SCIENCE

A WEEKLY JOURNAL DEVOTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, PUBLISHING THE OFFICIAL NOTICES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1908

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MSS. intended for publication and books, etc., intended for review should be sent to the Editor of SCIENCE, Garrison-on-Hudson, N. Y.

DEMOCRACY AND SCHOLARSHIP

THE most noteworthy fact in nineteenth century history is the onward sweep of democracy. It has shown itself not only in the formal establishment of republican forms of government, but in the virtual establishment of the power of the people in countries where aristocratic and monarchic forms of government have been maintained. Broadly speaking, democracy has established itself in many directions, if not in the complete absorption of political power, in monarchic England and in imperial Germany, as truly as in the republican United States of America. It has made its way sometimes by violence, as in the revolutions which in the middle part of the last century agitated various countries of Europe; but, generally speaking, its greatest progress has been by agitation, education and constitutional methods. Nor is the movement stopped. It is rather going on with increased momentum. The world is destined to see more democracy among a larger number of people and over still wider areas and in more countries than is the case now. The masses are demanding a wider recognition, through a more extended suffrage, in Germany, in Portugal, in Austria-Hungary, in Russia, in Persia and in India. Indeed, they have already won it in Austria-Hungary, and it is unlikely that the worn-out machinery of the old Russian government can stand much longer in their way.

Democracy has not won its way, however, without arousing a good deal of criticism and many somewhat doleful prognos-

tications of the evils that its success will surely bring in its train. There are prophets, not a few, crying in the wilderness of exploded political and social conditions that the success of democracy means the decay of refinement, the destruction of the higher ethical, intellectual and spiritual motives and ambitions; and the substitution of the gray gloom of mediocrity, in all departments of life, for the brilliant, if sometimes flaunting, diversity and exuberance of talent and activity that are fostered in the supposedly more genial atmosphere of an aristocracy. Nor are these critics of democracy so unimportant as to deserve scant attention. It is not necessary to go back to the great names of Aristotle and the many other critics, who, during the dark period of the suppression, or non-existence, of democracy found the richest and best of human existence in its absence. Within the limits of the nineteenth century we find many brilliant names in the list of those who deprecate the success of the democratic movement, and insist that the richest fruits of civilization can not be gathered in a democratic society.

It is doubtful whether we can find a more incisive presentation of the comparative merits and demerits of aristocracy and democracy in the literary pyrotechnics of Lecky, the crystal clear and cold presentation of Matthew Arnold, the dispassionate scientific exposition of Herbert Spencer, or the historical ponderosity of Sumner Maine, than is given in the simple but brilliant passage from De Tocqueville in which, while displaying an affectionate regard for democracy, he dwells with a lingering fondness on the advantages of aristocracy. He remarks:

> If it be your intention to confer a certain elevation upon the human mind, and to teach it to regard the things of this world with generous feelings; to inspire men with the scorn of mere temporal advantages; to give birth to living convictions, and to keep alive the spirit of honorable devotedness; if you hold it to be a good thing to refine the habits, to embellish the manners and cultivate the arts of a nation, and to promote the love of poetry, of beauty and of renown—if you believe such to be the principal object of society, you must avoid the government of a democracy. But, if you hold it to be expedient to divert the moral and intellectual activity of man to the production of comfort, and to the acquirement of the necessaries of life; if a clear understanding be more profitable to men than genius; if your object be not to stimulate the fruits of heroism but to create habits of peace; if you had rather behold vices than crimes and are content to meet with fewer noble deeds, provided offences be diminished in the same proportion; if, instead of living in the midst of a brilliant state of society, you are contented to have prosperity around you—if such be your desires, you can have no surer means of satisfying them than by equalizing the conditions of men and establishing democratic institutions.

Of all the theoretical criticisms that have been directed, or are now directed, against democracy, we are concerned for our present purpose only with that which alleges the hostility of democracy to scholarship and its manifestations in culture, literature, art, poetry and philosophy—the intellectual and spiritual essence of civilization. We turn, therefore, to inquire a little more closely into this so-called incompatibility.

It is asserted with much show of logic and much parade of evidence that democracy and scholarship are irreconcilable. The brilliant critic of democracy in America in its early days has remarked that high scholarship can not flourish in a democracy, since the desire of democracy is to utilize knowledge and not to discover it. He asserts that the pure passion for knowledge "can not come into being and into growth as easily in a democratic as in an aristocratic society, for the reason that men's minds are in a constant state of agitation in a democracy, that prolonged meditation is impossible, and that men are

more intent on knowing what will be of material benefit then on discovering truth from the love of it." One defendant of democracy, overwhelmed with the sense of its failure in this respect, tells us that "aristocracy distributes political power and rewards in favor of intelligence and at the expense of justice; democracy distributes them at the expense of intelligence, while trying, perhaps unsuccessfully, to satisfy the claims of justice."

It is hardly worth while to spend time criticizing the somewhat preposterous statement that aristocracy favors culture more than democracy. For, in the first place, aristocracy as a form of government and of society has had a far longer lease of life in the world's history than has democracy, so that a fair comparison can not be made. Moreover, we certainly can not say that the members of any aristocracy have been the developers of culture, or its exponents. It is probably true that more of them have been devoted to the racing track than to poetry and art, and to the exploitation of the rest of society by war and government than to the promotion of their interests by letters and the arts. The long list of names great in science, art, poetry, literature and philosophy is composed largely if not mainly of those of poor men of the middle or lower class. The only sense in which it can be claimed that an aristocracy is favorable to culture is that its members act as patrons of culture and have aided its devotees. But the claim is too great, if it is meant to be exclusive. The heroes and martyrs of civilization have as often gnawed crusts and fed on crumbs as they have sat at the banquet table of aristocracy as equals. What aristocrat paid for the Acropolis? Was it the classes or the masses that inspired Watt, Fulton, Shakespere, Milton, Kant, Voltaire?

When one sits in that little room in Dresden and feels stirring within himself the spiritual ideals of a hundred generations of his race, is he to feel grateful to any aristocracy or to any aristocrat for the immortal work of Raphael? Is it not rather true that that great work is the expression of the spiritual ideals and life of the common people and that it was made possible by the beneficence of that great democratic institution, the Roman Catholic Church? The possession of wealth, whether in railroad bonds or broad acres, does not prepossess its owner in favor of culture. That is a matter of the spirit. If the spirit is present the leisure that wealth gives aids, to be sure, but it never can create, culture.

Later prophets warn us that democratic materialism, commercialism and the demand for the practical are killing pure science and throttling literature. But yesterday a Cassandra voice in our midst announced that there is no scholarship in this democratic country of ours, and a representative of a people, many of whom like to claim that there is no scholarship but among themselves, proposes to promote it here by killing off two thirds of the professors in our university. When these critics are told to look about them and see what this democratic people of ours is doing to promote higher education and to stimulate scholarship and research by their great public school system and their state universities, unable to deny the facts, they take refuge in a subterfuge. They tell us, as an eastern university president did, not long since, that while it is true that many of the states are promoting higher education, it is a kind of higher education which is not consonant with, but antagonistic to, culture. We are told that the state universities may develop practical education, that from them we may look for great results in engineering and in agriculture, and in all those matters which are sometimes criticized as "bread and butter"

studies; but for things of the spirit, for the cultivation of intellectual independence, for the pursuit of knowledge which seems to have no direct utilitarian application, we must look to those institutions which depend for their existence on private beneficence; that only here, free from the agitation and the tyranny of a democratic majority, can we hope that the pure light of learning will be kept burning. This line of criticism involves two assumptions, the mere statement of either one of which makes the whole position ridiculous. If the criticism be true, then it must be that the choice spirits are to be found at endowed universities only, that by some irresistible attraction they find their way to those institutions of learning to the loss of those which are supported by public money; or else it must be that the people, the democratic majority, refuse to have culture in their state institutions, an assumption which by no means is justified by historical facts or *a priori* theory.

In spite of all these criticisms, however, democracy is reaching out and taking possession of the field of higher education. "Those who believe that the practical instincts of men, as witnessed in a long stretch of history and over a broad area of political existence, do not easily go wholly wrong; and that in the case of a conflict of practical life with theoretical criticism the latter is most apt to be at fault, will be likely to demand a revision of theory" (Dewey). In view of this fact, I venture to put forward and to defend the thesis, not only that democracy is not incompatible with high scholarship in any line, but that, on the contrary, the cultivation of scholarship by democracy is necessary to its stability, progress and perpetuation. I assert that, using scholarship in a broad sense, the permanent interests of developed democracy demand that the pursuit of knowledge shall be made in its own interest, by its own servants, supported by itself, to the end that knowledge shall not be made to subserve the purposes of a class, but become the general property of the community for the promotion of its material, intellectual and spiritual well-being.

There is truth in the charge that scholarship has not developed in the United States, which may be regarded as a representative modern democracy. It is true that we are suffering now-a-days from an excess of materialism, from the arrogant assertions of positivistic science over imagination and spirituality; from the subjugation of idealism to realism, and from the too great importance attached to mere material prosperity. But it is not alone the greatest democracy of the world that is thus suffering, although perhaps it suffers more than others. The condition exists throughout the civilized world, and we hear protests against materialism from the apostles of the ideal in every country, whether monarchic, imperial or democratic. It is a passing phase of civilization. Civilization does not move forward equally in all directions at the same time. It develops first on this line, then in that direction, and later on still another plane. The great geographical and industrial discoveries of the past century have put emphasis upon material growth for the present, and the light of things spiritual seems low by contrast. But that light has not gone out. Mankind has seen similar conditions before, and now, as hitherto, they are but temporary.

For, in the first place, in the United States particularly, men have been obliged by the conditions attached to life in a new country to devote themselves to the pursuit of economic success. A nation, like an individual, can do only one great thing at a time. Our work during the first century of our existence was that of the conquest

of a continent. In the second place, democracy has not until lately joined itself with the educated classes for the promotion of scholarship, because it has distrusted scholars and scholarship for the reason that in the past they have been the allies of aristocracy. They have, in large measure, walked hand in hand with the oppressors of the people. The educated classes have chosen to identify themselves with the propertied classes rather than with the propertyless classes.

The truth is that most of the criticisms of democracy are founded on a misconception of its character and of its mode of declaring its will. Certainly, its most recent critics, like Mr. Lecky, Mr. Maine and Mr. Mallock, have confounded democracy with universal suffrage, which is a condition of democracy, but is not all of democracy; and then have misinterpreted the nature and effect of universal suffrage. "One of the great divisions of politics in our day," says Mr. Lecky, "is coming to be whether, as the last resort, the world should be governed by its ignorance or by its intelligence. According to the one party the preponderating power should be with education and property. According to the other the ultimate source of power, the supreme right of appeal and of control, belongs legitimately to the majority of the nation told by the head—or, in other words, to the poorest, the most ignorant, the most incapable, who are necessarily the most numerous." I deny that either experience or theory drives us to any such conclusion. I assert that universal suffrage does not make necessary the predominance of ignorance, nor democracy insistence upon intellectual equality. As Professor Giddings has truly put it: "It is not true that control by the ignorant implies the rule of ignorance." The expression of the will of a democratic people is the expression of a consensus of opinion. It is not simply the sum, or the difference between two sums, of single individual opinions each formed without reference to any other. The vote of a democratic people reflects a consensus of opinion and judgment originated and molded by their leaders. Hence, even if we should grant that democracy means the decision of matters by the mass of ignorant voters, it does not follow that their decision would be an ignorant decision.

Democracy may be either a form of government, or a form of the state, or a form of society. As a form of government it places direct control of all government matters in the hands of the whole body of voters, and no such government exists on a large scale. As a form of the state, democracy acts through representatives and its government is republican, like our own. As a form of society, democracy lodges ultimate power in all matters of societary character and interest in the hands of the whole body of the people. There is no need of a discussion of these differences here. For our present purpose we are concerned with democracy as a form of society and as a form of the state.

Democracy implies equality, but not necessarily equality of condition or status in all directions. It implies equality of civil and political rights. It may claim a closer approximation than we now have to social and economic equality. But it is not true, even in the United States, as De Tocqueville thought, that "the theory of equality is in fact applied to the intellect of man."

The observations of De Tocqueville were made at a time when democracy in this country was socially and economically homogeneous. At that time the economic condition of one citizen was approximately the same as that of another, and equality assumed the aspect of identity or sameness of condition in all respects. In a highly

developed or heterogeneous society, like our present, however, conditions are different. Here we find classes performing different services to the community and securing unequal rewards in proportion to the importance of their class functions. It is essential for the preservation of democracy, that under such conditions equality of opportunity to pass from one class to another shall remain absolutely open to all individuals. Great inequalities of material wealth are not incompatible with democratic government, or democratic society, but the pursuit of wealth as the principal object of the members of that society and its adoption as the criterion of personal success and worth, are a danger to democracy. It is necessary, therefore, to have tests of success and ideals of life, in addition to those of a mere economic character. Hence, we must have a variety of social classes in different important pursuits, success in each of which is as well thought of by the people and is as well rewarded by public applause as success in any other, and the opportunity to pursue any one of which is equally open to all. It is true, therefore, that in a democracy there is room for a class of scholars as well as for a class of carpenters. But it is not enough for my purpose to say that there is *a place* for scholarship in the democratic scheme. We must show the need for it and show that scholarship will supply the need.

Intellectual and spiritual inequality are established by nature, and no form of society can do away with them. Now the preservation of opportunity to secure equality of status in intellectual and spiritual matters, depends on the existence of an accessible class whose service is the promotion of scholarship and research and who are devoted to the service of the public. For, in the first place, the existence of this scholarly class and the promotion of scholarship will open up ever new lines of industrial opportunity and will therefore tend to prevent the permanent lodging of the power of wealth in any one group, since the poor man of to-day may be the rich man of to-morrow.

In the second place, and of far more importance, the promotion of scholarship and the existence of a scholarly class will furnish the true leaders of democracy. For the destiny of democracy will be determined, in the last analysis, by the character of the influential few who mold public opinion. The people demand and follow leaders. No race and no class can make progress without them. The opportunity for the talented to become leaders should be furnished, therefore, by a democratic society. The scholar is and should be the pioneer of such a society to discover new lands for democracy to possess; its frontiersman, to push forward the boundaries of its life, to enlarge the possibilities of its prosperity and happiness, to leaven its mass and create the conditions of a changing type of democratic citizenship. The pioneer discoveries of the scholar become in time the substance of the education and life of the democratic masses. As the problems of democracy become more numerous and complex the need for such leadership is more keenly felt. In its absence, caused in part by misunderstanding and distrust of those who are devoted to higher education, the people have turned to that curious and contemptible product called the "boss." But the boss can not always retain his leadership. He will retreat before the advance of intelligence. What is necessary is a proof that the scholar is a more honest and competent guide than the boss, and signs are not wanting that the public is learning to have more confidence in him. In short, if a democracy is to be stable, progressive and permanent, it must itself provide educational facilities which will maintain and

improve its material prosperity; educational facilities which will train men to uphold its political, ethical and intellectual ideals and to improve upon them by pushing forward the boundaries of knowledge by the discovery of new truth. It must train for its own leaders all who are capable of serving as such in any line of human activity or thought. This necessity involves the frank recognition of the fact that the doctrine of equality, which underlies democracy, can not be applied in the same sense in all directions. It means equality of status in civil and political matters, but not equality in economic condition, and, still less, in intellectual matters. Democracy will find its safety and growth only in a frank acceptance of the intellectual inequality of men, the selection of the superior as its leaders, and the provision of men and means to train these leaders as experts in its service in every line of its wants, including those whose special interest shall be the development and preservation of the intellectual and moral ideals and standards of the democracy. Unless it does this it will become the prey of the demagogue and of corrupt wealth.

But what kind of scholarship should a democracy support and in what ways can scholarship be shown to meet those needs of progress and leadership which I claim are necessary to the stability and permanence of a democratic society? By scholarship in this connection I mean not only the wide and deep knowledge of a particular subject, but the power to add new truth to the world's stock of knowledge which commonly goes under the name of research.

There is an idea not infrequently expressed that a publicly supported system of education, whether grade schools or universities, ought to be more concerned with those studies which are likely to contribute immediately or directly to earning a living than with those which have no immediate or direct connection with the acquisition of the material good things of life. I have already adverted to this thought, and I shall try in a moment to show that it is entirely without foundation, and that the continued success of a democracy not only permits but requires devotion to the pursuit of the most abstract sciences and the loftiest flights of imagination as well as to those more concrete subjects whose advance ministers to the immediate prosperity of an individual, a class or a community.

In considering this subject De Tocqueville roughly grouped all subjects of scientific pursuit into those which are theoretical, with no known application, those which are theoretical but whose study is carried on because the immediate application of the theory is obvious, and finally, the applied or so-called practical studies.

Of the three divisions into which we may group the lines of scholarly research the utility to democracy of what may be called practical scholarship and research is so obvious that we need not discuss it at length. This division of our subject comprises research in all those practical subjects which minister directly to the economic wants of the people. It comprises the whole group of applied sciences, including those engineering and agricultural subjects which have taken so prominent a place in our recent educational development. It is commendable and necessary to study how to make two blades of grass grow where one grew before, how to improve our soil so that the product of the acre shall continue to feed the growing multitude of the city and at the same time increase the profit of the farmer; how to harness the forces of nature to complicated machinery so that sufficient food and clothing shall be put within the reach of all. These things, I say, are desirable and neces-

sary, and it is natural that a new community with unaccumulated wealth should for a time devote all its energies to their accomplishment and promote the studies which accelerate them. No defense, therefore, is needed for the promotion of applied science at the public expense in a democratic community.

What shall we say, however, to justify the expenditure of public money to support people and supply means for inquiry into the abstract subjects of philosophy, mathematics, literature, history, psychology and similar studies, which, in the opinion of the masses and of most of the classes, are of "no use" and no direct utility to them? In the first place, we may say that there is no necessary conflict between such branches of study and the other group which we have just discussed. If there were, who would undertake to say which is the more important—subjects which promote the material welfare of the people or those which create and uplift their spiritual and intellectual ideals? There are times in the life of the nation when a Tyrtæus is needed as a leader more than a Cæsar. There are times when the enthusiasm for righteousness, the passion for truth, ebbs so low in the lives of individuals and nations that their welfare and progress, even in an economic sense, can be best promoted by arousing them to new enthusiasm and stirring them to new ideals. A democracy, therefore, is not compelled to choose between this kind of research and the other, as if it could not do both; as if, forsooth, it were compelled to choose which god it would serve. In the long run, applied science, theoretical science, and the abstract studies of a more speculative character must stand or fall together in the life of the people.

For, in the first place, as I have remarked, these lines of scholarship run into each other. "All experience proves that the spiritual is the first cause of the practical." In the eloquent words of Walter Bagehot, the "rise of physical science, the first great body of practical truth provable to all men, exemplifies this in the plainest way. If it had not been for quiet people who sat still and studied the sections of the cone, if other quiet people had not sat still and studied the theory of infinitesimals, or other quiet people had not sat still and worked out the doctrine of chances, the most dreamy moonshine as the purely practical mind would consider, of all human pursuits; if idle star gazers had not watched long and carefully the motions of the heavenly bodies, our modern astronomy would have been impossible, and without our astronomy our ships, our colonies, our seamen, all which makes modern life modern life, could not have existed. . . . It is the product of men whom their contemporaries thought dreamers, who . . . walked into a well from looking at the stars—who were believed to be useless to the world; who, to the practical mind, were mere theorizers, but without whose theories, of the study of which we sometimes grow so impatient, the practical results which we desire could not be reached."

Who could have foreseen that Franklin's experiment with the kite, with numberless other experiments that to the practical mind of the time seemed mere boy's play, would result in the vast modern practical development of electricity?

There are not many men in the ordinary walks of life who have ever heard the name of Willard Gibbs. Yet there is no name entitled to a more honorable place in the world of learning in the long list of those connected with Yale University since its foundation. He devoted his life to the study of an abstruse subject called vector analysis. In his application of this method of mathematical investigation to the study of the relations between heat and

the energy of chemical combination he contributed, in the words of Professor Ostwald, "untouched treasures in the greatest abundance, and of the greatest importance for the theoretical and experimental investigator, and revolutionized in some of its branches the theories of chemical science."

Last fall one of the professors of this university by chance read in French a folk lore story which, after some research, he found was common to the Scandinavian, the German, the Hebrew, and probably other, peoples. As a result of his investigation he read an important paper last December at the meeting of the Modern Language Association in Columbus, Ohio, trying to show that this story and the spiritual or ethical precepts underlying it were the common property of many nations. Was his time wasted? Can such an inquiry be of any use to the people of a democracy? I answer yes. It is of use for its own sake, because it reaches down and stirs again into activity the elemental feelings common to all nations, and leads them to think of the unity of the race and the oneness, if I may say so, of its basic, moral and intellectual ideas. It is defensible, too, on a lower, or utilitarian, ground. I can conceive of the use of the facts brought out by this investigation as a help in promoting the assimilation of the foreign elements of our population. One fact concerning our immigration, which more than any other stands in the way of rapid assimilation, is the feeling of separateness or alienation among thousands of the foreigners who are now coming to our shores. The Slav, the Magyar, the Italian, the Russian, the Jew, feels that there is nothing common to him and this new American life into the midst of whose hurly-burly he is thrust. The telling of a story which is the common property of many races, to a group of such foreigners, gives them a certain community of feeling and interest, helps to break down their feeling of separateness, and shows them that the distance between the emotional and intellectual nature of themselves and the native American is after all not so great. This is one of the keys to success in some social-settlement work.

The other day we laid at rest, with such poor honors as we could show, one of the gentlest spirits and most enthusiastic scholars of our group. Gustav Karsten had a passion for research in his chosen field. Although from my conversations with him I judge that he had no thought that his work was capable of any possible practical application, yet who shall say that in time to come his study of philology and his researches into the elements common to many languages and his study of phonetics, may not aid in producing a language that shall be the common property of the commercial world and promote that very practical life from which his subject of study was so far removed? It is not a new thing in experience for philological and historical research to produce political and practical, as well as scientific and literary, results.

But the study of abstract subjects has another defense than is found in the fact that they may unexpectedly contribute to the practical. Even a democracy has classes with spiritual and intellectual aspirations, and such studies tend to produce results that satisfy the desires and better the lives of some classes, at any rate, in the community. Now a democracy may not insist that public money spent on education shall be restricted to the kind of education that will benefit one class only. Every class in the community has a right to ask that its interests, the subjects to which its heart and mind turn, shall receive their due attention. To justify the promotion of scholarly study in cultural

subjects, it is enough, therefore, to show that in a democracy there is a class whose happiness is promoted by such studies.

But we may place our argument on yet higher ground. The defense of the maintenance of scholarship in abstract and purely theoretical subjects rests not merely on the possibility that they will help us to more or better economic opportunities, or that they will satisfy the cultural demands of a class. Their strongest defense lies in the fact that a democracy needs to develop scholarship pure and simple, in the abstract—philology, art, philosophy, history, literature—in order to subserve wants that can not be satisfied by any other kind of knowledge. The satisfaction of the higher wants of a democratic people is necessary to prevent the decay of democracy. If any evidence of this were needed we see it all about us as a result of the too exclusive attention that we have thus far given to merely economic or material development. The present evils of our body social and politic are largely due to our over-emphasis of wealth, and the undue honor we have attached to the class that has supplied our economic wants.

Carlyle expressed a great truth when he said that the people would have leaders. Democracy needs ideals and leaders to sustain itself. Few people do their own thinking. Most inherit or borrow their beliefs. In the past the masses have taken their ideals and leaders from the class whose interests were not at one with their own or not primarily devoted to them. Democracy must train its own leaders, set up its own standards, establish its own ideals. The true life of a people is intellectual and spiritual. Material prosperity is a means, not an end. No democracy can endure which rests content with material prosperity. It must have as its ideals, intelligence, honesty, honor, service, all that makes character for an individual; liberty, fraternity and equality of opportunity, for public life. It can get and keep these ideals only if it provides means to men to gather for it the world's knowledge, to add to this knowledge, to set standards of public opinion and to stir the moral and spiritual nature of the people. We should have less occasion to-day for the denunciation of iniquitous wealth and we should see less of the betrayal of honor and trust in high places, if we had laid more emphasis in the last generation upon the necessity of knowledge in leaders of our people. We should have a better political and social policy if we had trusted more in the leadership of men who know the race life, its changing ideals, its history, its experiences, and its impulses. In the absence of such leaders the people, in their desire to be led, have turned, as they always will do, to the nearest demagogue who professes to be appointed to "prepare the way of the Lord."

What means now are appropriate for training such leaders and for setting up such standards of democratic life? I answer research, scholarship, in history, literature, philosophy and art—the records of human experience, the interpretation of human life, the analysis of human motives—to supply inspiration and formulate ideals that may be woven into the life of the people and become the intellectual and spiritual inheritance of the nation; to frame and furnish the ideas and impulses that shall be the substance of the common consciousness and find expression as the consensus of public opinion through political action in the formulation of law, creed and the general social order.

The nineteenth century was one of great material development whose activity has hardly yet slackened. If democracy is to endure, or is not to sink into a materialism like communism, the twentieth century must develop our legal, political, social and

ethical ideals and institutions to a corresponding degree. In the absence of such development the only alternatives are the worship of materialism leading to the communistic or socialistic order, or the destruction of democracy by the propertied classes, who will not permit communism. For the prevention of either disaster the promotion of scholarship in every subject of study will help.

If any evidence were needed that democracy requires ideals and scholarly leaders we shall find it in the evils that we are suffering from in our present conditions. We are concerned with the necessity of solving certain great problems. The problem of poverty which is ever with us is crying constantly for a scientific and ethical solution. The problem of city government is one the treatment of which has made our democratic people the laughing stock of the world and has done more to discredit democracy and raise doubts about its future success and permanence than almost any other of its failures. The great problem of immigration with its necessity of assimilation of our foreign population and the consequent problems of the modification of our forms of government to adapt them to the spirit and race conditions of a new people, is looming large in the immediate future. The adjustment of class relations, our relations to the people across the sea whom we have recently tied to ourselves, the negro problem, the currency problem, the problem of taxation, whose present condition in almost every state in the union is a disgrace to the intelligence of the people—all of these are pressing on us for solution, and upon our success in solving them will depend the continuance of our republican institutions. To whom shall the people look for guidance? To the ward heeler and the boss? To the man in the street, as we have been doing, who wins a following by his glib eloquence? Or shall we turn to the men who have studied deeply into the history and the experience of other peoples in the lines in which these problems run? It is to the philosopher, the student of literature, the student of the social sciences, aye, to the poet and the artist as well as to the man with a sense of practical administration, to whom we must turn for proper ideals and correct principles, on which to solve these problems and handle these difficulties.

There are, indeed, some signs of a change from our practise of following ignorant bosses. We have put our federal bureau of corporations, our census bureau, many of the divisions of our department of agriculture and some other branches of our government service directly in charge of those who are scholars in their respective fields. One of the most prominent, if not the principal figure, of the American delegation at the recent Peace Conference was one of our group, known and honored for his scholarship in the subject of international law. It has been said recently that "no governor of a commonwealth can permanently command public confidence except he add to political shrewdness the gift of political idealism." And there is other evidence that "our country still aspires to be led by men who shall prove their claim for leadership not by concrete material achievements, but by their character and their ideals."

Thus, then, is the future progress and welfare and permanence of democracy bound up with its promotion of scholarship and research; the promotion of technical research for its material welfare; the promotion of research in the theoretical and abstract sciences and in the humanities, to furnish ideals and leaders, to satisfy its intellectual and spiritual needs. Democracy, if it thus supplies its own need for leadership, will not die. The equalization

of power is destined to spread further than it has, in industry and government—in every direction. It will be better balanced because it will depend more on natural and trained leadership. In the past the masses have depended for leaders on the capable few whose interests were aristocratic, because they had no other choice; and the present distrust of scholarship is simply, in part at least, a revulsion from this coercion. They will depend again on a chosen scholarly few, and because they choose to do so they will provide for and command and control their services in the interests of all. They will create a scholarly class devoted to the service of the people, supported by the people, and entrance to which is free to all who have natural talent and the capacity. The masses will recognize more and more that while seeking greater equality in civil and political rights, in legal status, in industrial opportunity and condition, the natural inequality based on differences of capacity, ability and talent can never be eradicated; that, therefore, they must be utilized in the service of the people. That to be devoted to the service of the people they must be supported by the people and must be looked to as the source of supply of the ideals and the leadership needed to keep active the intellectual and spiritual life necessary to the permanence of democratic institutions.

We must not shut our eyes to the fact that scholarship supported by a democracy is subjected to some peculiar dangers. In the first place, the scholar can not command results, and there is danger that the impatience of the public for results will imperil the prolonged support necessary for the quiet meditation without which scholarship can not flourish at all. This danger can be met only by educating the public, and there are signs that the educative process has begun.

In the second place, scholarship supported by democracy is subjected to danger to liberty of thought and opinion—a danger to which the minority is always exposed from the tyranny of the majority. There is danger always that unpopular truth will be rejected and its advocates persecuted. True, there are some who believe that that danger is passing away. I do not share their belief. I see no signs that the tyranny of popular opinion is any less to-day than it ever was, or that there is likely to be greater liberty of opinion in the future than in the past. It is true, still, as it always has been, of all those who are in advance of their times and who hold the lamp of spiritual and intellectual truth aloft for the guidance of the people that

> The age in which they live
> Will not forgive
> The splendour of the everlasting light
> That makes their foreheads bright,
> Nor the sublime forerunning of their time.

There is no means of removing this danger, although, fortunately, "in the development of the policy of the great labor organizations, there are signs that the wage earners are learning the truth that liberty is the mother of progress." It is questionable, however, whether it is a more serious danger than befalls a scholarship supported by an aristocracy. There is as much danger that in the latter case truth will be colored to meet the ideas of the supporters of the scholars and their work, as that in the latter case it will be colored to curry popular favor. The duty of the scholar is plain—he must be the servant, not the slave, of democracy. He must have the courage of the seeker after truth. He must be ready, if necessary, to be a martyr to public opinion for the sake of the truth he finds. The scholar must see to it, too, that he does not yield to popular clamor and emasculate education by popularizing learning. He must ever "insist that

studies which can never by any possibility be popular, or appeal even to any large number of students, but which have demonstrated their power to enlighten and to ennoble those who pursue them, shall not be given up in obedience to popular clamor, merely to make way for other things that seem to be of more immediate utility." Consequently, we must put in the curriculum of our graduate schools those subjects whose study best disciplines the mind and character, makes strong men, establishes high ideals; subjects the most abstract and far removed from the material needs of mankind, even though popular clamor in its mistaken zeal is against them.

The state of Illinois has taken a noteworthy step in the history of democratic government in appropriating money specifically for the support of a graduate school of the arts and sciences. It is evidence that the democratic people of Illinois believe that scholarship is necessary to progress, prosperity and the continuance of democratic ideals. Their act is evidence of the existence of at least a subconscious belief that only thus can the democratic institutions that have become endeared to us be made permanent. The public of this state has learned more rapidly, and in a way that the people of scarcely any other state has learned, the value of research in the arts and sciences, from the splendid success and service of applied science, particularly in agriculture and engineering. They are carrying the lesson over and showing that they believe that the satisfaction of the intellectual and moral needs of the masses is as important a matter for public support as their material prosperity, or economic progress. It is therefore a high trust that is committed to us. We are called on here to lay plans which will bear fruit in the enrichment of the spiritual and intellectual nature and life of the people of our state and country. We are called on to add to the sum of the world's knowledge in the name of and through the support of a democratic people, to the end that the world shall be a better world, that democracy in particular shall be able to follow truer ideals and reach a higher life than it can without such scholarship. We are called on to make the State University the center of knowledge and information for all matters relating to public life and private welfare, in the interest of the citizens, and to furnish them the means for their intellectual, ethical and spiritual growth.

DAVID KINLEY
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

PROFESSOR WHITMAN AND THE MARINE BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY

PROFESSOR WHITMAN'S services to biology as director of the Marine Biological Laboratory have been so notable and his retirement from that post is a matter of so much general interest that consent has been obtained to publish the following abstract from the minutes of the trustees of the laboratory:

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

August 8, 1908.

TO THE TRUSTEES OF THE MARINE BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY, WOODS HOLL, MASS.

Gentlemen: This year has brought the twenty-first birthday of the Marine Biological Laboratory. For these many years you have continued to honor me with the directorship of the laboratory. In late years I have so far drifted out of office and out of use that a formal resignation at this time can be scarcely more than an announcement of the fact accomplished. The time has arrived, however, when a reorganization seems to be imperatively demanded, and as a prelude thereto, I must ask you to accept this note as a somewhat belated announcement of my resignation of the office of director.

Let me take this opportunity to thank you one and all very heartily for the cordial support you have extended to me.

Respectfully,

C. O. WHITMAN