

## Book Reviews

**No More War!** Linus Pauling. Dodd, Mead, New York, 1958. ix + 254 pp. \$3.50.

This is a tract for the times. The "message of this book," to quote from Pauling's preface, is that "the future of the human race depends upon our willingness to cooperate, to work together in a worldwide attack on the great world problems." This is a message with which it is not easy to disagree, but one should note that "our" refers to the whole human race and not just to the American or free-world subspecies of that race.

After sounding the clarion call of "No more war!" in his opening chapter, Pauling, in the body of his book, sets forth "the facts" regarding fallout and the effects of radiation on heredity and disease. I shall not, as a person untrained in the physical sciences, attempt to pass judgment on the accuracy or balance of Pauling's summary for a lay reader of "the facts," or on the fairness of his presentation of the scientific views of those, particularly those connected with the Atomic Energy Commission, with whom he disagrees. "On these basic facts," Pauling quotes J. Laurence Kulp, on the views of Pauling and Libby on radiation, "all are agreed" (page 113). Amen. It is when one asks what the facts mean and to what extent one can read public policy directly from the contemplation of these facts, and these facts alone, that basic agreement ceases.

To Pauling, the facts mean that the testing of nuclear weapons must stop and can stop now on the basis of a readily negotiated agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. They mean, further, that a great World Peace Research Organization should be set up within the framework of the United Nations. Given the all-round "willingness to cooperate" mentioned in the preface, the findings of this organization would presumably be accepted by acclamation.

As for the international "first-step" disarmament agreement, Pauling twice suggests (pages 184 and 190) that the Soviet Union has already accepted the plan for cessation of bomb tests with enforcement to be based on internal inspection stations. He suggests (page 185) that progress toward disarmament broke down in

1957 because Secretary Dulles intervened in the negotiations then being conducted in London by Harold Stassen. It was Dulles' "failure to reach a compromise" that "was an important factor in causing the conference to end."

Another important factor may possibly have been the Soviet delegation's failure to reach a compromise. The "we" who must be willing to cooperate includes both "us Americans" and "them Russians." The Soviet Union's peremptory rejection of the "keyhole" area-of-inspection proposal in April 1958 is only one of the more recent examples of Soviet behavior which remind us that it takes two to fail to reach a compromise—unless one is counseling his own side to surrender.

Pauling's other proposal—to bring an end to war by creating a great research organization—is not new. I do not know whether official sponsorship by the United Nations would make objective research harder or easier. It would be interesting to have testimony from the staffs of our great American foundations as to how much their programs for research on peace are now hampered by lack of funds on a scale which only governments or international organizations can provide.

There are some broad fundamental questions which Pauling's book raises but which it does not really answer; for instance:

1) Ought or ought not the United States, in the name of morality, simply cease bomb testing forthwith, whether or not there is Soviet agreement to accept international inspection, and even if indications were that such voluntary cessation would reduce the chance that the Soviet Union would later agree to effective internal inspection?

2) How does one equate the long-run biological risk of continued bomb testing and the short-run biological (and political) risk of two-way atomic war that would be involved in either a one-sided relaxation of the present effort to deter attack or an international agreement so loosely drawn as to permit unilateral violation?

3) How does one equate the gains from delayed international agreement, based on a more carefully negotiated in-

spection scheme covering a wider range of prohibited actions, and an immediate agreement calling for less stringent or narrower inspection? [For some recently published evidence as to the feasibility of a wider system of inspection, see *Inspection for Disarmament*, Seymour Melman, Ed. (Columbia University Press, New York, 1958)].

4) More broadly, what combination of firmness and conciliation in dealing with the Soviet Union will produce optimum relief from the threat of two-way thermonuclear war?

Between the Scylla of intransigence and the Charybdis of surrender, the passage is not clearly marked. The way may be narrow, tortuous, and hard to find. Faith in the brotherhood of man and a burning sense of urgency based on a knowledge of the evil effects of nuclear explosions may indicate the ultimate goal, but they are no guarantee against shipwrecks along the way. Patient analysis, as well as reliance on other kinds of skills and other kinds of facts, is needed if short-run and middle-run policies are to achieve long-run goals.

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**Obok.** A study of social structure in Eurasia. Elizabeth E. Bacon. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 25. Wenner-Gren Foundation, New York, 1958. xv + 235 pp. Maps and tables. \$4.00.

In 1938–39 Elizabeth E. Bacon, presently professor of anthropology at Washington University, St. Louis, did field work among the Hazara "Mongols" in Iran and Afghanistan. When she began to write the present monograph in 1947, she ran into a now familiar problem. The language of anthropology, notoriously unsatisfactory, is particularly deficient when it comes to such terms as *clan*, and Dr. Bacon joined those who wished to distinguish the varieties of unilinear organizations under discrete headings, thereby separating functionally dissimilar institutions which had previously been confused because of certain superficial resemblances. Dr. Bacon employs the word *obok*, which is Mongol and means "tribal genealogical [unit]." By comparative analysis, she seeks to establish *obok* as the basic extended social group throughout Eurasia, from Britain (Scots and Welsh) to the Pacific (China).

Dr. Bacon has done an enormous amount of work in assembling data on the social organization and kin terminologies of 15 cultures in Europe and Asia, and she is to be complimented upon