
for work in a controlled atmosphere



BLICKMAN VACUUM DRY BOX

Designed for safe handling of radio-isotopes, reactor fuel containing Plutonium or U233 and other hazardous substances. With air-lock, it can be sealed to create a vacuum. Fabricated of stainless steel plate—34" long x 26" high x 24" wide at base. Air-lock measures 18" x 12". Send for Technical Bulletin A-2.

FOR SAFE HANDLING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS



BLICKMAN FUME HOOD

Originally designed and developed for the AEC, this Fume Hood assures maximum safety in the handling of radioactive materials and radioactive isotopes. Sturdy 14-gauge stainless steel, round corner construction provides long life...easy cleaning and decontamination. Send for Technical Bulletin E-3. S. Blickman, Inc., 6907 Gregory Avenue, Weehawken, N. J.

BLICKMAN LABORATORY EQUIPMENT

Look for this symbol of quality



Letters

General Semantics

There is unquestionably a need for such a book as Martin Gardner's Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science [reviewed by John Pfeiffer in Science (126, 1296 [1957]). But there is always a danger that an overzealous debunker will throw out the baby with the bath water. And while certain "fads and fallacies" are obviously so, our debunker, who, after all, cannot be an informed specialist in every field of science, might easily be guilty of some "fallacies" himself. Such seems to be the case with Gardner, whose lumping of Alfred Korzybski and General Semantics [Nonaristotelian Systems and General Semantics] with the inanities of Velikovsky, Hubbard, and Reich is comparable to lumping the latter three with B. F. Skinner or Carl Rogers or Julian Huxley.

The scientific "respectability" of Korzybski's General Semantics is no longer seriously questioned (except by Gardner), for as a school of thought in the behavioral sciences it has actually gained at least as much "respectability" as Freud's psychoanalysis, if not more, and has blossomed into a significant International Society for General Semantics. Courses in general semantics are currently being offered by the University of Chicago and other universities of considerable "respectability," and the literature of general semantics features such prominent names as those of S. I. Hayakawa, Wendell Johnson, and Anatol Rapaport. Further, the large number of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other scientists who would disagree with Gardner's misclassification of general semantics as a "fad" or "fallacy" would seem to indicate that Gardner's ambitious attempt to draw a precise line between science and pseudoscience is neither 100 percent trustworthy nor 100 percent successful. Actually, any attempt to set up an "infallible authority" to distinguish between science and nonscience is bound to fail. Both Rome and Moscow have tried this and made themselves look rather silly.

Edd Doerr

Bogotá, Colombia

I agree with most of Edd Doerr's statements, having made the same points in my book. In both the "Introduction" and the final chapter, I discuss at some length the spectrum of science and pseudoscience and the extreme difficulty of drawing a precise line between them. I approached Count Korzybski's work by specifically pointing out that he was not to be classed with most of the men mentioned in the book (I made a similar distinction in respect to J. B. Rhine), and I emphasized the fact that I was attack-

ing only the doctrines which were original with the Count.

Many people do not realize that "semantics" is an old and highly respected branch of meaning analysis and that the Count simply drew heavily from this tradition and popularized it. College courses in semantics, even those taught by the Count's reputed followers, are little more today than elementary excursions into this field. Where Korzybski simply passed on a semantic commonplace, naturally no one disagrees, but in respect to those doctrines which are peculiar to the Count, one would be hard put to find a single philosopher of science today who did not agree with the acid opinion of Ernest Nagel, quoted in my book.

MARTIN GARDNER

Dobbs Ferry, New York

"Paramecium Controversy"

A recent addition to what is apparently developing into "the *Paramecium* controversy" was contributed by Kellogg (1), who presents a view of the main reason for disagreement between Gelber (2) and Jensen (3) that is rather surprising. According to Kellogg, Gelber hypothesizes that learning is characteristic of all living tissue, while Jensen restricts learning to the higher levels on the phyletic scale. These extreme views are not clearly expressed by either Gelber or Jensen in the articles cited by Kellogg.

Kellogg cites other studies of apparent learning in paramecia and, in referring to one report, states that French (4) "gives seemingly unequivocal evidence of trial-and-error learning in paramecia." "Unequivocal evidence" is a slippery quantity and, as Kellogg points out, there have been reports of negative findings also. Gelber, in an early publication (5), referred to many of the articles that Kellogg accuses both her and Jensen of neglecting to use as evidence.

In a very recent article Katz and Deterline (6) report the results of a replication of Gelber's basic study (5). The experimental design included several control groups set up for the purpose of testing the conflicting views of Gelber and Jensen. Jensen attributes the observed change in the behavior of paramecia in the Gelber studies to the presence of food, apart from any inference of learning. Katz and I came to the conclusion that Jensen's more conservative explanation is more credible than Gelber's. This does not mean that we deny that paramecia have the ability to learn. That phenomenon remains a fascinating possibility. We do insist that Gelber's technique does not isolate the phenomenon in an unequivocal fashion.

Apparently perception is an even bigger problem in psychology than is usually realized. Katz and I observed the be-