all my shots which hit outside them we sha'n't count." If we eliminate those who teach for nothing at all, why not disregard those who get less than a specified sum, say $1,500? It would make a still more favorable showing for the average. The writer must confess inability to follow his critic's logic in this.

The writer has no prejudice against Temple College. It may be doing the worthy work your correspondent vouches for. The writer's passing curiosity was aroused by the fact that it appears to provide for the needs of 2,343 students, and a teaching staff of 198, out of an entire annual expenditure of $72,895, and so he gave voice to it. When all the facts are known, it is quite possible that this institution may be found to have sounder standards than many another guilty of extravagant and ostentatious expenditures. The more light we can get on these points the better.

After all, your correspondent and the writer don't disagree on the main point at issue, namely, that honest and reliable statistics are vitally necessary. Only, the writer was laboring under the impression that, so far as concerned data not previously common property, he was supplying to a slight extent just that kind of accurate material. Assuredly he has made effort enough to have it so; his conscience acquits him on that score. And it will take rather more convincing proof than that offered by this correspondent to shake his faith in its value. GUIDO H. MARX

WARNING TO ZOOLOGISTS AND OTHERS

ZOOLOGISTS and geologists generally are warned that a clever swindler is making a canvass of the zoologists of New York, seeking money under false pretenses. He operates by claiming to be the "nephew" of some well-known scientist who is a personal friend of the intended victim; and the skill and thoroughness with which he prepares each case is fairly amazing. He knows thoroughly the scientific men of Washington, and especially those of the National Museum and the Cosmos Club.

In person he is tall (about 5 feet 10 inches), neatly and cleanly dressed, smoothly shaven and weighs about 170 pounds. He can instantly be recognized by his broad, flat face, small shifty eyes set widely apart, wide mouth, flabby lips and a long conspicuous row of upper teeth, all of them very evenly discolored by tobacco. When attempting to work his game, he laughs nervously fully half the time that he is talking.

If any intended victim of this man will hand him over to a policeman, I will very willingly arrange for witnesses to appear against him, for the purpose of landing him where he belongs. W. T. HORNADAY

NEW YORK ZOOLOGICAL PARK,
July 8, 1909

WE have also received the following statement from the secretary of the Smithsonian Institution: A man familiar with scientific men of Washington and New York, claiming to be a nephew of the secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, has recently been securing money as a personal loan from friends of the secretary upon false pretenses. The secretary has no such nephew; the man is a swindler. He may be described as follows: Tall and large, weight about 165 pounds; Eskimo-like face, smoothly shaven; mouth, wide; lips, flabby; long conspicuous row of upper teeth evenly discolored by tobacco; age about 35; carries head inclined to the right; laughs almost constantly while talking.

SCIENTIFIC BOOKS

Ethics. By JOHN DEWEY and JAMES H. TUFTS. New York, Henry Holt and Co. Pp. xiii + 618.

Characteristic phases of ethical study during the last twenty-five years are the interest shown in the history of morality and the attention given to social, economic and political questions. The works of Letourneau, Sutherland, Westermarck and Hobhouse are able examples of the fruitfulness of the genetic method in ethical science, while the books of Wundt, Paulsen and Bergemann combine with the historical and theoretical treatment a discussion of the larger social problems that are agitating the civilized peoples of to-day.

A noteworthy addition to this latter group of books on ethics is the volume written by Professors Dewey and Tufts. In its first part it examines the beginnings and growth of morality, describing certain aspects of group life and tracing the process of moral development in its general outlines, ending with specific illustrations of the process taken from the life of Israel, Greece and modern civilization. Part II., which represents Professor Dewey's contribution to the book, analyzes conduct on the inner personal side. It seeks to find the meaning of moral action (The Moral Situation, Problems of Moral Theory), discusses the typical answers which have been made to this question (Types of Moral Theory), tries to discover the principles underlying moral judgments and moral conduct (Conduct and Character, Happiness and Conduct, Happiness and Social Ends, Place of Reason in the Moral Life, Place of Duty in the Moral Life, Place of Self in the Moral Life), and ends with an examination of the fundamental virtues. Part III. is entitled The World of Action and studies conduct as action in society. The attention is here centered upon three phases of conduct which are of especial interest and importance: political rights and duties, the production, distribution and ownership of wealth, and the relations of domestic and family life (Social Organization and the Individual, Civil Society and the Political State, The Ethics of the Economic Life, Some Principles in the Economic Order, Unsettled Problems in the Economic Order, The Family).

The plan of the book is good. It is important that the student be made acquainted with the facts of moral life, with the moral ideas and practises of the race in their evolution, that he study the principles of morality, and finally that he receive some guidance in the application of this knowledge to the problems of individual and social life. It is not easy, however, to carry out so comprehensive a plan within the narrow limits of a single text-book. There is little wonder therefore that the reader should at times wish for a somewhat fuller treatment; so much matter is often compressed into a narrow compass that only a student already familiar with the subject can thoroughly appreciate it. This is particularly true of the chapter on the Hebrew Moral Development and the chapter on the Virtues. But as the bibliographies given at the end of each chapter are excellent, no person possessed of the reading habit need remain in darkness.

Another characteristic of modern ethics is its desire to do justice to the different ethical theories and movements which have divided thought and practice. In this respect too the book before us exemplifies the spirit of the times. Assuming as it does that there is some germ of truth in each one of the great schools, it seeks to make peace between them, choosing sanely that which is valuable in each. Thus in the consideration of the controversy between the "attitude theory" and the "result theory" the conclusion is reached that it is an error to split a voluntary act which is single and entire into two unrelated parts, "inner" and "outer," "motive" and "end." A "mere" motive which does not do anything, which makes nothing different, is not a genuine motive at all, and hence is not a voluntary act. Consequences which are not intended, which are not personally wanted and chosen and striven for, are no part of a voluntary act (p. 238). And as only voluntary acts are morally judged, "the appropriate subject-matter of moral judgment is the disposition of the person as manifested in the tendencies which cause certain consequences, rather than others, to be considered and esteemed—foreseen and desired. Disposition, motive, intent are then judged good or bad according to the consequences they tend to produce" (p. 262).

This would seem to be the correct solution of the conflict between the Kantians and the Utilitarians on this point. The question as to the *nature* of these consequences is handled in the same impartial way; we get another searching analysis of Utilitarianism and the opposing views, and an excellent criticism of psychological hedonism (chapters XIV., XV.). The net result of the discussion is:

(1) That happiness consists in the fulfillment in their appropriate objects (or the anticipation of such fulfillment) of the powers of the self manifested in desire, purposes, efforts; (2) true happiness consists in the satisfaction of those powers of the self which are of higher quality; (3) that the man of good character, the one in whom these powers are already active, is the judge, in the concrete, of happiness and misery (p. 280).

This view avoids the exaggerations of both hedonism and perfectionism; it shows also the influence of Professor Dewey's earlier idealistic training. But another question comes up here, and that is the time-honored controversy between individualism and universalism. And here too later Utilitarianism and German idealism join hands.

The genuinely moral person is one in whom the habit of regarding all capacities and habits of the self from the social standpoint is formed and active. Such an one forms his plans, regulates his desires, and hence performs his acts with reference to the effect they have upon the social groups of which he is a part (p. 298).

The true or final happiness of an individual lies not in the objective achievement of results, but in the supremacy within the character of an alert, sincere and persistent interest in those habits and institutions which forward common ends among men (p. 301).

Regard for the happiness of others means *regard for those conditions and objects which permit others freely to exercise their own powers from their own initiative, reflection and choice* (p. 302).

Moral worth consists in a readiness to regard the general happiness even against contrary promptings of personal comfort and gain (p. 364). This idea of the place of the self in the moral life is worked out in an interesting chapter XVIII., which discusses Self-Denial, Self-Assertion, Self-Love and Benevolence, and the Good as Self-Realization. The final word is that

The problem of morality is the formation, out of the body of original instinctive impulses which compose the natural self, of a voluntary self in which socialized desires and affections are dominant, and in which the last and controlling principle of deliberation is the love of the objects which will make this transformation possible. If we identify, as we must do, the interests of such a character with the virtues, we may say with Spinoza that happiness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself (p. 397).

Morality, then, consists in the social attitude; the highest type of moral men consciously aim at the social good. This type is, according to Professor Tufts, the product of moral evolution; on the third level of conduct, the level of conscience, conduct is regulated by a standard which is both social and rational, and which is examined and criticized (p. 38). It is the stage of complete morality, which is reached "only when the individual recognizes the right or chooses the good freely, devotes himself heartily to its fulfillment, and seeks a progressive social development in which every member of society shall share" (p. 73). And

It is as true of progressive society as of stationary society, that the moral and the social are one. The virtues of the individual in a progressive society are more reflective, more critical, involve more exercise of comparison and selection, than in customary society. But they are just as socially conditioned in their origin and as socially directed in their manifestation (pp. 434 f.).

And it is this social standard that Professor Tufts applies in his sane discussions of the social, economic, political and domestic problems to which the last third of the book is devoted.

Persons of individualistic temperament will feel that the social element is somewhat exaggerated in these accounts. They may grant that the moral is the social in the sense that moral acts have to do with the ordering of social relations. And they may grant that the agent is moral when he strives for the social weal. But it may be questioned whether the social motive is the only moral motive, whether acts prompted by the sense of obligation or the love of virtue are non-moral. At the same time the rules of morality are largely social in their origin and purpose, and the social ideal is the guiding principle of moral evolution.

The book is a valuable addition to the many

able works on ethics that have been published in recent years and it is a credit to American scholarship.

Frank Thilly
Cornell University

Athletic Games in the Education of Women. By Gertrude Dudley, Director of the Women's Department of Physical Education, University of Chicago, and Frances A. Kellor, author of "Experimental Sociology," "Out of Work," etc. New York, Henry Holt & Co. Price $1.25 net.

Miss Dudley and Miss Kellor have presented a study which is unique, not only with reference to the influence of athletic sports and particularly team games upon women, but with reference to the nature and meaning of athletic sports themselves. The titles of the first three chapters are significant of this fact. They are: Citizenship and Social Education, Educational Value of Athletics, Instructors—their Responsibility and Training.

The plan of the book, after presenting these general sociological and pedagogical considerations, involves a discussion of athletics for girls as now carried on in secondary schools, colleges, universities and clubs. It involves also a discussion of the nature and effects of competition, and particularly of competition in public. The influence of games in promoting self-control, cooperation, fair play, loyalty, courage, responsibility, discipline, is discussed. The book takes up the matter of training in general and training specifically for basket ball, field hockey, etc.

The philosophical point of view taken is that the instinct feelings back of athletics are in the main those that make and control masculine character; that the ability to do team work is developed in the male by playing team games, such as baseball; and that modern woman, in her growing relationship to the community has need of these same elements of capacity for subordinating the self to the whole, of "playing the game," that a man gets through his athletics. The authors add: "These qualities are not essentially masculine. They are but human qualities, needed for human fellowship." There is frank recognition of the fact that the ethical element is secured only when the games are wisely conducted, and that too often only evil results are secured from badly managed athletics.

A question is raised in the mind of the reviewer as to the truth of the first assumption. Is woman really changing her relation to society? Is the present world-wide wave of unrest among women symptomatic of a permanent biological or sociological readjustment; and if such is the case, is the readjustment to come about through the social discipline of the female, by the same means through which the male has been disciplined? Are the social instinct feelings which have been so closely connected with woman's life —as far back as the ages of savagery—to be changed and developed into instinct feelings that tend toward the team spirit? The query is raised, but in the nature of the case it can not perhaps be answered, for it is easier to look back than to look forward.

Luther Halsey Gulick

New York,
June 15, 1909

Fishes of the Russian Empire and of Africa

A much-needed "Preliminary Synopsis of the Fishes of the Russian Empire" from a systematic and geographical point of view has been published by V. I. Gratzianow. It is dated on the title page, Moscow, 1907, but the copy in the Smithsonian Library was received April 3, 1909. The work is entirely in Russian and consequently will be of little use to most ichthyologists except for what may be gathered from the scientific names. The classification of Jordan is adopted mainly. 948 species are enumerated under 331 genera and 101 families. Dichotomous tables are given for the various groups.

The first volume of a "Catalogue of the Fresh-water Fishes of Africa in the British Museum (Natural History)," by George Albert Boulenger, has been published by the museum. It embraces the Selachians and the Teleostomes down to and including the Cyprinoid genera *Labeo, Discognathus* and *Varicorhinus*. Descriptions of all the species