

FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
ASSOCIATION.

THE fourth meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held in Philadelphia, December 28-30, 1904, attended by about sixty members. In addition to the president's address, which was delivered on the evening of the twenty-ninth by Professor Ladd on the general subject, 'The Mission of Philosophy,' and which contained an able and eloquent plea for philosophy as a comprehensive and organized *Weltanschauung*, thirty papers were either actually read or read by title at the five sessions of the meeting. Two of the sessions were of special interest, that commemorative of the centenary of the death of Kant held on the afternoon of the first day of the meeting, and the joint session with the American Psychological Association held the following morning. At the Kant session, in which the newly formed Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology was represented by its secretary, Professor E. F. Buchner, of the University of Alabama, who read a paper, based on a careful comparison of passages, on 'Kant's Attitude towards Idealism and Realism,' one naturally looked to see what estimate American philosophers now put on the work of the most influential philosophical thinker of the past century. Five papers were read dealing with as many aspects of Kant's philosophy. The general impression which they made on the mind of at least one hearer was that, in the opinion of the most careful students, Kant is neither to be ignored, nor belittled, nor 'outflanked,' nor, on the other hand, to be unduly exalted, but to be critically studied, and that he still counts, if not as the paramount, at least as one of the most potent influences in the philosophical thinking of our time. Perhaps the widest divergence from Kant's teaching appeared in Pro-

fessor Royce's paper on 'Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics.' Royce held that the certainty of mathematical science is rightly no longer regarded as depending on constitutionally predetermined forms of perception. And yet in another respect he held Kant to have been unquestionably right, so far, namely, as he declared that constructive synthesis and observation of its ideal results are both necessary for mathematics, an insight which has profoundly influenced the progress of mathematical science. The nearest approach to a eulogy of Kant was in Professor Caldwell's paper on the 'Present Significance of Kant's Ethics.' Professor Caldwell contended that Kant's teaching had been misunderstood, and in particular that it was not open to the charge of mere formalism commonly brought against it; that the significance of Kant's ethics lay in his spiritual philosophy of human nature, a philosophy implied in all recent attempts to treat moral judgment as one of valuation, in recent epistemological assumptions about personality and in the theory of sovereignty or autonomy in the ethics of social democracy; that his emphasis on the standard as the law of personal dealing in a social realm frees us from many of the difficulties in the teleological moral philosophy of the present; and that his version of the standard is the one most consonant with a true theory of moral progress. Professor Tufts read a paper on the 'Significant and the Non-Essential in Kant's *Ästhetik*,' a part of his philosophy which was held to contain, perhaps, as large elements of permanent value as anything he ever wrote, and Professor G. W. Knox gave an interesting address on the 'Influence of Kant on Theology,' calling attention especially to the affinities between Kant's negative criticism of the ontological argument and the primacy he assigned to the practical reason and the theology of the school

of Ritschl. It is to be regretted that no more time was allowed for the discussion of these papers.

The first paper in the joint session with the Psychological Association, presided over by Professor W. James, was a criticism of Wundt's theory of feeling by Professor M. F. Washburn, of Vassar. The main point of the criticism was that the complexes of strain, excitement, etc., assumed by Wundt as feeling fusions really belong to an intermediate realm between sensation and feeling, and only ordinarily go unanalyzed because the organism has never needed to analyze them; but practical introspection reveals them as complexes of organic sensations. Two papers followed, one by Dr. D. S. Miller with the title, 'The Isolation of Minds,' the other by Professor Woodbridge on 'The Nature of Consciousness,' which had this in common, that consciousness, as distinct from what we are conscious of, was regarded as merely a relation of contents. But while in the one case this conception was elaborated to show that the co-experienced group of elements which constitute the contents of a consciousness at any moment had nothing in common with those belonging to any other consciousness, which latter, whether attributed to myself or another, were for the former only ejects, in the case of Professor Woodbridge it led to a suggestion of a realistic metaphysics hardly distinguishable from that which has commonly been called 'naïve.' Professor Ladd reported a case of nerve anastomosis in which the distal end of the facial nerve was united with the central end of the accessory nerve of the shoulder. By persistent efforts at voluntary control the subject was able at the end of about nine months to control the movements of the face without associated movements of the shoulder or contraction of other facial muscles. Analysis of the phenomena was

held to contribute additional evidence discrediting both the idealistic and the psychophysical parallelistic theories of the relation of body and mind and confirming the theory of interaction. Professor Münsterberg gave an outline of the 'System of Values' which he is intending to elaborate in a book. The aim was to classify our absolute values and to see whether one principle controls the whole system. The values themselves were classified as validity, perfection, achievement and completeness, each relating to a particular sphere of experience and subdivided according as the value is given or created and refers to the outer world, to fellow-men or to self. The one category common to all these classes of value was found to be the category of identity. This paper, of which it is impossible to give here any but the barest suggestion, was generally felt to be the most important contribution to philosophy made at the meeting. It was so large in scope, implying, as it did, a whole system of philosophy, and so novel in matter that only the finished book itself can lead to a just appreciation of its significance, while it is certain that when the book does appear, it will provoke widespread interest and discussion.

Of the other sessions it is enough to speak briefly. At the opening session four papers were read of logical import, one by Dr. Marvin, limiting the field of epistemology to completely rationalized knowledge; one by the Rev. E. S. Steele, finding in judgment the unit of thought rather than in the idea, which was treated as only one of its elements; one by Dr. G. R. Montgomery, applying the mathematical notions of calculus to represent the mobility and functional interdependence of concepts, and one by Dr. W. H. Sheldon, defining the universal as a concrete fringe of the image or response suggesting further similar images or responses. In the afternoon

session following the joint session, Professor Dearborn read a paper on 'Consciousness in the Brutes,' in which he held that the structure and metabolism of protoplasm in general, rather than that of the nervous system, was the physical basis of consciousness. Professor J. A. Leighton, in a paper in the 'Psychological Self and the Actual Personality,' contended that psychology, neither in its structural nor in its functional analysis does justice to the actual personality, which is manifested and realized in the constructions of historical culture. Dr. William T. Harris read a characteristic paper on 'Primary and Secondary Phases of Causality,' maintaining that natural science was founded on the latter and theology on the former. The other papers put down for this session were read by title, Professor Newbold's interpretation of a passage in Aristotle relating to mental synthesis being unfortunately crowded out for lack of time.

At the closing session on the morning of the thirtieth, Dr. Woodbridge Riley read an interesting chapter from a forthcoming book on deism in America, Professor F. S. Hoffman discussed the probability for immortality, Professor H. G. Lord discussed the nature and moral character of 'Gambling as Play.' This last was something of a surprise, for after seeking to determine the nature of gambling in general and of gambling as play in particular, Professor Lord, in the second part of his paper, which was a search for some solid basis for the moral judgment of gambling as play, arrived at the conclusion that there was no justification for its almost universal condemnation, a conclusion which no one present seriously disputed. Two other papers of merit on ethical subjects were read at this session, both by members from Cornell. Dr. H. W. Wright read on 'Ethical Method,' suggesting an evolutionary interpretation of morality, moral develop-

ment being treated as a process of organization unified by purposive activity, the different virtues being regarded as necessary stages in the process. Dr. T. de Laguna read an admirably clear paper on the stages in the discussion of 'Evolutionary Ethics,' of which he distinguished five, partly contemporaneous: the first being concerned with a supposed conflict between ethics and evolution; the second setting up evolutionary laws as a standard for morality; the third treating ethical problems in terms derived from the theory of organic evolution; the fourth asserting the distinctive nature of social and of specifically moral evolution; and the fifth concerned with questions of method. The last paper read was by Dr. Percy Hughes, seeking an answer to the question, Is there a distinct logic of historical construction? The answer was affirmative; it was contended that a clear perception of action as the concept of historical construction would bring about important results.

At the business meeting of the association the following officers were elected:

President—John Dewey (Columbia).

Vice-President—J. A. Leighton (Hobart).

Secretary-Treasurer—J. G. Hibben (Princeton).

Members of the Executive Committee for two years—H. N. Gardiner (Smith) and R. B. Perry (Harvard).

It was voted to hold the next meeting, at the invitation of Professor Münsterberg and the members of the Harvard Philosophical Department, at Cambridge, in connection with the inauguration of the new Emerson Hall of Philosophy, and to invite to meet with the association the Western Philosophical Association and the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. A vote of thanks was passed for the hospitality accorded to the association by the University of Pennsylvania. A vote was also passed in recognition of the services of the retiring secretary. Seven new mem-

bers were elected. The association was well represented at the dinner of the naturalists and affiliated societies on the evening of the twenty-eighth, and the next night, following the president's address, an enjoyable smoker was held in conjunction with the Psychological Association.

H. N. GARDINER.

SCIENTIFIC BOOKS.

An Introduction to the Modern Theory of Equations. FLORIAN CAJORI. New York, The Macmillan Company. 1904. Pp. ix + 239. \$1.75 net.

The present work falls into two nearly equal parts. The first 103 pages treat the following topics: Elementary properties and transformations of equations; location and approximation of the roots of numerical equations; solution of cubic, biquadratic, binomial and reciprocal equations; the linear and Tschirnhaussian transformations. The remaining 120 pages are devoted to substitution groups and Galois's theory of the solution of algebraic equations.

The work has much that may be praised; in particular, its very moderate size, its choice of topics, copious references for further study, and a large number of illustrative examples and problems.

We mention now a few points which we believe might be improved in a later edition.

The definition of algebraic and transcendental functions in § 1 is not quite satisfactory. The author really defines *explicit* algebraic functions, and the reader might easily infer that all other functions were transcendental.

Would it not be well to give a mathematical definition of continuity of a function in § 25? The reader would then have a clearer idea of the import of the theorem of this section.

In § 26 the author assumes that a continuous function which has opposite signs in an interval must vanish in this interval. This requires demonstration unless an appeal to our intuition is allowed. If so, the demonstration the author gives, that every equation has at least one root, might well be replaced by a simpler one which rests on the property

that a continuous function attains its extremes.

In § 65 the author makes use of continued fractions to prove the relation $mb - na = \pm 1$ where m, n are relative prime. It seems preferable, because more elementary, to prove this by means of the algorithm of the greatest common divisor.

In § 70 the assumption is made that numerator and denominator of a symmetric rational function are also symmetric. The definition of *incommensurable* in § 53 might be improved; we would also suggest the representation of complex numbers by points and not by vectors, as in § 22.

Let us turn now to the second half of the book which deals with Galois's theory. As the author tells us, he follows the exposition given by Weber. We must, however, in justice to Weber, note that the latter's treatment is not only more general, but is also free from a lack of precision of statement which mars the work under review and which is at times quite provoking.

The author restricts himself to equations whose coefficients are either constants or independent variables; why, we are unable to see. Certainly not because a greater simplicity is gained.

But this restriction once made, the reader should have clearly in view whether the coefficients of the equation dealt with in a given case are constant or variable. For results true when they are variable may be false when these coefficients are supposed constant. We regret to say the author is extremely careless in this important particular. Thus in chapter XI. we are informed in a footnote that the coefficients in this chapter are variables. In chapter XIII. we are left entirely in doubt; yet the theorems of Exs. 1, 2, § 119, which are used in a later chapter, may be incorrect if the coefficients are not independent variables.

This lack of explicitness is manifest in other parts of the book, *e. g.*, in the chapter on cyclic equations. The casual reader might well believe that the results established here are true for all cyclic equations. This, however, is not the intention of the author, for in