

## References and Notes

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# Science in the News

## The Test Ban: The Russians Now Say That the Inspection System Is Only "Symbolic"

The negotiations at Geneva have reached a critical point, and the outlook is dim. It is still barely conceivable that the recent Soviet attitude is merely a bluff. But this hope, rather widespread when the first signs of a hardening of the Russian line appeared, has steadily lost ground.

We offered a number of concessions: a reduction of the number of detection sites on Russian soil, a longer extension of the unpoliced moratorium on small tests, a willingness to let the Russians inspect the devices we would use for the testing program, and several others. For a time the argument was made that the apparent lack of Soviet interest in these concessions was merely a little tactical bluffing, and that they would, in due time, come up with counterproposals of their own. But hopes of this sort have all but disappeared in the light of the continued lack of interest of Tsarapkin, the chief Soviet negotiator, and by the recent attitude of Khrushchev as reflected in his interviews with Llewellyn Thompson, our ambassador to Moscow, and with Walter Lippmann.

The Soviet attitude shows most clearly in the demand that the previously agreed to administrative control by a neutral be replaced by a tripartite administration, representing East, West, and neutral views, with unanimous

agreement required for any affirmative action. In effect, this means that the Russians would have the right to veto any particular proposed inspection.

### Nondetecting Detection

Under such circumstances the value of the inspection system as a deterrent to clandestine testing becomes almost nonexistent, and the Russian delegate, according to reports leaking out of the meetings, has frankly taken the position that the detection system, and the inspections, will not really be intended to deter cheating, but will be only "symbolic" moves reflecting the good intentions of the treaty signers. If this view is accepted, it follows that the detection system should be as unelaborate as possible, since there is obviously no point in wasting a lot of money setting up a detection system which is not intended to detect anything.

There is no chance of a treaty's being signed so long as the Russians insist on the right to veto any inspection. Whatever might be said about the wisdom of continuing the present *de facto* ban on testing, nothing can be said for formalizing this ban, which in effect would abandon the position agreed to until now by everyone, including the Russians, that disarmament agreements should be accompanied by a reasonable inspection system to deter cheating. This is what provoked the President's remark at his press conference that "it is quite obvious that the Senate would not accept such a treaty, nor would I

send it to the Senate, because the inspection system [based on the right of each nation to veto any inspection that might prove embarrassing] would not provide any guarantees at all."

The common view is that the Russians have now decided that the advantages of a test ban are not alone sufficient to overcome their distaste for inspection, and that they now feel the treaty is worth considering only as part of a larger scheme of disarmament proposals.

This leaves the Administration with the problem of what to do about the *de facto* ban. The public attitude of the Administration, again as expressed at Kennedy's press conference, is that "if there is any chance at all of getting an agreement on a cessation of nuclear tests, regardless of what appear to be the obstacles, I think we should press on . . . I still believe that Mr. Dean [the chief American negotiator] should continue to work at Geneva."

### Administration's Dilemma

It may be that the Administration would consider giving in to the Soviet view, and allow the Geneva talks to drag on another 6 months, and then be merged with the general disarmament talks which are expected to be underway then. But there are strong pressures against this course. Last week, after unfolding the Anglo-American position gradually since the talks resumed on 21 March, the Western negotiators placed before the Russians the full text of a draft treaty we were prepared to sign. We have now laid all our cards on the table, and there is nothing more of an affirmative nature that we can do. The Russians have showed no interest at all in the Western concessions. ("Much ado about nothing," Tsarapkin has told the press.) Their principal response, the demand for a veto, rather than being a counteroffer, is a retreat from a position they had earlier accepted.

The original "gentlemen's agree-

ment" in 1958 to stop all tests has now dragged far beyond its original 1-year duration, and the position of both the old and new Administrations has all along been that the unpoliced moratorium will be permitted to run only as long as there seems to be a realistic chance of reaching a formal treaty. The Administration must now decide, in the face of what has happened in Geneva, whether to tacitly admit that its warnings about resuming testing if the Russians did not show they were serious about the negotiations was nothing more than empty talk.

This raises the problem of how, if a decision to resume underground testing is made, it is to be presented to the rest of the world, or alternatively, if the *de facto* moratorium on testing is to be continued, how this is to be explained to the critics, inside and outside Congress. These critics have been persuaded to accept relatively quietly the continued extension of the unpoliced ban this long only on the assurance that testing would be resumed once it had become clear that the Russians were not interested in serious negotiations.

#### Unpleasant Decision

Whatever the decision, and it is likely to be made quite soon, it will be a difficult one for the Administration, and will subject the Administration to a great deal of criticism.

We have never, in so many words, explicitly said we would resume weapon testing if the negotiations were to fail. There have been rather explicit statements about undertaking nonmilitary experiments, either for improving detection systems or for exploring the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, such as the proposal to use such an explosion to create an artificial harbor in Alaska.

But it is unclear whether a resumption of testing for nonmilitary purposes would do much to soften the certain displeasure of the neutralist nations. It will not be difficult, and probably not even inaccurate, for the Russians to tell the rest of the world that any resumption of testing would, in fact, be a resumption of some phase of weapon testing, regardless of whatever incidental purposes it might serve.

The result of whatever decision is made is bound to be unhappy. But the alternative of simply letting things drag on aimlessly at Geneva, although perhaps easier, seems at least as dismal.—H.M.

## News Notes

### The Krebiozen Trial

The Krebiozen trial in Chicago has been called off until the fall. The case has substantial implications for the scientific community at large, since it involves the question of how severely a scientist can criticize the work of a fellow scientist without opening himself to a libel suit.

Krebiozen is a drug purported to be effective against cancer, which, so far, has won little scientific support outside the small circle of its sponsors. One of the sponsors, Andrew C. Ivy, head of the department of clinical sciences at the University of Illinois, filed a suit for \$300,000 against George C. Stoddard, chancellor of New York University. Ivy charged that Stoddard had attempted to destroy his reputation as a scientist. The two men were at one time vice president and president, respectively, of the University of Illinois.

The judge in the case ruled that the trial should be put off until the government's National Cancer Institute could evaluate the claims made for the drug, although attorneys for both sides had agreed that the effectiveness of the drug was not the issue in the trial—that the issue was, rather, whether Stoddard had gone beyond the bounds of legitimate criticism in his implication that Ivy was not merely wrong but wrong to the point of professional incompetence.

The controversy is more than a decade old, and both men have suffered through their involvement. Professional sentiment in the field is overwhelmingly against Krebiozen, and in response the Krebiozen supporters have been rather free in suggesting that there is a conspiracy afoot to keep Krebiozen from being recognized and to destroy the reputations of its sponsors.

The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Abraham Ribicoff, responded to the judge's request for an official evaluation by reiterating the Cancer Institute's readiness to evaluate the drug whenever the Krebiozen supporters were prepared to cooperate in the standard procedures.

According to a statement last year of the Citizens Emergency Committee for Krebiozen, "In view of the history of so-called 'evaluations' in the past, Dr. Ivy does not wish to provide the opportunity for any new 'committee' to use such an evaluation as a device to prevent an actual clinical test because of

the risk of the negative influence of such a committee. Such a negative 'committee evaluation,' instead of actual clinical tests, could set Krebiozen back another 10 years."

The National Cancer Institute uses such a committee evaluation as standard procedure to decide whether it is worth going ahead with full clinical tests, which would cost several hundred thousand dollars.

### Shake-up in Soviet Science

The controlling influence over scientific development in the Soviet Union appears to have been taken out of the hands of the Academy of Sciences. A new agency, headed by a nonscientist and former production executive, has been given over-all responsibility for the control of all scientific research, and of Soviet contact with foreign scientists.

The new agency is called the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research Work. It is headed by Lt. Gen. Mikhail V. Khrumichev, former head of Soviet airplane production and, more recently, deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee. His new job carries the rank of deputy prime minister. The agency is apparently designed to direct Soviet scientific work toward fields holding the strongest promise of practical applications. One of its principal announced objectives is to shorten the time between the making of a scientific advance and its adaptation to practical uses.

The change marks a clear decline in the influence of the Soviet Academy, which had been criticized for allowing needless duplication and for "irrational" allocation of human and material resources available for research.

The reorganization, according to one view, is simply a logical manifestation of the tendency to decentralize that was apparent in the Khrushchev shake-up of industry in 1957 and of agriculture in 1959. The country's 200 specialized research institutes have been taken out from under the central direction of the Academy, which, in this view, will now be free to concentrate its efforts on pure research, leaving the problem of administering and coordinating industrial research to professional industrial administrators.

Other observers have stressed the emphasis, in the announcement, on avoiding duplication and channeling work into the most economically prom-