

SCIENCE

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1913

CONTINUITY.¹ II

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THE so-called non-Newtonian mechanics, with mass and shape a function of velocity, is an immediate consequence of the electrical theory of matter. The dependence of inertia and shape on speed is a genuine discovery and, I believe, a physical fact. The principle of relativity would reduce it to a conventional fiction. It would seek to replace this real change in matter by imaginary changes in time. But surely we must admit that space and time are essentially unchangeable: they are not at the disposal even of mathematicians; though it is true that Pope Gregory, or a daylight-saving bill, can play with our units, can turn the third of October in any one year into the fourteenth, or can make the sun south sometimes at eleven o'clock, sometimes at twelve.²

But the changes of dimension and mass due to velocity are not conventions, but realities; so I urge, on the basis of the electrical theory of matter. The Fitzgerald-Lorentz hypothesis I have an affection for. I was present at its birth. Indeed I assisted at its birth; for it was in my study at 21 Waverley Road, Liverpool, with Fitzgerald in an arm chair, and while I was enlarging on the difficulty of reconciling

¹ Address of the president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Birmingham, 1913.

² In the historical case of governmental interference with the calendar, no wonder the populace rebelled. Surely some one might have explained to the authorities that dropping leap year for the greater part of a century would do all that was wanted, and that the horrible inconvenience of upsetting all engagements and shortening a single year by eleven days could be avoided.

the then new Michelson experiment with the theory of astronomical aberration and with other known facts, that he made his brilliant surmise: "Perhaps the stone slab was affected by the motion." I rejoined that it was a 45° shear that was needed. To which he replied, "Well, that's all right—a simple distortion." And very soon he said, "And I believe it occurs, and that the Michelson experiment demonstrates it." A shortening long-ways, or a lengthening cross-ways would do what was wanted.

And is such a hypothesis gratuitous? Not at all: in the light of the electrical theory of matter such an effect ought to occur. The amount required by the experiment, and given by the theory, is equivalent to a shrinkage of the earth's diameter by rather less than three inches, in the line of its orbital motion through the ether of space. An oblate spheroid with the proper excentricity has all the simple geometrical properties of a stationary sphere; the excentricity depends in a definite way on speed, and becomes considerable as the velocity of light is approached.

All this Professors Lorentz and Larmor very soon after, and quite independently, perceived; though this is only one of the minor achievements in the electrical theory of matter which we owe to our distinguished visitor, Professor H. A. Lorentz.

The key of the position, to my mind, is the nature of cohesion. I regard cohesion as residual chemical affinity, a balance of electrical attraction over repulsion between groups of alternately charged molecules. Lateral electrical attraction is diminished by motion; so is lateral electric repulsion. In cohesion both are active, and they nearly balance. At anything but molecular distance they quite balance, but at molecular distance attraction predominates. It is the diminution of the predominant partner

that will be felt. Hence while longitudinal cohesion, or cohesion in the direction of motion, remains unchanged, lateral cohesion is less; so there will be distortion, and a unit cube *xyz* moving along *x* with velocity *u* becomes a parallelopiped with sides $1/k^2$, *k*, *k*; where $1/k^2 = 1 - u^2/v^2$.³

The electrical theory of matter is a positive achievement, and has positive results. By its aid we make experiments which throw light upon the relation between matter and the ether of space. The principle of relativity, which seeks to replace it, is a principle of negation, a negative proposition, a statement that observation of certain facts can never be made, a denial of any relation between matter and ether, a virtual denial that the ether exists. Whereas if we admit the real changes that go on by reason of rapid motion, a whole field is open for discovery; it is even possible to investigate the changes in shape of an electron—appallingly minute though it is—as it approaches the speed of light; and properties belonging to the ether of space, evasive though it be, can not lag far behind.

Speaking as a physicist I must claim the ether as peculiarly our own domain. The study of molecules we share with the chemist, and matter in its various forms is investigated by all men of science, but a study of the ether of space belongs to physics only. I am not alone in feeling the fascination of this portentous entity. Its curiously elusive and intangible character, combined with its universal and unifying

³ Different modes of estimating the change give slightly different results; some involve a compression as well as a distortion—in fact the strain associated with the name of Thomas Young; the details are rather complicated and this is not the place to discuss them. A pure shear, of magnitude specified in the text, is simplest, it is in accord with all the experimental facts—including some careful measurements by Bucherer—and I rather expect it to survive.

permeance, its apparently infinite extent, its definite and perfect properties, make the ether the most interesting as it is by far the largest and most fundamental ingredient in the material cosmos.

As Sir J. J. Thomson said at Winnipeg:

The ether is not a fantastic creation of the speculative philosopher; it is as essential to us as the air we breathe. . . . The study of this all-pervading substance is perhaps the most fascinating and important duty of the physicist.

Matter it is not, but material it is; it belongs to the material universe and is to be investigated by ordinary methods. But to say this is by no means to deny that it may have mental and spiritual functions to subserve in some other order of existence, as matter has in this.

The ether of space is at least the great engine of continuity. It may be much more, for without it there could hardly be a material universe at all. Certainly, however, it is essential to continuity; it is the one all-permeating substance that binds the whole of the particles of matter together. It is the uniting and binding medium without which, if matter could exist at all, it could exist only as chaotic and isolated fragments: and it is the universal medium of communication between worlds and particles. And yet it is possible for people to deny its existence, because it is unrelated to any of our senses, except sight—and to that only in an indirect and not easily recognized fashion.

To illustrate the thorough way in which we may be unable to detect what is around us unless it has some link or bond which enables it to make appeal, let me make another quotation from Sir J. J. Thomson's address at Winnipeg in 1909. He is leading up to the fact that even single atoms, provided they are fully electrified with the proper atomic charge, can be detected by certain delicate instruments—their field of

force bringing them within our ken—whereas a whole crowd of unelectrified ones would escape observation.

The smallest quantity of unelectrified matter ever detected is probably that of neon, one of the inert gases of the atmosphere. Professor Strutt has shown that the amount of neon in 1/20 of a cubic centimeter of the air at ordinary pressures can be detected by the spectroscope; Sir William Ramsay estimates that the neon in the air only amounts to one part of neon in 100,000 parts of air, so that the neon in 1/20 of a cubic centimeter of air would only occupy at atmospheric pressure a volume of half a millionth of a cubic centimeter. When stated in this form the quantity seems exceedingly small, but in this small volume there are about ten million million molecules. Now the population of the earth is estimated at about fifteen hundred millions, so that the smallest number of molecules of neon we can identify is about 7,000 times the population of the earth. In other words, if we had no better test for the existence of a man than we have for that of an unelectrified molecule we should come to the conclusion that the earth is uninhabited.

The parable is a striking one, for on these lines it might legitimately be contended that we have no right to say positively that even space is uninhabited. All we can safely say is that we have no means of detecting the existence of non-planetary immaterial dwellers, and that unless they have some link or bond with the material they must always be physically beyond our ken. We may, therefore, for practical purposes legitimately treat them as non-existent until such link is discovered, but we should not dogmatize about them. True agnosticism is legitimate, but not the dogmatic and positive and gnostic variety.

For I hold that science is incompetent to make comprehensive denials, even about the ether, and that it goes wrong when it makes the attempt. Science should not deal in negations: it is strong in affirmations, but nothing based on abstraction ought to presume to deny outside its own region. It often happens that things ab-

stracted from and ignored by one branch of science may be taken into consideration by another: Thus, chemists ignore the ether; mathematicians may ignore experimental difficulties; physicists ignore and exclude live things; biologists exclude mind and design; psychologists may ignore human origin and human destiny; folk-lore students and comparative mythologists need not trouble about what modicum of truth there may be in the legends which they are collecting and systematizing, and microscopists may ignore the stars. Yet none of these ignored things should be denied.

Denial is no more infallible than assertion. There are cheap and easy kinds of scepticism, just as there are cheap and easy kinds of dogmatism; in fact, scepticism can become viciously dogmatic, and science has to be as much on its guard against personal predilection in the negative as in the positive direction. An attitude of universal denial may be very superficial.

To doubt everything or to believe everything are two equally convenient solutions; both dispense with the necessity of reflection.

All intellectual processes are based on abstraction. For instance, history must ignore a great multitude of facts in order to treat any intelligently: it selects. So does art; and that is why a drawing is clearer than reality. Science makes a diagram of reality, displaying the works, like a skeleton clock. Anatomists dissect out the nervous system, the blood vessels and the muscles, and depict them separately—there must be discrimination for intellectual grasp—but in life they are all merged and cooperating together; they do not really work separately, though they may be studied separately. A scalpel discriminates: a dagger or a bullet crashes through everything. That is life—or rather death. The laws of nature are a diagrammatic

framework, analyzed or abstracted out of the full comprehensiveness of reality.

Hence it is that science has no authority in denials. To deny effectively needs much more comprehensive knowledge than to assert. And abstraction is essentially not comprehensive: one can not have it both ways. Science employs the methods of abstraction and thereby makes its discoveries.

The reason why some physiologists insist so strenuously on the validity and self-sufficiency of the laws of physics and chemistry, and resist the temptation to appeal to unknown causes—even though the guiding influence and spontaneity of living things are occasionally conspicuous as well as inexplicable—is that they are keen to do their proper work; and their proper work is to pursue the laws of ordinary physical energy into the intricacies of “colloidal electrolytic structures of great chemical complexity” and to study its behavior there.

What we have clearly to grasp, on their testimony, is that for all the terrestrial manifestations of life the ordinary physical and chemical processes have to serve. There are not new laws for living matter, and old laws for non-living, the laws are the same; or if ever they differ, the burden of proof rests on him who sustains the difference. The conservation of energy, the laws of chemical combination, the laws of electric currents, of radiation, etc.—all the laws of chemistry and physics—may be applied without hesitation in the organic domain. Whether they are sufficient is open to question, but as far as they go they are necessary; and it is the business of the physiologist to seek out and demonstrate the action of those laws in every vital action.

This is clearly recognized by the leaders, and in the definition of physiology by

Burdon Sanderson he definitely limited it to the study of "ascertainable characters of a chemical and physical type." In his address to the Subsection of Anatomy and Physiology at York in 1881 he spoke as follows:

It would give you a true idea of the nature of the great advance which took place about the middle of this century if I were to define it as the epoch of the death of "vitalism." Before that time, even the greatest biologists—*e. g.*, J. Müller—recognized that the knowledge biologists possessed both of vital and physical phenomena was insufficient to refer both to a common measure. The method, therefore, was to study the processes of life in relation to each other only. Since that time it has become fundamental in our science not to regard any vital process as understood at all unless it can be brought into relation with physical standards, and the methods of physiology have been based exclusively on this principle. The most efficient cause [conducting to the change] was the progress which had been made in physics and chemistry, and particularly those investigations which led to the establishment of the doctrine of the conservation of energy. . . .

Investigators who are now working with such earnestness in all parts of the world for the advance of physiology have before them a definite and well-understood purpose, that purpose being to acquire an exact knowledge of the chemical and physical processes of animal life and of the self-acting machinery by which they are regulated for the general good of the organism. The more singly and straightforwardly we direct our efforts to these ends, the sooner we shall attain to the still higher purpose—the effectual application of our knowledge for the increase of human happiness.

Professor Gotch, whose recent loss we have to deplore, puts it more strongly. He says:

It is essentially unscientific to say that any physiological phenomenon is caused by vital force.

I observe that by some critics I have been called a vitalist, and in a sense I am; but I am not a vitalist if vitalism means an appeal to an undefined "vital force" (an objectionable term I have never

thought of using) as against the laws of chemistry and physics. Those laws must be supplemented, but need by no means be superseded. The business of science is to trace out their mode of action everywhere, as far and as fully as possible; and it is a true instinct which resents the medieval practise of freely introducing spiritual and unknown causes into working science. In science an appeal to occult qualities must be illegitimate, and be a barrier to experiment and research generally; as, when anything is called an act of God—and when no more is said. The occurrence is left unexplained. As an ultimate statement such a phrase may be not only true, but universal in its application. But there are always proximate explanations which may be looked for and discovered with patience. So, lightning, earthquakes and other portents are reduced to natural causes. No ultimate explanation is ever attained by science: proximate explanations only. They are what it exists for; and it is the business of scientific men to seek them.

To attribute the rise of sap to vital force would be absurd, it would be giving up the problem and stating nothing at all. The way in which osmosis acts to produce the remarkable and surprising effect is discoverable and has been discovered.

So it is always in science, and its progress began when unknown causes were eliminated and treated as non-existent. Those causes, so far as they exist, must establish their footing by direct investigation and research; carried on in the first instance apart from the long-recognized branches of science, until the time when they too have become sufficiently definite to be entitled to be called scientific. Outlandish territories may in time be incorporated as states, but they must make their claim good and become civilized first.

It is well for people to understand this definite limitation of scope quite clearly, else they wrest the splendid work of biologists to their own confusion—helped, it is true, by a few of the more robust or less responsible theorizers, among those who should be better informed and more carefully critical in their philosophizing utterances.

But, as is well known, there are more than a few biologists who, when taking a broad survey of their subject, clearly perceive and teach that before all the actions of live things are fully explained, some hitherto excluded causes must be postulated. Ever since the time of J. R. Mayer it has been becoming more and more certain that, as regards performance of work, a living thing obeys the laws of physics, like everything else; but undoubtedly it initiates processes and produces results that without it could not have occurred—from a bird's nest to a honeycomb, from a deal box to a warship. The behavior of a ship firing shot and shell is explicable in terms of energy, but the discrimination which it exercises between friend and foe is not so explicable. There is plenty of physics and chemistry and mechanics about every vital action, but for a complete understanding of it something beyond physics and chemistry is needed.

And life introduces an incalculable element. The vagaries of a fire or a cyclone could all be predicted by Laplace's calculator, given the initial positions, velocities and the law of acceleration of the molecules; but no mathematician could calculate the orbit of a common house-fly. A physicist into whose galvanometer a spider had crept would be liable to get phenomena of a kind quite inexplicable, until he discovered the supernatural, *i. e.*, literally superphysical, cause. I will risk the assertion that life introduces something incal-

culable and purposeful amid the laws of physics; it thus distinctly supplements those laws, though it leaves them otherwise precisely as they were and obeys them all.

We see only its effect, we do not see life itself. Conversion of inorganic into organic is effected always by living organisms. The conversion under those conditions certainly occurs, and the process may be studied. Life appears necessary to the conversion, which clearly takes place under the guidance of life, though in itself it is a physical and chemical process. Many laboratory conversions take place under the guidance of life, and, but for the experimenter, would not have occurred.

Again, putrefaction, and fermentation, and purification of rivers, and disease, are not purely and solely chemical processes. Chemical processes they are, but they are initiated and conducted by living organisms. Just when medicine is becoming biological, and when the hope of making the tropical belt of the earth healthily habitable by energetic races is attracting the attention of people of power, philosophizing biologists should not attempt to give their science away to chemistry and physics. Sections D and H and I and K are not really subservient to A and B. Biology is an independent science, and it is served, not dominated, by chemistry and physics.

Scientific men are hostile to superstition, and rightly so, for a great many popular superstitions are both annoying and contemptible; yet occasionally the term may be wrongly applied to practises of which the theory is unknown. To a superficial observer some of the practises of biologists themselves must appear grossly superstitious. To combat malaria Sir Ronald Ross does not indeed erect an altar; no, he oils a pond—making libation to its presiding genii. What can be more ludicrous than

the curious and evidently savage ritual, insisted on by the United States officers, at that hygienically splendid achievement, the Panama Canal—the ritual of punching a hole in every discarded tin, with the object of keeping off disease! What more absurd, again—in superficial appearance—than the practise of burning or poisoning a soil to make it extra fertile!

Biologists in their proper field are splendid, and their work arouses keen interest and enthusiasm in all whom they guide into their domain. Most of them do their work by intense concentration, by narrowing down their scope, not by taking a wide survey or a comprehensive grasp. Suggestions of broader views and outlying fields of knowledge seem foreign to the intense worker, and he resents them. For his own purpose he wishes to ignore them, and practically he may be quite right. The folly of negation is not his, but belongs to those who misinterpret or misapply his utterances, and take him as a guide in a region where, for the time at least, he is a stranger. Not by such aid is the universe in its broader aspects to be apprehended. If people in general were better acquainted with science they would not make these mistakes. They would realize both the learning and the limitations, make use of the one and allow for the other, and not take the recipe of a practical worker for a formula wherewith to interpret the universe.

What appears to be quite certain is that there can be no terrestrial manifestation of life without matter. Hence naturally they say, or they approve such sayings as, "I discern in matter the promise and potency of all forms of life." Of all terrestrial manifestations of life, certainly. How else could it manifest itself save through matter? "I detect nothing in the organism but the laws of chemistry and phys-

ics," it is said. Very well; naturally enough. That is what they are after; they are studying the physical and chemical aspects or manifestations of life. But life itself—life and mind and consciousness—they are not studying, and they exclude them from their purview. Matter is what appeals to our senses here and now; materialism is appropriate to the material world; not as a philosophy, but as a working creed, as a proximate and immediate formula for guiding research. Everything beyond that belongs to another region, and must be reached by other methods. To explain the psychical in terms of physics and chemistry is simply impossible; hence there is a tendency to deny its existence, save as an epiphenomenon. But all such philosophizing is unjustified, and is really bad metaphysics.

So if ever in their enthusiasm scientific workers go too far and say that the things they exclude from study have no existence in the universe, we must appeal against them to direct experience. We ourselves are alive, we possess life and mind and consciousness, we have first-hand experience of these things quite apart from laboratory experiments. They belong to the common knowledge of the race. Births, deaths and marriages are not affairs of the biologist, but of humanity; they went on before a single one of them was understood, before a vestige of science existed. We ourselves are the laboratory in which men of science, psychologists and others, make experiments. They can formulate our processes of digestion, and the material concomitants of willing, of sensation, of thinking; but the hidden guiding entities they do not touch.

So also if any philosopher tells you that you do not exist, or that the external world does not exist, or that you are an automaton without free will, that all your

actions are determined by outside causes and that you are not responsible—or that a body can not move out of its place, or that Achilles can not catch a tortoise—then in all those cases appeal must be made to twelve average men, unsophisticated by special studies. There is always a danger of error in interpreting experience, or in drawing inferences from it; but in a matter of bare fact, based on our own firsthand experience, we are able to give a verdict. We may be mistaken as to the nature of what we see. Stars may look to us like bright specks in a dome, but the fact that we see them admits of no doubt. So also consciousness and will are realities of which we are directly aware, just as directly as we are of motion and force, just as clearly as we apprehend the philosophizing utterances of an agnostic. The process of seeing, the plain man does not understand; he does not recognize that it is a method of ethereal telegraphy; he knows nothing of the ether and its ripples, nor of the retina and its rods and cones, nor of nerve and brain processes; but he sees and he hears and he touches, and he wills and he thinks and is conscious. This is not an appeal to the mob as against the philosopher, it is appeal to the experience of untold ages as against the studies of a generation.

How consciousness became associated with matter, how life exerts guidance over chemical and physical forces, how mechanical motions are translated into sensations—all these things are puzzling and demand long study. But the fact that these things are so admits of no doubt; and difficulty of explanation is no argument against them. The blind man restored to sight had no opinion as to how he was healed, nor could he vouch for the moral character of the Healer, but he plainly knew that whereas he was blind now he saw. About that fact

he was the best possible judge. So it is also with “this main miracle that thou art thou, with power on thine own act and on the world.”

But although life and mind may be excluded from physiology, they are not excluded from science. Of course not. It is not reasonable to say that things necessarily elude investigation merely because we do not knock against them. Yet the mistake is sometimes made. The ether makes no appeal to sense, therefore some are beginning to say that it does not exist. Mind is occasionally put into the same predicament. Life is not detected in the laboratory, save in its physical and chemical manifestations; but we may have to admit that it guides processes, nevertheless. It may be called a catalytic agent.

To understand the action of life itself, the simplest plan is not to think of a microscopic organism, or any unfamiliar animal, but to make use of our own experience as living beings. Any positive instance serves to stem a comprehensive denial; and if the reality of mind and guidance and plan is denied because they make no appeal to sense, then think how the world would appear to an observer to whom the existence of men was unknown and undiscoverable, while yet all the laws and activities of nature went on as they do now.

Suppose, then, that *man* made no appeal to the senses of an observer of this planet. Suppose an outside observer could see all the events occurring in the world, save only that he could not see animals or men. He would describe what he saw much as we have to describe the activities initiated by life.

If he looked at the Firth of Forth, for instance, he would see piers arising in the water, beginning to sprout, reaching across in strange manner till they actually join or are joined by pieces attracted up from

below to complete the circuit (a solid circuit round the current). He would see a sort of bridge or filament thus constructed, from one shore to the other, and across this bridge insect-like things crawling and returning for no very obvious reason.

Or let him look at the Nile, and recognize the meritorious character of that river in promoting the growth of vegetation in the desert. Then let him see a kind of untoward crystallization growing across and beginning to dam the beneficent stream. Blocks fly to their places by some kind of polar forces; "we can not doubt" that it is by helio- or other tropism. There is no need to go outside the laws of mechanics and physics, there is no difficulty about supply of energy—none whatever—materials in tin cans are consumed which amply account for all the energy; and all the laws of physics are obeyed. The absence of any design, too, is manifest; for the effect of the structure is to flood an area up-stream which might have been useful, and to submerge a structure of some beauty; while down-stream its effect is likely to be worse, for it would block the course of the river and waste it on the desert, were it not that fortunately some leaks develop and a sufficient supply still goes down—goes down, in fact, more equably than before: so that the ultimate result is beneficial to vegetation, and simulates intention.

If told concerning either of these structures that an engineer, a designer in London, called Benjamin Baker, had anything to do with it, the idea would be preposterous. One conclusive argument is final against such a superstitious hypothesis—he is not there, and a thing plainly can not act where it is not. But although we, with our greater advantages, perceive that the right solution for such an observer would be the recognition of some unknown agency

or agent, it must be admitted that an explanation in terms of a vague entity called vital force would be useless, and might be so worded as to be misleading; whereas a statement in terms of mechanics and physics could be clear and definite and true as far as it went, though it must necessarily be incomplete.

And note that what we observe, in such understood cases, is an *interaction* of mind and matter; not parallelism nor epiphenomenalism nor anything strained or difficult, but a straightforward utilization of the properties of matter and energy for purposes conceived in the mind, and executed by muscles guided by acts of will.

But, it will be said, this is unfair, for we *know* that there is design in the Forth Bridge or the Nile Dam, we have seen the plans and understand the agencies at work; we know that it was conceived and guided by life and mind; it is unfair to quote this as though it could simulate an automatic process.

Not at all, say the extreme school of biologists whom I am criticizing, or ought to say if they were consistent, there is nothing but chemistry and physics at work anywhere; and the mental activity apparently demonstrated by those structures is only an illusion, an epiphenomenon; the laws of chemistry and physics are supreme, and they are sufficient to account for everything!

Well, they account for things up to a point; they account in part for the color of a sunset, for the majesty of a mountain peak, for the glory of animate existence. But do they account for everything completely? Do they account for our own feeling of joy and exaltation, for our sense of beauty, for the manifest beauty existing throughout nature? Do not these things suggest something higher and nobler and more joyous, something for the sake of

which all the struggle for existence goes on?

Surely there must be a deeper meaning involved in natural objects. Orthodox explanations are only partial, though true as far as they go. When we examine each particolored pinnule in a peacock's tail, or hair in a zebra's hide, and realize that the varying shades on each are so placed as to contribute to the general design and pattern, it becomes exceedingly difficult to explain how this organized cooperation of parts, this harmonious distribution of pigment cells, has come about on merely mechanical principles. It would be as easy to explain the sprouting of the cantilevers of the Forth Bridge from its piers, or the flocking of the stones of the Nile Dam by chemiotaxis. Flowers attract insects for fertilization; and fruit tempts animals to eat it in order to carry seeds. But these explanations can not be final. We have still to explain the insects. So much beauty can not be necessary merely to attract their attention. We have further to explain this competitive striving towards life. Why do things struggle to exist? Surely the effort must have some significance, the development some aim. We thus reach the problem of existence itself, and the meaning of evolution.

The mechanism whereby existence entrenches itself is manifest, or at least has been to a large extent discovered. Natural selection is a *vera causa*, so far as it goes; but if so much beauty is necessary for insects, what about the beauty of a landscape or of clouds? What utilitarian object do those subserve? Beauty in general is not taken into account by science. Very well, that may be all right, but it exists, nevertheless. It is not my function to discuss it. No; but it is my function to remind you and myself that our studies do not exhaust the universe, and that if we dogmatize in a

negative direction, and say that we can reduce everything to physics and chemistry, we gibbet ourselves as ludicrously narrow pedants, and are falling far short of the richness and fullness of our human birthright. How far preferable is the reverent attitude of the eastern poet:

The world with eyes bent upon thy feet stands
in awe with all its silent stars.

Superficially and physically we are very limited. Our sense organs are adapted to the observation of matter; and nothing else directly appeals to us. Our nerve-muscle system is adapted to the production of motion in matter, in desired ways; and nothing else in the material world can we accomplish. Our brain and nerve systems connect us with the rest of the physical world. Our senses give us information about the movements and arrangements of matter. Our muscles enable us to produce changes in those distributions. That is our equipment for human life; and human history is a record of what we have done with these parsimonious privileges.

Our brain, which by some means yet to be discovered connects us with the rest of the material world, has been thought partially to disconnect us from the mental and spiritual realm, to which we really belong, but from which for a time and for practical purposes we are isolated. Our common or social association with matter gives us certain opportunities and facilities, combined with obstacles and difficulties which are themselves opportunities for struggle and effort.

Through matter we become aware of each other, and can communicate with those of our fellows who have ideas sufficiently like our own for them to be stimulated into activity by a merely physical process set in action by ourselves. By a timed succession of vibratory movements (as in speech and music), or by a static

distribution of materials (as in writing, painting and sculpture), we can carry on intelligent intercourse with our fellows; and we get so used to these ingenious and roundabout methods, that we are apt to think of them and their like as not only the natural, but as the only possible modes of communication, and that anything more direct would disarrange the whole fabric of science.

It is clearly true that our bodies constitute the normal means of manifesting ourselves to each other while on the planet; and that if the physiological mechanism whereby we accomplish material acts is injured, the conveyance of our meaning and the display of our personality inevitably and correspondingly suffer.

So conspicuously is this the case that it has been possible to suppose that the communicating mechanism, formed and worked by us, is the whole of our existence: and that we are essentially nothing but the machinery by which we are known. We find the machinery utilizing nothing but well-known forms of energy, and subject to all the laws of chemistry and physics—it would be strange if it were not so—and from that fact we try to draw valid deductions as to our nature, and as to the impossibility of our existing apart from and independent of these temporary modes of material activity and manifestation. We so uniformly employ them, in our present circumstances, that we should be on our guard against deception due to this very uniformity. Material bodies are all that we have any control over, are all that we are experimentally aware of; anything that we can do with these is open to us; any conclusions we can draw about them may be legitimate and true. But to step outside their province and to deny the existence of any other region because we have no sense organ for its appreciation, or be-

cause (like the ether) it is too uniformly omnipresent for our ken, is to wrest our advantages and privileges from their proper use and apply them to our own misdirection.

But if we have learned from science that evolution is real, we have learned a great deal. I must not venture to philosophize, but certainly from the point of view of science evolution is a great reality. Surely evolution is not an illusion; surely the universe progresses in time. Time and space and matter are abstractions, but are none the less real; they are data given by experience; and time is the keystone of evolution.

Thy centuries follow each other, perfecting a small wild flower.

We abstract from living moving reality a certain static aspect, and we call it matter; we abstract the element of progressiveness, and we call it time. When these two abstractions combine, cooperate, interact, we get reality again. It is like Poynting's theorem.

The only way to refute or confuse the theory of evolution is to introduce the subjectivity of time. That theory involves the reality of time, and it is in this sense that Professor Bergson uses the great phrase, "creative evolution."

I see the whole of material existence as a steady passage from past to future, only the single instant which we call the present being actual. The past is not non-existent, however; it is stored in our memories, there is a record of it in matter, and the present is based upon it; the future is the outcome of the present, and is the product of evolution.

Existence is like the output from a loom. The pattern, the design for the weaving, is in some sort "there" already; but whereas our looms are mere machines, once the guiding cards have been fed into them, the loom of time is complicated by a multitude

of free agents who can modify the web, making the product more beautiful or more ugly according as they are in harmony or disharmony with the general scheme. I venture to maintain that manifest imperfections are thus accounted for, and that *freedom* could be given on no other terms, nor at any less cost.

The ability thus to work for weal or woe is no illusion, it is a reality, a responsible power which conscious agents possess; wherefore the resulting fabric is not something preordained and inexorable, though by wide knowledge of character it may be inferred. Nothing is inexorable except the uniform progress of time; the cloth must be woven, but the pattern is not wholly fixed and mechanically calculable.

Where inorganic matter alone is concerned, there everything is determined. Wherever full consciousness has entered, new powers arise, and the faculties and desires of the conscious parts of the scheme have an effect upon the whole. It is not guided from outside, but from within; and the guiding power is immanent at every instant. Of this guiding power we are a small but not wholly insignificant portion.

That evolutionary progress is real is a doctrine of profound significance, and our efforts at social betterment are justified because we are a part of the scheme, a part that has become conscious, a part that realizes, dimly at any rate, what it is doing and what it is aiming at. Planning and aiming are therefore not absent from the whole, for we are a part of the whole, and are conscious of them in ourselves.

Either we are immortal beings or we are not. We may not know our destiny, but we must have a destiny of some sort. Those who make denials are just as likely to be wrong as those who make assertions: in fact, denials are assertions thrown into negative form. Scientific men are looked

up to as authorities, and should be careful not to mislead. Science may not be able to reveal human destiny, but it certainly should not obscure it. Things are as they are, whether we find them out or not; and if we make rash and false statements, posterity will detect us—if posterity ever troubles its head about us. I am one of those who think that the methods of science are not so limited in their scope as has been thought: that they can be applied much more widely, and that the psychic region can be studied and brought under law too. Allow us anyhow to make the attempt. Give us a fair field. Let those who prefer the materialistic hypothesis by all means develop their thesis as far as they can; but let us try what we can do in the psychical region, and see which wins. Our methods are really the same as theirs—the subject-matter differs. Neither should abuse the other for making the attempt.

Whether such things as intuition and revelation ever occur is an open question. There are some who have reason to say that they do. They are, at any rate, not to be denied off-hand. In fact, it is always extremely difficult to deny *anything* of a general character, since evidence in its favor may be only hidden and not forthcoming, especially not forthcoming at any particular age of the world's history, or at any particular stage of individual mental development. Mysticism must have its place, though its relation to science has so far not been found. They have appeared disparate and disconnected, but there need be no hostility between them. Every kind of reality must be **ascertained** and dealt with by proper methods. If the voices of Socrates and of Joan of Arc represent real psychical experiences, they must belong to the intelligible universe.

Although I am speaking *ex cathedra*, as one of the representatives of orthodox sci-

ence, I will not shrink from a personal note summarizing the result on my own mind of thirty years' experience of psychological research, begun without predilection—indeed with the usual hostile prejudice. This is not the place to enter into details or to discuss facts scorned by orthodox science, but I can not help remembering that an utterance from this chair is no ephemeral production, for it remains to be criticized by generations yet unborn, whose knowledge must inevitably be fuller and wider than our own. Your president therefore should not be completely bound by the shackles of present-day orthodoxy, nor limited to beliefs fashionable at the time. In justice to myself and my co-workers I must risk annoying my present hearers, not only by leaving on record our conviction that occurrences now regarded as occult can be examined and reduced to order by the methods of science carefully and persistently applied, but by going further and saying, with the utmost brevity, that already the facts so examined have convinced me that memory and affection are not limited to that association with matter by which alone they can manifest themselves here and now, and that personality persists beyond bodily death. The evidence to my mind goes to prove that discarnate intelligence, under certain conditions, may interact with us on the material side, thus indirectly coming within our scientific ken; and that gradually we may hope to attain some understanding of the nature of a larger, perhaps ethereal, existence, and of the conditions regulating intercourse across the chasm. A body of responsible investigators has even now landed on the treacherous but promising shores of a new continent.

Yes, and there is more to say than that. The methods of science are not the only

way, though they are our way, of arriving at truth.

Uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam grande secretum.

Many scientific men still feel in pugnacious mood towards theology, because of the exaggerated dogmatism which our predecessors encountered and overcame in the past. They had to struggle for freedom to find truth in their own way; but the struggle was a miserable necessity, and has left some evil effects. And one of them is this lack of sympathy, this occasional hostility, to other more spiritual forms of truth. We can not really and seriously suppose that truth began to arrive on this planet a few centuries ago. The pre-scientific insight of genius—of poets and prophets and saints—was of supreme value, and the access of those inspired seers to the heart of the universe was profound. But the camp-followers, the scribes and pharisees, by whatever name they may be called, had no such insight, only a vicious or a foolish obstinacy; and the prophets of a new era were stoned.

Now at last we of the new era have been victorious; we inherit the fruits of the age-long conflict, and the stones are in our hands. Let us not fall into the old mistake of thinking that ours is the only way of exploring the multifarious depths of the universe, and that all others are worthless and mistaken. The universe is a larger thing than we have any conception of, and no one method of search will exhaust its treasures.

Men and brethren, we are trustees of the truth of the physical universe as scientifically explored: let us be faithful to our trust.

Genuine religion has its roots deep down in the heart of humanity and in the reality of things. It is not surprising that by our methods we fail to grasp it: the actions

of the Deity make no appeal to any special sense, only a universal appeal; and our methods are, as we know, incompetent to detect complete uniformity. There is a principle of relativity here, and unless we encounter flaw or jar or change, nothing in us responds; we are deaf and blind, therefore, to the immanent grandeur around us, unless we have insight enough to appreciate the whole, and to recognize in the woven fabric of existence, flowing steadily from the loom in an infinite progress towards perfection, the ever-growing garment of a transcendent God.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

A marked feature of the present scientific era is the discovery of, and interest in, various kinds of atomism; so that continuity seems in danger of being lost sight of.

Another tendency is toward comprehensive negative generalizations from a limited point of view.

Another is to take refuge in rather vague forms of statement, and to shrink from closer examination of the puzzling and the obscure.

Another is to deny the existence of anything which makes no appeal to organs of sense, and no ready response to laboratory experiment.

Against these tendencies the author contends. He urges a belief in ultimate continuity as essential to science; he regards scientific concentration as an inadequate basis for philosophic generalization; he believes that obscure phenomena may be expressed simply if properly faced; and he points out that the non-appearance of anything perfectly uniform and omnipresent is only what should be expected, and is no argument against its real substantial existence.

OLIVER LODGE

THE TEACHING OF COLLEGE BIOLOGY

IN schools below college grade it is considered eminently desirable and necessary that the teacher shall have given some attention to the art of teaching. It is furthermore expected that he keep himself informed through meetings, reports, journals and discussions of progress in the art as well as the science he is expected to teach. He is expected to keep in touch with new ideas, in the subject matter and in the best methods of presenting them to his classes.

There appears to be a sharp distinction in this respect between these schools and colleges or universities. As a rule, college teachers are not expected to annoy themselves with principles of education or with methods of teaching. To do so is to ally oneself with prep. school ideas and associations. To be in open sympathy with any effort to arouse interest in the teaching side of one's profession is to lose caste with one's colleagues. Though primarily employed to teach, the consideration of one's specialty from the teaching standpoint is considered a necessary evil to be tolerated but not encouraged. Each new appointee is expected to adopt the university methods of his teacher or to stumble upon a plan which so frequently is a compromise between the limitations set by the institution and the bias of his training and experience, with little or no regard for the real needs of the student.

Very slowly there has developed a growing consciousness that the plans and methods that served so admirably during the last generation no longer met the needs of the college man or woman of the present day, particularly in the natural sciences. And the opinion has frequently been expressed that an exchange of ideas and experiences by men from different colleges or universities of the country would tend to clear the ground for an understanding of the nature and scope of the biology courses in schools of college grade. It was felt that the first effort should be directed toward a study of the introductory course in biology, the only one that the great majority of college students ever take.