Book Reviews

Germany Rejoins the Powers. Mass opinion, interest groups, and elites in contemporary German foreign policy. Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1959. xvi + 320 pp. $6.50.

There has been much talk about the German *Wirtschaftswunder,* the remarkable economic recovery of Germany after World War II—and an extraordinary story it has been. Yet in some ways the economic recovery has not been the most impressive of the many German postwar "miracles." After all, we knew long ago that the Germans are hard-working, technically advanced people, and shrewd dealers in international trade. Nor has German recovery, for all the publicity, been so much more rapid than that of other European countries. What is certainly more remarkable than Germany's economic resurgence is its postwar politics; one has better reason to speak of a German *Regierungswunder,* a governmental miracle, than of a German economic miracle.

The prewar German democratic system, the Weimar Republic, was characterized by great instability of governments and by weak coalitions; its governments were almost always inadequate, sometimes impotent, and, in the last stages of the regime, completely paralyzed in the face of mortal economic and political crisis. In 14 years, 20 governments came and went; 11 governed for 8 of the 14 years, supported only by a minority in the Reichstag; those supported by a majority were little better than the minority governments, for all were weak coalitions, always on the verge of fission; minor, inexperienced politicians were constantly pushed to the highest positions in the unending game of coalition-making: men like Luther, Cuno, Brüning, von Papen, von Schleicher. Underlying this state of affairs, and responsible for it, was a hyperpluralistic party system, a low capacity for political integration, either in or out of Parliament, and an utter absence of *Koalitionsfähigkeit*—"coalitionability," to translate very literally. And responsible for this, in turn, was the close identification of parties with vested interests (every major part of the lobby appeared to have a party of its own), the dogmatic and intransigent ideologies of the parties, and the close control of parliamentary politicians by party bureaucrats, hampering their freedom of movement on the parliamentary scene.

Only against this background can we appreciate the magnitude of the governmental miracle since World War II. Old students of German politics must indeed find this a topsy-turvey world. In place of unstable governments, there now is a government which seems almost impervious to change; in place of coalitions, a single party is dominant; in place of party pluralism, there is a virtual two-party system, with Christian Democrats at one pole and the Social Democrats at the other. Instead of the identification of parties with particular vested interests (for example, trade unions, farmers, churches, regions), we find parties making very broad appeals, as do British and American parties. Ideology is on the wane—witness the dropping by the Social Democrat Party of its theoretical Marxism. The party bureaucrats seem to be the puppets of the parliamentarians, not vice versa.

What has happened? And will it last?

Karl Deutsch and Lewis Edinger, in *Germany Rejoins the Powers,* shed considerable light on these questions, although this was not their principal purpose. Their intention, essentially, was to analyze how German foreign policy is made and, incidentially, to assess the reliability of Germany as an American ally, and the various policies we might follow toward her. But they have discharged these limited tasks in such a way that their analysis is relevant to much more than an understanding of the formulation of German foreign policy. It is suggestive in regard to all phases of German political life and is, for this reason alone, a vindication of the modern method of political analysis they have chosen to employ.

This method differs from (or, better, goes beyond) the traditional methods of political analysis in that emphasis is placed not only upon political machinery but upon the whole setting in which the machinery operates: the more general "behavior" patterns (the quotation marks are used advisedly) of which governmental institutions are, at most, a part. For Deutsch and Edinger, five elements play a role in the formulation of foreign policy: the machinery of government itself, the "people" (public opinion, real or imagined), the policy-formulating "elite," the parties, and the interest groups. And in addition to the interplay between these elements, policy is treated as a product not merely of specific deliberative processes but also of general political attitudes, personality types, and the "national character."

This complicated approach to the analysis of foreign policy the authors call (somewhat mysteriously, and I think with little regard for usage) a "functional" approach; the simpler, more formalistic approach which they seek to transcend they call (still more mysteriously) the "descriptive" approach to politics. We may take it that "functional" analysis in this case means nothing more abstruse than a due regard for all the major factors, especially the background material, bearing on a case. But it is precisely this attention to the background (as revealed in public-opinion polls, elite inventories, quantitative studies of social structures, and historical analysis) which makes this work so useful for so many purposes. To be sure, the materials are somewhat outdated (no use seems to be made of polls conducted after 1956), but very little of the German political background seems to have changed significantly in the meantime.

What light, then, does the book shed upon the governmental miracle of the postwar years?

For one thing, it would seem that the present good behavior of the Germans is not unprecedented, but simply one aspect of two persistent themes in German history: on one side, cozy hominess, diligent craftsmanship, stolid competence, finely attuned esthetic and scientific sensibilities; on the other, admiration for force and cunning, hostility toward the outside world, mixed feelings of inferiority and superiority,

glorification of war, romantic daring. This ambivalence of character is reflected in appraisals of the Germans since the 16th century. Foreign observers were at one time impressed by the Germans' lack of discipline and their deficiency in soldierly courage; at another, by their obedience and their robust militarism. We get a very vivid picture of these Jekyll-and-Hyde-like paradoxes (which the authors rightly attribute to the conflicting influences of German history) from the first chapter —at once the most sprightly and the most disorganized, suggestive, and inconclusive of the study.

Germany's past, in Hans Speier's words, has been "truly unresolved." Have we any reason to think that the Adenauer era has resolved it? Unfortunately, the evidence is not all reassuring.

One piece of disquieting evidence is historical; the Germans have, in the past, changed from one aspect to the other of their "character" with fantastic rapidity, precisely because in any existing German behavior pattern its opposite seems always to be latent; the dialectic was a German invention, and Germany is a kind of antithetical country. The Weimar Republic itself is the best example. In 1928, even in 1930, all seemed plain sailing; only 12 Nazis were in the Reichstag, and the moderate Weimar coalition seemed firmly in control. By 1932 the worst had happened: 230 Nazis in the Reichstag, von Papen, representing only a tiny minority, in power, and Hitler waiting confidently in the wings. A year after that, rampant dictatorship. Why should not the same thing happen again?

Every piece of evidence Deutsch and Edinger produce which bears upon this question is itself highly ambiguous—as one might expect. Are the Germans, for example, sufficiently converted to democracy? Public opinion polls show only a steady 25 percent or so fully committed to popular government ("all-weather democrats," the authors call them), despite the fact that 50 percent associate dictatorship with acts of violence. The encouraging thing about these figures is that the young seem more strongly committed to democracy than the old, and that the proportion of reliable democrats seems to be climbing slowly (very slowly). The discouraging thing is that the proportion fully converted to democracy is so low, even after the catastrophic failures and misdeeds of Nazism, and that the proportion of Nazi die-hards seems to be nearly as great. About one-fourth of all Germans hold favorable opinions of Hitler, Hess, and von Schirach, oppose the democratic flag, and even think that no one who resisted in the war should be allowed to hold a high government position now. About a third are "unequivocally anti-Semitic," and a larger proportion still are anti-Semitic in one way or another. A very large number of Germans reproduce in their personal politics the ambivalence of their country, and the ambivalents and the unconverted Nazis constitute a large majority.

One gets an impression, here, of a peculiar disjunction between Germany on the level of government and politics and Germany on the level of public opinion—a disjunction which might well explain the present "governmental miracle" and make doubtful its ability to last. The government, through its restitution policies, has been quite generous to victims of persecutions and has done a good deal to suppress anti-Semitism. The vote for the extremist parties has been reassuringly low. But the Adenauer government seems often to govern merely without the active opposition of the public—not even with its tacit support. Only 11 percent of the public, for example, approved the $700 million indemnity paid to Israel, and similar discrepancies of policies and opinions have occurred in other instances. Is there not latent in this disjunction the possibility of yet another switch of character? One remembers all too well in this connection the sudden intervention in the elections of the early 1930's of those who had previously been apathetic (or aloof) toward politics, and the catastrophe they brought about. Do not these latent extremists still exist?

And what supports Adenauer's government? What gives it such autonomy? Is it the sort of democratic willingness to be led by responsible leaders one finds in Britain, or is it perhaps the admiration Germans still have for the successful autocrat, regardless of the basis of his autocracy? Adenauer is certainly an autocrat (although his power rests upon his party) and, so far, a successful one. And the Germans (over 80 percent of them) certainly appear still to have fond memories of autocracy. Apart from those who hold favorable opinions of many former Nazi leaders, the proportion of Germans who think they were better off before World War II (41 percent) is larger than the proportion who think they were worse off (24 percent)—despite the economic miracle. The Hohenzollerns are remembered with nostalgia (45 percent think the empire was the period when Germany was "best off"), and Bismarck is by far the most popular of all political figures. From this one may at least begin to suspect that the parliamentary system is tolerated—"supported" is much too strong a term—chiefly for its manifest success; but no democratic system is really safe if it cannot count upon unconditional loyalty—that is, if its life depends upon a constant flow of "miracles."

We may be more reassured by the formal machinery of government than by the character of German opinion. The Bonn constitution-makers had Weimar constantly before their eyes and were resolved to prevent a recurrence of its diseases. Their opinions about causes differed, as did those of the Allies with whom they had to negotiate, but in the end they came up with an impressive formal document. On one hand, the constitution was designed to prevent a recurrence of weak prime ministers and of ministerial instability (chiefly through the "constructive" vote of confidence). On the other, it was to prevent, also, the sort of constitutional autocracy (government according to the letter of the constitution but against its spirit) exercised by von Papen, von Schleicher, and Hitler himself—chiefly by the redefinition of emergency powers and the power of dissolution, and through the creation of a special constitutional court. All this, however, is empty formal machinery and, due to party-political conditions, is as yet untested. We do not know how the machinery would work if political life were to become more pluralized; after all, the Weimar constitution was itself proclaimed, in its own day, the best of democratic constitutions. And offices do not operate themselves; we must look at the occupants and at the men who influence them.

Here, once more, the picture is ambivalent in the extreme. It is encouraging to learn that the higher party elite of the Christian Democratic Union, the party in power, has a strong anti-Nazi record; 39 percent have a clear anti-Nazi record (35 percent were imprisoned by the Nazis), and only 4 percent had served the Nazis in official capacities. The anti-Nazi record of the Social Democrats is, of course, greater

still. But it is not encouraging to learn that the record of anti-Nazism falls off sharply below the top levels of the party elite; that cabinet ministers have been far less anti-Nazi than party hierarchs (20 percent belonged to the Nazi party or its affiliates, only 15 percent were imprisoned by the Nazis, and not a single cabinet member went into exile!); that members of the legislature had only a slightly better anti-Nazi record than ministers; and that higher civil servants, diplomats, and military men largely served loyally under Hitler and date back to the latter days of the Empire. This is not encouraging—first, because it means that as the top party leaders die off and are replaced, those most compromised (and presumably molded) by Nazism will achieve power; second, because any decline in the political influence of parties —any less duolithic party system—will mean a decline in power for the more reliable democrats. All the more is this the case when one takes into account the relatively poor anti-Nazi records of the leaders of interest groups (with the possible exceptions of trade-union officials and higher Protestant clergymen) and the still poorer records of leading German educators. Only the elite of the press, among the "influential" outside party politics have a strong anti-Nazi record. The press, of course, plays a large role in forming the foreign image of any country, and it is sobering to realize that the press of Germany is highly atypical of the general public and of the influential (and apparently not particularly able to influence either group). What is more, a relatively large proportion of the higher journalists have proved anti-Nazi records simply because it was the Allies who licensed editors and publishers until 1949; since then the figures have shifted considerably toward those for other elite groups, though they are still rather encouraging (42 percent were clearly anti-Nazi, 37 percent were persecuted).

There is, of course, much more to Deutsch and Edinger's book than I have even intimated; above all, I have omitted their interesting analyses of several cases of actual policy formulation; and while my concerns here have been with the specific political complexion of German opinion and German elite, their concerns are much broader. But if we restrict ourselves to the specifically political, what emerges from their book is this: a country with two shockingly disparate political faces, a reliably democratic party hierarchy disjointed from a largely antidemocratic or uncommitted country; a press largely unrepresentative of opinion; a generation more corrupted by Nazism than its predecessors now coming to power; a still younger generation less corrupted by autocracy than either; and a gnawing doubt: is it wise to rely as much as we do upon a country with a past and a future still so largely unresolved?

But what could one expect of Germany except what she is? In the words of the authors: "How tempting to pretend that all could be forgotten—that a poker-faced generation of amnesia cases could build a new German future by spreading clean wallpaper over the family closets that contain too many skeletons. Indeed, they can be found—the smooth and evasive men of affairs, the elite members with the large gaps in their biographies—but how could they themselves forget what has happened?"

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Directory of Nuclear Reactors. vol. 1, *Power Reactors*. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, 1959 (order from International Publications, 801 Third Ave., New York). 214 pp. Illus. Paper, $3.50.

Sterling Cole, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, states in the foreword of this volume that it represents "one of the Agency's first major scientific publications, demonstrating the importance we attach to making data in this field readily available internationally."

The power reactor *Directory* is to be followed by volumes covering reactors in different categories and by supplements which will keep the volumes up-to-date and complete.

This volume provides summary design information about 36 nuclear power stations in nine different countries. Each station has an electrical output of at least 2 megawatts and is either now in operation or scheduled to be in operation by the end of 1962.

The format of the volume is described well by the following paragraph from the introduction:

"Information is presented in a uniform way for each reactor. Thus, the first page contains general information, reactor physics data and information on the core. The second and third pages provide sketches of the fuel elements or of the fuel element assembly and of the horizontal and vertical sections of the reactor. On the fourth page information is grouped under the following headings: fuel element, core heat transfer, control, reactor vessel and overall dimensions, and fluid flow. The fifth page shows a simplified flow diagram and the sixth page provides information on reflector and shielding, containment and turbo-generator; when available, information is given on cost estimates and operating staff. The description of each reactor ends with general remarks and bibliographical data."

This uniform presentation of information gathered from international sources makes the *Directory* a valuable reference document. The format used is logical, legible, and reasonably complete. Unfortunately, no single format is the best one for all types of reactors, so the reader may find some design features of interest omitted or inadequately covered for clear understanding. In most cases, the reader is provided with a bibliography to guide more detailed investigations.

While there are relatively few places (considering the nature of the volume) where information has been listed as "not available," I hope that future supplements will reduce this number still further.

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A Bibliography of Birds. With special reference to anatomy, behavior, biochemistry, embryology, pathology, physiology, genetics, ecology, aviculture, economic ornithology, poultry culture, evolution, and related subjects. Part 4, *Finding Index* (to the subject index). Ruben Myron Strong. Chicago Natural History Museum, Chicago, Ill., 1959. 185 pp. $2.75.

The first three parts of this monumental, bibliographic compendium were issued during the years 1939 to 1946. These parts were reviewed in *Science* [**106**, 71 (1947)] by the late E. W. Gudger, who concluded his review with the following comment on Part 3, the subject index. "One has to work over the Subject Index, however, to realize its thoroughness and its complexity. So