panacea for psychology, nor for that matter do they offer any consistent point of view. At best they represent an exceedingly pragmatic approach to the philosophy of science, with emphasis on the meaning of concepts in terms of their locus in the "nomological net."

The 12 papers fall into three categories. One set contains the more or less traditional philosophy of science paper dedicated to analysis of the epistemological basis of modern science. Feigl argues convincingly for a sharp and clear distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Carnap proposes an empirical criterion of factual meaningfulness and distinguishes between theoretical concepts and dispositional concepts. This latter point is very timely, considering the confusion that has been generated by psychologists who fail to make such a distinction. Meehl and Sellars, although they deny adherence to any emergentist formulation, argue that such formulations are logically defensible: "As we see it, the question whether the world is to be conceived along emergentist lines is a scientific question which cannot be settled on a priori grounds." Sellars, in a lengthy article, attacks the sense-datum theories of knowledge and finally leaves the reader at a crossroads with no signposts.

The second group of papers is dedicated to psychoanalysis. First, a vigorous and often, if not always, successful attack on psychoanalysis is undertaken by *l'enfant terrible* of American psychology, B. F. Skinner. Scriven replies in kind by directing his scorn at Skinner's radical behaviorism while half-heartedly defending psychoanalysis. Scriven notes, and I agree, that "Skinner's position on almost every issue admits of two interpretations—one of them exciting, controversial and practically indefensible; the other moderately interesting, rather widely accepted, and very plausible." Scriven agrees with others who have argued that Skinner, despite his denials, has really proposed a theory. Possessing a methodological distaste for theories, Skinner finds himself in the enviable position of not having to defend his own theory. In spite of his methodological naivete, or perhaps as a result of it, Skinner remains one of the most original and creative modern psychologists. Two other papers, one concerned with an operational reformulation of psychoanalysis and the other denying the possibility of a logical reduction of psychoanalytic theory to physicalistic terms, conclude the section on psychoanalysis. It is a pity that so many contemporary philosophers and scientists feel compelled to analyze, interpret, and reformulate Freudian theory. Freudian theory is in much greater need of reliable empirical data than of theoretical refinement.

Perhaps the most constructive portion of the book deals with specific psychological topics. Cronbach and Meehl clarify the important and intimate reciprocal influence that can exist between psychological tests and psychological theory. Meehl demonstrates convincingly how an actuarial characterization of a person is superior to one formed on the basis of clinical judgment. Buck critically examines the logical status of general behavior systems theory and finds it wanting in all important aspects. And, finally, Scriven advocates a position that will be unpopular with tough-minded psychologists—namely, that there are some basic differences between the natural sciences and the social or behavioral sciences that prevent the latter from ever achieving the theoretical achievements of the former.

All in all, the book is an interesting one. It certainly justifies the fascinating sociological experiment known as the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science. Those who read it will await with interest the publication of succeeding volumes.

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Perspectives in Personality Theory. Henry P. David and Helmut von Bracken. Basic Books, New York, 1957. 435 pp. $6.50.

In June 1954, when the 14th International Congress of Psychology convened in Montreal, the program committee was guided by a conviction that "one of the great challenges to the International Union is not merely to bring psychologists of different nations together, but specifically to break down the parochialism of American psychology." This symposium volume, growing out of the congress, reflects this conviction.

Reviews of German, Swiss, British, French, and Italian psychologies of personality are supplied by eminent men from each country. Separate chapters are written by European psychologists whose names are associated with particular concepts or methods little known in the United States: phenomenology; existential psychology; stratification of the person; will; and character. Because these chapters and American rejoinders are presented in large perspective by excellent people, the book becomes an authoritative, world-wide picture of today's science of personality. Selective bibliographies after each chapter and a well-organized annotated 324-title bibliography in the appendix will rightly guide the reader whose interest is whetted into exploring unfamiliar literatures. Had the 14th congress accomplished nothing save generating this volume, its convening would have been worth while.

Strikingly, the psychology of each nation reflects that nation's culture. As McClelland points out: "One could make a case for the French insistence on absolute clarity and rationality of constructs, the Anglo-Saxon willingness to adopt a construct or hypothesis tentatively, however imperfect, so long as it leads to further research, the German preference for polarities, 'feeling with' another person and for hierarchical models." Are these national trends visible in other sciences?

To what extent is American psychology culture-bound? McClelland goes on to suggest that "American psychologists have had a strong interest in overt adjustment to the environment . . . because they were in a new country which demanded major adjustments from immigrants" and for other historical reasons. Also, the Strong Vocational Interest Blank, validated on an American sample, shows scientists in general to be "turned outward toward the world and away from their inner thoughts and experiences." Insofar as American psychology reflects this trend, adopting an anti-intraceptive definition of what is "scientific," remaining mechanistic, focusing on part-problems, ignoring the more unalterable aspects of man and refusing to examine what seem to be unpalatable sides of human nature, it clearly deserves to be called "ethnocentric."

After reading this book, one feels, however, that the pro-European contributors want to extend such an accusation unduly, to include the touchstone of empirical validity by which ideas are evaluated in American science. They appear to stretch the ideal of international tolerance to cover a demand that all ideas be assigned equal worth in the intellectual market place. I am not sure whether they therein display sophistication or sentiment. If some Continental thinkers are willing to honor untested ideas, must we feel that "the provincialism of American psychology" is revealed when Americans refuse to credit these ideas until their advocates show how they stand up to empirical test?

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Theories of Personality. Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey. Wiley, New York; Chapman and Hall, London, 1957. 572 pp. $6.50.

Hall and Lindzey have rendered a valuable service to teachers and students by collecting, under one cover, a description of 12 significant theories of personality. Four chapters are devoted to Freudian theory and several of its derivatives and deviants, like Jung, Adler, Sullivan, and Murray. Lewin, Allport, Rogers, and