

is suggested as a possible hypothesis, but while this does not conflict with the evidence, there is no positive evidence for it. Negatively, the line of Chinese publicity indicated that the Chinese Communist leaders were not much concerned over some of the points on which the U.N. side was willing to give them guarantees concerning Chinese interests, such as the question of power supplies for Manchuria from installations on the Yalu River. They were obviously much more moved by political considerations, even though it is not clear precisely which political considerations were decisive.

It is suggested that an important factor was a failure in communication. The Chinese Communist leaders appear to have considered that they had given clear warning that they would intervene if United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel and to have failed to realize that their warnings had been given in a way, and in a context, which led many people not to take them seriously. Similarly, the United States authorities failed to realize the confusion caused in Peking by the statements of General MacArthur and other people in the American government organization. "Utterances by 'authoritative spokesmen' in Tokyo were given equal weight (if not greater) with statements from Secretary Acheson and President Truman" (page 169).

There are some points on which the reader might wish for fuller discussion. For instance, the Wu Hsiu-ch'uan delegation to the U.N. is mentioned, and there is some discussion of possible reasons for the delay of almost a month in accepting the U.N. invitation. But the circumstances leading to the invitation are not made clear, and there is no discussion of the behavior of the delegation. The reader is told that on 24 November "Wu Hsiu-ch'uan arrives in New York, confers with Lie" (page 147). But he is not told of Wu's refusal to take part in serious discussions, either with Lie or with British representatives who tried to contact him, although the issue has important relevance for the problem of communication. How does one communicate with people who refuse to join in discussion? More generally, the book might have been more valuable if it had covered a rather wider period including the truce negotiations where the same sources of evidence could probably have revealed a good deal more about Sino-Soviet relations; the initiative both in starting truce negotiations and in

changing the Communist position, which made possible a settlement of the prisoners-of-war dispute, seem to have come from the Soviet Union. However, while on some points the book might have told more, what it does tell is both interesting and important.

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**Le Sahara des Africains.** Attilio Gaudio. Julliard, Paris, 1960. 297 pp. Illus. \$3.15 (approximately).

Attilio Gaudio seems to be a Man with a Message, the old and now tragically threadbare message of Utopia applied this time to the Sahara and North Africa in general. His latest book is essentially a human geography of the desert area which extends from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and from the mountainous and coastal desert fringes of the Mediterranean to approximately the latitude of Lake Chad.

Although sections dealing with the prehistoric and early historical periods make very entertaining reading, they are sadly incomplete and out of date, and they are weakened still further by dream-like revelations concerning tribal origins. The ethnographical descriptions of modern tribes are so fragmentary and uneven in quality as to be almost incoherent in some cases. There are so many errors as well as casually sweeping assumptions sprinkled through the book that it would be hopeless even to attempt to discuss them here. "Where there is sand there is water," says the author—if only he were right! And then he tells us that the water of the Nile often transmits "a terrible disease, bilharziasis . . . which no medicine can cure"—thank goodness he is wrong! And so on and so on. But there is some grain among the chaff.

Many pages are crammed with reasonably accurate figures concerning the natural resources and recent industrial development of the Sahara; these are really valuable, however boring they may be. And there are a few, a very few, strikingly bright spots here and there. Speaking of the reaction of a native guide to the Spanish and French methods of administering Moorish territory, Gaudio writes: "It all seemed unjust and absurd to this nomad, for whom, as for all his kind, the only real wealth is liberty [-anarchy], and the

only mother-country is the desert without frontiers." The destructive impact of industrial expansion on native socio-political and economic structures is described clearly and forcefully. A few casually incidental remarks mention recent fighting between joint Franco-Spanish and Moroccan forces (along the eastern frontiers of Morocco and the Spanish Sahara) which, so far as I know, has never before been referred to publicly, in either French or English. And yet even the practical value of Gaudio's book as a work of ready reference is seriously impaired because it has no index, no glossary, and no bibliography, and there are no precise bibliographical references in either the text or footnotes. There is a double-page map which looks excellent at first glance, but several of the places whose importance is stressed are not marked on it.

Gaudio's main argument is based on the astonishing proposition that the native peoples of the Sahara constitute a single spiritual whole, and so can easily become united (together with the peoples of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in a single stable confederation or nation, in which all will enjoy equal rights and privileges. From this he concludes that such a union is not only thoroughly desirable but eventually inevitable, in any case. Once established, this union's central government or federal council could invite foreign enterprise to develop the natural resources of the desert; the proceeds would be shared on a fifty-fifty basis, and everyone in the Sahara would then live happily forever after. I see no point in discussing this miraculous solution of all the current and awesomely complex problems of the Sahara and North Africa, beyond remarking that it seems to me utterly impossible, if only because of the essential disunity of the Saharan peoples. This disunity has been explained at length and in detail in several recent publications.

In short, *Le Sahara des Africains* is an incongruous mixture of solid fact and pseudoscientific theory, handled in a journalistic manner which sometimes verges on the sensational and sometimes sounds almost like straight political propaganda. Although the picture it presents of the Sahara purports to be well rounded, it is in fact deceptively incomplete and unbalanced, except in the field of economics, and even there the coverage is spotty. *Caveat lector.*

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