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THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONALISM[1]

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To all men of good-will, the thought of peace on earth must occur, and to many through the centuries it has been a compelling preoccupation. At no time in the world's history can it have presented itself more forcibly than now when the war in Europe is in its final stage, and arrangements for an adequate peace settlement have become imminent. As an important part of the historian's task is to illuminate the present by explaining the past, it is both fitting and highly desirable to consider here the pertinent events of the past that bear on this most important question of a better world order, and thus aid, no matter how slightly, toward a better comprehension and solution of the problems involved.

In 1933 this section held a Symposium on Nationalism[2]; I feel that it is significant that to-day it seems desirable to contemplate the concept of internationalism. As your chairman, charged with the responsibility of addressing the section, I have ventured to go out of my own field to consider the subject—not claiming any special knowledge and even admitting to the scholar's sin of utilizing some secondary sources, but with an amateur's enthusiasm and a lively sense of the importance of an informed public's opinion, especially while the course of legislative and administrative action is being shaped. I was further spurred to learn what I could from a considerable "literature" on the subject, in spare moments spread over several months, by the recent appearance of Hans Kohn's book on "The Idea of Nationalism."[3] My surprise at his view that the idea of "nationalism" only began with the French Revolution was equalled by the discovery that a real concept of internationalism had cropped up not infrequently since the ancient Greeks and Hebrews, even though the word did not appear in dictionaries

1 Vice-presidential address, Section L—History and Philosophy of Science, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Cleveland, Ohio, September 12, 1944.

2 W. G. Leland, "Nationalism," Papers presented at the 1933 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

3 Hans Kohn, "The Idea of Nationalism," New York: Macmillan, 1944.

till the nineteenth century. [In Samuel Johnson's Dictionary (1755; 4 Ed. 1775), for instance, neither "nationalism" nor "internationalism" appears, though one of the definitions for "national" is given as "bigotted to one's own country."] This can be taken to indicate that there was no particular concern with these concepts at this time. Incidentally, "civilization" is defined by that great lexicographer only as "the legal act of rendering a criminal act civil"!

With your indulgence, I shall touch on some pertinent high spots in the time allowed. My remarks may be clearer if prefaced by a few definitions: "internationalism" I would like to use in the sense of "all human relations between nations cooperating in a mutually advantageous manner." But as this, strictly interpreted, would exclude some of what I want to consider, I shall turn to the inadequate dictionary definition of "the state or principle of international interests or intercourse." [Such internationalism, of course, has nothing to do with the belligerent communism of the three Internationales. Yet such is the influence of "sneer words" that the Ligue Internationale et Permanente de la Paix (1867) found it desirable after some years to change its name so as to avoid any undesirable confusion with the other organization.] By "universalism" I mean to indicate the idea of human unity, whether of religion, ethics, government or other activity, a *societas generis humani;* the *Ta-Tung,* or world brotherhood (lit., "great similarity") that Confucius hoped for. By "imperialism" is meant the concept of forcibly including as much of the world as possible under one government, whether under an absolute monarch such as Alexander, or under a more constitutional form of government; "nationalism" represents the condition arising among people effectively united which leads to protection and advancement of their common interests—nationalism is, thus, a complex idea, compatible with various forms of government and of combinations of races, religions and customs. It is nearest to, but not identical with, "patriotism." [Incidentally, "patriotism," in the sense of devotion to one's country, made its appearance in England about 1725, but was often used ironically.] Nationalism differs from what has been called "Étatism," as illustrated by the active condition of German nationalism after Napoleon, when there were many separate German states, compared to the France of Louis XIV, where there was one powerful state but little or no feeling of nationalism.

Having become once more impressed with the superior power of ideas over material strength, even in making war, we should not be surprised to learn that the two exemplars of this principle among the peoples of antiquity—the Hebrews and the Greeks—contributed basically toward the concept whose fluctuations I shall endeavor to trace. The Hebrews, though strongly national politically, as they had to be in order to survive between their very powerful neighbors, Egypt and Assyria, nevertheless traced Israel from the same ancestors as the rest of mankind. "Love thy neighbor as thyself" was an Old Testament commandment (Leviticus, 19:18) long before its repetition by Christ, even though later the Hebrews proudly divided the world into Jews and Gentiles. Their Messianism (Hebrew, Mashiah, the anointed one), which later became a nationalistic expression of longing for salvation, originally contemplated a universalistic divine King over all the earth. Amos's God was the God of all peoples, giving equal justice to all; Isaiah (19:25) invoked blessings on Egypt and Assyria as well as on Judea.

The Greeks, who early in their history (*ca.* 600 B.C.) acquired a consciousness of superiority and like the Jews regarded themselves as a chosen race, divided the known world into Greeks and Barbarians. They, however, developed the idea of universal humanism, which, both directly and through their conquerors, the Romans, has continued to influence future ages. (The Japanese, the only other significant example of an early developed nationalism, took the world's stage too late to have any effect on the modern growth of the idea of nationalism, and we may be allowed to hope that their nationalistic role on that stage is shortly to assume a minor position). Though the Greeks were none too successful in managing their political affairs, and city continued to fight city until even Aristotle and Plato regarded war as inevitable, they did recognize the advantages of confederation, and achieved it against the Persians when the need was great. In fact, their Amphictyonic Council, with its provision that no Amphictyon could annihilate another's city or cut off its water supply, can be taken as the first organized attempt to limit the barbarities of war.

It has been often, but truly, said that Rome in conquering Greece politically was overcome by Greece culturally. The Greek culture, Cicero's *humanitas,* which came to Rome especially through the Stoic philosophy with its world-state idea, and the later Hebrew earnestness and vision of the world filled with God's children, were combined by the Romans in a form based on a true universalistic concept. Virgil with a vision of this broader attitude wrote of Dido in a very different spirit than Cato's "delenda est Carthago." The Pax Romana, though interrupted by provincial wars and administered only by the upper classes, was the best obtained by mankind till the beneficent dominance of the British Empire. In the Roman Empire, there were no longer, as with the Greeks and Hebrews, but two classes: Romans, and the rest, fit only to be en-

slaved. Roman citizenship and its rights were extended ever more widely, so that those conquered in the later campaigns were even given the same rights as the conquerors. Some of Rome's best emperors came from conquered provinces. This enlightened attitude toward citizenship, marred though it was by excesses and the inherent cruelties which have only very gradually decreased with the progress of civilization, was further augmented by the uniformity and excellence of Roman law and shortly by the wide expansion of Christianity. Small wonder that this spiritual predecessor of internationalism exerted its great influence through the centuries.

Through the standstill of the Middle Ages, the cohesive effect of the Church and of Christianity maintained a greater unity among civilized peoples than in more individualistic later centuries. Internationalism it could not be, as nations in our sense of the word did not exist, but it was a universalism of religion and culture, even of a common language for the educated, which had advantages for those times. It also has a warning lesson for promoters of a true internationalism: The autocratic rule that the Church exerted as it gained temporal power is a good example, as Stawell[4] recalls, of the fact that all attempts at unity have been conceived as the imposition of uniformity, not as the tolerance of variety.

This sacerdotism did not exist unopposed. The Holy Roman Empire, whether under Charlemagne or Otto and his successors, constituted an imperialism which at its height under Frederick II, the great Hohenstaufen, strove for a Golden Age for the whole civilized world. Conceived as a benevolent imperium, and short lived at that, theoretically it should concern us less than the various proposals toward international organization, of which Rudolph Hirsch[5] has recently listed 36 up to the year 1789. Hirsch points out the noteworthy fact that these were the work not of visionaries but of "well-established" men, including 4 princes, 3 leading statesmen, 8 jurists and 5 philosophers of renown. The host of proposals in the nineteenth century is far too numerous even to mention here; many are included in ter Meulen's last 2 volumes.[6]

The earliest and a good example of these is the "Recovery of the Holy Land" (1306) by Pierre du Bois (Petrus de Bosco) of Coutances. (For an account of this and subsequent proposals see Lange's[7] scholarly work.) Recognizing that a single imperium was no longer feasible for Europe, he proposed a confederation between the powers, wherein all differences would be submitted to arbitration and the members would agree to punish any who refused to conform. To be sure, he had in mind a federation dominated by France; but like Sir Thomas More of a later age, and most of us to-day, he believed that his own people were best fitted for such leadership. It took an Erasmus to ask, "Who is there who does not think his own cause just?" Erasmus also had ideas of a League of Nations. He wisely observed: "A unified Empire would be best if we could have a Sovereign made in the image of God, but men being what they are, there is more safety among kings of moderate power united in a Christian League." He wanted an ideal *tranquilitas orbis Christiani,* rather than a self-seeking nationalism.

From France, at this period the most enlightened country in Europe, came a more far-reaching, truly international proposal. Emeric Crucé's "Nouveau Cynée" (1624) not only advocated a confederation to arbitrate difficulties and prevent wars, but included Asia, Africa and the Far East, even the terrible Turk, as well as the countries of Europe.

Perhaps the most important of these early plans for federations to enforce peace was that of the great Sully, minister to Henry IV of France. His Grand Dessein may, to be sure, have had chiefly in mind the reduction of Austria's power and the enhancement of Henry's, though he specifically warned against France attempting to become Empress of the West, which would be as harmful to her as to those subordinate to her. His République très Chrétienne de l'Europe was divided into 15 powers—6 hereditary monarchies, 5 elective monarchies and 4 republics (Switzerland, the Netherlands, Venice, Northern Italy). Various territories (such as Navarre, Sicily, Naples, Flanders, Alsace) were to be allocated as seemed best, quite in twentieth century fashion. As usual, arbitration was stipulated, also armies "sufficient to maintain continuous war against the Infidel." The horrors of war were to be limited and armies were to be "pacific," pay for their supplies, etc. Henry's assassination extinguished any chances for Sully's plan, which, besides, was not published until many years later, and probably in much altered form. In the light of the subsequent military history of Europe, it was at least a timely effort.

Almost contemporary with the publication of Sully's plan was the "de Jure Belli et Pacis" (1628) of Hugo Grotius, more important as the beginning of international law than for international organization. Grotius, however, stated his belief that "conferences should be established between Christian powers to settle disputes by the voice of those nations who are not themselves affected; and that methods should be

[4] F. M. Stawell, "The Growth of International Thought," New York: Holt, 1930.

[5] Rudolph Hirsch, "Plans for the Organization of International Peace, 1306–1789," A List of 36 Peace Proposals, New York: The New York Public Library, 1943.

[6] Jacob ter Meulen, "Der Gedanke der internationalen Organisation," 2 Vols. in 3, Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1917, 1929, 1940.

[7] Christian L. Lange, "L'Historie de l'Internationalisme jusqu'à la paix de Westphale (1648)," Christiana: Aschenhoug, and New York: J. P. Putnam, 1919.

found for compelling the parties to accept peace on reasonable terms."

William Penn, in his "Essay toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe" (1692), also maintained that countries should agree on a plan to avert war by establishing a sovereign assembly which should decide on all differences that could not be adjusted by the individual countries. He held, rather surprisingly for a Quaker, that any sovereignties that refused to submit their claims or to abide the judgment should be compelled to submission by all the other sovereignties, and damages be given to the suffering party. "Thus the sovereign princes remain as sovereign at home as ever and only have their power lessened abroad in hindering the great fish from eating the little one." None of these proposals, however, any more than the covenant of the League of Nations, met the crucial difficulty of providing a feasible mechanism capable of making even the most powerful aggressor nation abide by the agreement.

To those who believe that nationalism could only begin after Rousseau's insistence on the natural rights of man had led to the participation of all classes in the affairs of state, Rousseau's attitude toward internationalism becomes of considerable importance, though his direct contribution was small. Focussing on the freedom of the individual, he was only secondarily interested in forms of government. His nationalism was aimed at more personal liberty and justice, not at the elevation of the nation. (See his "Projet pour un Constitution pour la Corse.") A zealous pacifist, he favored universal military service as the least unjust form for the individual. He hoped that the same power that united a nation—the patriotic will of the people—might make a union of nations, based on the general will of their peoples. In Rousseau's League, from which secession was not to be permitted, he stressed the difference between bowing to a ruler's will and complying with the decision of a body of which one forms a component part: "Liberty is lost in the hands of a master; it is confirmed in the hands of associates." In his "Institutions politiques" (destroyed by the Comte d'Entraigues, but mentioned in "Emile") he favored a federation of the smaller states, joined by international treaty. He may be called a universalist, in the sense of the universal sovereignty of the people.

Together with the political idea of international cooperation, grew benevolent proposals for perpetual peace and the efforts of peace societies toward this end (Beales[8]). Especially in England were these stimulated by the philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, one of the first to use the term "internationalism." His "Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace (1787–9), called for the usual court of arbitration but also for limitation of armament and an international police force. It was an important influence on such liberalists as his pupil, James Mill, and, in this country, on Noah Worcester, William Ladd, the founder of the American Peace Society, Elihu Burritt and others. [It is probably useful to recall here that this was long before the days of propaganda and double-talk, and that the name represented the true goal of the society, not a cloak for some hidden, nefarious purpose.] If the soundest basis for a lasting peace is a sufficiently strong conviction on the part of the stronger nations that warfare is both individually and collectively inexpedient as well as uncivilized, then the permeation of such ideas, even though unassociated with conspicuous political events, assumes great importance. From this point of view, we may take legitimate satisfaction in the efforts of the sincere peace societies, in the various peace congresses (beginning with the London Congress of 1843), in such successful international achievements as the International Red Cross, the Hague Court of Arbitration, settlement of the Corfu and the Aland Island incidents, and in other by-products of the League of Nations, in our border with Canada, which has lasted for more than a century, unarmed, and in Norway's peaceful separation from Sweden.

Nationalism, being dependent on the concern of the people in their country's affairs, was well established in Great Britain by the eighteenth century, but was non-existent on the continent until implanted by the heady influence of the French Revolution. With the downfall of Napoleon's imperialism and the consequent widespread longing for peace, a situation curiously analogous to that of 1919 and 1944 arose, with its corresponding warnings. When representatives of all Europe met at Vienna in September, 1814, "to make a friendly settlement of European interests," it was hailed as the dawn of a new era of lasting international peace and concord. The four powers who had defeated Napoleon (Russia, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia) however, had already concluded a treaty (Chaumont, March 10, 1814) followed by a secret protocol which arranged that the Four Powers should first decide on moot questions and announce their decisions to France and Spain, the other members of the executive committee of the congress. The inevitable rifts quickly appeared in the solidarity of the four major powers and the scramble for territory was still continuing at Vienna when Napoleon returned from Elba. Though a Final Act was signed a few days before Waterloo, it was concluded so hurriedly that Castlereagh's progress toward a promise of collective

[8] A. C. F. Beales, "The Catholic Church and International Order," Penguin Books, New York, 1941; also, "The History of Peace," New York: The Dial Press, 1931.

war against transgressors came to naught. Thus the congress arranged little more than a patchwork of territorial shifts, that, however, provided a much needed breathing space for the peace of Europe. Napoleon having been finally eliminated, the Czar proclaimed (September 26, 1815) his Holy Alliance with Francis I of Austria and Frederick William III of Prussia. All the potentates of Europe, except the Sultan, were invited to sign, the Pope and Great Britain alone courteously declining; later even the American republics were approached. A general statement of principles of Christian union, rather than a definite treaty, the Holy Alliance produced no practical results toward a "universal union"; in fact, after the death of Alexander, it happened to become, more than once, an instrument of princely oppression of popular liberties. Nevertheless, as the Czar's good faith has been generally accepted, it must stand as a milestone in the progress of internationalism, and later inspired another Czar to call the first International Peace Congress at the Hague (1899).

When we consider the greatest achievement in the progress of internationalism—the League of Nations and Woodrow Wilson, the proponent of its idealistic features—we are still too close to the institution and to the man even to approximate a true evaluation. We can and should, however, recognize that this was the first internationalistic proposal actually to be put into effect, and that it was able to survive as an international force for almost a generation. In the opening deliberations, Léon Bourgeois may have been tiresome and certainly was unsuccessful, but with equal certainty he was prophetically correct when he asserted: "If we are to have a League with security for all, sacrifices will have to be made, traditions and long accustomed rights abandoned. But how insignificant is this loss of independent action when you contrast it with the menace that will hang over us all if the League is not established with force behind it?" Are we again about to neglect this warning? During the twenty-five years of its activities the League not only functioned successfully on an international basis in many ways but it also survived a number of political crises, even though of secondary importance. If it had had our own country as a full member, and had been able to find an acceptable formula for enforcing its decisions, who can tell whether it might not have survived its critical period. By gradually correcting its defects, it might have eventually produced a workable system as superior to the original instrument as our Constitution was to our earlier Articles of Confederation. And we should not dismiss the comparison as irrelevant; because the difficulties and differences among the American colonies of economics and transportation, diversified interests, creeds, customs and racial strains, were at least partly comparable to those to be faced by international organizers to-day. The American Union had its Gethsemane, but no one to-day can reasonably visualize its break-up. Now again the advantages of whole-hearted cooperation have been forcibly impressed on the United Nations by their common peril to a degree that must be obvious to all. To paraphrase Burke: "The question with us is not whether you have a right to render the peoples of the world revenged but unsecure, but whether it is your interest to make them contented and secure." We may at least hope that the next peacetime attempt at some sort of International Federation will, like the American Union, also be successful. An abundant good-will, a better social, economic and political order, and a non-partisan force adequate to protect that order—a difficult but by no means impossible combination—these are needful to produce the results for which the world longs. And we must not forget Woodrow Wilson's reply to the Pope during the last war: "No settlement which contravenes the principles of eternal justice will be a permanent one." Agreement is not difficult on the need for force, the crucial difficulty was and is attainment of a satisfactory mechanism for applying this force. Combined control by the four great powers may perhaps be necessary for our immediate postwar period of punishments and adjustments; but I believe, with many others, that for a lasting peace we shall have to turn to some sort of World Parliament, with such "power to act" that even the most powerful will not act against it.[9] Its voting powers, to be sure, if reasonably distributed among the nations, must recognize the greater responsibility of the strongest nations, but not to the extent of enabling one or two to block the whole procedure.

The objection may be raised that efficient international arrangements must await better economic adjustments for the backward races (which still add up numerically to more than one half of the world's population). This objection can be at least partially met by the analogy of the Declaration of Independence's assertion that all men are born free and equal at a time when slavery flourished in this country and many of the signers were slave holders. The plan was established, nevertheless, and the elimination of slavery followed soon after, undoubtedly helped by this very statement.

Just as in prehistoric times, the cave family found

[9] The march of world events has been so rapid that even the few months that have elapsed since this address was given have made this statement seem out of date. If, however, we find ourselves burdened with a new balance of power or controlled spheres of influence, we must regretfully accept this indication, that the civilized world's collective intelligence has not yet reached the level of recognizing the inexpediency of such a narrow interpretation of self-interest.

it expedient to join forces with those in the neighboring cave, and thus eventually progress as far as tribes, which in turn combined into governments of cities or states, and thus to nations, which through centuries developed into such as those we know to-day, so circumstances seem to make it inevitable that, in time still larger groups will combine, eventually, to embrace the world in one international order. Then, indeed, the lady author may say "I accept the Universe," and a new Carlyle reply "By Gad! You'd better!"

Not that, focussing on the logical, and as a matter of fact the inevitable, political economy of the future, we should neglect the contributions to world progress that have been made by the present age of nationalism. One has but to compare it with the several attempts at universalism that preceded it, whether in the form of autocratic imperialism, or the nebulous universalism of the Middle Ages (founded on religion and tradition). Nationalism—whether based on Decatur's blind loyalty, "My country, may she always be right, but my country right or wrong," or on Franklin's wise expediency, "We must all hang together, if we don't want to hang separately," or on Nathan Hale's pure devotion, "I regret that I have only one life to give for my country"—nationalism has been also an inevitable state in the progress of civilization. It is a complex unity, "A state of mind corresponding to a political fact" (I. Zangwill) so dependent on the development of an intelligent, participating population and on good means of communications between large, even heterogeneous groups, that even the name wasn't needed or coined till comparatively recent times.

It is an integration that has served a useful and important purpose. Overcoming the handicaps of mixed races, religions, cultures, aspirations and economic opportunities, it tends to protect and increase the liberty of its country's citizens, ennobling the existence of all social levels and enriching culture by its processes of differentiation. It promotes the prosperity of the nation, vitalizing its activities and organizing development of sparse and backward areas, and secures for its government the majesty of true authority.

It is, however, when the defects of these qualities outweigh the good points in this or that unbalanced or unfortunate nation, that nationalism may become a potent contributor to world catastrophe, distorting patriotism into chauvinistic arrogance and setting barriers that tend toward obsolete isolationism. Then are we forced, willy-nilly, to look for higher forms of political integration. In Kohn's words: "Once it increased individual liberty and happiness, now it undermines them and subjects them to the exigencies of its continued existence, which seems no longer justified. Once it was a great force of life, spurring on the evolution of mankind; now it may become a dead weight upon the march of humanity." Though this may seem to you too sweeping a generalization, as it does to me, yet we must accept at least that a distorted nationalism has had just this effect more than once, and apparently with increasing frequency in the twentieth century. In Nurse Cavell's inspired words, "Patriotism is not enough."

Not that nationalism should be thrown overboard. The smoothed curve of human progress rises very slowly, and doubtless future generations will long continue to profit under a temperate, adaptable nationalistic state. Furthermore, we must realize that the nationalistic concept, not pushed to an extreme, is compatible with a rational internationalism. In fact, it is this very truth which, in my opinion, is our main hope for the immediate future of our civilization.

(Here, I'd like to digress for a moment to express my impatience with those who threaten that another global war would destroy civilization. Just as I also can not abide those stupid clichés: "Human nature never changes," as if that should block all attempts at social progress, and "We've always had wars and we're always going to," as if a surgeon would say in a case of doubtful cancer, "He's never had cancer, so this can't be one." As to the destruction of civilization, it is perhaps conceivable that the civilization of the Roman era might have been destroyed by barbarian hordes, though even here we must recall the aphorism of Voltaire, one of the wisest of historians: "Men commit a stupendous number of unjust acts in the fury of their passions, as they lose their reason in drunkenness; but when the drunkenness has passed, reason returns, and that is in my opinion the only cause which makes society endure." To me, it is quite inconceivable that in the present state of civilization's control of this world, it could be so damaged by any agent of this world that it would be beyond redemption after the drunkenness had passed.)

Thus, by way of summary, I have tried to trace from the universalistic religious ideology of the Hebrews and Christianity and the cultural humanism of the Greeks the elements which through the centuries have influenced internationalistic ideas and activities. With the depolitization of religion and the decline of absolute monarchies—both forces, to be sure, possessing elements useful for the progress of civilization—and with the rise of the people's share in government, nationalism grew to be a dominant factor through the nineteenth century. This, too, was for the most part a desirable development, at a time when man's control over nature had grown to such an extent that wider contacts over the earth's surface became inevitable and larger political units resulted. No longer restricted to a common race, language, tradition or economy, but

united only by a complex, yet zealous patriotism, nationalism has more and more tended to exceed the satisfying of political necessities. To-day, the evils of an exaggerated and perverted nationalism in various quarters, linked with the ever-increasing obliteration of world barriers and distances, appear to be hastening the completion of a cycle back to universalism. We have seen that internationalistic proposals have been made with increasing frequency over six centuries, but none put on actual trial till the League of Nations. We see that benevolent and logical proposals have not been enough, even when backed by high authority. However, an ever-increasing informed public opinion has already made its influence felt. On the other hand, the industrial age and man's greater control over the forces of nature have so charged the situation with world danger that unless it is efficiently met, modern civilization would appear to be doomed to the worst setback in its entire course. It would seem that a lasting solution of the international problem will only be found in the achievement of a plan based on justice to all and containing adequate provision for restraining the transgressor. This, then, is indeed a critical period of world's progress, but one which, wisely comprehended and handled, may so combine a rational nationalism with the internationalism of my original definition that the coming one hundred years may register the steepest curve yet recorded of man's upward progress.

I am near the end of my address, yet you will notice that I've not even mentioned the internationalism of science, of religion, of art, of commerce, of economic trends, in most of which we may take just pride. Every scientist knows that the scientist has culled his information from whatever land can provide it ever since there has been a science; and that, in normal times, his discovery as soon as published is broadcast throughout the scientific world. We can note with satisfaction that even to-day, astronomy pursues its customary international course, and a discovery, though perhaps made by a citizen of a warring country, is telegraphed to a neutral and thence to all the world. The ambitious student, if he has the necessary means and wisdom, goes to whatever center can give him the best education, regardless of country, and the historian of science as readily gives credit to a German as to a Frenchman, Swede, Britisher or American. Internationalism in art and literature has been accepted as matter of course for centuries. Masterpieces are recognized and eagerly collected regardless of their country of origin; art students flock to the center where they expect to find the best training regardless of its location, and pride in one's own country—a desirable form of nationalism—is but little apparent in artistic matters.[10] Commerce existed between nations long before nations existed—if you will pardon an Irishism—hampered at times, to be sure, when ideas of self-preservation raised tariff barriers; though I believe that economists generally accept the theoretical superiority of free trade over protective tariffs.

To-day you can talk with the ends of the earth more quickly than our Revolutionary great-grandfathers could get in touch with a neighboring village; and Jules Verne's Phineas Finn could now go round the world in nearer eighty hours than eighty days. Just as we are so much nearer to our neighbors, so also life's tempo increases, for bad as well as for good. The world's ability to produce, distribute and communicate has been vastly increased; but in its political arrangements it has sadly lagged. International comprehension, also, is conspicuously inadequate. As we have no way of estimating the intellectual capacity of the peoples of the world, how arrogant to assume a permanent inequality of races, with our own of course at the top! Thus, provocations and wars can and do arise more frequently and ever more devastatingly. The more imperative has it become, therefore, that the nations of the world set up an adequate framework, backed by the same sort of compelling force that each nation requires for preservation of its internal peace, to repress or chastise the international law breaker. We have now seen the catastrophic effects of this political lag twice in one generation. It would seem but common sense then, at no matter what cost, for the civilized world to make a third and worse catastrophe impossible. May God give those in authority the wisdom to erect such a just international structure that the world may shortly attain to a lasting peace!

THE WHITE DWARFS

By Professor W. J. LUYTEN
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THE discovery by Adams in 1915 that the faint companion to Sirius, the brightest star in the sky, was *white* caused a minor revolution in astronomical and physical thinking. In a sense this faint star had been discovered before it had been seen, for its existence had been proved by Auwers from the gravitational effect it produced in the motion of Sirius itself. By 1915 the orbits in which Sirius and this faint com-

[10] W. G. Leland, "The Internationalism of American Scholarship," Providence, R. I.: Brown University, 1940.