individual chemical elements as well as in several other articles. Yet, not knowing this, and using the encyclopedia for the first time, it took considerable persistence on the part of an experienced technical editor to locate the information wanted.

Another example: the entry "earth resource patterns" is listed with 14 subheads, but before one comes to it there is the main heading "Earth" with 30 subheads and some cross references, then a series of items such as "earth (age of)" to "earth (origin of)," each with a number of subheads, and then another series starting with "earth-current measurements" in which, in proper alphabetical place, one comes upon "earth resource patterns." The secret here is that the index first lists items in which "earth" is used as a noun, for example, "earth (core of)," and then begins a new alphabetical sequence in which "earth" is an adjective, for example, "earth interior." Just why "earth (core of)" and "earth interior" were selected as index entries instead of "earth core" and "earth (interior of)" or why the same form was not used for both entries, I do not know. In any event, the unwary reader may well overlook an item in the index because of this arrangement of noun and adjectival usage. Whoever plans to use the encyclopedia to a considerable extent will undoubtedly learn how it was constructed; a first-time user, even an experienced librarian, may fail to find the desired entry even though it is there.

The principal use for an encyclopedia is to find information you don't already have. The *New Yorker* recently (24 December 1960) reported an interview with Harry S. Ashmore, the new editor of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, in which Mr. Ashmore quotes Robert Hutchins, chairman of the board of editors, as saying, "You assume that no brain surgeon will read its article on brain surgery to enable him to operate, but the article must be so well done that if he does read it some night, it won't offend him." By this criterion, most of the articles we examined were satisfactory. When we examined articles on topics strange to us, there were fewer criticisms. One consultant summarized: "In no such instance did I complete an article with the feeling of dissatisfaction. I felt that upon reading the article I had a much clearer notion of the specific topic," and then added, "It would be fine to have this encyclopedia in our library and it could be recommended for home use as well. At least in my family, where there is a considerable interest in science, I found all members reading the volumes with interest and wishing that we might have them readily available."

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China Crosses the Yalu. The decision to enter the Korean war. Allen S. Whiting. Macmillan, New York, 1960. x + 219 pp. $7.50.

This book is of interest not only because of the importance of its subject but also because it shows the possibilities and limitations of any study of Chinese Communist foreign policy. At one point the author lists four main sources of evidence: official statements made for foreign consumption; a content analysis of the material intended for internal consumption, which appeared in the officially controlled Chinese press; U.S. intelligence reports and material obtained by interrogation of Chinese prisoners; and Peking's diplomatic activity, particularly toward India and the United Nations. Whiting argues: "None of these sources provides a comprehensive picture of decision making in Peking, nor is the evidence always subject to one exclusive interpretation. At some points the four types of data each support incompatible hypotheses. At important junctures, however, they suggest a pattern of policy clearly and consistently enough to constrict the range of reasonable explanation for Chinese Communist actions" (pages 52–53).

The weight of evidence is against any serious Chinese involvement in the start of the Korean war. Relations between Peking and Pyongyang do not seem to have been close. It was not until August 1950 that an ambassador from Peking presented his credentials at Pyongyang, and there is evidence of earlier disputes between the North Koreans and the Chinese Communist authorities in Manchuria, which were resolved only by Soviet mediation. The emphasis of Chinese Communist publicity was on the conquest of Taiwan and Tibet, and Chinese troop dispositions appeared to be primarily designed for these objectives. The only bits of contrary evidence are the return to North Korea of Korean troops from the Chinese Communist forces and, beginning in April 1950, a movement of the Fourth Field Army from South China to Manchuria. However, the return of Korean troops to Korea can be explained as part of a general settlement mediated by the Soviet Union, and the movement of this particular army to Manchuria can be explained as part of a plan to return army units to their original base areas.

When the Korean war started comment in the Peking press was delayed for 2 days, and the comments which did appear in the early period of the war suggested that the Chinese Communist leaders did not wish to present the Korean conflict to their public as an issue of primary importance to China. On the other hand, the reaction to President Truman's order to the Seventh Fleet to neutralize Taiwan was immediate and violent.

This action by the United States seems to have ended plans for an attack on Taiwan in the near future, and there was a redeployment of Chinese forces from South and Central China, some to Manchuria and some to Shantung. But the Chinese Communists did not use the most favorable opportunity for intervention when the United Nations forces had been driven back to a small area around Pusan and a little extra support on the North Korean side might have put the Communists in complete control of Korea. The material from the interrogation of prisoners shows that even the forces in Manchuria received little preparation for intervention until shortly before they crossed the Korean border in October.

There is an interesting discussion of the complicated negotiations at the United Nations and of the evidence that the Soviet representative may have been looking for some way to reach a compromise before the U.N. counterattack started. One point of special interest is the change in the Chinese attitude toward India. To begin with, Chinese comments had been strongly critical of Nehru's neutralism and had denounced him as a tool of the imperialists, but Indian support for Pekings' admission to the U.N. and Indian proposals for a compromise in Korea gradually brought about a change in attitude.

No conclusive deductions can be made about the precise reasons which finally made the Chinese Communists decide to intervene in the Korean war. Soviet pressure for intervention to prevent a complete North Korean defeat

is suggested as a possible hypothesis, but while this does not conflict with the evidence, there is no positive evidence for it. Negatively, the line of Chinese publicity indicated that the Chinese Communist leaders were not much concerned over some of the points on which the U.N. side was willing to give them guarantees concerning Chinese interests, such as the question of power supplies for Manchuria from installations on the Yalu River. They were obviously much more moved by political considerations, even though it is not clear precisely which political considerations were decisive.

It is suggested that an important factor was a failure in communication. The Chinese Communist leaders appear to have considered that they had given clear warning that they would intervene if United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel and to have failed to realize that their warnings had been given in a way, and in a context, which led many people not to take them seriously. Similarly, the United States authorities failed to realize the confusion caused in Peking by the statements of General MacArthur and other people in the American government organization. "Utterances by 'authoritative spokesmen' in Tokyo were given equal weight (if not greater) with statements from Secretary Acheson and President Truman" (page 169).

There are some points on which the reader might wish for fuller discussion. For instance, the Wu Hsiu-ch'uan delegation to the U.N. is mentioned, and there is some discussion of possible reasons for the delay of almost a month in accepting the U.N. invitation. But the circumstances leading to the invitation are not made clear, and there is no discussion of the behavior of the delegation. The reader is told that on 24 November "Wu Hsiu-ch'uan arrives in New York, confers with Lie" (page 147). But he is not told of Wu's refusal to take part in serious discussions, either with Lie or with British representatives who tried to contact him, although the issue has important relevance for the problem of communication. How does one communicate with people who refuse to join in discussion? More generally, the book might have been more valuable if it had covered a rather wider period including the truce negotiations where the same sources of evidence could probably have revealed a good deal more about Sino-Soviet relations; the initiative both in starting truce negotiations and in changing the Communist position, which made possible a settlement of the prisoners-of-war dispute, seem to have come from the Soviet Union. However, while on some points the book might have told more, what it does tell is both interesting and important.

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Le Sahara des Africains. Attilio Gaudio. Julliard, Paris, 1960. 297 pp. Illus. $3.15 (approximately).

Attilio Gaudio seems to be a Man with a Message, the old and now tragically threadbare message of Utopia applied this time to the Sahara and North Africa in general. His latest book is essentially a human geography of the desert area which extends from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and from the mountainous and coastal desert fringes of the Mediterranean to approximately the latitude of Lake Chad.

Although sections dealing with the prehistoric and early historical periods make very entertaining reading, they are sadly incomplete and out of date, and they are weakened still further by dream-like revelations concerning tribal origins. The ethnographical descriptions of modern tribes are so fragmentary and uneven in quality as to be almost incoherent in some cases. There are so many errors as well as casually sweeping assumptions sprinkled through the book that it would be hopeless even to attempt to discuss them here. "Where there is sand there is water," says the author—if only he were right! And then he tells us that the water of the Nile often transmits "a terrible disease, bilharziasis . . . which no medicine can cure"—thank goodness he is wrong! And so on and so on. But there is some grain among the chaff.

Many pages are crammed with reasonably accurate figures concerning the natural resources and recent industrial development of the Sahara; these are really valuable, however boring they may be. And there are a few, a very few, strikingly bright spots here and there. Speaking of the reaction of a native guide to the Spanish and French methods of administering Moorish territory, Gaudio writes: "It all seemed unjust and absurd to this nomad, for whom, as for all his kind, the only real wealth is liberty [-anarchy], and the only mother-country is the desert without frontiers." The destructive impact of industrial expansion on native sociopolitical and economic structures is described clearly and forcefully. A few casually incidental remarks mention recent fighting between joint Franco-Spanish and Moroccan forces (along the eastern frontiers of Morocco and the Spanish Sahara) which, so far as I know, has never before been referred to publicly, in either French or English. And yet even the practical value of Gaudio's book as a work of ready reference is seriously impaired because it has no index, no glossary, and no bibliography, and there are no precise bibliographical references in either the text or footnotes. There is a double-page map which looks excellent at first glance, but several of the places whose importance is stressed are not marked on it.

Gaudio's main argument is based on the astonishing proposition that the native peoples of the Sahara constitute a single spiritual whole, and so can easily become united (together with the peoples of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in a single stable confederation or nation, in which all will enjoy equal rights and privileges. From this he concludes that such a union is not only thoroughly desirable but eventually inevitable, in any case. Once established, this union's central government or federal council could invite foreign enterprise to develop the natural resources of the desert; the proceeds would be shared on a fifty-fifty basis, and everyone in the Sahara would then live happily forever after. I see no point in discussing this miraculous solution of all the current and awesomely complex problems of the Sahara and North Africa, beyond remarking that it seems to me utterly impossible, if only because of the essential disunity of the Saharan peoples. This disunity has been explained at length and in detail in several recent publications.

In short, *Le Sahara des Africains* is an incongruous mixture of solid fact and pseudoscientific theory, handled in a journalistic manner which sometimes verges on the sensational and sometimes sounds almost like straight political propaganda. Although the picture it presents of the Sahara purports to be well rounded, it is in fact deceptively incomplete and unbalanced, except in the field of economics, and even there the coverage is spotty. *Caveat lector.*

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