Book Reviews

American Foreign Policy Since World War II. John W. Spanier. Praeger, New York, 1960. 234 pp. Paper, $1.75; cloth, $4.50.

Spanier's volume on American foreign policy since World War II argues a case similar but by no means the same as that argued by Hans Morgenthau in *The Purpose of American Politics* [reviewed in *Science* **132**, 694 (10 March 1960)]. According to Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II* is (or should be) more preoccupied with power and national interest than with power as a means for achieving freedom in equality. Morgenthau laments our loss of direction, our forgotten historic purpose, and our failure of will to see that purpose through. Spanier wants us to transcend, if not to reject, our basic values in order the more effectively to sustain our national security and to protect our national interest. "Can the United States," he asks, "transcend its own values and experience, and do it quickly enough? This is the single most important question which confronts this country during the 1960's. Upon its answer will depend not just American and free-world security, but the non-Communist world's survival."

What, then, are the "values and experience" which America must "transcend" if it is to survive as a major power? Basically they are the "values and experience" of 19th-century liberalism. Liberalism, according to Spanier, in what will seem to many a caricature, identified the power of the state with the loss or limitation of individual freedom and therefore sought "to restrict this power." Power indeed was evil, and the Liberal was fond of quoting Lord Acton's aphorism that "power corrupts." By its attitude toward power, by "focusing upon the rights of the individual and minimizing the claims and authority of the state, liberal philosophy ignored the state's function to provide security."

As a corollary of its aversion to "power politics," Liberalism eschewed the use of force and violence. And this in turn was a logical corollary of the liberal faith in the essential goodness and rationality of man. Man in a state of nature lived at peace, hence any breach of the peace was unnatural, irrational, and inhuman. Classical liberal philosophy, says Spanier, regarded conflict as "a deviation from this norm (of peace), caused primarily by wicked statesmen whose morality and reason have been corrupted by the exercise of uncontrolled authority." From all this it follows that democratic (that is, liberal) states are peace-loving and undemocratic states are war-like. Hence the road to perpetual peace was to make the world democratic or at least "safe for democracy."

To transcend these allegedly liberal values the American people must be made to realize that "conflict is the natural offspring of clashing interests and groups, and that power plays a vital role in protecting, promoting, and compromising interests." We can no longer afford to regard power as evil, and we must learn to suppress the guilt feelings that arise in every liberal breast whenever, through circumstances beyond our control, we are compelled to take up arms. Not only must we abandon the rigid liberal dichotomy between peace and war but we must also abjure "the continued separation of force and diplomacy."

The argument is a familiar one that goes back to Hobbes and Machiavelli in Europe and at least to the liberal Jefferson, if not to Washington, in this country. Writing to Robert Livingston in 1803, Jefferson said "There is on the globe one single spot the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eights of our territory must pass to market. . . . France placing herself in that door assumes to us the attitude of defiance. . . . The day that France takes possession of New Orleans . . . we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." Surely this is not the language of a man allergic to power and its uses in defense of the national interest. Nor indeed was Jefferson's comment during the War of 1812 when he observed: "it is for the general interest that (England) . . . should be a sensible and independent weight in the scale of nations." His long friendship for France did not blind him to the dangers of a Napoleonic hegemony in Europe. "Surely none of us," he said, "would wish to see Bonaparte conquer Russia and lay thus at his feet the whole continent of Europe. This done, England would be but a breakfast. . . ." Such a contingency, he continued, "I would as leave not have to encounter when I see how much trouble a handful of British soldiers in Canada has given us."

Isolation Vis-à-Vis Participation

The fact is that power politics have not been alien to the American liberal temper in either theory or practice. The Monroe Doctrine with Olney's gloss and Theodore Roosevelt's famous corollary, Manifest Destiny and the Mexican War, the Oregon question and "54-40 or Fight," Admiral Mahan's treatise on sea power, numerous cases of military intervention in Mexico and in other Caribbean states to protect our interests, and even our involvement in World Wars I and II were not sentimental journeys made by a middle-class liberal state blind to the uses of power and the interrelations of diplomacy and force. Even our policy of "splendid isolation" from Washington to Woodrow Wilson and FDR was not wholly a policy of withdrawal prompted by an aversion to power politics. During most of our history, while we have proclaimed a policy of isolation, we have practiced active participation, sometimes on a grand scale.

What troubles me as I read scholars of the so-called power politics school is to discover in operational terms what their counsel to "transcend . . . (our basic) values and experience" can mean. Aside from Spanier's apparent belief that we ought to be spending more on arms, he offers few specific suggestions upon which responsible decision makers could act. Even on the question of arms research and development he offers no evidence that the real source of our backwardness, if indeed we are backward in this area, is due to lack of funds. Administrative confusion, inter-

service rivalry, and Presidential ineptitude are not remedied simply by larger appropriations.

Although he is sharply critical of American foreign policy since World War II and calls for a radical transvaluation of our whole value system, Spanier's account of American performance on the new world stage is anything but a record of failure. To be sure, he repeats the usual *post hoc* arguments about our political innocence in pulling back from Eastern Europe, in leaving Germany divided and Berlin an island in a communist sea, and in demobilizing our vast army before a political settlement had been reached, as well as about the other "blunders" that a "realistic" diplomacy of force might have avoided. But all this is what FDR used to describe as an "iffy" argument. Could we in fact have done anything to "free" Eastern Europe, including Germany and Berlin, without continuing the war—this time against our quondam ally, the Soviet Union? Did the demobilization of our Army in fact create a power vacuum in Central Europe, and if it did, what difference did it make? The Russians, by and large, did not in fact advance significantly beyond the lines they held at war's end. Was not Russia so weakened by the destruction of her economy and the loss of manpower that, while she could hold what she had, she was in no position to do more?

Foreign Policy Record

I would not argue that American foreign policy since World War II has been an unblemished record of success. Nor would I defend the diplomacy of "Brinkmanship," "Massive Retaliation," or "Liberation" rather than "Containment." But the Japanese treaty, the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, and even the Korean War, to mention but a few items in the record, represent achievements of no mean proportions in defense of our national interest. To be sure, these and other policies have not been unmixed with liberal notions about "peace," "generosity," and "friendship," but neither are they the policies of a nation suffering from an excessive fear of power.

In addition to our failure to understand and to play the game of power politics, Spanier chides us for failure to understand "the anti-colonial revolutions of the underdeveloped nations." The real issue here, he says, is "whether the United States can supply the new nations with the capital funds and with a social message that can compete with the appeal of Communism." It would seem that our liberal tradition and our own revolutionary heritage should stand us in good stead as we confront the "revolution of rising expectations and national independence" that is sweeping through Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. But this, too, will call for a tough appraisal of the extent to which the democratic values and democratic institutions of a "People of Plenty" are exportable to "People of Poverty and Illiteracy," with little or no experience in either politics or administration. The wrong answer to this question may well be the Achilles heel of American foreign policy in the 1960's.

Spanier's analysis and his argument as to what must be done pose a challenge to every literate American. Must we abandon the liberal and humane values which have been our heritage to achieve security against communist infiltration, subversion, and conquest? Must we, in a word, lose our souls to save our skins? I think not.

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Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century. A report of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1960. xi + 780 pp. $15.

This book fills a major need in the field of United States and Canadian economic history. The result of a joint effort by the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Economic History Association, the volume contains the most comprehensive and careful measurements yet made of the quantitative aspects of economic growth in Canada and the United States since 1790. Eighteen monographs, with critical commentaries, present new or improved statistical series covering the main trends in output growth, prices, income by sectors, factor payments, investment, and the balance of payments. These series tie in with contemporary series in national income, prices, wages, and so forth; hence, the volume makes possible reasonably accurate historical comparisons, in some cases for the first time.

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A Manual of Common Beetles of Eastern North America. Elizabeth S. Dillon and Lawrence S. Dillon. Row, Peterson, Evanston, Ill., 1961. 844 pp. Illus. $9.25.

This manual is the first of its kind on the largest group of animals, the Coleoptera. To be sure, there are manuals for general beetle collectors, but they are either too incomplete for reasonable accuracy or too bulky and technical for easy use. The Dillons' book strikes a happy medium. Keys identify some 1200 common beetles found in eastern North America. There are illustrations galore (544 of body parts) and 85 plates (four in color) of 1177 habitus drawings of species. If the user keeps in mind the fact that not all known species are included, he should find this book very useful, for never before has it been made so easy to identify beetles in the area concerned.

The introduction is a short discourse on the anatomy of beetles, collecting and preserving, and larvae. A chapter on ecology gives short accounts of the many environmental situations in which beetles are found; this chapter should suggest places for beginners to collect specimens. A key allows determination of 64 families and contains illustrations of body parts that might cause trouble for the user. The major part of the book, 85 percent, is concerned with each family and its species. Each family is briefly discussed; then keys to species are given. For convenience the many illustrations of difficult characteristics are placed very near the couplet concerned. Each species is described, and the habitus of each is illustrated on a plate. Finally, there is a glossary, a list of important technical articles, a list of faunal lists, and an index.

There is not much to criticize, but one serious fault is the use of many incorrect generic and specific names. These errors are unfortunate, and could easily have been avoided by consulting current catalogs or revisions. Some of the illustrations of body parts could be confusing: a line just inside the border indicates either a sulcus (Fig. 211) or convexity (Fig. 108). I have not made a search for errors, but one mistake in the key to families could cause some trouble: on page 39, couplet 18, Trogidae actually has closed mesocoxal cavities, whereas Scarabaeidae has open cavities (the figures referred to are correctly labeled).

It is my hope that this book will be shown to every undergraduate biology