeutic apparatus, "mechanized" surgery, prostheses, and new medical materials. (Office of Technical Services, USDC, Washington 25, D.C. \$1.25)

The following publications on the **nation's human resources** have been released by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare:

*Health, Education, and Welfare Trends*. Presents annual data on developments and needs for the several past decades and projections to the 1970's (\$1).

*Handbook on Programs of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare*. This includes program analyses and 5-year summaries of statistics showing the program dimensions and trends (\$1.75).

*Grants-in-Aid and Other Financial Assistance Programs*. Contains statistical and other information on all such programs administered by the department (\$1.50).

A group of Russian scientists have arrived in England to discuss **solid-state physics research** with their British counterparts. This is the first in a series of exchange visits between the two countries, being arranged under an agreement signed last May, for collaboration on peaceful uses of atomic energy.

A new **"literature-searching" service** in science and technology, initiated by the U.S. Department of Commerce, provides a subscriber with (i) a bibliography of current material in his field at designated intervals, or (ii) a bibliography of all pertinent material available at the time of request. The bibliographies are compiled from government research reports, unclassified and declassified AEC reports, technical trans-